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This thesis starts with what the House of Lords Third Report (2000) has identified as a 
“crisis of trust” between science and society. It explores ways of addressing this crisis by 
examining stem cell researchers’ discourses about their work and public engagement, and 
suggests ways of improving scientists’ engagement with publics.  
My journey from natural to social sciences started with an in-depth critical analysis of 
constructive (or critical) perspectives on public understanding of science (e.g. Irwin and 
Wynne). This highlighted the importance of investigating scientific institutions and 
scientists, and their embedded assumptions about publics, engagement and science. My 
research expands upon the limited empirical research on this topic and draws upon data from 
interviews and discussions with 54 stem cell researchers (of different levels of seniority and 
field of research, in Australia and the UK). Using informants’ discourse as a “topic” and a 
“resource” (Gilbert and Mulkay), the thesis explores in detail the strategic and socially 
contingent definitions and boundaries (Gieryn) in stem cell research (SCR).  
Analysis of the empirical material develops four main themes. Firstly, the language and 
conceptual fluidity of SCR is emphasised and shown to enable scientists to conduct 
“boundary-work” in a variety of ways. Secondly, discourses and performances of 
(un)certainty are examined to highlight a diversity of socially contingent identities SCR 
professionals can draw upon. This examination draws on MacKenzie’s “certainty trough” 
but also improves it by problematising the concept of “distance from knowledge 
production”. Thirdly, scientists’ expressions of trust and ambivalence are analysed as 
interactions with particular “expert systems” such as processes of informed consent, 
commercialisation or legislation in conditions of increased globalisation. By highlighting 
hermeneutic aspects of trust, this analysis is sharpened and shows that there are elements of 
“counter-modernity” as well as “reflexive modernisation” in SCR. It is argued that, to further 
explore the reflexive potential of stem cell professionals’ critiques of their work, these need 
to be further discussed in public. The forth and final theme focuses more specifically on 
engagement. Stem cell researchers’ accounts are shown to construct and perform publics, 
scientists and engagement – and thus “scientific citizenship” – in a variety of ways. This 
variety can be made sense of by reflecting on conceptions of expertise, democracy, and 
power. This enables the development of six “ideal-types” of engagement that can be used 
heuristically to study performances of citizenship.  
The thesis concludes by discussing its main contributions to knowledge. It highlights how 
social scientists can encourage greater “interpretative reflexivity” (Lynch) on the part of 
scientists; this can, in turn, lead to improved science-public relations. 
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Chapter 1  




The traditional ‘good shepherd’ self image of the governors [of 
science] is maintained, though with the modification that we now 
need to talk to the sheep and not merely push them around. 
(Ravetz, 2005: 51) 
 
 
In December 2006, it emerged that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) had licensed a research group in Newcastle (UK) to ask women, not undergoing 
medical treatment, to donate their eggs to stem cell research (Dreaper and Buchanan, 2006). 
This decision caused a storm of criticisms, particularly as it was made before the end of the 
HFEA’s public consultation on this complex issue. In this context, the title of this 
consultation, Donating eggs for research; safeguarding donors (HFEA, 2007), seems rather 
insincere; since it is difficult to safeguard donors if one does not listen to their concerns. This 
example of supposed public engagement appears to be mere lip-service and, referring back 
to the epigraph: it is unlikely the HFEA can maintain its image of good shepherd when it 
talks to, but ignores and possibly pushes about, the public. This example goes to the heart of 
widespread concerns about trust in science, its institutions and its governance; these are the 
focus of this thesis.  
  
1.1 A “crisis of trust”? 
The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Third Report (2000) 
opens by identifying a “crisis of trust” between science and society: 
Society’s relationship with science is in a critical phase. […] On the one hand, 
there has never been a time when issues involving science were more exciting, the 
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public more interested, or the opportunities more apparent. On the other hand, 
public confidence in scientific advice to Government had been rocked by a series 
of events, culminating in the BSE fiasco; and many people are deeply uneasy 
about the huge opportunities presented by areas of science including 
biotechnology and information technology, which seem to be advancing far ahead 
of their awareness and assent. (House of Lords, 2000: 1.1) 
The report laments that science, despite being part of everyday life, does not automatically 
command confidence, particularly if it is associated with industry or government. Other 
examples, in the UK, of the lack of automatic trust in science and its institutions include the 
rejection of genetically modified foods and the unwillingness of some parents to give their 
child the MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) vaccine.  
 
The House of Lords report warns that this situation must be dealt with since it has 
implications for national prosperity (House of Lords, 2000: 1.12-14). It suggests that part of 
the solution to this “crisis” lies in establishing a dialogue between science and members of 
the public, and encouraging public views and values to be included in decision-making 
around science. However, as the opening HFEA example suggests, this is not always 
straightforward. The present doctoral research starts with this institutional concern with trust 
in science and the possibility of improving it through public engagement activities. It 
critically examines science-public1 relations through the lens of stem cell research 
(henceforth SCR). Specifically, it investigates scientists’ discourses about their work and 
public engagement, and how these fit into broader contexts of power and trust relations in 
modern society.  
 
1.2 The public understanding of science 
The current preoccupation with science-society relations is not new (see Irwin, 1995). 
Traditionally, scientific institutions have assumed that greater public education in science – 
seen as value-free – will improve public approval and enable participation in social and 
political life (Irwin, 1995: 14). This way of thinking has been called the “deficit model of 
public understanding of science” (Wynne, 1991).  
 
                                                     
1 I choose here to use a dash (-) rather than a forward-slash (/) to indicate that science and publics are 
not in opposition to each other. Rather, both are part of society, and scientists, science and publics 
play different roles (as lay people and as experts) at different times. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 3 
Institutional concepts of the deficit model crystallised in the UK in 1985, with the 
publication of the Royal Society Report on the “Public Understanding of Science” (also 
called the Bodmer report). In a now famous quote, the panel urged scientists to get more 
involved in communicating science:  
our most direct and urgent message must be to the scientists themselves: Learn to 
communicate with the public, be willing to do so and consider it your duty to do 
so (Royal Society, 1986: 60) 
This approach to improving science-public relations has not been successful, and has been 
criticised. 
 
In particular, research that comes under the umbrella of critical or constructivist public 
understanding of science (cPUS) has shown that attempts at increasing public knowledge 
have not led to increased levels of support for science. For instance, Sturgis and Allum 
(2004) highlight the rising unease surrounding new scientific discoveries, despite efforts at 
science popularisation. Further, Collins and Evans note that people who are more informed 
about science often display less support for it (2002: 274); and, Evans and Durant (1995) 
find that people who are more knowledgeable about science are less supportive of 
contentious areas of research than people who are less knowledgeable about science. In a 
study specifically examining public perceptions of cloning, the Wellcome Trust found that, 
as people learnt more about the use of cloned embryos in research, they expressed more 
reservations towards this technology (Wellcome Trust, 1998: 6.4). Collectively, these sorts 
of studies demonstrate that science-public relations are not readily improved through public 
education.  
 
One potential limitation to the deficit model to address science-public problems stems from 
the particular image of science that is projected in these education campaigns. Often, 
attempts at gaining public trust involve portraying science as unproblematic, certain and 
unified. However, people experience the uncertainties and contingencies of science in their 
daily lives and therefore, when they are confronted with this unfamiliar portrayal of science, 
this can result in a decrease in trust (e.g. Collins, 1987; Wynne, 1988; Collins and Pinch, 
1993; Yearley, 2000). Many studies show that members of the public have multi-layered 
understandings of science and that it is the continued dismissal of this knowledge, rather than 
public misunderstanding, which can be the source of mistrust. This is shown vividly in the 
book Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology 
edited by Irwin and Wynne (1996). 
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This book and other cPUS research suggest the need to “problematise” notions of “public”, 
“understanding” and “science”. That is, “understanding” should be seen as a more 
interactional process than simply being able to repeat the “correct” definition of DNA. 
Rather, people have complex and sophisticated understandings of science, which come from 
using their embodied experiences and including social factors (such as the relevance of the 
information or the context in which it is given) to make sense of science. Thus, the “public” 
is not a homogeneous group that passively awaits information; “publics” are active 
participants in their interactions with science. In addition, “scientific facts” are not revealed 
from nature through rational thought, but are embedded in social and cultural processes. In 
this regard, there are always theories and assumptions that shape “facts”. For example, the 
validity of experiments is negotiated by social groups, not given by nature (e.g. Collins and 
Pinch, 1993). Thus, there are no simple “facts” that can simply be taught to lay people in 
order to make them support science; and lay people should be included in discussions around 
science as they may have interesting, valuable and legitimate knowledge and viewpoints to 
contribute.  
 
Scientific institutions are starting to take note of this cPUS research. In particular, the House 
of Lords Third Report (2000) drew on the above book, and one of its authors was a specialist 
advisor to the Select Committee on Science and Technology. Notwithstanding the use of 
language associated with the deficit model, the report highlights that people have an 
understanding of risk and that their mistrust of science may not be rooted in ignorance. 
Rather than simply proposing education as a solution, it highlights the need for openness and 
the inclusion of multiple views in decision-making around science.  
 
Additionally, in 2002, Copus, the Committee for the Public Understanding of Science 
created in the wake of the Bodmer report, stated that: 
We have reached the conclusion that the top-down approach which Copus 
currently exemplifies is no longer appropriate to the wider agenda that the science 
communication community is now addressing. (Copus News, 2002) 
Thus, we are now beginning to observe some evidence of the influence of cPUS research on 
some UK scientific institutions and there appears to be a shift from the deficit model towards 
a more dialogic model of science-society relations. However, whether this change is visible 
in the practice of public engagement, or whether it is purely rhetorical, needs further 
examination.  
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1.3 The co-existence of “two voices” 
Closer inspection of science policy suggests that the above shift is far from revolutionary. 
Hagendijk notes that a variety of policy documents try to include concepts drawn from 
public engagement rather than public education. However, these documents often read:  
as if two voices are struggling to be heard. The dominant voice, assuring the 
reader that citizens’ concerns should be taken seriously, and ought not to be 
treated in a condescending way. In contrast with this, however, a second, more 
‘scientistic’ voice argues that the public can only contribute properly if it is 
adequately educated and instructed. (Hagendijk, 2004: 46) 
Irwin (2006) draws similar conclusions when studying a variety of “engagement” exercises 
and official reports. He notes an “uneasy blend of ‘old’ and ‘new’” forms of governance 
(2006: 299). This more recent cPUS work suggests the need to be hopeful but also sceptical 
of the potential of public engagement.  
 
Wynne (2006) notes that scientific authorities, rather than problematising their assumptions 
– such as the universality of science, the separation of science from politics, or the 
technocratic and expert-led framing of risk – continually re-invent various deficit models. He 
finds that the “deficit of understanding” is replaced by a “deficit of trust”, which can 
supposedly be managed with improved “transparency”. He argues that scientific institutional 
bodies do not turn a critical eye on themselves and that most changes towards “engagement” 
are mere illusions: 
virtually all of the mushrooming commitment to public citizen engagement in 
‘science policy’ or ‘scientific-technical issues’, or to ‘democratizing science’, is 
something of a mirage, at least thus far. It imposes severe and unspoken framing 
limits around these new processes, such that the continuing failure to 
democratically sensitize science, and its persistent non-accountability to publics 
even in the new (if still limited) ‘participatory’ ethos, is omitted from critical 
attention. (Wynne, 2005b: 68, original emphasis) 
This indicates that sociologists need to explore the assumptions made by scientists and 
policy-makers, as well as the framing of engagement exercises, and how and why these 
remain unexamined. 
 
In the field of SCR, there are similar calls for engagement and/or education. For example, 
the Australian Stem Cell Centre (ASCC) seems firmly committed to “education”: 
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Education is a fundamental component of the work we do at the Australian Stem 
Cell Centre. The ASCC is committed to providing a range of community 
programs designed to help the public understand emerging issues in 
biotechnology and, in particular, stem cell technology. (Australian Stem Cell 
Centre Website) 
In contrast, the UK’s Institute for Stem Cell Research adopts the language of “outreach”. 
This could reflect different levels of uptake of cPUS suggestions by different institutions.  
 
Therefore, it seems that any shifts in institutional body language around engagement have 
not been very radical, even if some insights from cPUS have been taken on board. There is 
still much need for a contemporary examination of scientists and their practices and 
assumptions, particularly in a controversial area like SCR. This is what this thesis seeks to 
do. 
 
1.4 Stem cell research 
There is a broad agreement within the scientific community that stem cells are fascinating 
research tools with which to study fundamental biology, and that this could lead to findings 
from which therapeutic applications may derive. Stem cells are cells from which originate all 
other cells, and therefore tissues and organisms. They enable lizards’ tails to grow anew after 
being chopped off; they enable bone marrow transplants to repopulate someone’s blood and 
rebuild their immune system; they enable gut and skin epithelium to renew itself throughout 
adult life; they enable tissue repair in multiple organs. Some stem cells exist in an organism 
and generate new cells until the organism’s death (for example, bone marrow stem cells). 
Some stem cells only exist early during development, but have the potential to give rise to 
many different cell types (for example, embryonic stem cells). And some stem cells can be 
obtained by putting DNA from a terminally differentiated cell (that is, not a stem cell) into 
an egg, then causing this newly created cell to start dividing and, thus, give rise to a cloned 
embryo. Stem cells can occur in living organisms, or can be grown in culture. These cells 
also map onto a number of issues of public concern. 
 
In order to study the fluid science-public interface, it makes sense to choose an area of 
research where scientists and members of the public are likely to interact. This often occurs 
if research is “controversial”, which for Adele Clarke can come about: 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 7 
if the research has direct implications, if it challenges or threatens the ‘natural 
order’, if it is relevant to some politicized issue, if sentiment has mobilised a 
related social movement, or if the research is in competition for scarce resources 
(cited in Epstein, 1996: 5) 
SCR fulfils many of these criteria and is therefore a promising location for a thesis focussing 
on science-public relations. For instance, SCR is hailed by some as the new miracle cure for 
diabetes, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and various other devastating diseases. However, it raises 
fundamental questions about human identity with its association with human reproductive 
cloning. The need for women to donate their eggs raises issues of power, coercion and 
ownership of the body. The use of human embryos builds on earlier controversies about 
abortion and the sanctity of life (Parry, 2003a). Additionally, the funding of SCR, 
particularly in the United States but also within Europe, is fuelling many political 
disagreements. SCR fits into wider contexts of scarce funding for research and worries 
around commercial applications and patenting. SCR has also been very present in the public 
eye, in part due to its high profile proponents (such as the late Christopher Reeves, Nancy 
Reagan and Michael J. Fox) and opponents (Georges W. Bush or Mel Gibson). Yet, in spite 
of all these ethical, social and political problems, SCR attracts many researchers (Lewis, 
2007). 
 
For SCR to prosper beyond what it has already achieved (such as in basic developmental 
studies using mouse embryonic stem cells) and perhaps lead to further therapeutic 
applications in humans, it requires public support: from politicians, to release government 
funding for research or change laws in order to make embryo research legal (which is based 
on assumptions of broader public support); from patients, to participate in clinical trials or 
donate material (be it embryos, eggs, skin, bone marrow etc.); or from investors, to fund 
aspects of research and development. Thus, it is interesting to explore scientists’ engagement 
with publics in the context of SCR as this research is controversial as well as exciting.  
 
1.5 Studying scientists in the UK and Australia2 
This thesis studies scientists, stem cell researchers in particular, with a view to contributing 
to improving scientists’ engagement with public groups. There have been many cPUS 
studies of publics and their sophisticated understandings of science. Here, I want to address a 
                                                     
2 The research design is developed in more detail in chapter 3. 
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gap in the literature and focus specifically on scientists and their discourses. I examine how 
they talk about their work, but also about publics and engagement. This is important as 
scientists are influential participants in public engagement and the framing of engagement 
exercises. 
 
Public discussions around SCR have often taken the form of binary oppositions, both in the 
media and in parliament: adult versus embryonic stem cell research, science versus religion, 
curing patients versus respecting unborn lives, emotions versus rationality, or reproductive 
versus therapeutic cloning (e.g. Parry, 2003a; Williams et al., 2003; Harvey, 2005). This 
thesis is interested in the complexities and diversities in these seemingly straightforward 
positions. In particular, it does not aim to homogenize scientists, but rather to explore and 
highlight the diversity in their voices.  
 
A variety of stem cell scientists, in a variety of settings, are investigated: early and late-
career, female and male researchers, with academic and commercial backgrounds, during 
one-to-one interviews, group interviews and larger group discussions. This research also 
draws on some publicly available discourses (from legislative debates for example). Thus, it 
accesses dominant and marginal discourses, in public and private settings. By studying what 
informants say and how they say it, discourse is used as a “topic” and a “resource” (Gilbert 
and Mulkay, 1984). 
 
Another interesting aspect of this study is its international nature: it examines stem cell 
researchers in two different countries. Various people have highlighted the importance of 
doing international comparisons (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005a) and there can be national differences 
in levels of public engagement3. The UK and Australia were elected as study locations 
because both these countries are English speaking, have similar styles of governance and are 
committed to scientific research (and particularly to SCR). However, at the time of my 
research, they had different legislations governing SCR: the creation of embryos for research 
was illegal in Australia, but legal in the UK.  
 
Overall, the conceptual framework of this thesis is sympathetic to cPUS. It examines 
scientists and how they negotiate their authority in different settings (in particular what sorts 
of boundaries they draw, cf. Gieryn, 1983; 1995); how they portray their work, and its 
                                                     
3 For example, Denmark displays more openness and allows for more public criticism and therefore 
perhaps engenders more trust than in other countries (Rose, 2000; Irwin, 2006). 
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uncertainties and promises; how they construct their status as “expert” or “lay” actors in the 
context of increased globalisation (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992); and how they construct 
“scientific citizenship” (Irwin, 1995; 2001). 
 
1.6 Broader relevance and outline of thesis 
The audience for this research is multi-disciplinary because its findings are relevant to social 
and natural scientists, including, but not restricted to, those with a specific interest in SCR. 
Nevertheless, the present thesis is more particularly targeted at sociologists. Thus, although 
the introduction is meant to be accessible to the interested “lay” audience, the following 
chapters have a stronger sociological focus.  
 
Chapter 2 critically discusses the literatures which form the backdrop to my research. It 
introduces the key theoretical concepts that underpin my thesis. Some particular concepts are 
subsequently discussed in more detail in relevant chapters, whilst some specific literatures 
are only introduced in appropriate chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 starts by exploring engagement and its limitations by drawing on the sociology of 
scientific knowledge and cPUS, alongside development studies. It highlights that all forms of 
science-public interactions perform and impose particular identities on participants, which 
may lead to public alienation from science. The chapter then explores ways of 
conceptualising and making sense of trust, bringing together Beck and Giddens’ models, 
with the more hermeneutic approaches of Wynne and Szerszynski. Having argued that trust 
cannot be engineered, the chapter goes on to discuss how “reflexivity” may be a way of 
improving science-public relations by challenging the traditional, expert-led framings of 
public engagement. Routes towards emancipation are then theorised by drawing on Bourdieu 
and Foucault’s work on relational power and on social identity theory. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses the two main sociological tools which enable the investigation of 
scientists’ discourses: Gieryn’s “boundary work”; and Gilbert and Mulkay’s approach to 
discourse analysis. Overall, by problematising the contrast between “lay” and “expert” 
knowledge, this chapter enables the present study of stem cell researchers to employ a 
variety of conceptual frameworks to view these scientists as both as “experts” and “publics”, 
and to explore routes towards reflexivity. 
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Chapter 3 discusses my research design and how the above conceptual tools were used in 
practice. It sets out my research questions in detail and explains how they came about. It 
discusses some aspects of my theoretical and epistemological frameworks. It then details my 
data collection and analysis and concludes by reflecting upon the limitations of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 marks the beginning of my empirical chapters. It has two main aims: one is to 
introduce some of the language of SCR and how stem cells are classified; the other is to 
show the constructed and contested nature of some of these categories. This chapter starts 
rather descriptively; this is needed to preface the rest of the thesis, as some of my analytical 
discussions revolve around the constructions and use of labels in SCR. It discusses different 
types of stem cells such as those found in adult tissues and those found in embryos derived 
from IVF or cloning. It highlights that there is no obvious or naturally given way of 
classifying or defining these cells. The chapter then turns to data obtained from interviews 
and discussions. After highlighting that what counts as central to SCR varies between my 
informants, it examines different criteria used for patrolling the boundaries around SCR. 
How these are mobilised is dependent on informants’ social locations. This chapter shows 
that “stem cell” can be used as a boundary-object (Star and Griesemer, 1989) and its 
conceptual fluidity enables the alignment of multiple agendas in a field fraught with 
uncertainty. 
 
Chapter 5 examines this uncertainty in more detail. Using MacKenzie’s (1990) “certainty 
trough” to make sense of informants’ discourses of (un)certainty and, then, building on this 
model using Lahsen’s (2005a) problematisation of the “distance” from knowledge 
production, it highlights how social locations and the use of salient social identities can 
influence these discourses. This shifts the focus towards the performativity of language. 
Drawing on the sociology of expectations (e.g. Brown and Michael, 2003), it also analyses 
the hype and hope surrounding SCR, particularly in the context of competition for research 
funding or cognitive authority. This chapter offers the opportunity to start thinking 
normatively about (un)certainty discourses in the context of public engagement. 
 
Chapter 6 centres on stem cell researchers’ trust and ambivalence by exploring people they 
describe using labels such as “cowboy” or “maverick”. By analysing informants as “lay”, to 
the extent that they have to enter “expert systems” (Giddens, 1990), it reveals a number of 
ambivalences expressed by professionals with regards to particular areas of their work. This 
trust (or lack of) is not only analysed as the expression of an “actual” feeling based on 
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rational calculations, but also as a rhetorical but “virtual” trust (Wynne, 1996b) or a 
performance of trust (Szerszynski, 1999). Professionals’ concerns voiced about clinical 
trials, informed consent, commercialisation, and the internationalisation and globalisation of 
research, are shown to open up areas for “reflexive scientization” (Beck, 1992) and 
“interpretative reflexivity” (Lynch, 2000). This suggests that professional discourses may 
have a more revolutionary potential than previously thought (cf. Kerr and Cunningham-
Burley, 2000).  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 focus more specifically on engagement. They are concerned with how my 
informants’ discourses around publics, SCR and engagement construct and perform 
“scientific citizenship” in particular ways. Chapter 7 focuses on the variety of constructions 
of citizenship present in stem cell researchers’ accounts, as suggested by Irwin (2001). It 
reveals some of the assumptions embedded in these accounts by examining three aspects of 
SCR. Firstly, it examines an episode of boundary-work aimed at differentiating and merging 
stem cells derived from “embryos” and from “foetuses”. Secondly, it looks at the label 
“therapeutic cloning” and how it can be used to open up or close down discussions around 
SCR. Thirdly, it investigates how informants talk about reproductive cloning and use science 
fiction imagery. The analysis of these three issues around SCR reveals that these scientists 
draw on a number of hierarchical dualisms (cf. Faulkner, 2000): technical versus cultural, 
social or political; rational versus irrational, emotional or values-based; and reductionist 
versus holistic worldviews. They construct the roles of publics, scientists and engagement in 
multiple and socially contingent ways.  
 
Chapter 8 makes sense of these multiple concepts of scientific citizenship and develops six 
“ideal types” (Weber, 1949) of public engagement in science. These range from engagement 
as a public relations exercise, to engagement as educating potential consumers or citizens, 
and to engagement as an opportunity to draw on a variety of situated knowledges and reflect 
upon science, its assumptions and its consequences. Each ideal type assigns different roles 
and levels of importance to publics, scientists, “rational facts”, education, dialogue, and so 
on. Each one also reflects a different conception of “democracy”. This chapter argues that, 
contrary to Ezrahi’s (1990) assumptions, scientistic worldviews and “utopian rationalism” 
still dominate public engagement. It suggests the need to acknowledge and challenge power 
imbalances (Mouffe, 1996) and look for types of engagement that do not simply reinforce 
scientists’ cognitive authority.  
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Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by highlighting its main conclusions. Using “reflexivity” as a 
narrative thread, it explores my contributions to social sciences and to public engagement. In 
particular, it highlights the interpretative flexibility and performativity of stem cell 
researchers’ discourses. It also discusses the extent to which scientists are publics. It then 
explores opportunities for increased reflexivity on the part of scientists and their institutions. 
This can be facilitated by social scientists: they have a role in bringing to light and critically 
analysing the embedded assumptions which frame scientists’ knowledge claims, as well as 
science-public interactions. Eschewing a normative position that would see social scientists 
replace scientists as the main “experts”, the thesis concludes by making more specific 
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Chapter 2  






The starting point of this thesis is the concern voiced by various groups about a “crisis of 
trust” between science and publics. As raised in the introductory chapter, researchers 
interested in critical or constructivist approaches to “public understanding of science” 
(cPUS) have criticised the sole use of education as a means of restoring trust in science. 
Instead, they advocate the recognition and incorporation of other forms of knowledge, 
through public engagement in science.  However, despite cPUS views gaining public support 
and informing some policy-making, old voices of education and knowledge deficit remain 
alongside these new voices of engagement. The extent and meaningfulness of these slight 
shifts towards engagement need to be further examined if we want to better understand and 
improve science-public relations. 
 
As this chapter further discusses, work in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) 
tradition has demonstrated that scientific knowledge and “expertise” are socially constructed. 
In addition, cPUS research has provided a wealth of empirical and conceptual material on the 
interactions between science and publics from the so-called “lay” perspective – in particular, 
highlighting the abundance of sophisticated and relevant “lay knowledge” and “lay 
expertise”. However, the voices of “experts” are often dominant in science-public 
interactions and science and its institutions play important roles in public engagement 
activities, often framing them. Thus, it is also important to consider in more detail how 
scientists react to calls to engage with these knowledges, how they shape science-public 
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This thesis aims to build on the limited amount of work on science-public interactions, seen 
from the so-called “expert” perspective. It uses a constructivist epistemology informed by 
studies of power and language to examine how scientists (stem cell researchers in particular) 
talk about and do public engagement in science. Following in particular Irwin and Wynne’s 
recent work, it offers a contemporary investigation of how stem cell researchers’ discourses 
and worldviews shape science-public interactions. It also specifically searches for potential 
points of resistance to the traditional “lay” versus “expert” framing of science-public 
interactions. 
 
This chapter discusses the literature forming the backdrop to my PhD4. In particular, it 
problematises the categories “lay” and “expert” and combines conceptual tools and 
frameworks traditionally used to study “lay” publics with ones used to study “experts” 5. This 
enables analyses of stem cell researchers as both constructing and drawing on multiple and 
contingent identities and discourses. It firstly examines cPUS in more detail, as well as some 
limitations of engagement.  After highlighting that “knowledge” and “expertise” are socially 
constructed, this section details two empirical studies of “lay-expert” interactions and the 
sometimes uneasy combination of different forms of knowledge. Drawing on the 
Development Studies’ critique of participation, it then explores how the framing of 
engagement can impose identities and worldviews on participants. Secondly, the chapter 
turns to trust, a central concern of many interested in public engagement. It highlights the 
limitations of instrumentalising it and suggests the need for greater “reflexivity”. Thirdly, the 
chapter explores opportunities for reflexivity and emancipation from the traditional framings 
of engagement. Since I believe that scientific institutional reflexivity is not automatic (unlike 
some authors discussed here), I focus on ways of conceptualising power relations which 
enable an analysis of how reflexivity can challenge the status quo. This section looks at the 
role of social sciences in revealing the contingent nature of framings (of engagement for 
example) that we take for granted and suggests emancipation away from these. It also 
explores how social identity theory can help make sense of oppression and emancipation. 
Finally, the chapter focuses on scientists’ discourses, which are often central in shaping 
                                                     
4 My epistemological and ontological frameworks, as well as my research questions, are further 
discussed in chapter 3. 
5 Although I wish to problematise concepts such as “public”, “understanding” and “expertise”, there is 
a tension between using the language of social construction, and over-problematising to the point 
where language loses all meaning. Wynne (1992) notes that Sheila Jasanoff is successful in 
maintaining a good balance between the two in her book The Fifth Branch. I hope to achieve the same 
here. 
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engagement, and examines the two major frameworks used throughout the thesis to analyse 
these. One is “boundary-work” and the other “discourse analysis”. 
 
The chapter aims to show that the study of scientists, and their discourses and rhetorical 
strategies, can provide insights to help “improve” science-public relations. My normative 
position as to what constitutes “improvement” will become apparent as the chapter, and the 
thesis as a whole, proceeds.  
 
2.2 CPUS and the social construction of expertise and knowledge; The 
need for better public engagement 
A number of studies, such as those by SSK scholars, have demonstrated that scientific 
knowledge is socially constructed and that the validity of scientific claims is socially 
negotiated. This, in combination with cPUS findings that “lay” people hold alternative forms 
of sophisticated knowledge, challenges traditional conceptions of “expertise” and raises 
questions as to why publics are expected, under the deficit model of PUS, to simply accept 
scientific “facts” as given, rather than having a more active role in shaping science. 
  
2.2.1 The social construction of scientific knowledge  
As outlined in the introductory chapter, science is embedded in social and cultural processes. 
A variety of studies from the various Science and Technology Studies (STS) schools, 
especially from the SSK tradition, have shown the socially constructed nature of science and 
technology6 (see for instance Bloor, 1976; Collins and Pinch, 1979; Latour and Woolgar, 
1979; Barnes, 1983; Collins, 1983; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; MacKenzie, 1990). They 
argue that knowledge claims and definitions are socially negotiated rather than mirror 
images of nature. These are socially interpreted and open to discussion, controversy and 
dismissal. Historically embedded rhetorical strategies, tactical alliances, interests and social 
locations all play a role in the negotiation of scientific claims. Scientific theories are 
“underdetermined” by reality and observations are “theory-laden” (Bloor, 1976). Thus, 
                                                     
6 I use the term science throughout this thesis to imply science and technology, unless I am 
specifically distinguishing between the two as I believe that many findings about the social 
construction of science apply to technology and vice versa (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). 
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scientific knowledge can be considered “situated” (Haraway, 1988) or “contextual” (Irwin, 
1995). 
 
Collins and Pinch’s (1993) discussion of the “experimenter’s regress” is particularly salient 
here, and highlights the role of social factors in the constitution of knowledge claims. They 
show that controversies around science are not resolved by further experimentation: if a 
scientist obtains a result from a particular experiment, the knowledge claims that s/he makes 
can be contradicted ad infinitum by another scientist who believes the experiment is not 
being done “correctly”. If this second scientist replicates the experiment but gets a different 
result, there is no way of settling, simply by undertaking more experiments, whether the 
hypothesis being tested is wrong, or whether the experiments are being done slightly 
differently. Collins and Pinch show that it is through social negotiations that the validity of 
the knowledge claim is set. These negotiations also determine which persons constitute 
appropriate witnesses to these experiments (see Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).  
 
This social constructivist framework is equally relevant (and applicable) to technological 
knowledge. Mackenzie’s (1990; 1998) thorough investigation of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles demonstrates that there is no given or pre-determined trajectory that technological 
developments follow. It also shows how the accuracy of these missiles, which could not be 
easily empirically tested, was negotiated by a number of key figures in the area, and how this 
“accuracy” was related to a variety of political factors and interests such as personal, 
institutional or national commitments to particular technologies or objectives. By developing 
the concept of “heterogeneous engineering”, Mackenzie highlights that social actors 
“engineer” technical artefacts, as well as other social actors, in order to fit their interests 
(rather than artefacts existing independently of people). An important finding, made by 
Mackenzie (to which I shall return in chapter 5) is that the certainty displayed towards 
particular aspects of the technology is dependent on individuals’ proximity to knowledge 
production. 
 
Thus, a particular scientific claim about the natural world is temporary and contingent; its 
acceptance the result of social negotiation. This poses the question of how publics, or “lay” 
people, make sense of science and whether they have any knowledge to bring to these 
negotiations and broader discussions around science – I turn to this in the next section. The 
social construction of scientific knowledge also problematises the role of scientists in public 
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debates about science. Indeed, if scientists do not have a more direct access to truth, why 
should their view take precedence in public debates about science? 
 
2.2.2 The importance of “lay” knowledge 
A variety of studies have highlighted that lay people can have sophisticated understandings 
of science (for instance Wynne, 1991; Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1996).  
 
In particular, Kerr et al. (1998a; 1998b) have also shown that publics can display very 
intricate, socially located, understandings of science. In the context of the new human 
genetics, they show that lay people hold four different types of knowledge: “technical” 
knowledge, around genetic inheritance for example; “methodological” knowledge, such as 
knowledge of the limitations of genetic testing; “institutional” knowledge, such as the links 
between research and funding or commercialisation; and “cultural” knowledge, about the 
social and cultural contexts in which knowledge is produced. Although these knowledges, 
particularly the first two, may not always be “accurate”, they do not prevent participants 
from having sophisticated conversations about science and its limits (Kerr et al., 1998b).  
 
Parry (2003b) also shows that publics have complex and sophisticated understandings. Her 
informants make sense of SCR and cloning within broader contexts, such as their trust in 
scientific institutions, their knowledge of the way science is “done”, their lived experiences 
of disease, their awareness of commercialisation, the international nature of scientific 
research and the attending difficulties in legislating research (see also Parry, 2006).  
 
However, science may seem to “disappear” in everyday language (Irwin et al., 1996). For 
example, discourses about science are often made at two distinct levels: “science-in-general” 
and “science-in-particular” (Michael, 1992). Here, “science-in-general” corresponds to an 
intangible entity that is evoked in terms of the motives of research, the institutional context 
and the figure of the scientist, and “science in particular” is located in day-to-day life and has 
more practical applications. The disappearance of “science” can also be due to the way that 
lay people re-appropriate it for themselves, and translate it into language and concepts they 
are more familiar with, and upon which they can base decisions. For example, patients make 
sense of genetic risk, not in terms of statistics, but in absolute terms – should I/should I not 
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have a child, go for screening, etc. (see Parsons and Atkinson, 1992; Lambert and Rose, 
1996). They make sense of science in a particular context (see also Barns et al., 2000).  
 
The above studies demonstrate that people can intelligently and critically discuss research 
and its implications, without needing professional scientific training. Input from publics can, 
in fact, open up debates around scientific developments. The above discussions were in part 
facilitated by the context in which they took place – focus groups in  many cases, which 
enables people to develop their own views and understandings in a respectful and non-
adversary environment (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999). They are good examples of ways in 
which public “engagement” in science can be conducted, and highlight the richness that lay 
people can bring to these conversations when they are not marginalised or excluded. Here, 
an important feature of engagement is the upstream involvement of lay people in discussions 
about future directions of research. The objectives are not to teach lay people about abstract 
objective science, but to explore and learn from their understandings of science in context.  
 
A variety of methods for doing engagement have been suggested in addition to focus groups, 
such as public hearings, consensus conferences (Davison et al., 1997; Mayer and Geurts, 
1998) or citizens juries (Dunkerley and Glasner, 1998); and a variety of calls have been 
made for more lay involvement in healthcare, both in the UK (e.g. Kerr et al., 1998b) and 
Australia (Wiseman et al., 2003). These methods often are successful at eliciting a variety of 
views but, even in contexts where lay knowledge is particularly encouraged, it tends to be 
treated by scientists and lay people alike as inferior and less relevant than “expert” 
knowledge (Kerr et al., 2007). Additionally, local level successes encounter difficulties when 
they need to be translated to national contexts, where policy decisions are made (see 
Dunkerley and Glasner, 1998). In particular the complexities and uncertainties revealed 
during these small-scale discussions have difficulties finding their place in the dominant 
discourses around science, which retain their focus on universality, prediction and control, as 
I discuss further in the next section.  
 
2.2.3 Farmers, activists and expertise: combining different sorts of 
knowledges and worldviews? 
Despite the presence of sophisticated lay knowledges, the views of so-called “experts” tend 
to take precedence over these, often leading to troubled science-public relations.  
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As Nelkin argues, experts are “both indispensable and suspect” (1975: 36) in public 
discussions. Their authority, resting on beliefs about their objectivity, neutrality and 
rationality, is used to shore up different positions.; it becomes a “crucial political resource” 
(Nelkin, 1984 [1979]: 16). However, the attribution of this label is strategic and context-
dependent  (see also Kerr et al., 2007) and being able to call oneself an “expert” has 
important implications in terms of the authority this bestows to one’s views. Thus, 
“expertise” should be viewed as a social construction, rather than a something that exists out 
there (Turner, 2001, see also chapter 8). Expertise is thus context-dependent and establishing 
the ways in which it is an outcome of negotiations between different actors is central to 
studying public engagement.  
 
Here, I discuss two encounters between people considered “lay” and “expert”. In the first 
one, “lay” views were ignored, creating discord between farmers and government scientists. 
In the second one, patient activists, after a process of” expertification”, succeeded in having 
their knowledge and views respected by medical professionals, creating a more harmonious 
working relationship around the design of clinical trials. These two empirical studies 
question the sole reliance on “expert” knowledge and show the value of including alternative 
forms of knowledge in decision-making around science. They support calls for more public 
engagement in science and I return to them later in the chapter to show how the different 
conceptual tools I use can help make sense of them. 
 
The first study is that of Wynne’s now famous study of the Cumbrian sheep farmers near 
Sellafield (e.g. 1996b; 1996c). Following the Chernobyl disaster, high levels of radiation 
were measured in this region, leading to a ban on lamb sales. Despite initial reassurances by 
government scientists sent to investigate the problem that the ban would be short, radiation 
levels remained high. This led to an indefinite ban and to potential ruin for the farmers.  
 
Wynne shows that the government scientists applied their particular laboratory-based 
knowledge to the conditions in the Cumbrian hills. They assumed their knowledge to be 
universal and therefore directly translatable from the laboratory to the hills. Wynne argues 
that the scientists were committed to a version of nature as predictable and controllable. In 
contrast, the local farmers thought the variety in the local conditions – such as the ecological 
environment and the sheep’s feeding and penning habits – should be taken into account by 
the scientists. The farmers knew and understood this environment, but saw it as 
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unpredictable and uncontrollable. These two worldviews co-existed in the Cumbrian hills, 
but did not come together. The scientists remained faithful to their supposedly universal 
laboratory knowledge and dismissed the farmers’ knowledge as irrelevant. This led to a 
series of contradictory and un-implementable measures being set.  
 
Government scientists ignored important knowledge claims made by the farmers; this was in 
part responsible for the contamination of the sheep remaining high and for a lack of timely 
and appropriate solutions for the local economy being found. For example, the scientists 
undertook some experiments to measure the efficiency of a particular mineral – bentonite – 
in absorbing radiation and preventing sheep from becoming contaminated. They did this by 
spreading different concentrations of bentonite over particular areas, then penning sheep in 
these areas with the aim of measuring the contaminations levels in these sheep. The farmers 
immediately pointed out that the sheep, regardless of their contamination levels, would loose 
condition if they were prevented from roaming free. They argued that this would confound 
the experiment, but the scientists ignored their comments. The latter eventually abandoned 
the experiments, but never acknowledged why (see Wynne, 1996b: 67; 1996c: 26). The 
government scientists also proposed solutions that were inappropriate and they did not draw 
on the farmers’ expertise to adjust their recommendations.  They told the farmers that, in 
order to reduce the sheep’s contamination levels, they should take the animals from high 
level contamination areas – the fell tops – to low level contamination areas – the valley. The 
scientists ignored the local knowledge that there is not enough grass in the valley to feed the 
sheep for long periods of time (see Wynne, 1996b: 66; 1996c: 36). 
 
In this case study, government scientists, with the authority to recommend ending the ban on 
lamb sales, did not recognise farmers as having any relevant knowledge or “expertise” to 
bring to the way radiation measures and research in Cumbria were undertaken. In addition, 
they did not recognise the uncertainty or the contingency of their own knowledge. This was 
in part responsible for ruining the scientists’ credibility in the eyes of the farmers, who had 
seen their own knowledge dismissed, but had also witnessed the “messiness” of the 
scientists’ measurements and knowledge construction. Here, scientists’ and farmers’ 
knowledges were not fruitfully combined, but I think this study suggests that better 
incorporation of public knowledge could have lead to better decision-making and would 
have facilitated cooperation rather than mistrust between these two groups.  
 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature review 21 
In the second case study, holders of avowedly non-universal knowledge were able to affect 
the conduct of scientific research. Epstein (1995; 1996) investigates the role of AIDS 
activists in shaping clinical trials in California. To have an impact, this heterogeneous group 
of activists had to learn the customs of the scientific community, and find ways of entering 
it. They had to appear legitimate to the formal “experts”, which they did by a “process of 
‘expertification’” (1996: 13): attending conferences, reading peer-reviewed papers and 
getting familiar with the research and its lingo.  
 
Interestingly, the activists were also able to create new ways of establishing their credibility 
in the eyes of scientists. They introduced credibility currencies beyond those normally 
associated with science. For instance, they argued that it was morally important that patients 
should be able to participate in clinical trials, which were re-constructed as a social good, 
with inherent risks that individuals could choose to bear. Activists also challenged the idea 
that clinical trials could yield “clean” data by only including “pure” subjects in trials (that is 
those who had never been in trials and were not currently under any medication). Instead, 
they argued that trials should be used directly as a way of treating patients, and should, as 
one of the activists argued: “incorporate the heterogeneity, occasional or frequent ambiguity, 
and other ‘messy’ aspects of ordinary clinical practice” (Epstein, 1995: 422). Here, activists 
went through a process of expertification, but also were able to change the conduct of 
science. People with different kinds of knowledge were able to find common ground and 
cooperate. This example shows that public engagement can lead to decisions around science 
that are satisfactory to patients as well as professionals. 
 
These two examples, in conjunction with the cPUS and SSK work discussed earlier, 
challenge the idea that people traditionally labelled “experts” are the only relevant people to 
make decisions around science and begs the question of what “expertise” means and how 
public engagement activities are framed. 
 
The above two empirical studies were re-analysed by Collins and Evans (2002). Of 
relevance here, is that their analysis does not deal appropriately with the negotiations that 
take place in order to be conferred with the status of “expert” (see Jasanoff, 2003b). Collins 
and Evans argue that the failure in cooperation in Wynne’s example was due to the farmers 
lacking “interactional” expertise; that is, lacking the ability to show the scientists they had 
relevant knowledge. However, as Wynne (2003) argues in his response to Collins and Evans, 
the lack of cooperation was related to the government scientists imposing frameworks of 
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meanings onto the farmers, such as reducing the concept of “risk” to that of predictable and 
calculable risk.  
 
In terms of public engagement, Collins and Evans pose the question in terms of the “problem 
of extension”:  
Should the political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain be 
maximized by referring them to the widest democratic process, or should such 
decisions be based on the best expert advice? (2002: 235) 
Collins and Evans thus take a realist view of expertise. In doing this, they fail to analyse the 
political manoeuvrings that come into play when labelling people as experts or not, and as 
having a role in engagement or not. By contrast, in following Nelkin, Wynne, Jasanoff and 
others, I see this as central. Wynne argues that, by not attending to the imposition of 
frameworks onto public discussions by powerful “expert” institutions, Collins and Evans: 
risk reinforcing in practice just this authoritarian social idiom, in which public 
meanings (and identities) are not problematised, but presumed and imposed. 
(Wynne, 2003: 404) 
Following Wynne, I believe it is crucial to problematises “science”, and question how and 
why it becomes constructed as the “natural” framework in which to discuss questions about 
risk, rather than accepting science as the self-evident frame.   
 
Further, Jasanoff contends that Collins and Evans hold a very reductive way of conceiving of 
engagement. Particularly, in the context of modern democracies, she argues that publics 
should have a role in critically assessing the frameworks used by scientific and policy 
institutions, and checking whether they meet acceptable standards according to a particular 
culture’s “distinctive civic epistemology” (2003b: 398). This thesis seeks to pay particular 
attention to how engagement is framed by scientists and what sorts of citizenship this 
enables. In the next section, I explore how work in Development Studies has started 
examining how worldviews and identities are imposed during science-public interactions 
 
2.2.4 Engagement and participation; “performing” identities 
CPUS and Development Studies shed light on how the framing of engagement activities, or 
“participatory development” as it is called in the latter field, imposes particular identities on 
participants. The present thesis draws on this literature to show how particular ways of 
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framing engagement, even with the best intentions of openness and respect for lay 
knowledge, can render dominant or marginal particular kinds of voices and impose particular 
identities and worldviews on participants. I now examine particular science-public 
encounters and think about how identities can be imposed and challenged when science and 
publics meet.  
 
Both Wynne and Epstein argue that encounters between science and publics can challenge 
people’s identities. For example, when the Cumbrian farmers saw their knowledge (which 
they took as highly relevant to the radiation experiments) being dismissed by government 
scientists, they “experienced their identities to be threatened” (Wynne, 1996c: 20). The 
hierarchy of knowledge implicit in this dismissal (with farmers’ knowledge constructed as 
less relevant and “expert” than scientists’) reinforces a type of social relation between 
scientists and farmers. Scientists were imposing their unacknowledged cultural assumptions 
onto the farmers, who felt their status as experts in hill farming went unrecognised. By 
contrast, the AIDS activists in Epstein’s example were aware of research communities and 
other authorities attempting to impose identities upon them. They looked for ways to 
challenge this and create their own identities and “social meanings” (Epstein, 1995: 413).  
 
Development Studies also examine how identities can be imposed. In particular, 
participatory development is concerned with involving local people, from developing 
countries, in decisions about their livelihoods. It seems to answer many calls for improved 
public engagement with science, and for the recognition of the importance of local 
perspectives and understandings. However, this literature also highlights the limitations of 
participation – see, for example, the articles collected in Participation: The New Tyranny? 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001a). Henkel and Stirrat’s view is particularly salient here. They 
argue that participation only empowers people to fit the expectations of developed world 
donors: 
They are being empowered to be elements in the great projects of ‘the modern’: 
as citizens of the institutions of the modern state; as consumers in the global 
market; as responsible patients in the health system; as rational farmers increasing 
GNP; as participants in the labour market, and so on. (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001: 
182)  
Thus, participation projects try to remodel participants to fit a particular desirable image and, 
therefore, they impose particular identities. In this sense, Henkel and Stirrat argue that 
empowerment, through participatory development, is equivalent to what Foucault calls 
“subjection” (see below).  
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These impositions relate to the “performativity” of language. Speech act theory makes sense 
of how language can change the social world, how it can perform certain things. Drawing on 
Austin (1975) and Searle (1969), who are the principle founders of this theory, Szerszynski 
argues that: 
Through language and gesture we are performing certain acts which can, in the 
right circumstances, bring about social effects hermeneutically, through changing 
the definition of a situation, and of its constituent social relations. (1999: 245) 
In speech act theory, discourse can serve to reify certain social relations and identities. That 
this reification does not always occur does not, in my view, remove the performative aspect 
of language: the acts are performed, whether or not the social world changes. In the context 
of engagement, discourses and practices of engagement can therefore create situations where 
only certain types of engagement are possible. We must therefore pay attention to the sorts 
of identities performed by particular engagement practices.  
 
For example, Irwin (2001) examines how a public consultation in the UK constructed 
particular versions of the “scientific citizen” (such as ignorant and in need of education). He 
also highlights how the GM Nation discussions, by looking for the “open-minded” and 
“innocent” citizen, could exclude people with more radical and polarised views (Irwin, 2006: 
315). This imposes particular identities on participants. Although Irwin does not use the 
word “perform”, I would argue that these constructions of citizenship (attempt to) reify 
certain identities and, rather than describing a version of reality, they help it into being. 
These constructions are thus, in my view, “performances of citizenship”. Irwin suggests 
social scientists examine citizenship and engagement exercises in more detail, which the 
present research does. 
 
One interesting example is Genus and Rogers-Hayden’s (2005) study of the New Zealand 
Royal Commission on Genetic Modification which reveals hidden institutional cultural 
commitments. For instance, despite a commitment to broad public participation (including 
religious, Maori, industrial and ecological groups) and to examining a diversity of issues, 
many voices were not heard in this engagement exercise. Genus and Rogers-Hayden link this 
to the framing of the exercise. In particular, the template for submissions to the public 
consultation required participants to treat ecological, cultural, ethical, economic and other 
issues separately. This “reductionist approach” advantaged informants who viewed science 
as distinct from the context in which it is done, but disadvantaged informants who had a 
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more “holistic” view of the world and saw science, the environment and humans as 
interconnected. It made submissions from the latter seem clumsy and disjointed, as they 
would have needed to explain their ontological framework at the beginning of each question 
(Rogers-Hayden, 2003: 530). Thus, their views were “trivialised” (Hindmarsh and Rogers-
Hayden, 2004: 11).  
 
Goven (2006) argues that by framing the public inquiry in this manner, the Royal 
Commission imposed a modernist view of science (seen as having predictable consequences 
on the environment, which are separate from economic impacts and cultural factors). 
However, this worldview was not acknowledged as such, and was presented as the way 
things are, rather than a cultural commitment. By contrast, arguments such as those made by 
environmentalists were labelled as “worldviews” and framed as “values-based”. 
Consequently, the Commission could dismiss voices which it specifically associated with 
particular worldviews, whilst listening to, and accepting, voices for which it acknowledged 
no worldview. Goven argues that the Commission justified the dismissal of these other 
voices labelled as “values” by arguing that, in a “pluralistic society”, the only way for these 
“values-based views” to be legitimate is to be consensual (2006: 576). As the voices 
belonging to the modernistic worldviews had no acknowledged values, they did not need to 
be universally held and could, thus, remain cognitively superior. Here under the guise of 
being open, this engagement exercise could impose identities: scientific citizenship could 
only be enacted by people who adhered to this unacknowledged modernist worldview.  
 
The release of the Commission’s conclusions was followed by widespread public protests. 
highlighting, as does Wynne’s example above, that the imposition of identities can strain 
science-public relations. This suggests that engagement, if it does not take into account 
people’s worldviews and fails to acknowledge its own framings, can in fact further alienate 
publics from science and potentially deepen the “crisis of trust”. The present thesis pays 
particular attention to how scientists’ discourses can esteem or trivialise the voices of 
particular publics in engagement contexts and explores related trust relations.  
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2.3 Conceptualizing, engineering and enabling trust 
2.3.1 Institutions and “instrumentalising” trust 
As argued in the introductory chapter, scientific institutions are concerned with public 
mistrust in science. The House of Lords Science and Society Report (2000) seems to want to 
address the problem of trust through two-way dialogue and transparency. It suggests that: 
Openness is crucial, though it is not a panacea and is not without cost (1.21).  
 
Suppressing uncertainty is bound to lead to frequent changes of dogmatic 
position, and to the loss of public trust and respect (4.8). 
Quotes such as these demonstrate awareness by the Select Committee on Science and 
Society that trust cannot be obtained by projecting an image of certainty and that 
transparency and openness are necessary.  
 
However, this tactic of openness and transparency has been criticised by Brown and Michael 
(2003) and Irwin and Michael (2003), who argue that transparency as a means to obtain trust 
is unsuitable. Indeed, full transparency is never attainable and agreeing on acceptable criteria 
for transparency requires different actors to already be in relations of trust7. Nevertheless, 
Irwin and Michael argue that transparency can be used as a rhetorical tool to project an 
image of suffering and authenticity: actors can show that they are trying to be transparent, 
and that they are suffering in the process, due to various obstacles. This leads to an 
authentification of what they are doing:  
[w]hat these spokes-persons seem to be doing is tacitly claiming to make 
transparent their reasoning […]. It is just that it is their suffering which is made 
transparent (performed) and which, so to speak, in the final instance, 
‘authenticates’ their reasoning. (Irwin and Michael, 2003: 126) 
Here, transparency takes on a performative dimension. This highlights the need to ask how 
widespread and meaningful these calls for openness and dialogue are.  
 
In addition, Wynne notes that these strategies to improve trust cannot ever work: 
it is a contradiction in terms to instrumentalise a relationship which is supposed to 
be based on trust. It is simply not possible to expect the other in a relationship to 
trust oneself, if one’s assumed objective is to manage and control the other’s 
                                                     
7 This is reminiscent of Collins and Pinch’ “experimenter’s regress”. 
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response. The only thing which one can expect to control, and to take 
responsibility for, is one’s own trustworthiness (2006: 218-9, original emphasis) 
Wynne suggests that the way towards this, is for science and scientists to become aware of, 
and openly acknowledge, their social and cultural embeddedness; to become self aware and 
“reflexive”. He suggests that: 
The most fundamental objective for public engagement with ‘science’ should be 
to encourage the institutional culture of ‘science’ to acknowledge and question its 
own cultural assumptions and commitments. (Wynne, 2005a: 19) 
This is something this research seeks to follow up on. I turn to reflexivity in section 2.4. 
However, before that, it is necessary to explore analytical tools that can help make sense of 
trust (since expression of trust or mistrust may indicate opportunities or a need for greater 
reflexivity, as discussed in chapter 6) . 
 
2.3.2 Rational-calculative and hermeneutic trust 
Section 2.2 has problematised the dichotomy between “expert” and “lay” knowledge. 
Nevertheless, we are often in situations where we have to depend upon – trust in – other 
people’s knowledge. In addition, the framing of engagement and the threat to particular 
identities can lead to mistrust, and (as discussed in 2.3.1) scientific institutions are concerned 
about public trust in them. Trust is therefore a central concept in studying science-public 
relations.  In the following section, I draw on social theory to show how important trust is in 
current times. Although some aspects of social theory are problematic (I discuss some 
critiques of theories of modernity here and in the next section), other aspects – such as the 
concern with macro-level circumstances and the analysis of “expert”-“lay” relations – can 
fruitfully be combined with cPUS (my main theoretical framework) – as has been done by 
others (e.g. Irwin and Michael, 2003). 
 
Trust and dependence between different groups are particularly important in the case of 
SCR, which can be considered an area of knowledge creation typical of “late modernity” 
(Giddens, 1990) or “risk society” (Beck, 1992; 1996): it involves large amounts of capital, 
public-private alliances, collaborations between various international “experts” (in cell 
biology, law, policy, ethics, medicine), local and global8 regulations, international trading of 
                                                     
8 Global regulations include the United Nations attempts at banning cloning. 
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human material, as well as the creation of invisible pervasive risks that institutions have 
trouble coping with. 
 
For both Beck and Giddens, individuals today can no longer rely on their local knowledge 
and kinship ties to make sense of the world in which they evolve. They become dependent 
on other forms of knowledge. For Beck, this gives rise to a pessimistic vision:  
[...] the degree, the extent and symptoms of people’s endangerment are 
fundamentally dependent on external knowledge. [...] the affected parties are 
becoming incompetent in matters of their own affliction. They lose an essential 
part of their cognitive sovereignty. The harmful, threatening, inimical lies in wait 
everywhere, but whether it is inimical or friendly is beyond one’s own power of 
judgement (Beck, 1992: 53-4, original emphasis)  
Giddens also argues that individuals can no longer judge risk or understand how everything 
around them functions. His rather more optimistic analysis sees individuals as relying on 
“expert systems” which, in a process of “disembedding”, offer guarantees of proper 
functioning: they restructure social relations across “indefinite spans of time-space” 
(Giddens, 1990: 21). These systems enable people to go about their lives without having to 
know how everything functions (how bridges stay up, for example). For expert systems to 
serve this function, people must trust in them (to prevent bridges from collapsing by 
overseeing engineering standards). This trust is bestowed without any direct contact between 
expert system and individuals. Giddens calls these “faceless commitments” “in which faith is 
sustained in the working of knowledge of which the lay person is largely ignorant” (Giddens, 
1990: 88). Thus, trust here depends on faith in the systems to work as they are supposed to. 
Trust is often renewed, maintained and/or challenged at “access points” where individuals or 
groups come into contact with representatives of the expert system.  
 
Both Beck and Giddens see that it is not always possible, given the globalised nature of late 
modern society, to opt-out of modernity and its institutions. People become dependent on 
these systems and have to trust them which can give rise to “ambivalence”. For Giddens:  
Respect for technical knowledge usually exists in conjunction with a pragmatic 
attitude towards abstract systems, based upon attitudes of scepticism or reserve. 
Many people, as it were, make a ‘bargain with modernity’ in terms of the trust 
they vest in […] expert systems. (1990: 90) 
For Beck: 
the risk consciousness of the afflicted, which is frequently expressed in the 
environmental movement, and in criticism of industry, experts and culture, is 
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usually both critical and credulous of science. A solid background of faith in 
science is part of the paradoxical basic equipment of the critique of 
modernization. (Beck, 1992: 72, original emphasis) 
Here, Beck notes the presence of ambivalent trust, where conditional trust in institutions is 
mixed with feelings of mistrust, disenchantment and dependence 
 
Both Beck and Giddens see bestowals of trust as results of rational calculations and 
evaluations of risk and trustworthiness. They argue that, previously, people trusted experts. 
But with the increased visibility of expert disputes, lay people have to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of different experts and choose which ones to trust. Beck and Giddens seem to 
think that lay people automatically trust experts in the absence of public disputes and that it 
is only in the presence of public disputes between experts that the black box of expert 
certainty is opened, and that lay people have to decide which experts to trust. 
 
This view has been criticised, in particular by Wynne who disagrees with this “notion of 
public mistrust [which] is instrumental-calculative” (Wynne, 1996b: 47). He argues that 
Beck and Giddens have fallen for “a widespread confusion between unreflexive trust, and 
reflexive dependency and private ambivalence” (1996: 48). He develops the concept of “as-
if”’ trust (Wynne, 1995: 381; 1996b: 47-55). Here, people feel they depend on 
experts/authorities. They do not trust these, but lack the agency to do away, or vocally 
disagree, with them. Therefore people have to act “as-if” they trust them, and hope for the 
best: 
[People] are aware of their dependency, and of their lack of agency even if the 
boundaries of this are uncertain; and awareness of these conditions occasions 
anxiety, a sense of risk, and an active interest in evidence, for example about the 
basis of their unavoidable as-if ‘trust’ in those experts. These lay public processes 
are deeply imbued with reflexivity even though no public dissent or contestation 
is apparent. (Wynne, 1996b: 50) 
Thus for Wynne, the absence of vocal contestation on the part of lay people does not imply 
actual trust, and the trust that seems bestowed on institutions is only a “virtual” (1996b: 50) 
trust. For example, the Cumbrian farmers in Wynne’s research tended not to tell scientists 
how much they mistrusted them. 
 
Wynne is therefore criticising Beck and Giddens for equating expressions of trust with 
actual trust and advocates a more hermeneutic concept of trust. However, Wynne has also 
been taken to task for equating private expressions of mistrust for actual mistrust. Rather, 
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Szerszynski (1999) uses speech act theory to study the language of trust and suggests that 
trust can be a “directive declaration”. In stating that they trust an institution, people are in 
fact attempting to project an image on the institution which will encourage it to act as 
described, and be trustworthy. This is a fruitful way of making sense of trust declarations 
which are also performative. 
 
I am persuaded by Wynne’s criticism of Beck and Giddens, and Szerszynski’s criticism of 
Wynne. These raise the problems of analysing expressions of trust, mistrust or ambivalence: 
as a researcher, it is difficult to access what people really think. Thus, one should think about 
whether discourse is a description or a construction of a reality – in other words, if it should 
be analysed as a “topic” or a “resource” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, see below). Although I 
disagree with Beck and Giddens’ rational-calculative model of trust and their often realist 
conception of expertise, I find that their notion of dependence on expert systems in a global 
world (which is difficult to opt-out of) can be usefully combined with hermeneutic 
conceptions of (mis)trust in order to explore public engagement in stem cell research. In 
particular, it is interesting to analyse scientists’ expressions of trust, since, as Giddens (1990: 
146) also argues, they too are “lay” in many aspects of their lives and work, and have to rely 
on experts systems. In particular, expressions of concern can point to opportunities for 
greater “reflexivity”, which I discuss below. 
 
This chapter so far has suggested that trust and mistrust are central dimensions of science-
public relations and need to be explored. However, it has also underlined the difficulty in 
instrumentally engineering trust through openness or through forms of public engagement 
that impose problematic identities on participants. Therefore, I now want to examine how 
people involved in engagement can become more aware of their own framings – how they 
can become more “reflexive” – and how this can improve public engagement and enable 
alternative forms of knowledge to be recognised, thus enabling emancipation from 
traditional power relations. 
 
2.4 “Reflexivity” and emancipation 
There have been many calls to empower publics to effect change in the governance of 
science. However, as discussed above (see 2.2.4), these are often framed around very 
constrained sets of identities and do not question the central role of science in shaping these 
science-public encounters. I want to suggest that social scientists can play a role in helping 
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members of scientific institutions to become more aware of their founding assumptions and 
how these influence interactions with publics; that is how they can become more “reflexive”. 
This can offer alternative ways of conceptualising and using science in public. For changes 
to take place, it is crucial to consider how power relations can be transformed to build on this 
reflexivity. The relational notions of power as developed by Foucault and Bourdieu are most 
useful in this context. In particular, similar to Epstein, I build on some of Bourdieu’s 
concepts to analyse possibilities for challenging the dominant framings of public 
engagement. 
 
2.4.1 “Substantive” and “interpretative” reflexivity 
As shown above (see 2.3.1), Wynne argues that scientists and their institutions need to 
become “reflexive”, rather than try to engineer trust. There are various conceptualisations of 
“reflexivity” (e.g. Lynch, 2000). For the purpose of clarity, it is important to explain what 
versions of reflexivity are drawn upon in this thesis9. Here, I start with Beck and Giddens as 
they are central in conceptualising this notion. I then explore how their “substantive 
reflexivity” might be further developed in order to more profoundly challenge some of the 
scientistic framings of public engagement. I suggest this may improve science-public 
relations.  
 
According to Beck, modernity needs to become “reflexive” in order to address the issues it 
throws up. For him, this implies modernity’s “self-confrontation” (1996: 28) and concern 
“with its unintended consequences, risks and their implications on its foundations” (2000: 
226). This reflexivity is made possible by society’s increasing awareness of the social 
construction of risks, or “man-made hybrids” (Beck, 2000: 221).  
 
Sociology and other social sciences, for Beck, have a role in promoting reflexive 
modernization, in the “rupture” from enlightenment or “primary scientization”, to “reflexive 
scientization”: 
The agents of rupture are the disciplines of the critical application of science to 
itself – the theory of science and the history of science, cognitive sociology and 
the sociology of science, psychology and empirical ethnology of science and so 
on – which have been gnawing at the foundations of the self-dogmatizing of 
                                                     
9 There are a number of other conceptualisations of “reflexivity”, notably “methodological reflexivity” 
which I discuss in chapter 3. 
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scientific rationality with varying success since the beginning of the century. 
(Beck, 1992: 165, original emphasis) 
Beck contrasts this reflexive scientization with a less desirable “counter modernity”, a re-
invention of “modernity”, where “fascination with the ersatz god of progress” and 
institutionalised non-responsibility take over (Beck, 1992: 214). Here, there is an opportunity 
for radical but constructive critiques of science to promote “primary scientization” over 
“counter modernity”, and to open up a role for public engagement in and appraisal of 
science. This is where some of the aims of this thesis are located, although this work seeks to 
go beyond Beck, as discussed below.  
 
Beck also sees a central role in reflexive modernization for a variety of “sub-politics”, such 
as ecological movements, citizen or consumer groups, counter-experts and industrial 
competitors (e.g. Beck, 1996: 32-3; see also Leach and Scoones, 2005: 32). There are many 
such groups relevant to SCR, with voices, expertise and criticisms coming from a variety of 
local or trans-national organisations including: feminist movements, religious groups, anti-
abortion activists, research institutes and funders, individual scientists or the international 
“Hands off my ovaries” association. All these groups can form a variety of alliances 
facilitated by international communication networks. They can have a role in re-framing the 
discussions around SCR and help scientists confront the assumptions embedded in their 
work and discourses.  
 
Giddens’ version of reflexivity is similar to Beck’s in that it suggests that the ever-increasing 
amount of knowledge available in modern enhances our awareness of the risks created by 
science. A crucial difference between these two scholars is that, according to Giddens, 
reflexivity does not need to be a response to challenges from outside science. Rather science, 
in reflexive modernity, is inherently reflexive: 
reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are 
constantly examined and reformed in light of incoming information about those 
very practices, thus constitutively altering their character (Giddens, 1990: 38)   
Thus, Giddens’ reflexivity is supposed to describe what is occurring in late modernity, 
whereas Beck’s reflexive modernity is more of a normative statement of what society should 
aim for.  
 
There are many critiques of these theories of modernisation (see Wynne, 1996b; Rose, 2000; 
Scott, 2000). In particular, it has been argued that the differences between early and late 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature review 33 
modernity are not as striking as Beck and Giddens suggest. In addition, their conceptions of 
reflexivity – which can be labelled “substantive reflexivity”– privilege scientistic and 
technocratic worldviews (Lynch, 2000: 28) and is mainly pre-occupied with planning for and 
addressing unintended consequences. Thus, although Beck’s reflexive modernisation seems 
a promising aim in the context of improving science-public relations (in contrast to counter-
modernity), it is insufficient: if self-confrontation is simply concerned with unintended 
consequences and scientistically framed risks, it will not profoundly challenge the current 
ways in which science-public interactions take place. Since it is precisely this scientistic and 
technocratic framing that imposes alienating identities on “lay” participants (Wynne, 1993; 
1996b), a form of reflexivity that puts into question this framing is needed. Science must 
acknowledge and explore its frames and worldviews, and how these shape science-public 
interactions. 
 
Consequently, “interpretative” notions of reflexivity become useful – where reflexivity is 
concerned with “a style of interpretation that imagines and identifies non-obvious 
alternatives to habitual ways of thinking and acting” (Lynch, 2000: 32). If science is 
unreflexive in this sense, this can cause problems and, as Jasanoff argues:  
The danger here is not simply public alienation or apathy in the face of 
technological change, accompanied by a hollowing out of meaning, intimacy, 
connection and emotion. Real as these threats may be to the ideal of democratic 
engagement, more important still is the loss of reflexivity within the scientific 
enterprise itself, a phenomenon that disables modern science from recognizing, 
and admitting, how profoundly normative are its visions of progress (Jasanoff, 
2005b: 196-7) 
Following on from this, the present thesis seeks ways to develop the potential for scientific 
institutional reflexivity in the sense advocated by Jasanoff and Wynne where reflexivity is: 
the process of identifying, and critically examining (and thus rendering open to 
change), the basic, pre-analytic assumptions that frame knowledge-commitments 
(Wynne, 1993: 324, emphasis added) 
Thus, building on but moving away from Beck, this thesis promotes a more “interpretative” 
form of reflexivity. “Counter modernity” and “reflexive modernization” are used as idealised 
categories with which to compare data. Sub-politics and social scientific analyses are seen as 
playing an important role in critiquing the institutions of science, but even more so, in 
providing alternative means of representation and interpretation. In keeping with my 
commitment to constructivism, these alternatives are not put forward as more truthful than 
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scientistic ones10: they are suggestions of alternatives which  may help science improve its 
relations with publics. 
  
 Kerr and Cunningham-Burley (2000) have found evidence of limited reflexivity in 
scientists’ discourses11. This thesis further explores the kinds of reflexivity already in 
evidence in scientists’ discourses and seeks ways of further developing these. For example, 
by highlighting scientists’ “pre-analytic assumptions”, it may suggest new paths towards 
(interpretative forms of) reflexivity, so that framings of engagement can be negotiated, rather 
than blindly imposed on participants. However, in order for the reflexive potential of stem 
cell researchers’ discourses to challenge the framing of engagement, we need to take into 
account (and also challenge) the existing power relations as they shape science-public 
interactions in problematic ways. To do this, we need sophisticated tools to analyse power. 
 
2.4.2 Conceptualizing power and emancipation 
Development studies scholars draw our attention to power relations and highlight the need to 
understand these in the context of public engagement. For instance, Hildyard et al., in their 
case study about forest management in India, found that most consultations reproduce ready-
existing local power relations (see also Stirling, 2005) and tend to be dominated by the more 
powerful groups, usually men from politically strong villages. Other research shows that 
participation may often do nothing more than reflect the agenda of aid organisations or other 
external groups (e.g. Francis, 2001), or may reproduce and reify pre-existing power 
imbalances (Kothari, 2001). Thus it is important to think about how these existing power 
relations can be conceptualised and challenged if we want alternative frames of meaning to 
take hold and improve public engagement. 
 
Foucault’s theorisation of power is central to many development studies’ analyses. For him, 
power is not a monolithic entity which some possess and others do not (1976: 123). Rather, 
it corresponds to a “multiplicity of power relations” and strategies whose “institutional 
crystallisation takes shape in state apparatuses, the formulation of laws and in social 
hegemonies” (1976: 121-2, my translation). Pervasive and meticulous methods of 
surveillance and control enable the “subjection” or “assujettissement” (1975:139) of people. 
                                                     
10 More details of my epistemological and ontological commitments are given in chapter 3. 
11 See chapter 6.  
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It is through these unacknowledged – and hard to acknowledge – control and 
“normalisation” mechanisms that power relations are played out in engagement. For 
instance, norms such as “women are less dominant than men” can be reinforced through 
participatory development, rather than questioned. 
 
I find Foucault’s concepts of “normalisation” and “subjection” particularly salient to the 
study of public engagement and how it can, in an unseen manner, impose identities and 
framings on participants12.  However, some critiques of his work are of relevance here: it has 
been argued that Foucault does not suggest any ways to challenge existing power relations 
and strive for emancipation. Although he notes that “wherever there is power, there is 
resistance” (1976: 125), he finds that these nodes of resistance rarely create great changes in 
power relations (127) and he is more concerned with studying small transformations. 
Feminists in particular have been critical and Harstock (1993), for example, argues that 
power relations need to be critiqued and transformed by creating alternatives to the dominant 
cultures. The possibility of resistance or emancipation from dominant cultures is especially 
salient in public engagement with SCR, as many publics may not feel they have anything to 
contribute to discussions and may consistently defer authority to “experts” (see Kerr et al., 
2007).  
 
Bourdieu’s analysis of power offers ways of challenging power relations and Epstein uses 
this to make sense of how the AIDS activists he studied succeeded in changing the way 
clinical trial were undertaken. Bourdieu develops the concepts of “habitus” and “field” 
which makes sense of individual agency13 within objective structures. “Fields” are objective 
complexes of socially and historically contingent relations. “Habituses” are: 
systems of durable and transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principles generating 
and organising practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to 
                                                     
12 Foucault is also a central figure in analyses of power in medical sociology. Nikolas Rose has 
developed an interesting re-interpretation of Foucault’s work in this context, which centres on doctor-
patient relations (e.g. Rose, 2001; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Rose, 2007). However, he focuses on 
how Foucault’s work is useful to make sense of normalization forces on the body. This interest in 
biomedicine, in the “somatic individual” and its “fleshly corporeal existence” (Rose, 2007: 26) and in 
“neurochemical selves” (Rose, 2007: 187) is less useful when thinking about public engagement in 
SCR; particularly when one wants to challenge framings of engagement that tend to privilege 
scientists enrolling patients as desperate for treatments (e.g. Parry, 2003b). 
13 Although Bourdieu has been criticised for not allowing for agency (see Knorr-Cetina, 1982; 
Williams, 1995), I find that his framework does enable it particularly when it is combined with 
insights from social identity theory (see section 2.4.3). However I do take on board Knorr-Cetina’s 
view that macro-level claims such as those made by Bourdieu need to be empirically investigated at 
the “micro-level” (1982: 116), which this thesis seeks to do. 
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their goal without the necessity of the conscious aiming towards these ends or of 
the express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them [...] (Bourdieu, 
1980: 88, my translation) 
These dispositions – norms and ways of thinking for example – are infused into people and, 
thus, become embodied dispositions. The field structures the habitus, and the habitus gives 
meaning to the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). People act according to the 
habitus and the field. In particular, if the structure of the field maps onto internalised norms 
(habitus), the social order seems given by nature (1980: 229-30; see also Cronin, 1996); this 
can impose identities on people, unbeknownst to them. According to Bourdieu, emancipation 
from these embodied dispositions is possible, in particular through the scientific “field” – 
which includes social sciences for Bourdieu.  
 
Fields are the products of historical processes, but due to constant struggles are also 
constantly changing (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). Although the most dominant 
agents in a given field have an interest in keeping particular areas “outside the limits of the 
struggle” (Bourdieu, 1975: 109, original emphasis), other agents can question and change 
what is at stake in the struggle: 
The primary locus of resistance to power on Bourdieu’s analysis is not the 
political field but the scientific field, since scientific representations of social 
practices can dispel the mystifications underlying symbolic domination by 
revealing the arbitrariness of the social divisions it serves to legitimate. (Cronin, 
1996: 76) 
For Bourdieu, the scientific field can reveal the arbitrariness of the structure of the field, and 
therefore of power relations. This enables particular power relations to be challenged and 
transformed.  
 
However, it is necessary for these revelations to be credible. This depends on the “symbolic 
power” one can mobilise, where symbolic power: 
is defined in and by a definite relation that creates belief in the legitimacy of the 
words and of the person who utters them, and it operates only inasmuch as those 
who undergo it recognise those who wield it (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
148)14 
This power comes from having different levels of “cultural capital” which, in the scientific 
field for example comes from publications, peer recognition and the struggle for the 
                                                     
14 Bourdieu’s symbolic power is similar to Gieryn’s notion “epistemic authority” which can be 
achieved through boundary-work, as discussed below. 
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authority to speak on scientific matters and impose the definition of what counts as science. 
This capital can be converted into other kinds of capital, such as when scientists with 
authority in the scientific field reconvert – successfully or not – this authority in the 
“political field”15 or in policy, and try to impose their definitions there too.  
 
In terms of engagement, Bourdieu’s work is very salient. Indeed, many viewpoints, 
particularly “lay” objections, can be excluded from debates for not fitting the frameworks of 
debates (see 2.2.4). The importance or relevance of lay knowledge is not commonly part of 
the habitus. Thus science, including social science, by revealing the embodied dispositions 
and the structure of the field, can show that the accepted social order (for example, that 
natural scientific voices have more authority and power than others) is not given by nature 
and therefore can be challenged. This directly relates back to Wynne when he argues for the 
role of social scientists in examining (therefore opening up to change) the assumptions that 
frame knowledge (see 2.4.1). 
 
Therefore, I believe that a good way of “empowering” lay people in public engagement is to 
convert their capital into capital recognised in the scientific field. Epstein finds that this is 
what his AIDS activists could do (1995: 415): they used their high levels of cultural capital 
(their access to good education for example) and converted it into capital that made them 
credible in the eyes of scientists (they learnt how to understand scientific papers and talk 
using scientific jargon). Even better, one can resist the technicist framing of public debates 
by redefining the rules governing the structure of the field and making a new kind of capital 
gain credibility in the field of interest. In Epstein’s study, AIDS activists made the access to 
a social good (the clinical trial), which can be constructed a “moral” (rather than “scientific”) 
credibility, become important in the conduct of clinical trials (1995: 420-1).  
 
It is important to note here that, following Epstein, I diverge from Bourdieu in the way I see 
the “objectivity” and “truth” of the alternatives that social science can reveal16. Indeed, for 
Bourdieu, “scientific truth” exists and is knowable. Wacquant argues that Bourdieu, even 
though he thinks that knowledge needs to be deconstructed and that science is “an eminently 
political activity”, is also “passionately modernist”: he sees the progress of reason as leading 
to further autonomy in the scientific field and better access to truth. (Bourdieu and 
                                                     
15 Bourdieu makes a difference between the “political field” and political aspects which are present in 
all fields. 
16 This is mentioned in 2.4.1 and will be further discussed in chapter 3. 
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Wacquant, 1992: 67)17. Thus, in Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of emancipation, there is an 
idea that the alternative frameworks offered by social scientists, for example, will be more 
truthful and more objective than the unexamined and unacknowledged ones. Here, his 
reflexivity can be labelled “reflexive objectification” (Lynch, 2000: 30). In contrast, I do not 
think that social scientists have a better access to truth or are more objective than other 
people interested in public engagement. I think they can offer an alternative lens through 
which to view the framing of engagement, reveal assumptions made by scientists and help 
reveal the arbitrariness of the status quo, thus open up ways of changing it. To put it in 
Bourdieu’s terms, their role is to offer ways of challenging the “rules of the game” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99) in the “field” of public engagement.  
 
Thus, using the same framework as Epstein, I draw particularly on Foucault’s notion of 
power as relational and exercised through small normalising forces, and on Bourdieu’s ideas 
that the rules of the game in any field can be challenged through the revelation of the 
arbitrariness of the structure of the field, and that there are different kinds of capital which 
can be mobilised and converted into others. 
 
2.4.3 Social identities 
Previous sections have highlighted how identities can be imposed by, and challenged during, 
encounters between science and publics. However, participants in these exercises (be they 
scientists or publics) can still decide, to an extent, which identities to enact. I now discuss 
“social identity theory”, which provides an analytical framework to understand the 
contingency of action and discourse. 
 
Social identity theory derives from social psychology and is a useful conceptual tool for this 
research18. It is “intended to be a social psychological theory of intergroup relations, group 
processes, and the social self” (Hogg et al., 1995: 259). It studies the psycho-social links 
between structure and agency: 
                                                     
17 In this, I agree with Dreyfus and Rabinow’s  sympathetic critique of Bourdieu where they argue 
that: “the meaning of human action is not accessible to a scientific theory” (1993: 35) and that “one 
must abandon the claim to have a scientific sociology” (1993: 43).  
18 Psychological approaches have been criticised for being reductive (e.g.  Wynne, 1995). However, 
despite its roots in social psychology, social identity theory expressly distances itself from other 
approaches in psychology which focus solely on cognitive processes (as I discuss in the body of the 
text). 
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Social identity is intended as a concept that mediates between social context and 
the action of human subjects. It is not seen as a psychological reality that 
determines social reality. (Reicher, 2004: 933)  
Social identity theory provides mechanisms for understanding identity at an individual level, 
whilst taking into account broader socio-cultural factors (including belonging to a 
profession, nationality, gender etc.). It specifically attempts to avoid cognitively reductionist 
accounts of people’s identities (Hogg et al., 1995). For example, Reicher argues that “one of 
the basic tenets of the social identity tradition is that identities are cultural constructs” (2004: 
937) and “it is necessary to avoid reductionist misreadings of the theories that would explain 
human social action simply by reference to psychological processes” (2004: 921). Thus, 
although some of the methods used (with “dependant variables” and “experiments” in 
“laboratories”) are quite different to what I to do in my thesis, the broader concepts are 
relevant to my work and can be combined with my constructivist framework. 
 
Social identity theory develops the concept of “salience”19: people can draw on a number of 
identities, and the one they enact depends on the actual situation, the audience, the identities 
at their disposal (Stets and Burke, 2000: 231). In particular, identity salience depends on who 
is perceived to be the group one wishes to belong to – the “in-group” – and the group one 
wishes to be differentiated from – the “out-group” (Hogg et al., 1995: 260; see also Stets and 
Burke, 2000: 225). Social identity theory has been extended into “self-categorization 
theory”:  
according to self-categorization theory, people cognitively represent social groups 
in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a subjective representation of the defining 
attributes (example, beliefs, attitudes, behaviours) of a social category, which is 
actively constructed from relevant social information in the immediate or more 
enduring interactive context. (Hogg et al., 1995: 261, emphases added) 
This notion of “prototype” explains why certain categorisations give a stereotypical view of 
others and self, as can be the case during episodes of “boundary-work” (discussed below). 
Importantly, the prototype and identity depend on which out-group the particular identity 
construction is addressed at.  
 
Social identity theory also highlights the notion of identity as “reflexive”20: 
                                                     
19 Which is different to the more static notion of salience developed by “identity theorists”, from the 
symbolic interactionist tradition (see Hogg et al., 1995 for a comparison of these two approaches). 
20 This notion of reflexivity is more restricted than the interpretative reflexivity that I favour. 
However, awareness of and confrontation with one’s identities and self-categorisations contribute 
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In social identity theory and identity theory, the self is reflexive in that it can take 
itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in 
relation to other social categories or classifications. (Stets and Burke, 2000: 224, 
emphasis added) 
Thus, although identity options are to an extent constrained by the physical world, people 
can draw on different identities in different circumstances, without this being simply an 
unconscious reflex predetermined by their social locations21. They have a certain degree of 
choice in which identities they enact and identities can create social situations and effect 
change. However, similar to the Cumbrian farmers, identity negotiations are not always 
straightforward, and trust and power also are a central aspect of the encounter between 
science and publics. 
 
Social identity theory enables accounts of power relations and can make sense of 
unacknowledged normalizing forces – such as those inculcated through the habitus – and of 
more noticeable, coercive forces. “Subjection” will be more noticeable and felt as more 
conflictual if the two groups or individuals do not share common salient identities and do not 
see themselves as belonging to the same in-groups (thus explaining why people feel their 
identities are being threatened). Although some groups may, for example, be recruited to 
help others, this does not mean they are incapable of challenging this. People can use their 
identities to change the social world, in particular if they have access to identities where they 
have a higher status:  
If dominated Bs have access to systems of identities that are external to the 
system of domination and associated identities, they can draw on alternative 
interpretative horizons [...]. As a consequence, the identity as Bs may eventually 
be re-anchored and re-constructed in ways that transcend and challenge the 
prevailing social order. In addition to this cognitive resource and its contribution 
to cognitive liberation [...], alternative identities also provide access to valuable 
social and material resources (for example new allies and their funds), which 
should help to further loosen the grip of the original domination. (Simon and 
Oakes, 2006: 129) 
This is similar to the situation where people can effect change when they see the arbitrariness 
of the habitus but, here, a particular mechanism for change is revealed.  
 
Thus, a possible explanation for Epstein’s case study, discussed above, is that the AIDS 
activists had a low status identity in clinical research. However, they had access to high 
                                                                                                                                                      
ones awareness of embedded assumptions and worldviews, thereby contributing to further 
interpretative reflexivity. 
21 Although this does not imply that all identities are conscious choices, or rational calculations. 
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status identities (in their role as businessmen, for example) and found the situation where 
they were in a weak position unnatural. They could see that this social order was amenable to 
change and they effected this by the process of “expertification”, but also changed the 
structure of the “field” of clinical trials by reconstructing it such that they had a higher status 
identity and their understandings were relevant. They converted some of their capital into 
capital relevant in clinical trials. They also altered what was considered to be relevant capital 
by mobilising resources and alliances. Thus, as Reicher highlights: 
These definitions of identity are projects, not descriptions. They are intended to 
mobilize people to create social reality. (2004: 938) 
Therefore by revealing the arbitrariness of power relations and of the structure of the field, 
social scientists can help empower people, particularly by showing them that they have 
access to other identities than the ones imposed on them. This can not only encourage “lay” 
people to engage more actively with science, but also encourage scientists to change their 
discourses and the identities they enact (they do not have to evince certainty in public, for 
example). 
 
2.5 Studying scientists and their discourses and rhetorical strategies  
Much of the literature I have discussed criticises projections of particular identities, 
epistemologies and frameworks onto publics. However, similar projections are made onto 
scientists and institutions (such as their obsession with prediction and control). This thesis 
investigates whether this is accurate for the scientists I interview, and how this relates to the 
maintenance of cognitive authority. For example, it explores whether their epistemological 
commitments are different to publics’. It also explores how scientists, in particular through 
their discourses, shape encounters with publics. In this section, I discuss the main analytical 
tools I use for studying scientists and their discourses. 
 
2.5.1 Boundary-work  
As Bourdieu notes, part of the symbolic power of a scientist comes from his/her ability to 
define what counts as “science”: 
The definition of what is at stake in the scientific struggle is thus one of the issues 
at stake in the scientific struggle, and the dominant are those who manage to 
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impose a definition of science which says that the most accomplished realization 
of science consists in having, being, and doing what they have, are, or do. 
(Bourdieu, 1975: 96) 
No author has done more on this struggle about the definition or boundaries of science than 
Gieryn and his cultural cartography of science22. 
 
Previous sections have shown that scientific claims are socially constructed and that the 
notion of expertise is highly problematic. Despite this, science holds a lot of cognitive 
authority and often frames engagement exercises. As this special location of science in 
society is not given by the nature of scientific knowledge, it is important to think about the 
construction of legitimacy, credibility or authority. One way to do this, suggested by Gieryn, 
is to look at how science sets itself apart from other disciplines or social groups. 
 
Gieryn moves beyond traditional essentialist criteria for the demarcation of science from 
non-science (e.g. Merton, 1972). He chooses to investigate how scientists erect boundaries 
between what they see as “science” and as “non-science” and how the construction of these 
boundaries can contribute to scientists’ authority. He does this by introducing the concept of 
“cultural cartography”: “a mapping out of epistemic authority, credible methods, reliable 
facts” (Gieryn, 1999: 4). Gieryn finds that people of opposing views draw out different 
representations or “maps” of science. Each map justifies why science is special. Gieryn calls 
this process “boundary-work’, which is:  
the discursive attribution of selected qualities to scientists, methods, and scientific 
claims for the purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and 
some less authoritative residual non-science (1999: 4-5) 
It is important to note that Gieryn is not interested in who is “right” or “wrong”, or which 
science becomes vindicated by history (this idea of symmetry is shared by SSK scholars in 
general). Rather, boundary-work corresponds to the rhetorical construction, de-construction 
and re-construction of boundaries. This is where interesting notions about science can be 
revealed and the creation of epistemic authority can be seen. Gieryn suggests that “the public 
better learn about ‘science’ through contrasts with ‘non-science’”(1983: 791). He follows 
                                                     
22 Bourdieu’s use of fields is much narrower than Gieryn’s notion of scientific disciplines. Bourdieu is 
also talking about “idealised agents” rather than real people, thus his meanings for forces and 
struggles are different to those of Gieryn. Nevertheless, these two approaches can be used in 
conjunction since Gieryn’s cultural cartography can be one way of examining how actors rhetorically 
attempt to set what is within and out with the limits of a field. Also, Gieryn, like Bourdieu, sees a 
constraining role for the structure of the field, or what Gieryn calls the “peculiarities of each of these 
arenas” (1999: 24). 
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this idea through his various episodes of boundary-work; by looking at the discourses of key 
figures in scientific arguments, he identifies four types of reasons for which boundary-work 
is conducted .  
 
Firstly, boundary-work can be done to “expand” the authority of science. Science is opposed 
to other disciplines in a flattering manner; this enables the authority of science to extend to 
spaces formerly occupied by other intellectual or practical activities. Gieryn gives the 
example of the boundaries erected between science and religion and mechanics, by Tyndall 
in Victorian England (1983: 783-7).  
 
Secondly, Gieryn describes boundary-work conducted for “monopolization” of resources or 
authority away from other activities. In this case, people who want to be regarded as 
scientists exclude competitors from within, in order to keep hold of the authority science 
already has. Gieryn explains that do this, rivals draw alternative maps of science, including 
themselves and their practices, but excluding their opponents as non-scientific or pseudo-
scientific, amateurish or fake. Gieryn shows that this type of boundary-work was done by 
supporters and opponents of phrenology in Edinburgh (1983: 788-9). He notes that different 
definitions for particular terms were given by each group. These mapped onto broader 
political struggles and social locations in which the cultural cartographers were situated.  
 
Gieryn describes a third reason for boundary-work: “expulsion” of individuals from a field. 
This type of boundary-work is similar to monopolization except that particular members are 
rejected from science, rather than a whole field being excluded23. In both cases, pejorative 
labels are one of the discursive tools used by the insiders. The main objective of this 
boundary-work is to protect authority by not being associated with individuals or practices 
that are seen as non-scientific. Expulsion has also been done to stem cell researchers 
claiming to work towards human reproductive cloning (Parry, under review). 
 
The final type of boundary-work that Gieryn studied is aimed at the “protection of 
autonomy”. Here, scientists draw boundaries to prevent outsiders from invading science and 
using its authority either to make science responsible for things scientists feel are not within 
their remit, or to enable outsiders to become responsible for things that scientists see as their 
preserve. The protection of autonomy can be done to separate science from politics, industry, 
                                                     
23 In his book, Gieryn in fact uses the term “expulsion” to describe the battle between two intellectual 
activities .  
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or from its consequences (1983: 789-91). When science protects its autonomy from 
infringement by other areas like politics, it becomes important for scientists, and indeed for 
politicians, to keep science close to, but not within, the realm of politics, so that science can 
maintain its role as neutral adviser. This relates back to Nelkin’s discussion of expertise as a 
strategic label (see 2.2.3). It can also be useful to define arenas which are between, but not 
part of, science and politics (or industry etc.). Jasanoff, for example, examines the role of 
expert advisory committees: 
such bodies keep alive the politically useful fiction that science is apolitical and 
that scientific advisers are capable of ‘speaking truth to power’” (Jasanoff quoted 
in Jasanoff, 2002: 374).  
These arenas can be appealed to by politicians and scientists alike to maintain the authority 
of science. 
 
When science protects its autonomy by separating the generation of “facts” from their 
application, scientists can set up a duality within science – as pure and applied – and draw on 
it. For example, by asking scientists about the social environment in which they work, Kerr 
et al. show how scientists distance themselves from the implications of their findings (such 
as the use of genetic data by insurance companies) and at the same time accept some form of 
responsibility towards society (by advising governments and educating the public in a 
“neutral” fashion). By doing effective boundary-work and using the fluid “micro/macro 
split” (see the following section), these professionals can maintain their authority. This 
contrasts with Kerr et al.’s (1998b) discussion with lay groups, which challenge these 
discourses and their given authority. 
 
Cultural cartography is a useful way of studying scientists in the context of public 
engagement and fits well within my overall theoretical framework, despite some of Gieryn’s 
language that at times seems to indicate realist claims24. This concept has been used, for 
example, to study stem cell researchers (Wainwright et al., 2006a) and clinicians (Ehrich et 
al., 2006). In both the papers, the authors describe how professionals, when discussing their 
work (for example when they explain why they are happy to work on some sources of stem 
cells but not others), draw on considerations that the authors label “ethical” considerations, 
and how professionals use this to try to position themselves as “ethical”. The authors of these 
                                                     
24 For example, Gieryn states that: “science is both pure and applied, theoretical and empirical” (1983: 
792, original emphasis). Rather, I would say that science can be experienced and constructed by 
cultural cartographers as pure and applied, theoretical and empirical. 
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two papers call this practice “ethical boundary-work” and argue that, contrary to usual 
boundary-work which increases the authority if science, this boundary-work “enhances the 
authority of ‘non-science’[…] and de-privileges science” (Wainwright et al., 2006a: 735). 
This use of boundary-work is slightly different to mine. Indeed, I want to avoid imposing 
analysts’ categories of what counts as “science” and “non-science” and I would not want to 
argue that science is essentially different to ethics or legislation, for example. I would 
interpret this “ethical boundary-work”, not as de-privileging science, but as privileging a 
construction of science as an ethical pursuit.  
 
Gieryn’s draws several general themes from his studies of boundary work. Firstly, he notes 
that episodes of boundary work only occur in times of struggle, when there is competition 
for funding or when the authority of science is at stake. Indeed, when someone makes claims 
that go against a particular scientific field’s ideas, s/he is not always “expelled” but usually 
ignored if resources (pecuniary or cognitive) are not at risk.  
 
Secondly, Gieryn highlights that boundaries are very fluid and permeable; they include 
different characteristics depending on who is drawing them and when, for which purpose and 
for what audience25. Thus, different repertoires are used in each instance. The maps of 
science are created de novo each time. Although the cartographer may be inspired by 
previous maps, s/he includes only the features s/he wants at that particular moment. Thus, 
this thesis will highlight the social locations of individuals drawing different maps of SCR. 
These first two themes reveal that boundaries are constructed in response to external 
pressures as well as internal interests.  
 
Thirdly, Gieryn draws attention to the fact that these maps give us an insight into how 
science can be understood in our society. Like its boundaries, science can be seen as variable 
and ambiguous. The different discursive repertoires highlight the (socially constructed) dual 
nature of science: basic science as opposed to applied science. By looking at the boundaries 
that my informants draw around SCR in general, and around particular areas within SCR, the 
constructed nature of this field is revealed. This highlights the ways in which stem cell 
researchers seek to promote their authority.  
 
Lastly, Gieryn highlights the importance of winning these episodes of boundary-work.  
                                                     
25 This is similar to arguing that particular identities become “salient” in particular social 
circumstances.  
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The stakes are very large for cultural cartographers themselves, for their 
particular version of nature hangs in the balance. [...] Losers see their claims 
moved out from fact to illusion, lie, ulterior motive, or faith while they (and their 
methods, practices, organizations, and institutions) get marginalized or excluded 
fully from the domain of epistemic authority reserved for science and its 
genuinely licensed practitioners. To the victors, go the spoils of successful 
cultural cartography: not only do their claims become real enough for others to act 
on them, not only is their authority to make truth provisionally sustained, but they 
enjoy (for a while anyway) the soaring esteem, cascading influence and possibly 
abundant material resources (cash, equipment, bodies-and-minds) needed to make 
still more truthful tales. (1999: 13-4, my emphases)  
Similarly, in SCR, there have been calls to stop work using embryos, and replace it with 
“adult” SCR, which some consider more ethically sound. Thus, if a map is stabilised, where 
embryo research is outside the boundaries of “good science”, the whole future of embryonic 
SCR would be at stake. This ability to have one’s utterances of “truth” recognised, at least 
temporally, as such is reminiscent of Bourdieu’s analysis of symbolic capital above. Like 
Bourdieu, Gieryn notes that this “epistemic authority” is not something that exists 
objectively, rather, is constructed and acted out socially. This thesis examines how my 
informants locate and act upon authority, to which knowledge claims they assign the label 
“truth”, and how this impacts on engagement. This must be done without imposing an 
analyst’ view of what science is or should be, as suggested by Gilbert and Mulkay’ (1984) 
version of discourse analysis.  
 
2.5.2 Discourse analysis 
Both Bourdieu and Foucault direct our attention towards discourses26 as reflections and 
constitutions of power relations. Discourse is also the focus of a variety of social studies of 
science, including the rhetorical strategies used in cultural cartography, as we have examined 
above (see also Mulkay, 1993; Wright, 1993; Michael, 1996; Irwin, 2006). Therefore, I am 
interested in scientists’ “discourse”, which for me is concerned not only with “linguistic 
utterances” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 146) – which can be written as well as spoken – 
                                                     
26 Foucault does not use the term “discourse” in English in the works I discuss above, and his use of 
that label in his earlier works – on which I do not draw – is too restrictive and linguistic for my use of 
this concept (see Sawyer, 2002, for a detailed critique of Foucault's use of the term "discourse"). 
Nevertheless, my use of the label “discourse” corresponds well to the sorts of power relations and 
normalising influences that Foucault discusses in the works on which I draw. In addition, he uses the 
term “discours” in French for example in “Histoire de la Sexualité 1” (1976). Therefore Foucault has 
made me think about “discourse”, not in the sense he uses in English, but in a broader sense, which is 
relevant to this thesis. 
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but also with the social context in which they take place – that is the relation to other 
utterances27, who they are aimed at, the power relations that are being played out, whether 
the speaker is seen or not to have the authority to make these statements, the identities taken 
on by the speaker of attributed to him/her etc. My ontological, epistemological and 
methodological commitments, especially in relation to discourse, are set out in more detail in 
the following chapter on my research design. Before turning to that, I want to end the present 
chapter by discussing the main analytical tools used in this thesis. 
 
Gilbert and Mulkay’s book “Opening Pandora’s Box” (1984) has been very influential in 
social studies of scientists’ discourses and is a central inspiration for my  work on stem cell 
researchers. For Gilbert and Mulkay: 
Discourse analysis […] is the attempt to identify and describe regularities in the 
methods used by participants as they construct the discourse through which they 
establish the character of their actions and beliefs in the course of interaction.  
Gilbert and Mulkay break with previous sociological tradition in that they suggest the 
importance of studying how scientists talk, before using what they say as resources to build a 
picture of the social world (see also Mulkay and Gilbert, 1982; Mulkay et al., 1983). They 
advocate that the study of discourse as a “topic” is “methodologically prior” to that of 
discourse as a “resource” (1984: 8). I follow Gilbert and Mulkay’s approach in that I use 
discourse as a “topic” 28. However, following others such as Kerr et al. (1997), I also use 
discourse as a “resource”29 and I am also interested in dimensions beyond discourse, such as 
power and  institutional settings30. 
 
To investigate scientists’ discourse, Gilbert and Mulkay look for regularities and 
interpretative flexibilities in their talk. They uncover that scientists use two main modes of 
accounting for the social world, using the “contingent repertoire” and the “empiricist 
repertoire”: 
We call this repertoire the ‘empiricist repertoire’ because it portrays scientists’ 
actions and beliefs as following unproblematically and inescapably from the 
empirical characteristics of an impersonal natural world. (1984: 56) 
                                                     
27 See, for example, the concept of intertextuality, coined by Kristeva when relaying Bakhtin’s work 
on the relation between utterances (discussed in Fairclough, 1992) 
28 By studying discourse as a “topic”, I can also examine the performative aspects of language. 
29 This is true in particular at the beginning of chapter 5, although I come to the realisation that using 
discourse as a resource is limited.  
30 My ontology and epistemology, including a focus on discourse analysis, are set out more explicitly 
in chapter 3. 
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When this [contingent] repertoire is employed, scientists’ actions are no longer 
depicted as generic responses to the realities of the natural world, but as the 
activities and judgements of specific individuals acting on the basis of their 
personal inclinations and particular social positions. (1984: 57) 
Gilbert and Mulkay find that the empiricist repertoire is very common in scientific 
publications, whereas the contingent repertoire is more common in informal accounts. 
Similarly, stem cell researchers’ use of various repertoires and interpretative devices will be 
explored. In particular, examples where scientists accept contingent factors as intrinsically 
linked to the production of scientific knowledge must be explored, since, like Wynne, I am 
advocating more (interpretative) reflexivity on the part of scientific institutions and looking 
for ways to incorporate lay knowledges into decision making around science. 
 
One role of the contingent repertoire described by Gilbert and Mulkay is that it enables 
scientists to “account for error”. They use the empiricist repertoire to describe their own 
actions, and the contingent repertoire to explain the error in others’ beliefs which are 
contrary to their own (1984: 72) Gilbert and Mulkay find that this “asymmetrical 
counterposition of empiricist and contingent versions of action and belief” (1984: 82) 
reinforces the idea that the speakers beliefs are “true”, that is uncontaminated by contingent 
factors. 
 
The “truth will out device” or TWOD (1984: 90-111) is another key rhetorical strategy found 
by Gilbert and Mulkay, whereby “temporality is used as an interpretive device”. TWODs are 
examples of “reconciliation devices” as they enable present uncertainties, which are often 
attributed to contingent factors, to be treated as unproblematic as they will inevitably be 
resolved in the future, when “truth” will emerge and researchers’ empiricist conceptions of 
the world can be reinforced. This strategy reinforces a notion of the “truth” as insulated from 
contingent factors that can cause errors; thus, even if a speaker is in error, s/he can have faith 
that eventually “truth” will shed any contingent contaminations and be revealed. 
 
An additional finding by Gilbert and Mulkay is that “consensus” is “best conceived as a 
contextually variable aspect of scientists’ discourse” (1984: 112). It enables participants to 
augment the authority of their own view by suggesting it is simply a consensus view, and 
that anyone who thinks about it properly would come to the same conclusion.  
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Using a slightly adapted version of Gilbert and Mulkay’s discourse analysis, Kerr et al. 
(1997) reveal another interpretative device: the “micro/macro split”, used by new human 
genetics professionals. This device enables professionals to maintain the claim that “good 
science” is neutral and objective – at the micro, empirical level – even if contingent factors 
can be detected at the macro level of its generation and application. This division is 
permeable: there may be contingent influences on research itself – like the areas funded at 
particular times or the selection of what experiments should be done first – and scientists 
may enter the social realm – but only to give objective advice. Thus, the flexibility of the 
“micro/macro split” enables scientists to maintain their authority and acknowledge the 
existence of contingent factors, but also highlight that these do not affect the final outcome 
of scientific research: “objective truth”. 
 
All these interpretative devices serve to heighten the speaker’s authority, or in Bourdieu’s 
words, it increases their “symbolic power” by “creating belief in the legitimacy of the words 
and of the person who utters them” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 148). As noted by Kerr 
et al. (1997), accounts of power relations are missing in Gilbert and Mulkay’s analysis of 
scientists’ discourse. This thesis, in contrast, pays particular attention to how informants 
maintain or generate authority in their utterances and enable particular power relations.  
 
Gilbert and Mulkay’s version of discourse analysis has also been criticised by Gieryn (1982: 
291-2), who argues that social science would become impoverished were it to focus solely 
on discourse as a “topic”. He argues for the need to look at science within its institutional 
context, including power relations and social norms. Acknowledging this critique, but 
accepting the analytical significance of discourse as a topic, the present research relates 
discourses to broader contexts such as parliamentary debates. It examines scientists’ 
accounts of different aspects of SCR, how they discuss engagement and how they 
dynamically construct categories such “good science”, “expertise”, “lay knowledge” or 
“embryo”, and what implications these constructions and categorisations have for public 
engagement in science. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
These diverse literatures inform the present thesis. They help problematise the “lay”/“expert” 
dichotomy and open up roads towards (interpretative) reflexivity in science and improved 
science-public relations. However, two provisos must be made before turning to the research 
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design. Firstly, as Michael and Brown (2000) highlight, it is very easy and appealing to 
impute “deficits” to others (deficits of scientific, sociological, or political knowledge, of 
trust, etc.). This thesis does more than point out scientists’ deficits in reflexivity (for 
example), it also investigates other dimensions of their identities and shows that they are, 
like other social beings, full of complexities and ambiguities. Secondly, engagement is not 
put forward as a panacea. This follows suggestions from development studies research, for 
example:  
Ironically, though, authentic reflexivity requires a level of open-mindedness that 
accepts that participatory development may inevitably be tyrannical, and a 
preparedness to abandon it if this is the case. Thus any meaningful attempt to save 
participatory development requires a sincere acceptance of the possibility that it 
should not be saved. (Cooke and Kothari, 2001b:15) 
Thus, although the present research is conducted with a commitment to engagement, this is 
not to suggest that engagement is either necessary or sufficient for the resolution of all 
science-public relation problems. 
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Chapter 3  
            
Research design:  





This thesis is concerned with public engagement in SCR and stem cell researchers’ 
engagement with publics. It examines stem cells researchers’ discourses around these 
themes, as a way of exploring constructions of SCR, expertise and scientific citizenship.  
 
This chapter discusses my research design. It starts with the research questions and how they 
came about. It then focuses on the epistemological framework and theoretical commitments 
guiding the research. It then discusses data collection and data analysis, before concluding 
with a reflecting upon this study and its limitations. This research was undertaken in an 
iterative fashion, where phases of data analysis informed subsequent phases of data 
collection. Thus, the separations between the sections in this chapter, done for the sake of 
clarity, are somewhat artificial. 
 
3.2 Research questions 
3.2.1 Background and initial decisions 
The research design developed gradually throughout my thesis, shaped by previous 
education, guidance from supervisors, interests and findings from earlier phases of data 
collection and data analysis. 
 
I was registered to do a traditional laboratory-based PhD after my research Masters in 
Human Genetics. When my science supervisor, Veronica, gave me the opportunity of doing 
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a more ethico-sociological PhD, I seized upon it. Given the chance to focus of a variety of 
subjects, I chose SCR. One reason for this was a particularly novel stem cell paper I had 
come across during my Masters year. It was considered ground-breaking at the time (by 
myself and various science journals) because it suggested that stem cells from the bone 
marrow could give rise not only to various types of blood cells but also to a range of other 
cells types including skin, nerve and liver cells (see Jiang et al., 2002). This suggested that 
cells found in adults were much more versatile than previously thought. Another reason for 
choosing SCR was that it can be seen to include recent work on cloning (such as the creation 
of Dolly the sheep) and the derivation of stem cells from human embryos. Therefore it 
seemed like a very exciting area of scientific research, which also raised issues of public 
concern.  
 
Early decisions about my thesis occurred at a time when many research institutions, 
including my funding body (the MRC), were trying to improve their public communication 
strategies. I remember my first conversation with Sarah, who was to become my social 
science supervisor, when I talked about researching ways to improve public “understanding” 
of the promise of SCR (needless to say that conversation would be different today). We 
discussed her research on publics and their sophisticated understandings of SCR. This was 
the start of my rethinking of science-public relations and led to my focus on two way 
engagement, rather than one-way communication. At this point, I realised I was in a 
privileged position, having access to scientists through my contacts from my earlier training 
and “speaking their language”. I settled upon studying relations between science and publics 
by looking at scientists’ accounts, especially since scientists have a central role in public 
engagement.  
 
3.2.2 Questions and analytical framework 
Whilst thinking about the main themes for my thesis, I started doing more reading around 
SCR and sociology, and following some STS courses. This helped develop my research 
questions. Starting with the “crisis of trust” identified by the House of Lords (2000), this 
research examines “public engagement” and its multiple meanings. Although there is a need 
for social scientists to highlight that lay people have relevant and legitimate contributions to 
make to science, it is also important to do more that that, including examining scientists’ 
discourses about engagement. Using a variety of sociological tools, this thesis studies the 
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fluid science-public interface, since this is a social location where interesting power, 
authority and trust negotiations take place. My thesis addresses two main research questions: 
 
1. How do scientists talk about their views, understandings, and experiences of publics, 
engagement, and SCR and the issues surrounding this field? 
 
This research question raises four inter-related themes: 
 
i) The construction of the stem cell field 
This theme examines what counts as “SCR” for some researchers and what does not; what is 
raised as the greatest promise of SCR or the most concerning issues; how definitions of 
different types of stem cells are given; how the history of the stem cell field is rendered or 
how it’s futures are imagined; and whether some scientists acknowledge that their field may 
be constructed. 
 
ii) The construction of publics 
This theme looks at the roles envisaged by scientists for different publics; how publics are 
defined and contrasted, or assimilated, to scientists and experts; how science-public relations 
are played out and discussed; and the sorts of knowledges, expertises, emotions or fears 
projected onto publics. 
 
iii) The purpose of engagement 
This studies the meanings that scientists give to engagement; what aims they describe for it 
(such as promotion of research, education, raising problems etc.); how they would “improve” 
it; who they see as having a role in it; whether there is a move away from the deficit model; 
and how engagement, legislation and decision-making are, or should be, related. 
 
iv) Reflexivity 
This thesis specifically looks for opportunities for “reflexivity” and “emancipation” from 
existing power relations (as discussed in 2.4). It investigates how scientists view themselves; 
whether they confront the consequences of their work and the mutual shaping of science and 
society; and whether there is a move towards “reflexive scientization” (Beck, 1992: 165) and 
more “interpretative” (Lynch, 2000) forms of reflexivity (see section 2.4.1). 
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2. What implications do these discourses have for public engagement in science and 
scientists’ engagement with publics? 
 
This theme arose during data analysis and is the focus of the last two substantive chapters. 
The way in which scientists conceive of, define, label and project images of, publics, 
engagement and SCR, shapes how science-public relations can take place. If publics are seen 
as uncritical vessels for information, the routes to more inclusive engagement will be 
different to those possible if publics are seen as active agents in the construction of science. 
Similarly, scientists’ views of engagement, and of the sorts of “capital” (for example 
technological expertise) acceptable in public discussions, will shape science-public relations. 
We should also think about how opportunities for reflexivity can be used to change how 
public engagement is done.  
 
There are three main analytical foci to explore these research questions: 
 
1. Factors shaping these discourses and views  
As Kerr et al. (1998c: 179) suggest, social locations influence professional concerns. These 
locations include the extent to which people’s identities and situatedness (such as research 
field, seniority, gender, experiences of engagement, or contact with publics such as patients 
and patent lawyers) play a role in scientists’ discourses of public engagement in SCR. The 
impact of national settings (different legislations, history of science-public relations, political 
and ethical environments) is particularly relevant here, since science is at once local and 
international. This can highlight some factors that could help improve dialogues between 
scientists and publics.  
 
2. Strategies to maintain authority 
These comprise the language and labels used by scientists in different settings (for example 
in private or in public, with peers or with other types of “experts”); the discursive tools they 
deploy to maintain authority; the boundaries they erect; and how authority, legitimacy, trust 
and power are negotiated. A better understanding of rhetorical strategies can provide an 
insight into scientists’ concerns. It can also suggest, for example, how certain features of 
“private” discourses can be brought out into “public”. 
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3. Expertise, trust and contextual knowledge 
The different epistemological frameworks used by scientists to make sense of the world 
around them are explored. The analysis teases out ways in which particular forms of 
knowledge are legitimised by scientists, who is given the status of “expert” and how 
relations between experts and lay people are negotiated. Occasions when scientists portray 
themselves as “lay”, and need to rely on other “experts”, are also explored. This provides 
insights into relations of trust between various actors and can suggest ways in which 
alternative types of knowledge can be respected and used in public discussions and policy-
making. 
 
This thesis seeks to speak to social and natural scientists since both have an interest in 
science-public relations. The initial responses from talking to ex-colleagues, as well as the 
support the MRC has displayed for this project, support this assertion. In addition, the fact 
that I was supervised by a natural scientist as well as a social scientist helps ensure this 
research stays relevant to both groups.  
 
3.3 Epistemological and theoretical frameworks 
3.3.1 Ontology, epistemology and methodology 
As a scientist by training, I came to this project with a positivist approach and was expecting 
to uncover part of the unique reality that exists outside of human activity. However, this 
viewpoint ignores the importance of investigating how particular forms of knowledge 
become accepted as “fact” and others not; and how power and authority are managed. 
Informed by my various readings and classes, I now take the position that all forms of 
knowledge are socially constructed and consider myself an epistemological relativist. 
However, I reject ontological relativism and the concept that there is no unique external 
reality. I believe that there is a common physical world, which exists independently of our 
knowledge of it, and that “[t]he real world is culturally filtered as meanings are constructed” 
(Jones, 2002: 248). I think the investigation of what shapes the construction of meaning can 
help solve problems in the physical world. 
 
Although we cannot directly know the world (by observing it or by using reason), we make 
sense of it: we classify it, we impose meaning on it, we make knowledge claims about it and 
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we shape others’ claims about it. These activities are achieved through discourse, in the 
sense adopted by Wetherell from Mouffe and Laclau, where discourse is: “the unceasing 
human activity of making meaning” (Wetherell, 1998: 403). Thus, discourse plays a central 
role in constituting us as social beings. Following Potter and Wetherell, whose work builds 
on and extends Gilbert and Mulkay’s, this research takes an approach to discourse analysis 
which:  
is concerned with talk and texts as social practices [...] has a triple concern with 
action, construction and variability [...] [and has a] concern with the rhetorical or 
argumentative organization of talks and texts (Potter and Wetherell, 1994: 48).  
This definition of discourse is broader than that used by conversation analysts and 
structuralists, for example (critiqued in Wetherell, 1998), or even by Gilbert and Mulkay, 
whose focus on “accounts” is quite restrictive31. 
 
Discourse is seen as a creative, rather than a descriptive, activity. This conceptualisation 
enables me to explore what my participants say and how this can construct different versions 
of reality or impose particular worldviews. However, I do not claim to access what any of 
them really think; like many of the researchers discussed in the literature review, this PhD is 
not concerned with the truth content of particular utterances, but in how utterances are made 
and what implications they may have. 
 
One of my main sources of data was interviews. Interviewing is currently a very prominent 
method of qualitative data collection in the social sciences and some argue that we live in an 
“interview society” where the interview is assumed to be central in accessing and making 
sense of our real identities (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Silverman, 2001: 22). However,  
in keeping with my epistemology, I think that an interview cannot exactly reflect private 
thoughts (see Michael, 1996: 97) and one should not ignore the “creative activities” and 
“biographical work” undertaken by interviewer and interviewee (Atkinson and Silverman, 
1997). To reiterate, interviews are not used to access who my informants really are and what 
they really think. Rather, they are used to access informants’ accounts of events and the 
implications of these. Interviews are similar to naturally occurring conversations in that they 
often consist of retrospective accounts in which informants make sense of, and re-order, the 
past in light of the present (Silverman, 1973). Thus, they are a good means of investigating 
scientists’ interpretative practices (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Mulkay, 1985). In 
                                                     
31 I further discuss how I draw on Gilbert and Mulkay’s frameworks but expand them in section 3.5.1 
below. 
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addition, interviews are not “culturally unique” (Kerr et al., 1997; see also Wetherell, 2003: 
13) and many of the researchers interviewed had previously been interviewed by journalists 
or had given evidence in parliament. Nevertheless, one-to-one interviews provide access to 
data not otherwise obtainable because focussed discussions give rise to more data on a 
specific topic than naturally occurring talk (Rapley, 2004: 29). Interviews are also useful in 
that they reveal practices and repertoires, used in these more private settings, which can be 
reproduced in public to improve science-public relations.  
 
It is also important to look beyond particular instances of discourse. Indeed, as suggested by 
Wetherell, I take into account the situatedness of the various discursive processes: 
productive and constructive discursive processes [are seen] as extending way 
beyond the activities in the immediate conversation. The constructive process 
emerges historically. Past and current collective negotiations organize the spaces 
(physical, institutional, and symbolic) in which conversations take place, for 
example, as well as the ways in which people and events can be represented 
within them. (Wetherell, 2003: 24) 
Therefore, I complement accounts from interviews with discourses found in other arenas 
such as scientific journals, the news media and parliamentary debates, and consider each 
instance of discourse in their broader institutional, historical and cultural contexts.   
 
3.3.2 Symmetry, “methodological” reflexivity and infinite regress 
The epistemological relativism I have discussed above has specific methodological 
counterparts. In particular, the present research aims to be “symmetrical in method” (Bloor, 
1976). This is the third tenet of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. It means that all 
beliefs are analysed in the same sociological fashion, whether they correspond to what is 
currently held to be “true” or “false”. The notion of symmetry is particularly pertinent for a 
study of science where there are disagreements amongst stem cell researchers about the 
promises of various types of stem cells. My analysis is “impartial” (Bloor, 1976) to the truth 
or falsity of knowledge claims and, rather, investigates why and how particular constructions 
are mobilised in particular circumstances, and what implications this has for engagement.  
 
Another central tenet of SSK is that it should be “reflexive” – what Lynch would call 
“methodological reflexivity” (2000: 29-30): that is, its explanations of how scientific 
knowledge claims come about should also be applicable to social scientific knowledge 
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claims (Bloor, 1976). Bloor responds to those who argue that this form of reflexivity causes 
SSK to become “self-refuting” by stating that this criticism is only convincing if one 
believes that social construction equates with error, which for him is not the case. (Bloor, 
1976 [1991]: 16). Likewise, I see the knowledge claims that I make as socially contingent. 
Nevertheless, they can have implications for the practice of engagement, since they offer 
alternative interpretations and frames of meaning (as discussed in 2.4). Thus for me, 
relativist arguments can be applied to social scientific findings without undermining them. 
 
A similar tu quoque argument has been made against discourse analysis: how can discourse 
analysts deconstruct and analyse accounts, when their findings will, themselves, be conveyed 
in particular accounts which can also be deconstructed (discussed in Fuhrman and Oehler, 
1986; Potter, 1987)? Many discourse analysts respond to this by focussing on reflexivity and 
thereby reflecting upon how analysts’ own texts are created. Some even try out new forms of 
academic writing that eschew the standard, single-voice authoritative account, via so-called 
“new literary forms” (discussed in Potter and Wetherell, 1987; e.g. Woolgar, 1993). 
Although I agree with Woolgar and others that this focus on reflexivity and the creation of 
the analysts’ accounts is interesting and a “means of signalling an opportunity for theoretical 
sensitizing” (Woolgar, 1992: 338), I do concur with some critics of this work who find that 
this radical form of reflexivity can lead to a “relativist regress” causing us “to have nothing 
to say” (Collins and Yearley, 1992: 302), or at least nothing interesting to say. As Barber 
argues: 
No amount of reflexive writing about the way sociologists write about science can 
pretend to replace writing about science itself and will only generate endless 
volumes of initially interesting but eventually sterile prose. (1992: 114) 
Following this, whilst remaining aware of the constructedness of the knowledge claims – and 
of the accounts of the knowledge claims – made in this thesis, my research is more focussed 
on how scientists construct their claims and what these claims do. 
 
3.3.3 Values and political stances 
The above discussion on reflexivity has highlighted the importance of reflecting on one’s 
knowledge claims, methodological and epistemological choices, and on the constructedness 
of one’s accounts. Part of this involves thinking about one’s values and political aims.  
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No research can be separated from the researcher’s values, experience, background and so on 
and be “value-free” (Gouldner, 1962). Therefore, although the present research takes a 
methodologically symmetrical and impartial approach, it steps away from some SSK 
scholars who argue that we should try as far as possible to be value-free (e.g. Collins, 1996): 
my views have inevitably been challenged, changed and shaped by this study and I cannot 
pretend that I am neutral with regards to what is said about SCR in public. This does not 
mean that one must “side with the underdog” as suggested by other SSK scholars (e.g. Scott 
et al., 1990) and feminists (e.g. Wilkinson, 1999), since the underdog is not always that easy 
to identify (see Ashmore, 1996; Collins, 1996; Wynne, 1996a). Nevertheless, I am aware 
that my research may be “captured” (Scott et al., 1990) by some stem cell researchers or 
publics and I also briefly reflect on this in the concluding chapter. 
 
So, rather than attempting to be value free, I try to be value aware. One strategy for this is to 
make one’s assumptions explicit. This position has been advocated by many feminists (e.g. 
Stanley and Wise, 1993; Maynard and Purvis, 1994). I do this at three levels. Firstly, I try to 
make my (ever-changing) views and feelings about SCR and engagement explicit to myself. 
This involved writing a research diary and thinking about my views during interviews and 
during the analysis process. Secondly, I shared some of my views and feelings with my 
informants before interviews by providing them with information concerning my 
background and thoughts about engagement. Thirdly, I include biographical details and my 
theoretical commitments in the present thesis and in other contexts where I present my 
research findings.  
 
In addition to this, while I am committed to an impartial analysis, I cannot shy away from 
political implications of my research. Following Wetherell, we cannot claim that analysts 
have a better access to truth than participants32. Nevertheless, we do have important 
contributions to make since: “In the past these forms of knowing derived from scholarship 
have been useful and powerful. (Wetherell, 2003: 25, emphases added). I believe that 
sociological analyses of scientists’ discourses can have important and normative implications 
for public engagement in science.  
 
In a similar vein, Winner  (1993) has highlighted the crucial political role scholarly research 
can play. He criticises the idea that one can describe different interpretations – of artefacts in 
                                                     
32 This differs from Bourdieu, as discussed in 2.4.2. 
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his example – and not be concerned with power and the implications of some interpretations 
becoming fact and not others. He argues that: 
It is necessary for social theorists to go beyond what positivists call value 
neutrality and what constructivists resurrect as interpretative flexibility. One must 
move on to offer coherent arguments about which ends, principles and conditions 
deserve no only our attention but also our commitment. (Winner, 1993: 374) 
Following Winner, the present work is considered to be inherently and unavoidably political: 
by pointing out alternative framings for public engagement, for example, I am making a 
political statement that these statements are worth pointing out, and might be worth adopting.  
My work specifically seeks to offer alternatives to the way public engagement is done and, 
in the conclusion, will even make specific normative suggestions as to how engagement 
could be improved.  
 
3.3.4  A grounded theory-inspired approach 
Overall, this research project is data driven. It draws on certain methodological principles of 
grounded theory, with data collection and analysis feeding into each other. I do not however 
adopt grounded theory’s realist epistemology, instead following constructivist adaptations of 
this approach.  
 
Grounded theory is an approach to qualitative research developed by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) that involves an iterative process of constantly going between empirical data 
collection and analysis in order to generate theories grounded in data. As Pidgeon (1996) 
argues, grounded theory is a methodology, but also an epistemological stance. 
Epistemologically, some grounded theorists argue that there are true interpretation of the 
world which can be revealed; that is, they believe in the “discovery of theory from data” 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 1, emphasis added). This original formulation of grounded theory 
has evolved, with Glaser becoming more interested in theory “construction”, and Strauss 
(publishing with Corbin) in theory “discovery” (discussed in Heath and Cowley, 2004) and 
hypothesis testing (discussed in Pidgeon, 1996). Strauss’ focus in particular does not fit well 
with my epistemological commitments.  
 
In keeping with my epistemology, I prefer to follow constructionist revisions of grounded 
theory and focus on the strengths of its methodology, rather than on its more problematic 
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realist epistemology. Constructionist versions of grounded theory highlight the “creative 
dynamic character of the research process” and the importance of the researchers’ 
“perspective from which they seek to build their analyses” (Pidgeon, 1996: 83, see also 
Potter and Wetherell, 1994: 51), which fit in well with my own epistemology. In addition,  
some of these revision suggest focussing more on discourse analytic methods (Pidgeon, 
1996: 83) such as the approaches I favour (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and 
Mulkay, 1985; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996). 
 
From grounded theory, I adopt an interest in “sensitizing concept”. This notion was 
introduced by Blumer to describe a concept that “gives the user a general sense of reference 
and guidance in approaching empirical instances” (1954: 7). It highlights the need for 
researchers to have theoretical insights to help in their data analysis. Here, sensitizing 
concepts include the construction of expertise and knowledge, “boundary-work”, power, 
authority and “trust”. These concepts guide the coding and analysis of my data but do not 
dictate the themes that emerge. From grounded theory I also adopt a commitment to 
“constant comparison” between data and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; see also 
Pidgeon, 1996: 77-80; Pidgeon and Henwood, 1996; Heath and Cowley, 2004) and 
“theoretical sampling” (see below). My research is thus very iterative and data collection and 
analysis happen concurrently, with initial phases of data collection informing and shaping 
subsequent ones. 
 
3.4 Data collection 
My overall strategy is to study accounts of stem cell researchers in and from different social 
locations and to explore the implications of these. Some of my choices are outlined above 
but the methodological decisions that came later are discussed here. The main sources of 
data are interviews with 48 stem cell researchers (31 in Australia and 17 in the UK) and two 
multi-disciplinary discussions (in the UK), bringing the total number of stem cell researchers 
investigated to 54. 
 
3.4.1 Multiple sites of data collection 
1. Who and what? 
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Stem cell researchers from different social locations are studied. Researchers of varying 
levels of seniority are spoken to: research assistants, PhD students, post-docs and group 
leaders. By accessing dominant as well as marginal discourses, this research reveals 
differences between, for example, “media-savvy” senior researchers and their less 
experienced colleagues. Researchers involved in human as well as animal SCR are included, 
partly because few scientists have licences for human SCR, and partly because both these 
types of SCR are closely related, with findings from one feeding into the other and vice 
versa. This research also looks at scientists involved in adult and embryonic human (and 
mouse) SCR, in order to explore whether the dichotomies between these two areas, set up in 
the media, are reproduced in other social locations. I also speak to a couple of researchers 
involved in immunology, which is directly related to the clinical application of SCR. In 
addition, the study sample includes purely academic researchers, as well as ones involved in 
commercialisation, because of public concerns about this (Parry, 2003b).  
 
The scientific research environment is often considered male dominated and I was planning 
on specifically trying to speak with women as well as men researchers. However, the 
selection of people for interviews or participation in the multi-disciplinary discussions 
tended to be based on people’s topic of study, level of seniority and geographical location 
(and of course on their availability). Nevertheless, approximately one third of my 
interviewees are women and there are more women than men in the multi-disciplinary 
discussions.  
 
2.  Studying two countries 
The beginning of my research design followed the decision in the USA not to allow the 
federal funding of research that destroys embryos, including embryonic stem cell research. 
This led to warnings in the scientific press of an exodus of scientists from the USA to the 
UK where embryonic stem cell research is permitted (see Science, 2001) and highlighted the 
impact of legislation on research. I therefore opted to study scientists in countries with 
different legislative frameworks. There is a limit to what can be achieved in the timeframe of 
a PhD and two countries is a good number for doctoral research.  
 
The first country I chose was the UK, Scotland in particular, because it is an internationally 
recognised centre of excellence in SCR, and more pragmatically, Edinburgh was where I was 
studying and knew scientists. The second country was Australia, chosen for a variety of 
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reasons. One is that, like the UK, it is a leader in reproductive technologies33, is at the 
forefront of SCR (e.g. BBC News, 2001) and is one of the few countries to have derived 
embryonic cell lines approved for use in the USA (NIH, 2001). In both the UK and 
Australia, there is also an institutional commitment to including public voices in some 
decisions around science: for example, in the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority regularly consults publics; and, in Australia, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council welcomes submissions from the Australian community on a variety of 
issues.  
 
An important reason to focus on the UK and Australia is that, although they have similar 
systems of governance, they had, at the time of my data collection, different legislation with 
regards to SCR. In the UK, scientists could create embryos and then cell lines using cloning 
techniques, whereas those in Australia could not34. This situation changed when the 
Australian legislation was amended to allow the cloning of embryos for research purposes. 
My Australian interviews took place in the lead up to the reviews of the cloning legislation. 
This means that in the UK, the battle to allow the creation embryo for research had 
essentially been won, whereas in Australia, it was about to be fought again.  
 
Although data were gathered in two countries, this thesis does not systematically compare 
scientists in Australia and the UK. It is not aiming to interview “equivalent” people (same 
gender, level of seniority, media experience and research topic) in the two countries, in order 
to uncover the precise factor that creates a difference in opinion. It is, instead, looking at a 
variety of researchers, in a variety of settings, to explore some differences and similarities. 
Therefore this research is not either a case-study, with each country being one “unit of 
analysis” (Yin, 1984: 29). I find that in order to address my research questions, it is more 
useful to think in terms of multiple instances of science-public interactions.  
 
From these studies, I am not hoping to draw “grande generalizations”, but “petite 
generalizations” (Stake, 1995: 7); that is, small refinements to my findings and further 
insights. Even a two-country study focussing on scientists’ discourses can shed light on 
notions as complex science, publics and engagement, and conclusions relating to the UK and 
Australia can be generalised to most developed countries. Similarly, findings derived by 
                                                     
33 For instance, Melbourne witnessed the world’s first IVF pregnancy under Carl Wood’s supervision 
(De Kretzer et. al, 1973), donor insemination program (Leeton and Backwell, 1976) and frozen 
embryo baby (Trounson and Mohr, 1983) (for other examples, see 
http://www.monashivf.edu.au/about/milestones.html). 
34 See chapter 4 for more details on these legislations and on how stem cells are derived. 
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focussing on SCR can be expanded to other sciences that are particularly relevant to public 
engagement. 
 
3. Access, sampling and timing 
Potential informants were accessed by: directly contacting researchers I knew from working 
in science; attending scientific conferences or public talks where I would introduce myself, 
provide a four page summary of my background and PhD; sending out letters with details of 
my research to people I had not met and following up with an e-mail; contacting people 
recommended by earlier interviewees; and asking group leaders if I could interview some 
other members of their team.  
 
Thus, a combination of “theoretical”, or “purposive” (Silverman, 2001: 250-4; Gobo, 2004: 
448-9), and “snowball” (Gobo, 2004: 449) sampling was adopted. That is, informants were 
selected based on their relevance to the research questions and on suggestions by other 
informants. After a few interviews and initial rounds of data analysis, thus after “constant 
comparison”, new participants were identified. This was done until reaching “theoretical 
saturation” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 61-2). 
 
Data collection started in March 2004, with the first multi-disciplinary discussion. This was 
followed by a few pilot interviews. I then went to Australia from September 2004 to March 
2005 and conducted my Australian interviews. Upon returning to the UK, I conducted some 
more interviews. Data collection ended in September 2005 with the second multi-
disciplinary discussion.  
 
The timing of my research corresponds to a unique set of circumstances. In addition to the 
interesting circumstances with regards to the Australian legislative changes, the data 
collection was also marked by high profile publications and retractions in the field of SCR. 
The first set of events and publications relate to the ability (or not) of some adult cells to turn 
into other types of cells (for more details, see chapter 4). The second set relates to the 
promise of “therapeutic cloning” (or the ability to create patient-specific stem cells lines by 
cloning cells from an adult person, see chapter 4). In February 2004, a paper announcing the 
proof-of-principle of human therapeutic cloning was published by a team in South Korea 
(Hwang et al., 2004, retracted). In May 2005, the same team published a paper showing they 
had managed to drastically improve their cloning efficiencies, suggesting that therapeutic 
cloning could quite easily be used routinely in the clinic. However, these exciting 
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publications were followed by a string of events35 culminating in the retraction of the papers 
in January 2006 (Kennedy, 2006), due to all the findings being fraudulent36. All my 
Australian interviews and the first half of my UK ones took place after the publication of the 
first Korean paper. The other half of my UK data collection took place after the second 
publication and before the retractions. The promises and uncertainties raised by my 
informants would probably be different were my data collection to take place today. 
 
4. Scientists in multiple social locations 
Stem cell researchers were spoken to alone (in one-to-one interviews), in peer-groups (in 
group interviews) and in more “public” settings, with people from other specialisms (in 
multi-disciplinary discussions). This is complemented by reading some of the transcripts of 
the Australian parliamentary discussions about SCR as well as the submissions sent in during 
various phases of the legislation amendments. I also keep up with the scientific literature, 
attend scientific conferences and public discussions, watch televised debates about SCR and 
follow some of the international changes of legislation and discussions about SCR. 
Qualitative methods are used because they are the best suited to answering my research 
questions. Indeed, I am not interested in the percentage of stem cell researchers that are 
“very supportive of”, “supportive of”, “opposed to” or “strongly opposed to” public 
engagement. Rather, I want to explore scientists’ discourses in detail and think about them in 
terms of knowledge construction, maintenance of authority and public engagement.  
 
3.4.2 Multi-disciplinary discussions 
Two multi-disciplinary discussions were organised in the UK. These are a sort of cross 
between focus groups and science-public interactions.  
 
The first multi-disciplinary discussion was my first point of data collection. It was entitled 
“Stem cells, Scientists and Publics: Generating a Dialogue” and took place over an 
afternoon. Twelve people participated (including the chair) and I observed. Many of the 
participants knew each other. There were: 
                                                     
35 For a 2005 summary of this, see Nature News (see also Check and Cyranoski, 2005; Bionews, 
2006; Normile, 2006; Park et al., 2006; Snyder and Loring, 2006 for more details and more recent 
updates). 
36 There have also been many problems with unethical conduct and accusations of embezzlement (for 
more details, see SNU Investigation Committee, 2006) 
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 three stem cell researchers, 
 three people working as researchers or administrators in a scientific institute with an 
interest in SCR,  
 five social scientists whose work focuses on reproductive technologies, science and 
technology studies and/or public engagement, 
 one lawyer37. 
 
There were eight women and four men, and there was one person in an early stage of their 
career and eleven in later stages (group leaders, senior lecturers and professors). Participants 
were allocated particular seats in order to encourage them to mix. This discussion took place 
at INNOGEN and was co-sponsored by INNOGEN and the MRC Human Genetics Unit. It 
was audio and video recorded. 
 
One stem cell researcher and one social scientist began the afternoon with two talks. The 
former opened the discussion with an introduction to SCR, in particular its technical aspects 
and promises for clinical and pharmaceutical applications. The latter followed by a reflection 
on the constructions of publics, ignorance and risks, and on earlier embryos debates. Each 
talk took 25 minutes, which left 5 minutes at the end of each for questions of clarification. 
We then broke out for tea. This enabled participants to digest some of the information they 
had just received and chat amongst themselves. We then reconvened for a more in depth 
discussion. This focussed on the “strands for discussion” (see appendix 2) given on a hand-
out distributed at the beginning of the afternoon and on some of the issues raised in the 
question time before the break. The discussion was very lively and raised many issues. 
Shortly before the end of the afternoon, the chair brought the discussion to a close and asked 
the participants to share their thoughts about the event.  
 
The second multi-disciplinary discussion was my last point of data collection. It was entitled 
“Stem cells, Scientists and Publics: Continuing the Dialogue” and took place over a morning. 
In the first instance, I sent an e-mail invitation to people who had participated in the first 
multi-disciplinary discussion, asking them their availabilities. After finding the most suitable 
date, I sent letter invitations to new participants. There were fifteen participants:  
 six social scientists, 
                                                     
37 These separations are to an extent artificial as many of the social scientists are former natural 
scientists and many of the scientists had an interest in public engagement, often participating in 
various engagement exercises themselves.  
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 four stem cell researchers,  
 two scientists,  
 two lawyers, 
 one ethicist. 
There were twelve women and three men; and three people early in their career and twelve at 
later stages. Again, participants sat round a large table, but I did not give them set 
placements. The event took at the MRC Human Genetics Unit and was co-sponsored by 
INNOGEN and the MRC. It was audio recorded.  
 
The format was slightly different. I chaired and, rather than opening with two talks, 
discussions were encouraged using prompts, such as a speech made by Lord Winston about 
the hype of SCR, headlines from various scientific publications and discussions in Nature 
about whether or not publics should have a say in which scientific research projects get 
funding. Tea, coffee, fruit and biscuits were available throughout to encourage a relaxed 
atmosphere. As in the first event, I closed the discussion by asking everyone to give their 
thoughts about the morning. All the participants seemed to enjoy both discussions. Many 
came to see me afterwards and told me so. These events are interesting to analyse as a 
process of public engagement, albeit participants were all elites.  
 
In both cases, although there were particular topics that I wanted to focus on, the participants 
were also able to raise their own issues and concerns. In this sense, these multi-disciplinary 
discussions were similar to focus groups where participants have some control over the 
conversation topics (Wilkinson, 1999: 70) and which: 
are ideal for exploring people’s experiences, opinions, wishes and concerns. The 
method is particularly useful for allowing participants to generate their own 
questions, frames and concepts and to pursue their own priorities on their own 
terms, in their own vocabulary (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999: 5) 
However, my participants inhabited different social worlds, which at times meant that there 
were communication problems due to people using specialist vocabularies.  
 
These group settings can often be difficult to use with elite professionals. Indeed, Kerr 
conducted a focus group with senior health care professionals and claimed it was the “the 
most difficult research interaction she ha[d] ever encountered” (Cunningham-Burley et al., 
1999: 196). However this sort of approach is necessary to explore power relations and 
science public interactions. In addition the same authors note that “focus group research can 
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be harnessed to challenge the power of experts and contribute towards greater public 
engagement with policy decisions” (2000: 186). This certainly was the case here, where 
there was no sense of “non-scientists” deferring to stem cell researchers, and where many 
scientists commented upon how much they had learnt.  
 
3.4.3 One-to-one interviews 
I conducted 37 one-to-one interviews: 24 in Australia and 13 in the UK; 14 with women, 34 
with men; 10 with PhD students, 4 with post-docs and 23 with group leaders (or senior 
managers). The academic versus commercial divide is more difficult to establish as many 
researchers hold patents, are on advisory boards of companies and work in laboratories that 
are part government and part industry funded. The interviews ranged from 40 to 105 
minutes, with most lasting approximately 60 minutes. They took place in the scientists’ place 
of work (either private offices or common rooms), except for one that was over the phone. 
Out of all the people I approached, the overwhelming majority accepted to be interviewed. 
This is unusual and may indicate participants were interested in the topic of this research. 
 
Each interview began by me highlighting that, although quotes would not be attributed to 
people, complete anonymity could not guaranteed, due to the small size of the stem cell 
community. I would then ask informants if they accepted to be interviewed and recorded. 
For the first four interviews, consent was obtained orally, but for subsequent interviews, 
informants signed an informed consent form which also asked to state whether or not they 
wanted a copy of the transcript or a summary of the findings (see appendix 4). 
Approximately one third of informants wanted a copy of the transcript and the findings, one 
third wanted a copy of the findings only and one third wanted neither. Informants also 
received a summary of my research. This covered my education, the topic, objectives and 
methodology of my PhD, some points made by the critical Public Understanding of Science 
literature and the name of my supervisors. I added their contact details after the suggestion 
from one participant (see below).  
 
The topic guide, which evolved throughout my research, started with the same question to all 
participants, concerning their work and its relation to SCR. The rest of the interview was 
organised in themes (legislation, engagement, commercialisation etc.) and used prompts 
(quotes from other interviews, quotes from scientists in the press, legislative guidelines) to 
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help the discussion. The topic guide was rarely followed in order, or the questions asked with 
the exact same wording. Indeed, my questions often followed directly from what my 
informants had been talking about. When they used particularly interesting expressions I 
would make note of these and return to them if/when an appropriate moment came up.  
 
3.4.4 Group interviews 
Three group interviews were conducted: one with senior researchers (one woman and two 
men) and one with junior researchers (three women and one man) in Australia; and one with 
junior researchers (one woman and three men) in the UK. All three interviews lasted about 
one hour. 
 
The senior researchers were a well established pre-existing group in that these three people 
worked together and spent a lot of their spare time together too. They chose to be 
interviewed in a group rather than individually. The second group interview in Australia was 
with some of their students. I specifically requested a group setting as the day was drawing 
to a close and I felt I would obtain more information from four students in a group, than one 
or two spoken to individually. These researchers told me that, although they worked in the 
same laboratory, they were not used to talking to each other about the issues surrounding 
their work. Nevertheless, the interview went well and again, participants were able to 
challenge each other’s views and refine their positions. 
 
These first two group interviews were sort of ad-hoc and I had not planned a different set of 
questions for them. However, as they were a good data collection method, especially with 
younger informants, I decided to organise another group interview in the UK. I arranged for 
a room, brought cakes and juice, and developed a slightly different topic guide with specific 
prompts. I was planning for this group interview to be a focus group with participants talking 
to each other, rather than to me. However, the room we were in was long and thin; this meant 
that the four participants were sat in a line opposite me, making conversations amongst 
themselves difficult. Thus, it was difficult to encourage them to create their own questions 
and raise issues of importance to them. Nevertheless, the prompts did generate interesting 
discussions between the participants. 
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3.4.5 Background activities 
The above data were analysed in the context of some more public discourses. I observed 
stem cell researchers in scientific conferences and public engagement exercises. Although I 
was not always able to interview scientists I had seen talking in public, it was very useful to 
bear in mind the sort of discourse made in public when trying to make sense of those made 
in a more private setting. I also followed submissions made to the Australian Parliament by 
some of the scientists I had interviewed. This data was not included in the thesis, but helped 
me make better sense of the interviews. I also presented some of my findings to scientists 
and made notes of the comments raised in response to this. I also read any media articles that 
discussed stem cell related issues; I gained knowledge of many of these through a weekly e-
mail from Bionews.  
 
In addition, I kept up with the scientific literature by closely following the contents of: 
Nature, Nature Cell Biology, Nature Medicine, Nature Genetics, Nature Biotechnology and 
Science. I also set up automatic alerts to with key words such as “embryonic stem cell” or 
“human stem cell” which kept me up to date with relevant articles in journals such as Cell, 
Stem Cells and Journal of Cell Science. This selection of journals means that I am not 
problematising the peer-review system, or the hierarchies set up by scientists; I am not 
specifically looking at publications in non-peer reviewed journals or low impact journals.  
 
3.4.6 Reflections on data collection 
1. Consequences of working with a small community: anonymity and access 
One of my main concerns with this project was the difficulty of maintaining anonymity in 
such a small community as that of SCR. Indeed I had read about a study done in a small 
community where participants had subsequently identified the quotes from every other 
participant (Robson and Robson, 2002). Thus, I knew that I could not guarantee anonymity 
and I highlighted this in the summary and orally at the beginning of each interview. Most 
participants responded by saying that they either did not care what people thought since their 
views were well known, or that they did not think any one would have problems with what 
they would say. If I did ask them something they did not want to talk about they either went 
“off the record” (see below) or removed it from the transcript that I sent for checking (this 
only happened once). 
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Another problem that comes from working with a small community is precisely the small 
number of potential participants. Although I was aware of this when I started my research, I 
did not realise how much competition there would be for stem cell researchers in the UK. It 
seems journalists, and various social scientists flock towards them. I had to extend my UK 
research from Scotland to England and Wales. However, thanks to good response rates from 
Australian interviewees, I was easily able to conduct sufficient numbers of interviews. Thus, 
in retrospect, I was very lucky to do some research outside the UK. In addition, the multi-
disciplinary discussions were quite popular and I thankfully did not have to fight for 
participants. 
 
2. Creating a rapport with “elites” 
Accessing and studying elites is notoriously difficult (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Puwar, 1997; 
Cunningham-Burley et al., 1999; Undheim, 2003). The scientists studied, particularly the 
senior ones, as well as the people invited to the multi-disciplinary discussions, can all be 
considered elites in that they all occupy “a key place in power networks” (Undheim, 2003: 
online). I have already discussed some of the means by which I gained access to stem cell 
researchers for interviews and multi-disciplinary discussions. I think it was easier for me to 
organise the multi-disciplinary discussions in the UK than a group discussion with senior 
researchers in Australia because I had support from institutions that participants were 
familiar with and many of them knew (of) my supervisors.  
 
Once I had access to these elites, I aimed to create a rapport in which participants not only 
felt they could open up to me, but also respected me. One aspect of this was to highlight that 
participants could stop the interview at anytime and should not feel obliged to answer any 
question they were uncomfortable with. In particular, I insisted on showing participants 
where the “stop” button was on my recording device. Most laughed, telling me that they 
would not be revealing anything that secret. However, two interviewees did ask me to stop 
the recording to answer some questions “off the record” and others did comment during or 
after the interviews that they had ended up talking about topics they had not really thought 
about before and revealed more of their opinions than they had expected. The fact that no-
one contacted me to be removed from the study, or removed large sections of transcripts sent 
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In order to gain respect and not be patronised, I was also keen to demonstrate that I could 
“do” science and didn’t need to be lectured. Thus, my four page summary contained a few 
lines from my CV detailing my education and work experience in natural sciences (genetics 
in particular, see appendix 3). I also made sure I was wearing closed shoes, as open-toed 
ones are not allowed in laboratories for health and safety reasons. In addition, if someone 
started explaining something to me in very simplistic terms and was getting away from what 
I was interested in talking about, I would quickly make a comment or ask a question which 
“showed off” my understanding. I tried to renegotiate the power relations between 
researchers and myself by highlighting my knowledge. I also tended to use “technical” terms 
such as blastocyst or SCNT (somatic cell nuclear transfer), rather than embryo or therapeutic 
cloning, especially at the beginning of the interviews. This can be problematic as I am 
reinforcing a language that black-boxes many of the issues I want to examine. To deal with 
this, as the interview progressed, I would ask specific question relating to the language of 
SCR. 
 
Highlighting my identity as a trained scientist could be problematic as some informants may 
have assumed that, as a scientist, I was necessarily on their “side” and wanted to find ways 
of educating publics for example. However, I also highlighted my identity as a social 
scientist. I made clear in my summary, my oral introduction and during my questioning, that 
I was trying to be more critical of the participation agendas. As Ostrander (1995: 149) 
suggests, I made my objectives clear to “establish some control over the research situations 
from the outset”. There was one interview however where I found it quite difficult to steer 
the conversation. It was at the end of the day, one of my last interviews in a week averaging 
three to four interviews a day. The informant was very chatty and kept going off topic. As I 
was suffering from interview fatigue, I let this interview turn into a conversation. It was 
fascinating but there was not much data I could directly use. Following that, I no longer 
undertook such concentrated episodes of data collection.  
 
3. A difficult phone interview 
One of my interviews was rather unpleasant. It was the only one that took place over the 
phone. I think the fact that we were not face to face contributed to my difficulty in 
establishing a rapport. For most of the interview, the informant treated me like a journalist 
and tried to second guess why I was asking questions and how I would distort his words. 
When I asked him about informed consent, he refused to answer and instead dissected my 
consent form, telling me it was inappropriate because it did not contain contact information 
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of my supervisors for people to complain if need be. To try and regain control of the 
interview, I started explaining some of my questions, highlighting that I was not a journalist 
but a social scientist. For example, I explained that I was interested in who he wanted to 
include in public consultations not to criticise him if he forgot someone, but to try and get an 
idea about who scientists think are relevant and legitimate voices in debates around SCR. By 
the end of our interview, he was much nicer and stopped answering my questions with pre-
prepared sentences full of provisos. After this experience, I decided to concentrate on face-
to-face interviews, even if that meant more travelling.  
 
4. Interviewing students and young researchers 
When I interviewed junior participants, the power relations were different to when I 
interviewed senior researchers. In particular, I accessed many of them by interviewing their 
supervisors and asking if they would mind me speaking to their students, assistants or post-
docs (there were some exceptions when I targeted particular students I was interested in). 
This raised an issue of consent and coercion as participants may feel they had to be 
interviewed because their supervisors had agreed. Therefore I made it clear that they were 
under no obligation to participate. We could either just have a chat or they could go back to 
the lab. In addition, I spent more time explaining my project because they would not have 
received my summary in advance. All the students I spoke with however seemed quite happy 
to participate. 
 
3.4.7 Data presentation 
1. Transcriptions 
I transcribed the data for all my interviews and discussions (except: two interviews where I 
forgot to turn the microphone on; one interview and part of the second multi-disciplinary 
discussion that were transcribed by another person to help me save time; one interview 
where the informant chatted a lot and rarely addressed my questions, and one interview 
during which a fire alarm went off making the transcribing an extremely unpleasant – I only 
transcribed relevant sections in these cases). 
 
The interviews and discussions were recorded on mini-disks. During the transcription 
process, I created track marks approximately every five minutes of discussion. That is, I 
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divided the initial unique track corresponding to the whole interview into multiple tracks, 
each about five minutes long. I then noted the track number alongside the transcripts. This 
enabled me to easily return to particular sections of the interview on the minidisk, without 
having to re-listen to the whole recording. This was particularly useful when, after multiple 
readings of an interview, the tone of a particular passage, which may have been obvious 
during transcription, became lost to me.  
 
I sent back transcripts to participants that requested it. A couple of the more senior ones 
edited them and returned them to me. They mainly removed hesitations and made certain the 
passages about the “science” were clear. This made these interviews more polished. 
However the content, rhetorical and interpretative practices were not much affected. I only 
included the edited transcripts in my analysis 
 
2. Presentation of transcripts and anonymisation 
I gave each participant a pseudonym. However, some participants are quite famous, and can 
easily be recognised, particularly when I asked them about their participation in 
parliamentary debates or comments made during media interviews. I gave these people a 
second pseudonym38 which I used in instances where they would be recognisable. 
 
In some instances, I felt it was important to give a feeling for the whole sample I 
interviewed, usually in the form of a table, highlighting a particular aspect of each of my 
informants. Here, I used numbers or letters that nowhere else refer back to the individuals. In 
this way, there can be no attribution of quotes to particular people, but particular quotes can 
be put in the context of the whole sample of data collection. 
 
The symbols used in the transcripts reproduced in this thesis are as follows: 
 “[” marks an interruption 
                                                     
38 This may raise the hackles of some people in Australia who are familiar with the scandal that broke 
out around the publication of a book by Helen Garner about a case of sexual harassment (“The first 
Stone: some questions about sex and power”, Pan Macmillan Australia, 1996). In it, the author uses 
several pseudonyms for quotes from one particular feminist who criticised her. This gave the 
impression that there was an army of feminists out to get the author. This was widely controversial 
and leaves many uneasy about the use of multiple pseudonyms for one person. However, I feel it is 
appropriate in my case as I only ever use a maximum of two pseudonyms and I really feel not to do so 
would be detrimental to the trust relationship I built with my informants. I thank Leigh Dale for 
bringing this controversy to my attention.  
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 “Interviewee: talk [Interviewee 2: talk] talk” indicates interviewee 2 is talking at the 
same time as interviewee 1 
 “Interviewee 1: talk [word] talk”: indicates a word that I have added  to make the 
meaning of Interviewee 1’s sentence clearer 
 “...” indicates a hesitation 
 “[...]” indicates that part of the quote has been removed 
 
3.5 Data analysis 
3.5.1 Discourse analytic approach  
My approach to discourse analysis draws heavily on Gilbert and Mulkay’s work – and uses a 
number of analytical tools they develop (discussed in 2.5.2) – but also on Potter and 
Wetherell’s development of this work. 
   
The principal data collected are discourses from interviews and multi-disciplinary 
discussions, analysed within broader contexts in which they are used and constructed. I am 
interested in multiple layers of discourse, including: what stem cell researchers say and how 
they say it; rhetorical strategies and the performativity of language; power relations, 
identities and worldviews as created and played out through discourse, interpretative 
flexibility and intertextuality; and social, legislative and institutional contexts. My analysis 
takes into account these various interests and goes beyond conversation analysis which 
focuses on turn-taking and the organization of talk (discussed in Potter, 1996; Wetherell, 
1998). 
 
Following Wetherell, discourse analysis in this thesis involves two “related movements”39: 
“One is the identification and analysis of patterns (cultural resources), while the other is 
theorizing and explaining this pattern” (Wetherell, 2003: 13-4). In the first movement, data 
are clustered into “units of analysis” – which correspond to “patterns” across interviews, for 
example, rather than individual interviews (Wetherell, 2003: 14) – and examined for the 
ways in which people talk and construct their accounts, in particular for which 
“interpretative regularities” such as the “truth will out device” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) 
are used. Particular “argumentative threads” are examined as well as participants “methods 
                                                     
39 Given the iterative nature of my research, these movements are not completely separated in time. 
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for sense-making” (Wetherell, 1998: 404). In the second movement, more emphasis is given 
to the implications of participants’ discourses which are made sense of in the context of 
social scientific concepts.  
 
This type of analysis enables me, for example, to explore an interest in: 
how the effect of truth is created in discourse and  in how certain discursive 
mobilizations become powerful – so powerful that they are the orthodoxy, almost 
entirely persuasive, beyond which we can barely think. (Wetherell, 2003: 14) 
Thus my broad conception of discourse gives rise to an analysis that pays attention to the 
fine grained details of linguistic utterances, but also explores rhetorical strategies and 
examines and takes into account the broader contexts (including power relations) in which 
discourses are constructed.  
 
3.5.2 An iterative process 
After each instance of data collection I wrote down my initial impressions. This would 
include brief comments on how my informant and I had interacted, whether I felt it was a 
good interview or discussion, if there were any points of particular significance etc. I also 
made a note of questions of prompts that had (or not) worked particularly well.  
 
I undertook two main phases of intense social scientific literature reading. The first was 
during the first year of my thesis, when I was discovering the field. It helped me develop 
many of my sensitizing concepts. The second was at the end of my data collection, when I 
started building chapters. It helped me deepen my knowledge of the field, explore some 
notions I was uncovering and hone and give strength to my analysis. 
 
Transcription and correction of transcripts was an essential moment of preliminary analysis. 
During these times of very close engagement with my informants talk, many thoughts would 
spring to my mind. I made note of these immediately in the body of the transcript. These 
would relate to comments on questions being leading or to particular analytical points of 
interest, and were guided by sensitizing concepts such as “the deficit model”, the concept of 
“nature”, “expertise” etc. Some of these initial thoughts became central themes in final 
chapters; others fell to the way-side. At each phase there was a mix of “substantive” (with 
codes relating for example to “issues raised”, “experience of engagement”, “views on 
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patients”)  and “theoretical” (for example “boundary-work”, “example of reflexivity”, 
“discourse of suffering”) coding (Glaser cited in Heath and Cowley, 2004). The former was 
more common in the earlier stages of analysis, and the latter in the later stages.  
 
At various points during the year of data collection and then during the subsequent year, I 
presented my findings at meetings. This was a time to return to my transcripts and recordings 
and re-engage with them in detail. I would then examine many interviews or events in a short 
time, and specifically look for discursive regularities, recurrent themes, quotes of interest and 
striking differences within and between the interviews and discussions. This would 
correspond to another significant phase of coding. 
 
As I got more familiar with my data and found more recurring themes, I started developing a 
coding tree. It evolved with each new episode of data collection and analysis. The codes 
were assigned to old interviews as I re-read them or to new interviews as I transcribed/edited 
them. The coding was done manually in Word documents at the beginning of the analysis, 
but then was done using a custom built Microsoft Access database called QASA (discussed 
in the following section). 
 
One particularly challenging aspects of the data analysis was taking into account some of the 
many contingent factors shaping my informants’ discourses. Two were especially relevant. 
Firstly, as my topic guide consisted mainly of themes, and as I rarely used the same wording 
to ask my questions, I had to constantly return to the whole interview, checking how I had 
asked the question and making a note if it prompted a particular type of response. Secondly, 
I reflected upon where my informants were locating me (see Gilbert, 1980): as a social 
scientists, as a natural scientist, as a peer, as a journalist etc. This changed throughout some 
interviews, and affected participants’ discourses.  
 
3.5.3 “QASA” 
At the beginning of my data analysis, Word was used to search for particular expressions or 
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I did not have (free) access to any of the usual software. But a very good friend of mine 
offered to develop a data analysis programme. The programme, called QASA (Qualitative 
Analysis Software Aid), evolved throughout my PhD. By the end, it was quite sophisticated. 
It enabled me to: 
 import whole transcripts from Word; 
 create background files linked to each interview where I could keep information on the 
interviewee, their field of work, their gender etc; 
 create codes with associated files containing the name of the code, its label, its 
definition and perhaps a more detailed explanation; 
 assign codes to particular sections of text; 
 add notes or comments to particular sections of text; 
 search and retrieve all sections of text containing a particular word, assigned a 
particular code, and/or/not spoken by a particular person; 
 merge codes; 
 rank codes (for example “boundary-work” and “discourse of suffering” were 
originally separate codes, but subsequently became daughter codes under the new 
“strategies and language” parent code); 
 visualise the coding tree; 
 perform complex searches and retrieve relevant sections of data. 
 
Most importantly, QASA enables the re-contextualisation of each section of data. After 
doing a search for coded as “boundary-work adult versus embryonic” AND spoken by “X” 
NOT containing text “foetus”, I could click on each hit and be taken back to the interview 
transcript in its totality. Thus, I could check what my exact question was or what the 
previous discussion was about. This was particularly significant for the group interviews and 
the multi-disciplinary discussions where simple “snapshots” of the data can miss essential 
aspects of the discussion processes (Catterall and Maclaran, 1997).  
 
3.6 Reflections and limitations 
1. Negotiating multi-disciplinarity 
What started out as a thesis seeking ways of improving science communication, quickly 
became concerned with two-way public engagement and critically examining the 
construction of knowledge. Therefore, it may seem to some readers that I have become “anti-
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science”. This is not the case. Indeed, I am still very excited about many of the promises and 
achievements of science. This thesis is not about pointing the finger at scientists and blaming 
them for all the problems of trust in society. However, it is not either about going back to a 
deficit model of public understanding. Although I do highlight many problems and issues 
about some of the ways my informants talk, I also want to underscore the possibilities that 
these critical appraisals offer not only to the improvement in the communication but also to 
the appreciation of science.  
 
This thesis still aims, as it always did, to be of relevance to scientists as well as social 
scientists. Thus, I endeavour to contribute to social scientific theory as well as making 
suggestions about engagement and science discourses that are relevant to natural scientists. 
 
2. Limitations and further studies 
There is one particular piece of research I would do differently, if I were to start again: I 
would begin my research by doing an in-depth analysis of the parliamentary debates in 
Australia that led to the legislation on human embryos. This was done in the UK (Parry, 
2003a) and creates a very good backdrop for the analysis of more private conversations. One 
of the reasons I did not do this, was because I hoped that other researchers, who were 
involved in work around SCR before me, would do it. Unfortunately, although various 
papers on the Australian stem cell debates were published, none were from the sociological 
and discursive analytical frameworks I would have liked to see.  
 
Although I reached theoretical saturation, there are aspects of this project that could have 
benefited from further study. For instance, it would have been interesting to combine group 
and individual settings with the same young researchers, rather than organising group 
interviews for some, and one-to-one interviews for others. This way, I would have been able 
to raise some of the issues and contradictions in group settings, and explore them in detail in 
individual interviews. I would also have been able to contrast topics they felt they could/not 
raise in front of their peers. In addition, it would have liked to gain access to all the stem cell 
researchers I saw talking in publics debates. I was able to do that for some, and this gave me 
an insight into some of the contrasts between public and private discourses. However, many 
of the researchers who talk in public are in much demand and cannot always spare the time 
for interviews.  
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Another limitation is that I did not fully analyse the multi-disciplinary discussions. In 
particular it would be interesting to explore how these various “experts” position themselves 
with regards to other “publics” who are also “experts”. Unfortunately, there was no room in 
this thesis to discuss this in detail. However, due to my iterative approach, these multi-
disciplinary discussions shaped the rest of my research and analysis. Indeed the first multi-
disciplinary discussion was instrumental in raising some of the issues I explored in 
interviews, and it helped me elaborate some of my early analytical categories. I also 
presented its preliminary analysis at an international conference and some of the questions I 
was asked there shaped my later research. The form taken by the second multi-disciplinary 
discussion was strongly influenced by my previous findings, and the comments that people 
made during that morning were very influential in the later stages of my analysis and write-
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Chapter 4  
            
Constructions and definitions of stem cell research 
 
 
Public debates are processes of signification, in which meanings, 
definitions and concepts are discussed and wagered. Many voices 
partake in this debate, arguing from different interested positions, 
each trying to put their marks upon the debate. 
The trophy of a public debate is to turn a particular interpretation 
into an accepted fact which seems beyond the stage of negotiation. 
(Van Dyck, 1995: 13) 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Many discussions around SCR tend to suggest that there exist precisely defined entities such 
as “adult” stem cells (AS cells) or “embryonic” stem cells (ES cells); this includes public 
discussions and social scientific analyses (e.g. Parry, 2003b). However, this chapter will 
demonstrate that there are rarely such clear definitions to be found in SCR. By investigating 
the discourses of a variety of stem cell researchers, I show that, even if these simple 
definitions are necessary in public, they are fiercely contested in more private situations such 
as interviews.  
 
This chapter has a dual purpose. Firstly, it aims to make readers familiar with the language 
of SCR: it gives an introduction to terms such as “somatic cell nuclear transfer”, “cloning”, 
“pluripotency” and “adult” versus “embryonic” SCR. It highlights the difficulty in defining 
“SCR”. Secondly, it aims to show that these concepts are socially defined and categorised; 
they are mobilised in order to promote particular aspects of SCR and draw boundaries 
around “good” or “promising” science. As Barnes (1983) points out, such categorisations 
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and classifications are shaped by contingent goals and interests (which may or may not be 
recognised as such) and are an interesting location for sociological investigation. 
 
Before exploring and deconstructing some of the taken-for-granted meanings in SCR and 
how professionals categorise their work, the first section of the chapter locates these 
discourses within broader contexts. The subsequent section focuses on terminology and 
highlights the difficulties in pinning down exactly what counts as a “stem cell” and where to 
find one. It examines labels in the natural scientific literature and then turns to what my 
informants consider stem cells to be. The next section of the chapter draws on Gieryn’s work 
to examine the cultural cartography conducted by the stem cell researchers I interview. Five 
different (but often related) criteria that can be used for boundary-work are identified: the 
age of the stem cell field, naturalness, differentiation potential, safety and potential 
applications.  
 
This chapter demonstrates that what counts as SCR is different for different researchers and 
highlights the contingency of “stemness”. It suggests that public “ignorance” of the “facts” 
can be a reflection of the uncertainty and confusion around these “facts”, as they are 
discussed by stem cell professionals. However, I do not want to imply that language is purely 
strategic; rather, it is a reflection of “interdependence between societal structures, cultural 
background, stem cell science and its terminology” (Hauskeller, 2005: 41). Extensive 
footnotes are provided in this chapter to enable interested readers to look up some of the 
natural scientific publications. However, the main text should serve as ample introduction to 
some of the complexities and conceptual ambiguities of SCR.  
 
4.2 Contexts of SCR discourses 
In order to make sense of stem cell researchers’ discourses, some salient features of the 
context in which they take place needs to be highlighted. In the UK, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (1990) allows the creation, storage or use of human embryos outside 
the body, for specific purposes including in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment and research 
into infertility. It was amended in 2001 to extend the legal use and creation of embryos to 
research for the purposes of: “(a) increasing knowledge about the development of embryos; 
(b) increasing knowledge about serious disease, or (c) enabling any such knowledge to be 
applied in developing treatments for serious disease” (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations, 2001). The definition of embryo in this document includes 
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embryos created by fusing egg and sperm and by “somatic cell nuclear transfer” – or SCNT, 
also called “cloning” (see HFEA, 2003). Subsequent to the HFE Act amendment, emergency 
legislation was also put into place to ban “reproductive cloning”, or the implantation into a 
woman of an embryo created by SCNT (for more details, see Parry, 2003a; Hauskeller, 
2004). 
 
In Australia, the situation during my data collection was slightly different as there was no 
established federal legislation governing the use of embryos created outside the body, but a 
patchwork of State legislations (for more details, see Magri, 2003; Morley and Hall, 2003; 
Harvey, 2005; Dodds and Ankeny, 2006). In 2001, the Council of Australian Governments 
called for nationally consistent regulations. By June 2002, the Research Involving Embryos 
and Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill 2002 was introduced into the House of 
Representatives (federal parliament). It was debated and split into two after a free vote, 
resulting in two bills: the Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill and the Research Involving 
Embryos Bill. Both bills were passed by the House of Representatives without amendment, 
then by the Senate in December 2002 (after free votes). They became the Prohibition of 
Human Cloning Act (2002) and the Research Involving Embryos Act (2002). They made the 
use of “surplus” IVF embryos in research legal, but banned the creation of embryos 
specifically for research, including by fertilisation. They also banned all forms of human 
“therapeutic” and “reproductive” cloning. The acts were immediately timetabled for review 
by 19th December 2005. Following this review (by the Lockhart Committee), the moratorium 
on therapeutic cloning was lifted (Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the 
Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Act, 2006; discussed in Harvey, 2007). 
At the time of my interviews, research on cloned embryos was not allowed in Australia. 
 
Both the amendment of the HFE Act and the introduction of two pieces of legislation in 
Australia in 2002 followed heated discussions in parliament and the media, with a selection 
of stakeholders and interested parties. Analyses of these discussions (e.g. Herrmann, 2003; 
Parry, 2003a; Williams et al., 2003; Goggin and Newell, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Kitzinger and 
Williams, 2005; Newell, 2006) reveal a number of points relevant to this chapter. One 
important point is that proponents40 of embryonic SCR (ESCR) presented themselves as the 
voices of “rationality”, in opposition to “emotional” (Newell, 2006: 280) or “irrational” 
                                                     
40 As suggested by Parry (2003a: 198), many people held more nuanced positions than simply for or 
against ESCR. Nevertheless, the debates, both in the UK and Australia, took place in the lead up to 
votes for or against research on embryos, or for or against cloning. Thus many public discussions were 
organised in this dichotomous fashion.  
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others (Parry, 2003a: 185), such as religious leaders, lay publics, or persons identifying with 
having a disability. Supporters of ESCR often portrayed their views as based on “the facts” 
(Kitzinger and Williams, 2005: 736). This chapter will show that these “facts”, including the 
definition of “stem cells”, are far from clear, even amongst professional stem cell 
researchers. 
 
In addition, these studies show that a central part of the pro-ESCR case, was to show that this 
work was the best – quickest, most likely to be successful – way of obtaining therapies. This 
involved recruiting patients and “constructing a demand” (Parry, 2003a: 187; see also 
Harvey, 2005; and Parry, under review), without leaving space for alternative interpretations 
of disease and disability (Newell, 2006).  
 
To reinforce this promise of ESCR-derived therapies, proponents in the UK also needed to 
“deny the potential of adult cells, as otherwise the research on embryos might be seen as 
unnecessary” (Kitzinger and Williams, 2005: 738). This was done in part by highlighting 
that AS cells have less “plasticity” than ES cells (Parry, 2003a: 195); that is, they cannot 
give rise to as many different kinds of cell types as ES cells can, they are not as 
“pluripotent”.  
 
Demoting AS cells by highlighting their lack of plasticity became more difficult to do by the 
time the Australian debates took place. In 2002 (as these debates were in full swing), a paper 
was published by a group in Minnesota lead by Verfaillie, suggesting that AS cells may have 
as much plasticity as ES cells (I examine this in more detail in the body of this chapter). This 
paper (Jiang et al., 2002) was explicitly drawn upon by the news media and opponents of 
ESCR to promote ASCR (adult SCR) at the expense of ESCR. The central argument, here, 
was: if AS cells are as versatile as ES cells, but do not raise any ethical problems, why not 
simply focus on AS cells? Proponents of ESCR responded to this threat by patrolling the 
boundaries of SCR and drawing maps of this research to increase the cognitive authority (cf. 
Gieryn, 1983; 1995) of ESCR and reduce that of ASCR. However, as I show in the body of 
this chapter, ASCR versus ESCR is not the only place where boundary-work takes place. 
The uncertainty and fluidity of the field of SCR enables professionals to do boundary-work 




Chapter 4 – Constructions and definitions of SCR 85
4.3 Defining and finding stem cells 
Stem cells are defined by the International Society for SCR (ISSCR) as: 
Cells that have both the capacity to self-renew (make more stem cells by cell 
division) as well as to differentiate into mature, specialized cells. 
(www.isscr.org/glossary) 
There is however a spectrum of definitions for “stem cells” and the defining characteristics 
of these cells are contested and constructed. Before I attempt to give definitions of stem 
cells, I detail a few types of stem cells, to provide a flavour for what SCR can be about. 
 
4.3.1 Types of stem cells 
SCR is often separated into two categories: ASCR and ESCR. The term “AS cells” usually 
describes particular cells found in adults (or children) that can give rise to cells of a specific  
 
Table 1: Some pros and cons put forward about tissue-specific stem cells 
Pros Cons 
- established use in therapy (in bone marrow 
transplants for example)  
- no immune rejection if stem cell donor and 
recipient are the same person 
- have been identified in many tissues
41
 
- few problems of uncontrolled growth or 
differentiation 
- exist in very small numbers  
- difficult to identify in certain tissues
42
 
- cell lines would have the same genetic 




                                                     
41 For example, researchers have found stem cells for the external surfaces of the body such as skin, 
hair and cornea (Miller et al., 1997; Blanpain et al., 2004; Stingl et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2006), for the 
small intestine (Potten and Loeffler, 1990), for the liver (Herrera et al., 2006), and for cardiac 
(Leinwand, 2003; Anversa et al., 2006) and skeletal (Collins et al., 2005; Rando, 2005) muscle. The 
human brain has unexpectedly been shown to go through regeneration (Eriksson et al., 1998), and 
putative neural stem cells have been identified in rats and mice (Reynolds and Weiss, 1992; Gritti et 
al., 1996; Johansson et al., 1999), and humans (reviewed in Factor and William J. Weiner, 2002: chap. 
50). 
42 Some tissue based stem cells remain elusive, such as those of the lung (Rawlins and Hogan, 2006). 
43 Therefore, it is difficult to use tissue-based stem cells from a donor to repair tissue damage in that 
same person, if the damage is caused by a genetic condition. This problem can be solved by 
genetically altering the cells before they are re-implanted into the patient, as was done in humans by 
Mavilio (2007). 
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tissue or physiological system. This includes for example stem cells in the bone marrow that 
can give rise to all the blood cells types (white blood cells, red blood cells, platelets etc.). 
These stem cells can also be called “tissue-specific” stem cells. Some pros and cons of these 
are summarised in Table 1. These stem cells are present in the body but can also be isolated 
and maintained in vitro.  
 
The term “ES cells” describes cells that have been derived from an embryo, can remain in an 
undifferentiated state, and can also give rise to all kinds of cell types (such as red blood cells, 
skin cells, nerve cells etc). There are several ways of obtaining embryos. The most common 
one is to ask gamete donors if they agree to their embryo – originally created for IVF – being  
 
Table 2: Some pros and cons put forward about IVF ES cell lines 
Pros Cons 
- can theoretically give rise to all cell types of 
the body 
- derived from embryos that are in theory 
“surplus” to IVF and would otherwise be 
destroyed 
- human work well grounded in mouse ESCR 
- grow in large numbers 
- destruction of embryos
44
 
- potential immune rejection of cell line 
derivatives 
- difficulty in controlling ES cell differentiation 
and proliferation
45








- the “surplus” embryos may be of poor 
quality (frozen-thawed, low grade embryos to 
start with) 
 
                                                     
44 A variety of alternatives to the destructive  embryos are being investigated and critiqued (for 
example: Melton et al., 2004; Chung et al., 2005; Cowan et al., 2005; Meissner and Jaenisch, 2005; 
Holden, 2006; Marchant, 2006; Snyder et al., 2006; Weissman, 2006). 
45 It seems that certain cell lines have a propensity to go down particular lineages more easily and 
many factors will need to be understood to easily direct any cell line down a particular lineage (see 
Pera and Trounson, 2004). Some researchers have been successful in this directed differentiation and 
have managed to obtain neural, pancreatic, muscle, epithelial, lung and other cells (e.g. Lowell et al., 
2005; Rippon et al., 2006; Yao et al., 2006).  
46 Stem cells are very similar to carcinoma cells and many cancers are caused by cells reverting to 
their undifferentiated and proliferating state. For a review of the difficulties of directed differentiation 
and the risks of cancer and tumour formation, see Carson et al. (2006).  
47 However, growth media free of human and animal components – therefore less likely to carry 
pathogens – are being investigated and developed (e.g. Richards et al., 2002; Hovatta et al., 2003; 
Amit et al., 2004; Klimanskaya et al., 2005; Rajala et al., 2007). 
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used in research. To derive ES cells from such embryos, a particular group of cells (the inner 
cell mass) is removed from the embryo to establish a cell line. This process destroys the 
embryo as it can no longer develop into an adult organism by being implanted into a woman. 
The ES cells are cultured under specific conditions in order to be maintained as “pluripotent” 
cell lines in vitro. Some advantages and disadvantages of stem cells derived from IVF 
embryos is shown in Table 2 . 
 
The first group to derive human ES cells was led by Thomson (see Thomson et al., 1998). 
Only a few laboratories have successfully generated cell lines from IVF embryos (for recent 
reviews see Hoffman and Carpenter, 2005; Trounson, 2006). ES cells have been shown to 
give rise, in vivo or in vitro, to derivatives of the three embryonic “germ layers” (that is the 
three main groups of cells needed to make up a whole grown organism: “ectoderm”, 
“endoderm” and “mesoderm”) as well as extra-embryonic lineages48. 
 
One of the main advantages put forward by supporters of ESCR is that it can be done using 
“surplus” IVF embryos. However, these can be of poor quality (see Table 2) and research 
suggests that the embryos that are sought are fresh, high quality embryos, not ones left-over 
from IVF (see Parry, 2006). 
 
Another way of obtaining embryos is to create them by somatic cell nuclear transfer, or 
SCNT (also known as cell nuclear replacement or CNR). This involves taking the nucleus 
(which contains most of the genetic material) out of a somatic cell (a cell that is not a 
gamete) donated by a particular person, and putting it into an enucleated oocyte (egg). This 
cell starts dividing, and gives rise to an embryo, which can then be cultured to produce a 
blastocyst (early embryo) that may in turn transform into an ES cell line (also called nuclear 
transfer ES cell line). This cell line would have the same nuclear genetic material as the 
person who donated the adult cell; that is the cells would be genetic clones of the adult’s 
cells49. Therefore, if specific cell types (say skin cells) were developed from SCNT ES cell 
line, they could be re-injected into the original cell donor without immune rejection being a 
problem (for example it could be grafted onto the site of a burn to help skin regeneration). 
This idea forms the basis of “therapeutic cloning” (discussed in Hochedlinger and Jaenisch, 
                                                     
48 ES cells can differentiate into cell types such as gut epithelium, cartilage, bone, muscle, neural 
epithelium, blood, neural cells, cardiomyocytes, yolk sacs and trophectoderm (Thomson et al., 1998; 
Xu et al., 2002; Pera and Trounson, 2004; Hoffman and Carpenter, 2005; Trounson, 2006). 
49 However, the egg cytoplasm also contributes small amounts of genetic material and factors that 
regulate gene expression. 
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2003; 2006; Yang et al., 2007). Some pros and cons of SCR with SCNT derived cell lines 
are outlined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Some pros and cons put forward about SCNT ES cell lines 
Pros Cons 
- patient-specific therapies, no immune 
rejection 
- can potentially derive cell lines from 
diseased patients to study that disease 
- platform for drug testing 
 
- the development of a cell line following 
SCNT has not been achieved in humans
50
 
- human oocytes are considered a rare and 
precious resource
51
 and high numbers are 
likely to be needed to derive each cell line 




- risk of ovarian hyper stimulation syndrome 
associated with oocyte procurement
53
 
- SCNT is an inefficient process and potential 
patient-specific treatments are likely to be 
expensive 
- cell lines would have the same genetic 
defects as the donor 






In theory, if the embryo created by SCNT was implanted into a woman’s uterus, it could 
develop into a foetus and then a baby. This procedure is called reproductive cloning (see 
Table 4) and is the way in which Dolly the sheep was created (Wilmut et al., 1997).  
 
                                                     
50 The creation of cell lines by SCNT has been achieved in mice (Munsie et al., 2000; Wakayama et 
al., 2001). Only the creation of a nuclear transfer embryo has been achieved in humans (Stojkovic et 
al., 2005), not that of a cell line, despite claims of the contrary (Hwang et al., 2004, retracted).  
51 Alternatives to the use of human oocytes such as rabbit oocytes  (Chen et al., 2003; Edwards, 2004) 
or ES cell-derived oocytes (Hubner, 2003; Clark, 2004; Brown, 2006) have been discussed. Some 
researchers are also attempting to reprogram somatic cells in large numbers by fusing them with ES 
cells (Cowan et al., 2005; Strelchenko et al., 2006). 
52 For example junior members of staff donated their eggs to their group leader’s project in Korea 
(Holden, 2005; Hawes and Oakley, 2006). 
53 This has been reviewed by Avecillas et al. (2004), but is rarely discussed in the medical community 
(Ferber, personal communication). 
54 Many limitations are discussed in Yang et al (2007). 
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Table 4: Some pros and cons put forward about reproductive cloning 
Pros Cons 
- could potentially help certain infertile 
couples have genetically related children 
- if ever achieved, would create a person 
with the same nuclear DNA as another, 
raising issues of identity 
- there are many developmental 
abnormalities in cloned animals and live 





Reproductive cloning has been widely rejected, but it has also been put forward as a 
potential way of helping infertile couples, for example by the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 
a submission to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee: 
There may be acceptable reasons for human cloning, which might, for example, 
include the creation of a child following the death of another – especially if the 
intending parents are now infertile [...]. The use of cloning for some reasons 
might legitimately be banned but there may be merit in exploring whether or not 
cloning is always wrong. (Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2004: paragraph 8) 
The cloning experiments described above suggest that certain cells found in adults (any cells, 
not just stem cells like those in bone marrow) retain the information to become any other cell 
in the body. That is, as they differentiate and become more specialised, they do not forget 
how to become other sorts of cells. This ability to “de-differentiate” into less specialised 
cells goes against previous fundamental assumptions in biology.  
 
A variety of adult cells committed to a particular cell lineage (such as blood cells) seem to 
have the ability to become cells from different lineages (such as neural cells)56. This is 
sometimes called “trans-differentiation”. These AS cells are said to show “developmental 
plasticity”. The research by Verfaillie’s group (introduced in 4.2) suggests that a particular 
subset of adult bone marrow stem cells from mice and rats (called mesenchymal stem cells) 
can become cell types of all three germ layers in vivo and in vitro (Jiang et al., 2002). It has 
been suggested these cells have a developmental potential similar to ES cells and that they 
                                                     
55 Many cloned animals are abnormal (discussed by Solter, 2000), and Dolly died prematurely 
(Whitfield, 2003).  
56 For example neural stem cells (Bjornson et al., 1999) and muscle stem cells (Jackson et al., 1999) 
can take on haematopoietic “fates”. Bone marrow cells can become epithelial (Krause et al., 2001), 
skeletal muscle (Ferrari et al., 1998; Labarge and Blau, 2002) and cardiac muscle (Orlic et al., 2001) 
cells. Some of these fate changes are in response to injury but also seem to happen under biological 
conditions (for a review see Clarke and Frisen, 2001).  
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may be “pluri-” or “multipotent”. A variety of studies have been published since, supporting 
the plasticity of adult cells (some are reviewed in: Lakshmipathy and Verfaillie, 2005). An 
example in humans is the ability of cells taken from inside the nose to give rise to a variety 
of cells from all three germ layers (Murrell et al., 2005); or the possibility of reprogramming 
fibroblast57 cells into cells with ES-like properties (Wernig et al., 2007).  
 
However, not all scientists are convinced of the plasticity of these adult cells; in particular, 
many of these results have not been reproduced in other laboratories. Some researcher 
suggest that the apparent trans-differentiation events are very rare if they occur at all; others 
suggest that they are in fact due to cell fusion and not trans-differentiation (differentiated 
cells are postulated to fuse with other types of differentiated cells and take on this new 
developmental fate). The plasticity, or not, of adult stem cells has been the source of lively 
discussions within the scientific community58. If it occurs, it could enable the study of 
biological processes and perhaps pave the way towards autologous59 therapies (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Some Pros and cons put forward about “plastic” AS cells 
Pros Cons 
- could potentially provide autologous cell 
therapies and avoid immune rejection 




- difficult to identify and isolate 
- rare 
- may not really be plastic 
- cell lines would have the same genetic 
defects as the donor 
 
 
Stem cells from foetuses61 can differentiate into many cell types. They are often classified as 
“AS cells”62 even though this can be counterintuitive, and some people prefer to keep them 
in a separate category. In some instances, however, it becomes useful to classify cells 
                                                     
57 Fibroblasts are present in connective tissue and gives rise to other cell types present in this tissue. 
58 For example: Dewitt and Knight (2002), Joshi and Enver (2002), Wagers et al. (2002), Ying et al. 
(2002), Alison et al. (2003), Wagers and Weissman (2004) and Check (2007). 
59 Autologous therapies use material from the patient himself of herself. 
60 A niche is the dynamic environment in which stem cells exist and function in the body. It is the 
result of the interplay between the anatomic locations of the cells, signals from neighbouring cells and 
physiological conditions such as pH. 
61 Germline cells (Shamblott et al., 1998), and neural (Cai et al., 2002) and haematopoietic (Jordan et 
al., 1990) stem cells with a broad differentiation potential have been discovered in foetuses.  
62 For example, “Adult stem cells have been found in sources including bone marrow, blood, the 
brain, skeletal muscle, the pancreas, fetal tissue and tissue from the umbilical cord” (Parliament of 
Australia, 2002a: 2.14)  
 
Chapter 4 – Constructions and definitions of SCR 91
derived from foetuses as ES cells (as I will discuss in chapter 7). Using foetal material raises 
different kinds of issues to the use of embryos, such as the ethical difficulties in getting 
informed consent from people going through terminations. Cord blood stem cells also can 
give rise to many cells types63 and can be classified as adult stem cells or kept in a separate 
category. 
 
4.3.2 Defining stem cells? 
In 1978, a group of scientists, composed mainly of haematologists, decided upon the 
following definition for stem cells:  
Cells with extensive self-maintaining (self-renewal capacity), extending 
throughout the whole (or most) of the life-span of the organism. Differentiation 
potential is a property of some types of stem cells but it is not an essential feature 
of stem-ness (Lajtha quoted in Lajtha, 1983, emphasis added) 
This definition differs from the first one, by the ISSCR, given at the beginning of section 4.3. 
In this second definition, “differentiation potential” is not defining of “stemness”; rather, it is 
the ability of a cell population to maintain itself over long periods of time that is defining. 
The latter is a property of haematopoietic stem cells. A third definition comes from a paper 
published in 2005: “The Stem State: Plasticity Is Essential, Whereas Self-Renewal and 
Hierarchy Are Optional” (Zipori, 2005, emphasis added). This definition focuses on the 
opposite characteristic to the previous definition. It suggests that “plasticity” defines 
“stemness”.  
 
These last two definitions arose in scientific publications. They represent extremes in a 
continuum of emphasis in the meaning of stem cell. It could be that the divergence is due to 
different temporal contexts: whereas the second definition was given in the late 1970, when 
haematopoietic stem cells were the best-known stem cell type, the third one was given more 
recently, when embryonic stem cells have perhaps become more dominant (although, it is 
certainly not the case that everyone now thinks that stem cells are defined by their 
differentiation potential as I will show below). It could also be that this divergence is due to 
different research focuses: researchers in haematopoietic stem cells, still tend to focus on 
self-renewal (e.g. Adams and Scadden, 2006: 333), whilst ES cell workers tend to focus on 
differentiation potential (e.g. Trounson, 2006: 208) . A range of definitions is currently used 
                                                     
63 See especially the cells derived from cord blood by Kogler et al. (2004).  
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by stem cell researchers and others. In addition, “differentiation potential”, often used to 
classify stem cells, is a very fluid concept, as I now show. 
 
4.3.3 Classifying stem cells according to their differentiation potential 
The classification of cells according to their differentiation potential can become an 
important site of social negotiations. In particular, much of the 2002 Australian 
parliamentary debates came to focus on the differentiation potential of various stem cells64.  
 
Stem cells can be described as “totipotent”, “pluripotent”, “multipotent” and “unipotent”. 
The last term describes cells that can only give rise to one cell type, and did not often come 
up in my research. The other three terms came up more frequently; although each one was 
not necessarily used to describe the same stem cell types (particularly “pluripotent” and 
“multipotent” had contested meanings). These terms were also present in news media, public 
discussions and scientific publications. The ISSCR website defines them as follows:  
Multipotent stem cells 
Stem cells whose progeny are of multiple differentiated cell types, but all within a 
particular tissue, organ, or physiological system. For example, blood-forming 
(haematopoietic) stem cells are single multipotent cells that can produce all cell 
types that are normal components of the blood.  
 
Pluripotent stem cells 
Stem cells that can become all the cell types that are found in an implanted 
embryo, fetus, or developed organism, but not embryonic components of the 
trophoblast and placenta (these are usually called extra-embryonic). 
 
Totipotent stem cells 
Stem cells that can give rise to all cell types that are found in an embryo, fetus, or 
developed organism, including the embryonic components of the trophoblast and 
placenta required to support development and birth. The zygote and the cells at 
the very early stages following fertilization (i.e., the 2-cell stage) are considered 
totipotent. (www.isscr.org/glossary) 
As I raised in the introduction, it was, at times, necessary for supporters of ESCR to 
downplay the promise of ASCR. This was done, in part, by classifying ES cells, and not AS 
cells, as “pluripotent”. It is beyond the remit of this chapter to carry out an in depth 
investigation of the mobilisation of the terms “pluripotent” and “multipotent”, but I shall 
                                                     
64 I return to the scientism prevalent in debates around SCR in chapter 7. 
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make a brief illustration, in order to introduce the reader to the fluidity of these concepts 
central to SCR. I do this by discussing three papers and their use of these labels.  
 
The Thomson publication I introduced above describes the derivation of “pluripotent” 
embryonic stem cell lines. These could differentiate in vivo into cells of the three germ 
layers, including: 
gut epithelium (endoderm); cartilage, bone, smooth muscle, and striated muscle 
(mesoderm); and neural epithelium, embryonic ganglia, and stratified squamous 
epithelium (ectoderm) (Thomson et al., 1998: 1146) 
When ES cell lines were made to differentiate in vitro, they also gave rise to endoderm and 
trophoblast derivatives. That ES cells are pluripotent is generally accepted. 
 
The Verfaillie paper describes the derivation of stem cells labelled as having “pluripotency” 
in the title, but as being “multipotent” in the abstract. These cells were given the name: 
“multipotent adult progenitor cells” (MAPCs). They: 
differentiate, at the single cell level, not only into mesenchymal cells, but also 
cells with visceral mesoderm, neuroectoderm and endoderm characteristics in 
vitro. When injected into an early blastocyst, single MAPCs contribute to most, if 
not all, somatic cell types. On transplantation into a non-irradiated host, MAPCs 
engraft and differentiate to the haematopoietic lineage, in addition to the 
epithelium of liver, lung and gut. (Jiang et al., 2002: 41) 
Even though these cells seem to give rise to a similar variety of cells as Thomson’s ES cells 
above, they are not always called “pluripotent”. For example: 
Recent research on adult stem cells indicates that they have the capacity to 
generate not only the tissue in which they are found, but to generate the 
specialised cell type of another tissue. It is thought, however, that adult stem cells 
can differentiate into a more restricted range of tissues or organs than embryonic 
stem cells. They are thus described as ‘multipotent’ rather than ‘pluripotent’ 
(Parliament of Australia, 2002a: 2.33) 
Here being able to differentiate into cells beyond one particular lineage (beyond the 
haematopoietic lineage for example) is not enough to earn cells the label “pluripotent” as the 
ISSCR definition above would suggest. Opponents of ESCR however did describe these 
cells as pluripotent (e.g. Good, 2002).  
 
A third paper I wish to mention briefly here is by Murell et al. (2005). They derived cells 
from adult olfactory mucosa (made up of olfactory epithelium and mucus secreting glands) 
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which could give rise to a variety of cells including: neurons (497), cardiac muscle, skeletal 
muscle and liver cells in vitro (499); and blood vessel, brain, spinal cord, liver, skeletal 
muscle, gut (499) and haematopoietic cells (503) in vivo. Here again, differentiation beyond 
the lineage of origin (neuronal lineage) was not sufficient to gain the label “pluripotent”. The 
authors however suggest in their discussion that the cells they study could be labelled 
“pluripotent” but they do not use this label in their title. Whether this is the journal editors’ 
or the authors’ choice, I do not know. However, it seems likely that at the time of the 
Verfaillie publication, the term “pluripotent” was not as contested as it became by the time 
of the Murrell publication.  
 
Thus, we see that cells that can differentiate beyond their lineage of origin can be labelled 
both “pluri-” and “multipotent”. The differentiation potential measured for any cell type does 
not pre-determine the label that will be used to describe it. Rather labels are used more 
strategically and contingently. Part of this conceptual fluidity comes from the difficulty of 
pointing to a cell and saying: this is a stem cell, and it can differentiate into these five other 
cell types. Some of the difficulties that come from this can be seen as illustrations of the 
Collins and Pinch’s experimenter’s regress (see 2.2.1).  
 
ES cells are often defined as pluripotent: 
 Embryonic stem cells by definition, can give rise to all tissue types (pluripotent). 
(Parliament of Australia, 2002b: 3.20) 
They are assumed to have this property in humans because they are derived from the inner 
cell mass, which has that ability in mice. However, ES cells are not equivalent to inner cell 
mass cells65 (they have no in vivo counterpart) and the mouse inner cell mass cells are not the 
same as the human inner cell mass cells. It is difficult to directly examine what happens to a 
particular group of cells in vivo and they usually have to be taken out of their usual 
environment to be studied66. Thus, the observed properties of stem cells could simply be 
artefacts of being cultured in vitro.  
 
In humans, an indicator of a group of cells’ differentiation potential is given by removing 
them from their biological location, creating a cell line, and injecting some of these cells into 
                                                     
65 It has also been suggested that ES cells may be more similar to early germ cells than inner cell mass 
cells (Zwaka and Thomson, 2005) 
66 This was already pointed out in reference to haematopoietic stem cells, in the early 1980s (Potten, 
1983).  
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immune deficient mice67. A sort of tumour usually develops and the different cells types that 
arise therein can be examined. Again, however, it is difficult to simply observe what the 
different cell types are by looking at cell morphology. Cell surface markers are used, but this 
is an indirect measure and to draw any conclusions, researchers need to believe that the link 
between cell surface markers and cell types has been “accurately” established. This 
highlights that these claims are “theory-laden” and “under-determined” by reality (see 2.2.1). 
The difficulty in establishing what cells differentiate into, and what they would differentiate 
into were they not taken out of their usual context, highlights the socially constructed nature 
of the labels used to describe them and their differentiation potential.  
 
This section has shown that the field of SCR is wrought with uncertainties and many of the 
labels used within it are contested. Nevertheless, I hope that I have given the reader an 
introduction to some of the meanings of these labels, as well as an indication of some of the 
ways in which they are mobilised.  
 
4.3.4 Professionals’ accounts: multiple foci for SCR 
So far, the impossibility of pointing to a stem cell has been shown. Indirect methods are 
necessary to assess the characteristics of these cells and the labels used to describe their 
characteristics are conceptually fluid. As a result, many types of research are labelled SCR. 
In this section, I give an overview of what my informants see as central to SCR.  
 
The emphasis my informants place on various areas within SCR is summarised in  
Table 6. Overall, as expected, they tend to see the area they work in as central to the field. 
There are no systematic differences based on researchers’ gender or level of seniority 
concerning what sorts of stem cells they portray as important. Researchers in Australia more 
frequently defend one aspect of SCR at the expense of another; whereas researchers in the 
UK appear less polarised. There are also differences between these two countries in how 
researchers talk about SCNT (which I discuss in more detail in chapter 5). 
                                                     
67 It may be possible one day to identify stem cells by their chromatin conformation, which enables 
access to a variety of genes and suggests an epigenetic (rather than genetic) control of stemness (e.g. 
Wiblin et al., 2005; Azuara et al., 2006; Buszczak and Spradling, 2006). 
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Table 6: What is central to SCR?  
My informants portray different areas of research as central to SCR. The importance 
accorded to each area is colour coded, with yellow indicating a practice that the interviewees 
specifically excluded from SCR, and purple indicating a practice portrayed as central to SCR. 
“Tissue-specific” SCR, here, specifically corresponds to the study of AS cells such as those 
found in the bone marrow or the brain. The study of “AS cell plasticity” corresponds to 
attempts at finding or examining cells found in adult tissues (including cord blood and foetal 
matter) that can differentiate into cell types outside their original lineage. Research using 
“IVF embryos” is what is commonly referred to as ESCR, and only includes work with 
embryos from IVF clinics, so-called “surplus” embryos. “SCNT – therapy” is the study of 
cloning processes with the specific intention of developing patient-specific therapies. “SCNT 
– research” encompasses studies to develop SCNT embryos to further understand basic 
biological processes or to develop new drugs on SCNT ES cell lines. Researchers are 
grouped according to the country in which they work and then broadly classified thematically 
(with those portraying tissue-specific SCR as central grouped together, for example). The 
data come from one-to-one interview settings and group settings. The blanks correspond to 
aspects of SCR that were not covered during our discussions. I have not given any more 
biographical details in the interest of anonymity. The purpose of this table is to highlight the 







Small part of 
SCR 
Part of SCR 
Important 
part of SCR 
Central part 
of SCR 




For some researchers, like no 47, the main part of SCR is doing research on embryos from 
IVF clinics. This area is the most exciting and likely to give rise to therapeutic applications. 
For others, like no 31, SCR is an old field, based in the study of haematopoietic or epithelial 
stem cells. Even though ESCR may contribute some new information, adult cells are the 
most likely to lead to therapies as they have been doing for years. 
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For researchers like no 32, although SCR started with the study of adult cells, it has seen a 
revival with the discovery of AS cell plasticity. The main point of SCR now is to study this 
exciting phenomenon in order to better understand stem cell niches and develop autologous 
therapies.  
 
Researchers, such as no 18, see the possibility of using SCNT for patient specific therapies as 
one of the main aims of SCR and as the “perfect solution” to the problem of transplant 
rejection. Many other researchers, though, see the role of SCNT in SCR as providing better 
research tools, rather than therapies. Some researchers, like no 20, specifically do not classify 
SCNT as central to SCR as they are uncomfortable with the idea of creating an embryo to 
destroy it: 
I think [ASCR and ESCR] have to go hand in hand. I don’t think embryos should 
be created specifically for research purposes. I think that IVF surplus stocks can 
certainly be used to derive enough ES cell lines, for whatever people want to do. 
Yeah, I guess I do have a bit of a problem with that [the creation of embryos for 
research]. 
Finally, for some researchers, like no 24, SCR is a mix and match of all aspects, including 
research on reproductive cloning for potential alleviation of infertility.  
 
Some aspects of my informants’ representations of SCR have just been sketched. The data 
given here are inevitably disembedded from their social location and, in the interest of 
anonymity, informants are not examined in turn, with details of their background given to 
explain their accounts. Nevertheless, following this indication of the variety in stem cell 
researchers’ portrayals of SCR, the ways in which social locations shape these discourses 
need to be highlighted and examined. This is done in a variety of ways in the remainder of 
the thesis. I start this task in the subsequent section by examining the boundary-work 
conducted by stem cell researchers when talking about their field, and how this serves to 
maintain the authority of particular aspects of SCR. 
 
4.4 Patrolling the stem cell boundaries 
Being able to position oneself as a stem cell researcher, adult stem cell researcher and/or 
embryonic stem cell researcher has important implications. There are financial rewards to 
doing SCR. These are accessible for example by joining prestigious research institutes, 
endowed with large financial resources, which specifically study SCR (the Australian Stem 
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Cell Centre in Melbourne, the Institute of Stem Cell Research in Edinburgh or the Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Stem Cell Research in Cambridge) or by applying for funding specifically 
earmarked for SCR (via the UK Stem Cell Initiative). However, not all stem cell funding is 
available for all types of SCR, and some will only go to ASCR (the National Adult Stem 
Cell Research Centre in Australia, see Abbott, 2006)  and some specifically exclude research 
that destroys embryos (the European Seventh Framework Programme, see Council of 
European Unions, 2006). So there are implications to labelling one’s work as SCR, or 
embryonic versus adult SCR. My informants included and excluded research on different 
types of stem cells in their definition of good or promising SCR by highlighting various 
characteristics of these cells. I am not trying to imply that all scientists deliberately mis-lead 
funders and give definitions of SCR they do not believe in, simply in order to obtain funding; 
rather, the conceptual fluidity and the uncertainty besetting this field enables boundary-work 
to be conducted in many ways. 
 
4.4.1 Age as a selection criterion 
One of my informants was dismayed at public ignorance around SCR, particularly the 
supposed misunderstanding that SCR is new, when it is, according to him, old. This section 
shows how the age of SCR is one of the contingent characteristics mobilised by stem cell 
professionals in order to promote particular aspects of this field. 
 
Some publications start the history of SCR at different time points: at the first mammalian in 
vitro fertilisations, in 1878 – also highlighting the importance of the first live human IVF 
birth, in 1978 (Brown University); at the derivations of the first ES cell lines from mice, in 
1981 (ISSCR, 2005); at the derivation of the first human embryonic stem cell lines, in 1998 
(often in introductions to sociological papers such as: Magri, 2003; or scientific papers such 
as: Hoffman and Carpenter, 2005; Keller, 2005; Zipori, 2005); or at the first bone marrow 
transplantations, in 1956 (Olinger, 2006). My informants draw on this diversity of starting 
points and conduct boundary-work by constructing SCR as “emerging” and/or “established”. 
 
In some cases, my informants describe SCR as emerging and full of promise, in opposition 
to areas that have been around for a long time, have not cured all diseases and are therefore 
passé. For example, Brian, a young researcher working on ES cells dismisses ASCR as it has 
failed to realise its promises: 
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Brian: You can easily derive adult haematopoietic stem cells which reconstitute 
bone marrow, but my supervisor is an oncologist, and although we’ve been able 
to derive those cells for 20 years, leukaemia still kills people after bone marrow 
transplants. So it’s not a cure, it doesn’t actually work that well, unfortunately. 
Brian does not discuss two of the main problems with bone marrow transplants for 
leukaemia treatment: the rejection of the grafts and the difficulties in destroying the cancer 
cells. These problems will not automatically be solved using cell lines derived from IVF 
embryos. Rather Brian sets up the failure of tissue stem cell-based therapies as the reason for 
focussing on new therapies that have not yet failed. He draws the map of promising research 
to include ESCR, which he describes as new and therefore able to offer new possibilities for 
therapy; and to exclude ASCR, which he describes as old, and already proven incapable of 
curing leukaemia. This cultural cartography takes age as a criterion. It “expands” the 
cognitive authority of ESCR to an area previously covered by ASCR, but where Brian claims 
ASCR has already failed: leukaemia treatment, and by extension, therapies in general. 
Importantly here, therapeutic applications are where success and failure of different cell 
types are judged.  
 
For some researchers, SCR is young and promising, even without considering its therapeutic 
potential: 
Danielle: So when I decided I wanted to come back and do a PhD, I wanted to 
pick an area that I thought was very promising and that I believed in, but I still 
felt was very young and had the potential for a lot of basic research. Because I 
obviously want a career in basic research. So I saw the field of stem cells as being 
really fascinating, I thought it had a lot of promise for applications but also for 
basic research, a lot of information to be gathered. So I chose that area.  
Danielle is using the label “the field of stem cells” and not for example the field of 
embryonic stem cells. One could imagine, if simply given this quote, that she was referring 
to a variety of stem cells sources. However, given the story that she tells in this interview 
about not being able to do her research in the United States, and her less enthusiastic 
responses when I ask her about other types of stem cells, I am quite certain that she is talking 
about doing research on cell lines derived from IVF embryos. Thus for her, the label SCR is 
used to describe what may, more narrowly, be given the label ESCR. For Danielle, this field 
is exciting because its youth implies that a lot of discoveries can still be made. This is in 
contrast to tissue-specific SCR, for example, that has been under investigation for longer, 
and therefore is perceived to have less potential for basic science findings. Danielle does not 
mention the potential findings that could come from studying AS cell plasticity.  
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Contrary to the above example, other scientists conduct boundary-work to “monopolise” the 
authority that ASCR already has, and exclude what is considered to be the new, hyped, 
ESCR. SCR is portrayed as an established field in order to suggest it is full of promise and a 
good area to focus research on. For Sylvester, an adult stem cell researcher, SCR is clearly 
rooted in older work such studies of haematopoiesis. This does not mean that newer 
research, such as the discovery of brain stem cells, has not revitalised the field. He includes 
his work in the map of promising research by highlighting that it is an established field and 
has already proven itself – by having therapeutic potential: 
Sylvester: So in some ways the catch-cry of stem cell revolution is sort of wrong 
anyway. There was a revolution, and it happened 30 years ago, and it was about 
using bone marrow; they saved an enormous amount of people. [...] So, there’s 
a confusion there as well as if somehow this is a new phenomenon, so called 
tissue or adult stem cell versus embryonic stem cells which, that’s, that’s not 
the debate at all. 
Concerning ES cells, Sylvester argues that: “there’s nothing special about them, they might 
sort of fill in gaps in places”. He dismisses the idea that ES cells are bringing about a “stem 
cell revolution”. For him, AS cells have already proven themselves to be very exciting and 
therapeutically applicable cells.  
 
Approximately half my informants work in ESCR and are, unsurprisingly, very supportive of 
that work. Some are quite exclusive, such as Danielle. Others argue that ES cells are to be 
studied alongside other types of stem cells; even if they describe ES cells as more promising. 
Similarly, most of the researchers focussing on ASCR describe that aspect as central to SCR; 
with Sylvester being the most ardent supporter of ASCR.  
 
Many researchers also draw on the age of the field to promote both ESCR and ASCR. For 
example, Stanley, who works on AS cells, views SCR as old and based on tissue-specific 
stem cell work. He also sees it as an evolving and exciting field, and is happy to include 
ESCR. He starts the history of the term SCR with studies of endogenous stem cells such as 
those in the skin: 
Stanley: I’ve been working in this field for quite a number of years, it is kind of 
ironic in the sense that the term stem cell could have, could be seen, I’m not 
saying I see it, it could be seen to have been hijacked by those working on 
embryonic stem cells. Because of course, the very concept of a stem cell really 
emerged from the study of adult tissues, it is not something that arose from 
embryonic stem cells; [...]. Again it was really trying to invoke the concept of a 
stem cell in those constitutively renewing tissues that led to concepts of stem cells 
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and ultimately to the search for, you know, the Holy Grail. Of course Holy Grail, 
it’s like a moving series of goal posts, the goal has changed. 
Although Stanley describes SCR as coming out of adult work, he does not, here or elsewhere 
in the interview, argue for putting ES to the side. Rather he argues that science constantly 
changes, “like a moving series of goal posts”, and that we should study all the different areas 
that are promising. This is similar to how scientists argued, in the UK parliament, for the 
continued study of all different avenues of research (Parry, 2003a).  
 
Similar to many other scientists, Stanley identifies no direct competitors for resources; the 
discussion is set up as if funding was infinite. This suggests boundary-work analysis is 
inadequate: this researcher is not trying to “expand” the cognitive authority of SCR to areas 
previously occupied by competitors; he is simply aiming to expand the authority of SCR. 
This sort of discursive strategy masks that resources are limited. It does not enable questions 
around what funding gets cut if this new area of biotechnology gets funded. For example, 
Newell (2006) argues that this focus on biotechnological solutions often masks the lack of 
resources for less glamorous areas, such as wheelchair provision or carer salaries. 
 
Thus, SCR can be portrayed as beginning with: bone marrow studies, work on endogenous 
stem cells, the derivation of ES cells or the discovery of adult stem cell plasticity. The age of 
stem cell research is up for negotiation and labelling the field as old or new is used in 
cultural cartography. Both the youth and established aspects of SCR can be used as criteria 
to suggest this research holds promise. The ways in which researchers portray the field does 
not necessarily reflect what area they work in.  
 
4.4.2 Nature as a selection criterion 
The concept of “nature” is a powerful resource that can be mobilised in various ways. For 
example, Parry (2003b) shows how publics draw on their lived experiences to construct the 
category of “nature” which they can drawn upon in contingent ways in their discourses on 
SCR and cloning. Brown and Michael (2003) discuss professionals’ uses of “nature”: xeno-
transplantation’s difficulties are explained by its “un-naturalness”, and is contrasted to 
SCR’s predicted success, and its naturalness. In their cultural cartography, my informants 
portrayed as “natural” particular areas of research that they supported and were comfortable 
with, and excluded others as “unnatural”. 
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Nature can be used to “monopolise” resources for SCR by excluding reproductive cloning as 
“unnatural”, in contrast to a more “natural” reproductive method: IVF. One researcher tells 
me he does not find reproductive cloning “acceptable”. When I ask him why, one of his 
reasons is: “it just doesn’t feel right to me”. When I ask him if it would be acceptable in the 
context of treating infertility, he responds: 
Peter: Yeah, you’re asking a question which I haven’t thought about. I have a 
problem with it. I do have a problem with it. So why, I’m not actually, other than 
those reasons I gave you. I’m not, I’m worried about, I’m partly worried about a 
mistake happening that you don’t expect, um [N: Being passed on?] being passed 
on forever. Partly, I think that’s partly it. Also it just seems like there are 
alternatives, I mean, we’ve always got adoption. 
 
Nicola: But then that would be the same for IVF, why have IVF? So would you 
have some[ 
 
Peter: ]IVF to me is a bit more natural,[…] I don’t have any problem with that 
because there, there may be some physical reason or some sperm motility reason, 
or some issue like that that’s kind of you’re not, yeah, I don’t have a problem 
quite so much with that. 
Peter seems to suggest that infertility should only be treated by “natural” means such as IVF 
and adoption. He does not reflect on processes of  “naturalisation” that technologies such as 
IVF have gone through (cf. Parry, 2003b), but rather posits “nature” as a stable category. He 
uses nature to exclude reproductive cloning from acceptable science. This reinforces the 
message that SCR is natural, therefore acceptable. 
 
Using nature is also a powerful way of doing adult/embryonic boundary-work. In the 
following quote, an ES cell scientist draws the map of promising research to include nature, 
and thus ESCR, and to “expel” ASCR. Although he does not explicitly appeal to the label 
“nature”, he does so implicitly by using “meant to”: 
Vincent: In the case of the embryonic stem cell, it can generate all the cell types 
that it would do if it was still in the embryo and if that embryo had been 
implanted. […] And these cells because they come from the early embryo they’re 
meant to do this. So there’s lots of discussions and hype about adult stem cells. 
There is no evidence that an adult stem cell …that there can be any physiological 
function for an adult stem cell to generate these types of tissues. So … Whereas 
these cells, this is what they are meant to do.  
Vincent is promoting research on ES cells by arguing that these are “meant” to differentiate 
into many different cell types, as this is what the cells in an embryo do in order to form a 
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grown adult. He expels AS cell plasticity by highlighting that adult cells do not “naturally” – 
that is in vivo – differentiate into many different cell types.  
 
Interestingly, Vincent, later on in this discussion, highlights the absence of any in vivo 
equivalent to ES cells, suggesting these to be artefacts of culture: 
Vincent: So the critical thing here is that we do not know what the real 
relationship is between an embryonic stem cell in culture and cells in the embryo. 
So, so, it's short hand to say that the inner cell mass becomes ES cells, but the 
inner cell mass is not a group of ES cells. There's no stem cell, real stem cell 
function in the early embryo. Stem cells [...], they may be cells that are purely 
artefacts, being generated in culture. 
Vincent makes this claim following a question about why more than one stem cell line is 
needed for research, if they can indeed differentiate into all different cell types. It is part of 
his argument that more research is needed to better understand exactly what ES cells are and 
how they work. In this way, Vincent, in the first quote, contrasts the “naturalness” of ES cell 
differentiation potential to the “unnaturalness” of trying to make adult cells differentiate into 
many cell types. There naturalness implies something that occurs in vivo. However, Vincent 
also needs to show that ES cells are not simple to understand and are not the same thing as 
the inner cell mass: they need to be further investigated. So in the second quote, he draws on 
the difference between the “naturally occurring” inner cell mass and the “artefactual” ES 
cells to justify more research. Here, whether or not this inner cell mass is “meant” to be put 
in vitro and transformed onto ES cells no longer seems relevant. The map of good research is 
drawn alternately to include the use of “naturally” occurring ES cells, which are better than 
“unnatural” AS cells; and alternately to include the study of ES cells, which are not 
“naturally” occurring, and therefore need to be investigated. This flexible use of “nature” 
highlights the strategic character of this particular account.  
 
“Nature” can also be used to promote tissue-specific SCR at the expense of ESCR: 
Zach: The sort of idea that the embryonic are much more… pluripotent, and have 
[a] much greater range of differentiation, but, I don’t know how that relates... I 
think, I like the idea of, with my work, that we’re not trying to push them too far 
anyway. Like we’re trying to encourage them to go down their natural pathway, 
just more efficiently I suppose. So I get a little sort of concerned that just because 
you can change a cell into something else, it doesn’t really need to. 
Zach is a PhD student working on a particular type of tissue-specific stem cells, trying to 
understand their differentiation in more detail. He is attempting to monopolise resources to 
maintain the cognitive authority of his work by suggesting that it is more “natural” than 
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trying to forcefully “push” ES cells down particular differentiation pathways that they may 
not be meant to follow. He excludes ESCR by painting it as a fashionable whim, trying to 
make cells do something they would not “naturally” do. 
 
In summary, “nature” is a useful interpretive resource that can flexibly promote different 
areas of research (IVF-derived ESCR, tissue-specific SCR, AS cell plasticity) and exclude 
others (reproductive cloning, ASCR, ESCR). The constructedness of “nature” is visible here; 
however, none of my informants reflected upon it, unlike lay groups examined by Parry 
(2003b).  
 
4.4.3 Differentiation potential as a selection criterion 
As I argue in the introduction, the potential plasticity of adult cells, raised by the publication 
of the Verfaillie paper, posed a direct challenge to ESCR. In the UK, this paper was 
mentioned in the news media (Highfield, 2002; Whitehouse, 2002). However the 
parliamentary debates were over by the time of its publication and ESCR was already legal. 
In Australia, the concept of AS cell plasticity were raised in submissions and briefs given to 
Parliament (e.g. Do No Harm, 2002; Information and Research Services, 2002), in 
Parliamentary discussions (e.g. Official Committee Hansard, 2002, September 19th; 2002, 
September 24th), in reviews of the stem cell debates (e.g. Herbert, 2002) and in the news 
media (ABC News Online, 2002a; Wroe, 2002). It was put forward by opponents of research 
using embryos as a reason to focus on ASCR, rather than ESCR: 
Work at the University of Minnesota points to the fact the destruction of human 
embryos is unnecessary to obtain stem cells for ‘miracle cures’. (Catholic 
Women's League Australia-NSW Inc, 2002). 
To respond to this, supporters of ESCR needed to organise their defence. They challenged 
the logic that the plasticity of some AS cells was enough to render ESCR obsolete; they 
dismissed the findings by highlighting that they had not been reproduced and that these cells 
if they exist, are very rare and difficult to isolate; and they backed the parallel investigation 
of AS and ES cells (e.g. Dr. Elefanty, Official Committee Hansard, 2002, September 24th: 
CA194). These are the same arguments as the ones made in the British Parliamentary 
debates (Parry, 2003a). They reinforced this point by drawing on Verfaillie’s statements that 
her work should not be used as an excuse to stop ESCR.  
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The potential plasticity of AS cells is also a common theme during my interviews. Some 
researchers express the feeling that ASCR became a much more potent challenge to the 
legalisation of ESCR when it could compete on the “scientific” side: 
Peter: The use of adult stem cells has certainly become one of the strongest 
arguments from the lobby groups, the Catholic lobby groups in particular, for not 
doing embryonic stem cell work. So, in the beginning, I guess the science for the 
adult stem cells has moved along even more quickly in recent years, at the 
beginning, there wasn’t that potential so the debate was more, is it ethically 
acceptable or not. Without there being an alternative to, I guess, help the Catholic 
debate further. So I think they’re in a stronger position, have a scientific kind of 
arm in their argument that they didn’t have before. 
By talking about this “scientific arm”, Stanley indicates that “technical” challenges (ones 
that result directly from laboratory-based findings), rather than “ethical” ones, hold more 
sway in debates about the future of science (I return to the often scientistic nature of public 
debates in chapter 7). This quote suggests that for this informant, plasticity is an important 
criterion by which to judge the promise of a stem cell.  
 
Many of my Australian informants dismiss ASCR plasticity during interviews, using similar 
strategies to the ones in parliament (some of my informants gave evidence in parliament 
too). For example, Philip saw the plasticity of AS cells as exaggerated during parliamentary 
debates: 
Philip: I think it was a time when there were some apparently startling 
observations in the stem cell field about adult cells, I think those observations 
gained a lot of exposure. They were politicised to quite a substantial degree 
because of this thing as seeing this as an alternative to working on embryonic 
stem cells. So it was partly the media, perhaps even partly the scientific journals, 
perhaps made somewhat more out of these claims than was merited.  
Phillip is suggesting that AS cell plasticity was hyped. By focussing on differentiation 
potential and describing ES cells as more plastic (therefore more promising) than AS cells, 
he attempts to “monopolise” cognitive authority for ESCR and away from ASCR. ASCR is 
excluded from within the map of promising research. 
 
Another researcher also dismisses suggestions that AS cells are as plastic as ES cells, but 
highlights a variety of other criteria which suggest that all different kinds of stem cells 
should be investigated: 
Victor: You know it’s the same argument about adult versus embryonic stem 
cells, ‘hey adult stem cells do this, why should we use embryonic’. I agree, but 
the problem is you can’t proliferate them that fast, you won’t get the numbers you 
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want, they don’t have the same differential potential, you need to treat them 
differently. So therefore, let’s work on both. Let’s actually find out the best way 
to do it, rather than the safest way to do it initially, see if we can actually get this 
whole system to work. And then try to see if you can transfer information from 
one system to another one that might be more safe or more practical.  
Victor suggests that there are various criteria which distinguish between cell types, beyond 
differentiation potential, such as cell proliferation or culture conditions. All these criteria are 
“technical”, and the ethics of using different sources does not, here, come into his judgment. 
He is “protecting the autonomy” of SCR from infringement by ethics. He is also promoting 
SCR in general and not reflecting on what may loose funding or authority if we work on all 
these different types of stem cells. 
 
Other researchers equate plasticity with promising research, and suggest that cells with a 
high differentiation potential, but less ethical problems than ES, cells should take precedence 
over these:  
Simon: We were all absolutely gob-smacked to read this paper last year, 
absolutely amazing paper…. [all these different cell types] they’re all present in 
cord blood. So the whole stem cell/ cloning debate is finished, well there's no 
debate, [there] is no ethical, no possible ethical objection to collecting cord blood. 
Simon is discussing findings suggesting that cord blood stem cells can give rise to cell types 
from all three germ layers. He portrays these cells to be as promising as ES cells, but without 
ethical problems. For him this does not lead to a loss of autonomy of science, which has to 
defer to ethical criteria; rather, he constructs the map of “good” SCR to include “ethical” 
SCR. He describes the discovery of these more “ethical” cells as sufficient to resolve the 
stem cell debates. 
 
For Simon, ethics and plasticity are the main criteria by which to decide which type of SCR 
should be pursued, whereas for Peter and Philip, suggestions of adult cell plasticity are not 
considered enough to stop ESCR. This difference mirrors these participants’ professional 
interests, with Philip and Peter working on ES cells, and Simon focussing more broadly on 
therapeutic applications (and therefore being less threatened by the potential of AS cells, 
taken as cord blood stem cells here). However, Victor (above), who like Peter and Philip 
dismisses claims that AS cells are as plastic as ES and supports research down all avenues, 
works on understanding cell differentiation. Therefore his defence of ES cells does not 
advance his narrow professional interests (I return to the idea of defending science as a 
whole, rather than any one particular area in the following chapter).  
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Another researcher does not consider adult cell plasticity to be mere hype, unlike Philip and 
Peter: 
Nathan: We’ve had a lot of trouble getting our paper published particularly 
because you have embryonic stem cell groups competing for money. And now 
that adult stem cells are coming out and being shown to be able to do a lot of 
things that embryonic could do, without all of the ethical dilemmas and, like 
immune rejection issues that the embryonic ones have, that they’re I guess being 
subjective in their analysis of a paper that’s submitted for publication. They say: 
well these guys now are competitors, adult stem cell guys are going to be taking a 
lot of our money away because we’re being restricted by legislations and also 
because they’ve been showing great things so... 
Nathan is a PhD student. He works on adult cell plasticity. For him, differentiation potential 
is an important criterion to judge stem cells by, and he places ASCR on the side of promising 
research. However, as for Simon, plasticity is not the only criterion. Nathan highlights ES 
cell ethical and immune rejection issues in order to promote ASCR and exclude ESCR from 
good research.  
 
In addition, the above quote is particularly interesting as Nathan is unusual in that he 
highlights the “political” nature of science: even when research on IVF embryo-derived stem 
cells is legal (as it was at the time of this interview), he argues that too many achievements 
from AS cells risk directing funds away from ESCR. Nathan suggests that researchers (peer-
reviewers here) are still concerned by the challenge posed by ASCR, and therefore less 
willing to promote the publication of findings in support of AS cell plasticity (which is what 
the un-published paper Nathan is referring to was about). He “accounts for the error” of the 
peer-reviewers by pointing to contingent professional interests (see 2.5.2). This difficulty in 
publishing could also reflect the global nature of science: the peer-reviewers may be in a 
different country such as the USA, where ESCR is still not legal. Nathan, here, reflects on 
the limited and competitive nature of funding. 
 
4.4.4 Safety and control as criteria 
Some people, rather than focussing on differentiation potential as the hallmark of a good 
stem cell, focus on the need for safety and controlling this differentiation: 
The stem cell is a bit like the griffin of mythology – half lion, half eagle; grand 
and powerful, but potentially monstrous in effect. These essentially unspecialized 
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cells can renew their own population while supplying cells that mature 
(differentiate) into the specialized cells necessary for all tissues. Although this 
ability to reproduce and self-renew is sublime when functioning properly, its 
disorder creates masses of dysfunctional replicating cells. (Janzen and Scadden, 
2006) 
If the differentiation of stem cells is not controlled, their use in the clinic could lead to 
dangerous effects such as cancers. 
 
The differentiation potential of ES cells was used as a negative point by opponents of ESCR 
during Australian parliamentary debates: 
Why would you want to put cells into a person which have the potential to change 
into other cell types that are not required? Those particular cells, due to their 
totipotential, can give rise to teratomas; that is, tumours formed by cells which 
can give rise to multiple tissues. The greater plasticity of embryonic cells is a 
disadvantage, not an advantage. (Prof. Good, Official Committee Hansard, 2002, 
September 19th: CA 127-8) 
Similar arguments are present in my data.  
 
Some of my informants, both in the UK and Australia, are concerned about clinical trials 
going on around the world where different types of stem cells are injected into people, 
without a good understanding of how differentiation operates, and therefore without being 
able to control it. For John, in the UK, this sort of work is pseudo-science, which he opposes 
to “real science”: 
John: Well, real science, I mean, what I mean by real science in that instance is 
not just sort of stuffing stem cells into my favourite injury, but actually doing 
some developmental biology and finding out how you’re going to control them. 
Here, understanding control is more important than using the cells with the most 
differentiation potential. John does not exclude a particular cell type, but rather certain 
practices from his map of good research. 
 
Nathan (I introduced above), excludes ESCR from good science by trying to monopolise 
resources for ASCR, which he describes as safer:  
Nathan: I think adult cells are miles ahead, miles, miles, miles ahead. I mean 
people have had [...] bone marrow grafts for years, all of the animal work shows 
that they don’t make tumours, there’s no problem, it’s a benign thing in a way. 
Whereas the embryonic one, just about every animal experiment you see, and the 
collaborators with us have seen, o my god. I’ve seen a rat, they put [ES cells] in 
the brain or something, and it’s growing right out of his head, walking around 
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with this big growth sitting out of its skull. That’s an extreme case, but that’s sort 
of how it is now. 
Nathan draws the map of good SCR to include the use of cells that are well studied and 
understood, and therefore proven to be safe; he excludes the use of newer ES cells, which so 
far seem to cause cancer.  
 
Ted, from the UK, contrasts ES cells (high differentiation potential and high risks) with AS 
cells (lower differentiation potential and lower cancer risks):  
Ted: [...] we know [ES cells have] got a potentiality, in some ways they've got too 
much potentiality. The problem with adult stem cells is, we know that they're not 
carcinogenic but do they [have] a potentiality? So the kind of mirror image 
problem if you see what I mean. And I suspect at the end of the day, it's not going 
to be either adult stem cells or human ES cells, it's going to be some kind of mix 
of the two or one informed by the other.  
Ted suggests that finding pluripotent cells is not the quintessential goal of SCR. In contrast 
to Nathan, however, he does not use the risk of cancer as a reason to monopolise resources 
just for ASCR and exclude ESCR. Rather he suggests he wants to promote SCR in general: 
all these problems can be overcome by more research (cf. Parry, 2003a; under review) 
 
For other informants, although more research is needed to reduce the risk of cancer, the 
focus is on improving ES cell work, rather than studying different types of stem cells:  
Peter: So there’s a big risk of embryonal carcinomas and that’s something that has 
to be overcome, and there are ways, potential ways of overcoming that by sorting 
by FACS68 or by some sort of techniques, sorting the good cells away from the 
bad cells. 
Peter’s rhetorical strategy aims at “monopolizing” resources for further research on ES cells, 
and away from ASCR. The risk of cancer is a particular challenge in the context where one 
of the main ways in which to judge good research is whether it holds therapeutic promise. I 
now turn to this final criterion.  
 
                                                     
68 FACS, or Fluorescent Activated Cell Sorting, is a technique for sorting labelled cells, based on the 
light they emit. 
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4.4.5 Research tool or therapy? 
As Parry suggests, it is often necessary for proponents of a new and controversial area of 
research to create a demand for it (2003a: 155) and: 
Crucial to the construction of potential user groups as desperate was the 
construction of SCR as the only hope of producing therapies that would cure 
people (2003a: 158). 
Although this discourse was commonly used by my informants, they also drew upon a 
duality often used in cultural cartography: the idea that science can be “pure” as well as 
“applied” (e.g. Gieryn, 1983: 791). Informants not only highlighted SCR’s direct therapeutic 
potential via transplantation therapies, but also its role as a research tool.  
 
Sylvester, whom I introduced above as a firm supporter of ASCR, conducts much of his 
boundary-work to “monopolise” resources for ASCR by focussing on its therapeutic 
applications. He dismisses the clinical potential of ESCR as hype: 
Sylvester: the debate was being driven by the promises of using [ESCR] for 
therapy, which seemed to be a little premature at that stage, I mean the promise is 
always there, but the promise is there for anything you can think about, and the 
idea that you want to cure disease, doesn’t translate into the fact that you can do 
it. 
He is in essence critiquing the use of “promise” in the same way that Kitzinger and Williams 
critique the use of “hope” in discourses promoting embryos research: proponents of 
controversial research can use words such as “hope” to conjure images of “limitless and 
imminent potential”, without having to provide any hard evidence. Hence, if nothing 
materialises, they have an “escape clause” as they were only ever talking about possibilities, 
not making forecasts (Kitzinger and Williams, 2005: 738). However, as Sylvester argues, 
“the promise is there for anything you can think about”. Instead, Sylvester prefers focussing 
on evidence of therapies that do work (as the ones from ASCR discussed above). For him, 
whether ES or AS cells have a good differentiation potential is not the crux of the matter; it 
is whether they have a good therapeutic potential.  
 
Rachel, another Australian researcher, highlights the importance of focussing on therapeutic, 
rather than differentiation, potential: 
Rachel: There’s been a lot of controversy in the stem cell field. Some people just 
do not believe that blood, bone marrow stem cells, can actually form other tissues. 
Other people believe it’s true. We certainly find evidence that at a very low 
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percentage, cells from [an adult tissue] are coming in and forming [cells in 
another adult tissue]. So I think it happens, but not very often. So whether this is 
trans-differentiation, [...] whether it’s fusion for example, [...] if it’s actually just 
an inflammatory cell coming in and playing a role in the repair process. So 
whether that inflammatory cell is actually forming a new cell, we don’t actually 
know. Like it might just be part of the repair and remodelling process that tissue 
goes through during inflammation. But that’s fine [...]. So we try to think of it as a 
balance of injury and repair, and it's really important to understand those 
processes, more in order to try and control that. 
For Rachel, what matters is not whether AS cells are pluripotent and can “trans-
differentiate”; rather, it is that they can contribute to injury “repair” and thus have clinical 
applications. The aim of good research is to understand how cells can contribute to organ 
repair, not to find a pluripotent cell. Therapeutic potential is not diminished if this repair 
occurs through “fusion” rather than “transdifferentiation”. Lack of plasticity is not a reason 
to exclude a cell, rather, lack of therapeutic potential is. However, the potential does not have 
to be directly via transplantation, it can come from understanding basic cell.  
 
Gary, an Australian PhD student working on AS cells argues that these hold the most 
promise as they are “easier” to use in therapy. This promise also comes from a good 
understanding of how these cells develop in vivo: 
Gary: I think [autologous cell therapy] will be one of the more, easier, on a 
relative scale. It’ll be some of the easier things to do rather than differentiate ES 
cells into particular lineages and then re-introduce them back into a patient, um. I 
think yeah the idea of isolating a patient’s own stem cells, expanding them in 
vitro and then putting them back in, is a very tempting possibility, um. But even 
more so I think understanding the niches that stem cells are living in the body and 
how they function normally. And then trying to stimulate them, sort of give them 
a kick start rather than taking them out, and growing them up and putting them 
back in.  
Gary does not dismiss ES cells for being less applicable in therapy; indeed, all different 
kinds of cells types can provide information about developmental processes.  
 
Although transplantation therapies are often touted in public fora, many of my informants do 
not see them as central to ESCR. For example, Ted from the UK argues that while 
transplantation may be what comes to our mind first, the promise of SCR may lie elsewhere: 
Ted: I think there's a potentiality that the field will allow us to understand or 
develop mechanisms for regenerating tissue or supporting tissue. [...] and that's 
not necessarily though transplanting cells. It might [be] that with embryonal or 
adult stem cells allow us to grow tissues [...]; or maybe grow subsidiary stem cells 
that could be re-implanted [...]; or it might be that they will allow us to understand 
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the mechanisms by which such tissues can be regenerated and then develop 
standard pharmaceutical drugs with which to intervene; or it might be that it will 
allow us to develop tissues which we can use to test drugs on for example and 
develop new drugs. Because at the moment, pharmaceutical companies find it 
very difficult to test both the effects of drugs, and drug toxicity in animal models 
and animals are different to humans in important ways. 
SCR is described as very interesting primarily because it is new research tool, and 
secondarily because it may have applications in drug development or directly in therapies. 
Here, stem cells do not need to be transplantable and pluripotent in order to be promising and 
worth studying.  
 
The dual construction of science as pure and applied is a particularly useful resource for 
talking about the promises of SCNT. Although public discourses about SCNT often focus on 
patient-specific therapies, I find that only four of my informants considered this a likely 
possibility (one of these was a scientist giving a presentation during a multi-disciplinary 
discussion, and was therefore talking in a much more public context than my interviewees). 
Many informants, like Terence in the UK, describe SCNT as a research tool, rather than a 
therapy: 
Terence: I mean, I think the consideration of really at this moment in time, getting 
somatic cells and developing using oocytes and developing cloned ES derivatives 
for cell therapy, I mean it is an attractive technical... possibility and I think the 
jury is still out as to whether it is a probability. There are too many technical 
issues and unknown factors associated with the major aspects of the technology. 
[...] At the moment I would say for me, it [patient-specific therapies] is still 
fiction rather than fact. 
 
Although Terence paints SCNT as unlikely to provide therapies directly (it is a “possibility”, 
“fiction rather than fact”), he argues it is a promising research tool and therefore he does not 
exclude it from his definition of SCR. Thus, the duality of science enables this informant to 
“monopolise” resources for SCR as a whole, by highlighting either its use as a research tool, 
or as a therapy.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that there are no unique definitions for “stem cell” and other labels 
related to this area of research. It highlights that different people centre SCR on different 
areas, including ESCR, ASCR, “therapeutic cloning” and adult stem cell plasticity. For 
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some, only one area is central; for others, a combination of areas constitutes SCR. 
Depending on which stories people tell, they raise different promises and issues, and imagine 
different trajectories for the research. These different emphases of stem cell definitions may 
indicate that “stem cell” is a boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989): the same label is 
used by different people who give it different meanings and this may facilitate institutions 
such as stem cell centres to be set up, or stem cell consortia to receive funding. 
 
The fluidity of the term “stem cell” can be paralleled to that of the term “biotechnology”. As 
Bud (1989) argues, the latter also had historically changing definitions. It was used to 
describe the study of fermentation processes decades before it was associated with 
recombinant DNA technologies. This hijacking of an old term to describe a newer area can 
also be seen in the application of the label “stem cell”, initially used to describe gut epithelial 
stem cells, to embryo derived stem cells. Similar to “biotechnology”, people who draw on 
the label “stem cell” do not always think about how it has been used in the past.  
 
The conceptual fluidity in SCR enables my informants to conduct boundary-work in various 
ways, using diverse criteria. This chapter also explores attempts at “monopolising” resources 
and cognitive authority for different aspects of SCR. Some of my informants paint SCR as 
an emerging field, with much therapeutic potential, that uses cells with a high level of 
differentiation potential. Others paint it as an established field, with therapeutic potential, 
that uses cells that are “pluripotent” and or easy to control. The promise of SCR is also made 
by appealing to the importance of basic research or of doing research that does not go against 
“nature”. The demarcations between different types of SCR are not just made by measuring 
cells’ differential potential, or by contrasting “adult” to “embryonic” SCR.  
 
The UK and Australian parliamentary debates often centred around the “question of life” 
(e.g. Parry, 2003a; Harvey, 2005); even though many participants tried to focus the debates 
on “technical” issues (as I discuss in 4.1 and 4.3.3 above). In contrast, by looking at stem cell 
researchers discourses, during these interviews, it becomes apparent that the adult/embryo 
binary opposition is often constructed as revolving around “technical” factors (I look at this 
in more detail in chapter 7). This enables my informants to promote their own area as well as 
research more generally. In particular, by talking in terms of therapies, scientists can enrol 
patients and emphasise the importance of science in helping society. They can exclude 
particular cell types as not promising, either because they are not “plastic:” enough” or 
because they are likely to cause tumours.  
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In summary, there are many co-existing understandings for the concepts used in SCR, and 
these are given different levels of importance by different stem cell researchers. There is no 
unique way of “understanding” what SCR is about. I would argue that for most public 
“misunderstandings” the same “misunderstandings” exist among scientists. However, public 
debates are often set up in such a way that participants (both publics and scientists) feel they 
can only contribute if they know the “facts” (as I discuss in 2.2.4). This framing of debates 
and people’s assumptions that there are unique definitions needs to be unpacked and 
examined if we want to open up public debates to broader publics (I return to this in chapter 
7). Therefore, I suggest that the ability to give exact definitions of “stem cell” cannot be a 
requirement for participating in discussions about the future of SCR, and the constructedness 
of these multiple definitions needs to be recognised. Social scientists can highlight this 
diversity to scientists policy-makers and diverse other potential engagement participants. 
 
In addition, the focus of debates on certain contested meanings and not others excludes many 
relevant aspects from discussions. To paraphrase Star (1985): the more stem cell researchers 
argue with one another about how to use stem cells (such as adult or embryonic), the less 
salient the question of whether to use them becomes69. By focussing on whether we should 
use adult or embryonic stem cells, or by focussing on the virtue of pluripotent stem cells, we 
are not asking if money could be better spent on recruiting carers, improving access for 
wheelchair users or promoting healthy eating, for example. This emphasis on local debates 
hides broader uncertainties about the role of science in society. As Star puts it, this reduces 
uncertainty by translating local uncertainty to global certainty. The next chapter focus on 
how scientists manage uncertainty.  
 
                                                     
69 The original is: “The more localizationists argued with one another about how to do, for example, 
ablation experiments, the less salient the question of whether to do them became” Star (1985: 412). 
 
Chapter 5 – (Un)certainty discourses and SCR futures   116 
 
Chapter 5  
            





Chapter 4 traced some of the diversity in definitions of SCR and accounts of what constitutes 
“good” or “promising” research. This chapter looks at my informants’ discourses in more 
detail and examines how social locations can shape these. It focuses on futures imagined for 
SCR and the uses of discourses of (un)certainty. 
 
During public discussions about SCR, a number of futures for this technology are presented. 
These can be full of hope or fear (e.g. Kitzinger and Williams, 2005). Regardless of the 
pessimistic or optimist contents of these futures, they are usually presented as if certain or 
inevitable; for example, if ESCR is legalised, cures will be found (Kitzinger and Williams, 
2005: 735-6). Thus, modernist notions of prediction and control, and the equation of 
knowledge with certainty are powerful tropes that dominate many discourses around SCR 
and its applications for therapies. However, data from more private interactions, such as 
interviews, can reveal more subtlety and uncertainty in stem cell researchers’ discourses. 
 
STS has long been concerned with “certainty” in science and it is an interesting site for 
sociological investigation. As Campbell puts it: 
since the authority of expertise is predicated on superior knowledge, the question 
of uncertainty touches on the credibility and importance of scientists as experts, 
with the result that the amount of knowledge becomes a major theme in the 
debates among scientists when they appear as experts. (Campbell, 1985: 429) 
Pinch finds that researchers most intimately involved with a particular area of knowledge 
often express high levels of confidence in it (1981: 151). However, they are also aware of 
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many uncertainties within their area, which they may or may not choose to voice (1981: 153-
4). Collins (1987) also finds that researchers want to project images of certainty in public 
fora, particularly on television. (Un)certainty discourse can be used strategically (Campbell, 
1985). Star (1985) argues that scientists have many ways in which to transform what she 
calls “local uncertainties” into “global certainty”, or “facts”. For example, she finds that 
scientists may delete uncertainties besetting the classification of pathologies, which arise 
from the divergence of symptoms between individual patients, by choosing to focus on 
“exemplar” cases.  
 
Uncertainty can also be reduced by mobilising possible futures as interpretive resources. 
Brown and Michael discuss how these futures can be studied not as a “neutral temporal 
space” but as an “analytical object” (2003: 4) and how this can be used to build on 
MacKenzie’s certainty trough. From this emerging “sociology of expectations” (see also 
Brown, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Horst, 2007) arises another interesting feature of 
(un)certainty discourses: performativity. For example, expectations of future “biovalue” for 
particular types of stem cells (Waldby, 2002) can result in parents banking their babies’ cord 
blood in the present (Brown and Kraft, 2006). In particular, Michael finds that the 
performativity of imagined futures can include a variety of aspects:  
the presentation of self, the production of subject positions for readers/viewers, 
the enrolments and alignment of various others, the bringing into being of a 
particular state of affairs. (Michael, 2000: 22) 
Consequently, the performativity of language also needs to be investigated 
 
This chapter explores how stem cell researchers talk about imagined futures for SCR and 
examines their mobilisation of (un)certainty discourses. It starts by discussing a particularly 
useful tool for exploring (un)certainty: MacKenzie’s certainty trough (1990; 1998). It shows 
how this model helps to make sense of stem cell researchers’ discourses with relation to their 
distance from knowledge production. The chapter then highlights some data that does not fit 
the certainty trough and builds on Lahsen’s critique of this model to develop it by taking into 
account certain features of knowledge production and the psychology of knowledge 
producers. The subsequent part of the chapter examines some of the “recurrent interpretative 
resources” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) my informants mobilise, and explores the 
performativity and strategic uses of (un)certainty discourses, including: the necessity of 
displaying certainty in public, the mobilisation of pasts and futures as well as the change in 
discourses as technologies become more established. The chapter then shows how social 
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identity theory (e.g. Hogg et al., 1995; Stets and Burke, 2000) can help build on the certainty 
trough by focussing on the sorts of identities scientists mobilise in particular social 
circumstances. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of these (un)certainty 
discourses for public engagement in science. 
 
5.2 Using the certainty trough to look at discourses around SCR 
During each of my interviews, I ask my informants: “What, for you, are the best promises 
that could come out of SCR?” This is to elicit answers beyond the usual public promises of 
finding therapies for any, and every, condition. I am provided with a range of responses, 
which I start analysing with MacKenzie’s “certainty trough”. In this section, I introduce this 
concept and discuss how it can be used in the case of SCR. 
 
5.2.1 MacKenzie’s certainty trough 
MacKenzie (1990; 1998) discusses the construction of certainty for the accuracy of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Building on Collins’ work on certainty in science, he 
introduces the concept of “certainty trough” depicted in figure 1. He identifies two groups of 
people who are uncertain about the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles. One group 
includes people who are closely involved with producing knowledge about these missiles. 
These people are aware of the difficulties associated with measuring, assessing and 
predicting missile accuracy and express uncertainties concerning the accuracy estimates and 
their usefulness. (I indicate them by A in figure 1). Another group includes people who are 
“alienated” or “committed to an alternative weapon system” (1990: 371). They also 
expressed uncertainties with regards to missile accuracies (location C). In between these 
two, MacKenzie suggests the presence of third group of people: those loyal to the work and 
those who “believe what the brochures tell them” (1990: 371). These people lie in the 
“certainty trough” (location B). Thus, MacKenzie sees the “distance” from knowledge 
production as an important factor modulating people’s certainty. 
 
 





Figure 1: The certainty trough.  
Adapted from MacKenzie (1990: 372) 
 
 
There are three key points regarding the certainty trough that I wish to highlight here. The 
first is that MacKenzie couches the description of his concept in very tentative terms:  
It is possible, indeed, that this schematic and impressionistic diagram might 
describe (I am merely speculating) the distribution of certainty about any 
established technology.” (1990: 371, original emphasis)  
From this, I assume he is suggesting the certainty trough should be taken as a model or a 
heuristic tool, not as a necessary description of how people are, and that it may not be 
universally applicable. The second point relates to the notion of “established technologies”. 
MacKenzie suggests that this model applies to “established”, rather than “emerging”, 
technologies. However, as I showed in the previous chapter (see 4.4.1), the ascription of this 
label to some technologies and not to others is itself a construction and a rhetorical strategy. 
As a result, this notion is not helpful when deciding whether to apply the certainty trough 
(although, see 5.4.3, below). The third point concerns the attribution of certainty: for most of 
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“certainty” axis, and what he knows of their research to establish their location on the 
“distance from knowledge production” axis. So, I would argue that he treats these accounts 
as “resources” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). However, I believe that strategic use of language 
should not be ignored and as outlined in chapter 2, I use discourse as a “topic” as well as a 
“resource”70.  
 
For the start of this chapter, like MacKenzie, I use discourse as a resource (Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984): I place my informants on the certainty trough graph according to what they 
told me in interviews, as well as what I know of their published works, research programs 
and what they said in public debates. Their placement also depends on how essential I take 
certain factors to be, such as their belonging to stem cell research groups. For instance, when 
researchers work directly on AS cells but belong to a consortium with a strong focus on 
embryonic stem cells, they can feel alienated from, or included in, the promises of ESCR. To 
decide where to put them on the graph, I mainly take my cues from side comments made 
during interviews, but I feel it is important to keep in mind and analyse these tensions in 
people’s social locations. However, as I will reveal during this chapter, discourses, 
particularly discourses of (un)certainty can have strategic roles; therefore I will, later in this 
chapter, move away from MacKenzie’s use of discourses as “resources”, and instead use 
them as a “topics”. 
 
I interview a range of researchers, including junior PhD students spending most of their time 
at the bench, senior group leaders spending theirs lobbying politicians, people working on 
immunology, epigenetics, embryos, blood stem cells. As I hint in the previous chapter, they 
express differing amounts of certainty about the future of different aspects of SCR. To make 
sense of these data, I placed my informants on certainty trough graphs. However, it quickly 
became obvious that I could not have a graph for certainty expressed about SCR in general 
and I required a number of graphs to break down the different aspects of SCR. I developed 
four graphs: for ESCR using IVF embryos, ASCR (including work on adult cell plasticity), 
SCNT as a research tool and SCNT for therapies. These graphs (not reproduced here) were 
very useful in making sense of part of my data. 
 
                                                     
70 MacKenzie is not unaware of the strategic dimension of (un)certainty discourses as discussed in 
section 5.4. 
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5.2.2 Confirming the certainty trough 
My topic guide did not specifically address the difficulties my informants were encountering 
in the laboratory. Nevertheless, many people mention these and how they related to 
uncertainties about the future of SCR. For instance, when answering a question on whether 
both adult and embryonic SCR should be pursued, the following female postdoctoral fellow 
says:  
Heidi: there'll be other disorders that maybe derivatives of embryonic stem cells 
will produce cells that would be important for research […] [M]y work is […] 
trying to derive beta cells from human embryonic stem cells, which is a way off, 
as you probably gathered if you were sitting in those sessions, I tried to avoid 
even the word beta cells! 
Heidi is aware of a number of “technical” difficulties and uncertainties relating to her 
particular work (she is also referring to talks where many people were exposing their 
difficulties in similar areas). She thinks that embryonic stem cell work has a future. However 
she uses very tentative language – “maybe”, “trying” and “a way off” – that highlights her 
uncertainties. She is an illustration of location A: she is aware of many difficulties that may 
beset the future use of ES cells in deriving beta cells, which is the area of SCR that she 
works in.  
 
Some of the people I interview express much more certainty about the future and potential of 
SCR; they do not work directly in the particular area of SCR under discussion and do not 
raise the technical difficulties this area may encounter. They can be located in B. The 
following quote is about the promise of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT): 
Peter: one of the best arguments for doing [SCNT] is that you would take a 
[somatic] cell from the patient, this is a sort of scenario that’s I guess slightly 
science fiction but not too far away from a possibility anyway, […] get the 
nucleus, transfer it into some host, perhaps a host embryonic stem cell, […], grow 
up embryonic stem cells from that, that have the same genetic material as the 
potential recipient, then if we understood this process I mentioned before of how 
to properly direct the embryonic stem cells into the right type of cells, you could 
certainly then get a population of stem cells to transplant back into the same 
patient that was the donor of the somatic cell in the first place. 
Peter is not involved in SCNT as, at the time of this interview, it was illegal in Australia 
(where he works). However, he belongs to a large research group that had publicly expressed 
its wishes to see SCNT legalised. Peter is aware of potential difficulties as evidenced by the 
use of “science fiction” or “if”, but does not detail a list of specific limitations. He is much 
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more certain about the future of SCNT than most other people I spoke to. He expresses 
strong confidence that the difficulties are surmountable. This is particularly noticeable when 
I ask him about whether access to these tailor-made therapies may be difficult:  
Peter: I don’t know… even though it’s expensive, […] it would get absorbed, a 
lot of the costs wouldn’t get passed back on I think in the immediate term I think 
to the patient. 
This scientist does not know much about technical difficulties of creating cell lines from 
nuclear transfer embryos and using these in therapies. Here, his distance from knowledge 
production about SCNT can explain why he expresses certainty about the ease of future 
application of this technology. He is a good example of location B.  
 
Some of my informants fall into category C: they express uncertainty about the promises of 
technologies to which they are not committed. One PhD student, Danielle, after thinking 
long and hard about what to do for her thesis, decided on ESCR. She could think of many 
promises for this work, but was very uncertain as to how ASCR could be useful. I also 
interview several researchers working on AS cells, who do not belong to a joint 
adult/embryonic SCR group, and who are having trouble publishing their results. I consider 
them to be alienated from ESCR. These researchers, contrary to Danielle above, are very 
certain about the promises of ASCR, but not of ESCR:  
Connor: I expect that adult stem cells will be the way that you have therapies. I 
don’t expect embryonic stem cells really ever to be therapies.  
They could think of many obstacles to the use of ES cells and were very uncertain about 
their future. The commitment of these researchers to a particular technology (either ASCR or 
ESCR) can explain why they express high levels of uncertainty towards competing 
technologies.  
 
The above data confirms the certainty trough. Nevertheless, there are also many other 
examples that directly contradicted it. To investigate this, I draw on Lahsen’s critique of the 
certainty trough, which I now discuss.  
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5.3 Building on the certainty trough: problematising “distance”  
5.3.1 Critiquing the certainty trough 
Myanna Lahsen makes useful developments to MacKenzie’s certainty trough. She discusses 
its use for certainty distributions around General Circulation Models (GCMs) in climate 
predictions. Like me, she points out that MacKenzie may have only meant his concept as a 
“heuristic” device (2005a: 897) . However, she notes that the wide use of the certainty trough 
requires its careful appraisal. She discusses four features of knowledge production and 
producers that should be included in the certainty trough to make it more powerful, 






Figure 2: Building on the certainty trough 
The dotted line is a mirror image of MacKenzie’s certainty trough model (full line). People 
located in A’ (low uncertainty, close to knowledge production) are in the mirror image 
location to A (high uncertainty, close to knowledge creation). The same goes for locations B 
and B’, and C and C’. People can be located anywhere between the full and dotted lines. 
The divergence from the full line can be accounted for by factors such as psychological 
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Lahsen firstly shows that knowledge can be produced in various sites; secondly that users 
and producers of knowledge may be intersecting groups; and thirdly that some types of 
inaccuracies can be better identified by people with a different expertise to those producing 
the knowledge. From these first three points, Lahsen argues that: 
there is no single vantage point from which to best evaluate the performance of a 
single complex GCM [in predicting climate change] (2005a: 897). 
The fourth set of features that Lahsen suggests modulates certainty is “social and 
psychological factors” (2005a: 897) from which she derives the trope of “critical distance” 
(2005: 903). She finds that scientists may be unable to criticise their work, and thus their 
degree of “certainty” may be difficult to establish. Critical distance has two components. 
Firstly scientists can become “seduced” by their work and therefore unable to discern 
uncertainties in it; they are too close to their work. Secondly, they may be unable to voice 
uncertainties about their work. This highlights the performativity of discourse (see 
Szerszynski, 1999), where informants may use certainty to project particular images, 
increasing the authority of their work and enabling particular futures while disabling others 
(e.g. Michael, 2000; Brown and Michael, 2003; Horst, 2007); the act of describing a 
particular future as certain can create the social conditions for that future to materialise. This 
notion of critical distance is helpful in understanding how and why researchers may display 
more or less certainty in different contexts and I return to it below. It also highlights that 
different identities may be “salient” in these different contexts (as discussed below in 5.5). 
 
Like Lahsen for general circulation models, I want to argue that it is very difficult, in SCR, 
to locate a particular point from which to measure certainty and distance from knowledge 
production. Indeed, as noted above (and in chapter 4), there are multiple types of SCR. In 
addition, there exist multi-site and multi-national research groups in collaborations as well as 
in competition. Like Lahsen, I firstly find that knowledge about stem cells and their 
application comes from diverse sites: laboratories work on different aspects of this field 
(such as immune rejection or finding appropriate media to grow cells in) and the application 
of SCR requires knowledge from clinics, commercial ventures, pharmaceutical companies, 
policy circles etc. Secondly, users and producers can be one and the same people: someone 
organising a clinical trial can use knowledge claims from the laboratory, but produce another 
set of knowledge claims. Similarly in the context of public engagement in science, patients, 
some of the targeted end-users, also have knowledge relevant to the application of SCR, and 
some big research funders encompass or represent patient groups (like the Juvenile Diabetes 
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Research Foundation). Thirdly, and following from this, people who do not work at the 
bench can be better placed to identify uncertainties that could affect the future of SCR (for 
example, working with IVF patients can highlight that embryos are a precious resource , 
indicating it might be difficult to obtain enough for research). Fourthly, certain informants 
appear to find it difficult to see particular uncertainties.  
 
The above four points problematise the notion “distance” and explain why some people 
appear close to the site of knowledge production, but express a lot of certainty (location A’) 
and others who appear one step removed from knowledge production, but express 
uncertainty (location B’). I examine these in the following section (I focus on the difficulty 
in voicing uncertainties, leading to people being located in C’, in section 5.5). 
 
5.3.2 Data for locations A’ and B’ 
One of the PhD students in my sample is a particularly good illustration of location A’. He 
works on developing cellular therapies for a particular disease using AS cells from the 
affected patient (autologous therapies) and expresses certainty regarding the future 
applications of his work:  
Gary: I really think that the possibility of autologous cell therapy is really the 
most interesting, and probably will be the most beneficial at least in the shorter 
term. 
His confidence in the future of his work is suggested by his use of “most beneficial” and 
“shorter term”. In addition, when I asked him about whether access to these treatments 
would be a problem, he replied:  
Gary: Once a high-throughput system has been developed, I think it would be 
[viable] […] I think yeah, once the system’s established, hopefully, the 
technology that’s required to do that would become more affordable, more 
accessible to everyone. 
Gary expresses certainty with regard to the future application of his work in the clinic he 
seems certain that it will be technically and financially straightforward to obtain these 
therapies. I can see three possible reasons for this apparent contradiction to the certainty 
trough. Firstly, Gary is only close to one aspect of knowledge production, thus he may not be 
aware of all the potential difficulties in bringing cellular therapies to patients (such as the 
difficulties in obtaining approval for clinical trials or the high financial cost of setting up 
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these trials). So, although he is close to knowledge creation about how to derive stem cell 
lines from adult cells, he is far from knowledge creation, for example, about the application 
of cellular therapies. Secondly, he is possibly certain that there will be no difficulties in 
applying his work because he has been successful in his research so far, and therefore may 
not have encountered as many difficulties as other more senior researchers, or less successful 
PhD students (he has a good publication record and his supervisor describes him as the best 
student she has ever had). Finally, it is possible that he is simply repeating his supervisor’s 
view; I did not interview her, but from her public talks, she too seems committed to 
developing cellular therapies. Therefore, both Gary’s successes and his social location in a 
group that sees the promise of autologous therapies can explain his difficulty in seeing many 
factors that may limit the clinical application of his work. A combination of factors can 
therefore explain his location in A’. 
 
During my analysis, I also place people in B’. In terms of distance, these researchers appear 
to be one step removed from a particular area of knowledge production to which they are 
committed and yet, they display many uncertainties towards it. Some people in B’ are 
removed from a particular area of knowledge creation, such as studying ES cells for use in 
therapies, but work in a related area, such as immunology. They may display uncertainty 
towards ESCR because they know of the difficulty of solving immune rejection of ES cells 
from their own work. Other people in B’ are removed from a particular area of knowledge 
creation because they are program directors and spend more time in the public eye, talking 
about the research, than at the bench. They may display uncertainty towards the particular 
area of SCR their group is working on because they have learnt from others about a diversity 
of limitations to SCR. For example, they may learn about ethical difficulties of oocyte 
procurement from participating in public debates, or about the problems that hyping can 
cause from talking to disappointed patients. These two explanations are related, as public 
spheres can be considered alternative sites of knowledge production.  
 
As an illustration of B’, John works on spinal cord repair. Part of his research is committed 
to using AS cells, but he is also very interested in the potential of ESCR. However he 
expressed uncertainty with regard to any of these cells sources to be miracle cures. When I 
asked him how people with spinal cord injuries saw him and whether they thought he was 
coming to “save” them, he answers: 
John: Well, spinal injury patients are a bit more canny than that, they’ve been 
around, they’ve had their injury many of them for decades, and they’ve seen 
scientists come and go, they’re aware that nobody has actually produced a cure 
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for them yet, so they look at you with a fairly cynical eye. But, no I think it’s clear 
to all of them that there are treatments coming to clinical trials soon for them, 
which probably are going to offer some benefit, so they’re very interested and 
they’re interested in talking to you. 
Although John is committed to SCR, he is uncertain of its future, partly because interactions 
with patients have highlighted that cures do not always come along as promised. 
 
In summary, it is difficult to determine a single site of knowledge production in SCR (and in 
science in general) from which researchers may or may not be distant. One could imagine 
solving some of these difficulties by drawing up different certainty trough graphs for 
different aspects of SCR (as I did when starting to sort through my data). However, this is 
not very satisfactory, as there are probably infinite sub-fields and knowledge production sites 
which are relevant to SCR. In addition, “critical distance”, particularly the strategic use of 
language can further hinder the use of the certainty trough. I now turn to some of the 
regularities in my informants’ discourses around SCR futures. In particular I show how 
performances of (un)certainty can give strategic meaning to locations B and C on the 
certainty trough. 
 
5.4 Performing (un)certainty and SCR futures 
Up until now, I have been doing what Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) would call “classic 
sociology”: I have been using interview data and other sources (such as publications) to find 
out about my informants’ views on the promises of SCR – and therefore using discourse as a 
resource. However, many social scientists argue that language can be performative (e.g. 
Szerszynski, 1999; Brown and Michael, 2003, see also 2.2.4) and it is necessary to also use 
discourse as a topic. Looking for interpretive resources and regularities, and turning to 
analytically prior questions about how my informants talk and in which contexts, this section 
shows how stem cell researchers resolve some of the inconsistencies in their accounts. It 
highlights factors that influence informants’ discourses and pays particular attention to the 
“repertoires”71 that they use. In particular, I look at how they use (un)certainty discourses as 
interpretive resources since these are performative and can serve to “enable some 
technoscientific worlds and disable others” (Brown and Michael, 2003: 14). 
 
                                                     
71 For an introduction to Gilbert and Mulkay’s use of these repertoires, see chapter 2. 
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5.4.1 Evincing certainty in public  
The notion of “critical distance”, especially its second component, highlights the importance 
of the context in which discussions take place. Donald MacKenzie was not unaware of this. 
He discusses the case of Charles Stark Draper who, as well as being close to research on 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, was a key actor in their promotion. MacKenzie suggests 
that when technologies are “emerging” and when many people are criticising them, “there 
are often to be found charismatic technical figures, close to its heart, who evince great 
certainty” (1990: 371, emphasis added). He calls these people “heterogeneous engineers”, as 
they must recruit and organise people and artefacts in a variety of worlds. By using the term 
“evince”, he highlights the strategic aspect of language and suggests that particular 
discourses can be useful resources for promoting the authority of a research area. As I have 
already stated, the difference between “established” and “emerging” technologies is partly 
rhetorical. Thus, evincing certainty and heterogeneous engineering are necessary at any 
moment when the struggle for cognitive authority is heightened (cf. Gieryn, 1995); this can 
occur when technologies are seen and/or constructed as “emerging”. 
 
One of my informants is very similar to Charles Stark Draper and I would consider him a 
heterogeneous engineer. He is very active in the field of ES cells: although he spends less 
time in the laboratory now, he is one of the vocal proponents of ESCR. This locates him in B 
on the certainty trough. 
Barry: I think in the application side, when you have diseases like respiratory 
diseases growing so rapidly, throughout the whole wide world, and the only thing 
you can do for that is a whole lung transplant, I mean, we need embryonic stem 
cells for cell therapy, we’ve just got to get there; because I can’t see any 
alternative. The harder we work, and the [more] careful the work we do, to 
establish the efficacy and the safety of these methods, then, I think we’ll have a 
new medicine that’ll be extraordinarily powerful. 
In this extract, he evinces certainty about the potential application of ES cell therapies for 
respiratory diseases: he is using therapeutic potential to promote ESCR (see chapter 4). In 
particular, when he says “we’ve just got to get there”, his tone of voice implies that it is just 
a matter of getting the work done, and therapies will inevitable come forward.  
 
However, by looking at other sources than this interview, I find that this informant could be 
uncertain about the future of ESCR, particularly given the competition from other forms of 
stem cells, as suggested by a comment from one of his colleagues:  
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[He] is fully aware of [the publication of a paper showing the promises of ASCR], 
he’s a little bit threatened by it because the empire might come crumbling down.72 
Rather than decide which account I believe and where Barry should really be on the certainty 
trough, I am asking why he expresses so much certainty in the quote above, and particularly, 
why he does not mention the possibilities that could come from ASCR at any point during 
our interview. I would argue that Barry is making a strategic omission to promote the 
authority of ESCR. He does not engage in boundary-work. He is not creating a cultural space 
from which he can exclude ASCR, for example; he simply does not acknowledge the 
possibilities that could come from research other than ESCR. This goes further than the cases 
discussed in Irwin and Wynne (1996) where lay knowledge is excluded because 
unrecognised; here, ASCR is strategically ignored by a researcher who is well aware of it. 
By not addressing the possibility of ASCR, he is hoping to evince certainty and promote the 
authority of ESCR. Here, silence is very powerful and Barry’s certainty can be performative: 
by talking about ES cell based therapies with such certainty, he can create a situation where 
these therapies can exist.  
 
Other informants also used certainty discourses as interpretive resources to promote their 
field. Some did this by displacing the responsibility for reducing uncertainty into other 
spheres or social worlds (cf. Shackley and Wynne, 1996: 290-2). For example, they move 
indeterminacy to another field (such as immunology), another area (such as policy), or 
another social group (often “wider society”). This is highlighted in the following example 
where a group leader comments on his responsibilities for the potential applications of his 
work: 
Peter: I mean there’s so many steps that, […]a lot of safety steps, you know 
animal models, phase I clinical trials which are safety trials basically, all those 
things are really under the control of the drug company and it’s up to them to 
work out really whether the lead that I’ve given them is dodgy or not, I feel. 
By doing this, he places the risks and their resolution under the remit of drug companies. In 
this way, he is free to continue his work without worrying about the uncertainties it creates. 
Uncertainty is placed outside his area, certainty inside.  
 
Other researchers also highlight certainties, rather than uncertainties, in other fields; this can 
serve to create or maintain certainty in their own field, or in an area of research more 
                                                     
72 I have chosen not to attribute this quote to protect the speaker’s anonymity, but also because I do 
not want to focus on the social location of this speaker. 
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generally (cf. Star, 1985). For example, researchers in cell therapies use the apparent 
certainty and feasibility of other therapies, like organ transplantation, to justify their work, 
even though the difficulties faced by these technologies may be very different from each 
other. They are bringing (what Star would call) “outside” certainty “inside”. 
 
Another way of displacing uncertainties about one’s work is by projecting them, and their 
resolution, into the future. The following quote is from a scientist who is very committed to 
ESCR. He makes a list of future achievements of ESCR, placing any difficulties in the 
future:  
Ben: In the short term, there’ll be discovery of a whole new range of drugs that 
will help diseases that are based on driving of embryonic stem cells into various 
lineages or the prevention of disease phenotypes. I clearly think that these are the 
short term opportunities, I think the medium term, is that we’ll be able to use 
some of these cells to treat, by cell therapy, a number of different diseases, but 
also that you’ll be able to use these cells for gene therapy in patients who have 
genetic disease and if you can do that for a young person, I think it’s marvellous. I 
think we’ll be able to reprogram the immune-system, […] that is probably more 
medium to long term aspirations, but it’s all there […]. I whish I was 20 years old 
and starting because I think it’s very exciting times. 
This list projects certainty about the potential accomplishments of ESCR. By “scheduling 
into the future” and “identifying when and how key uncertainties will be reduced” (Shackley 
and Wynne, 1996: 287-90), Ben can perform certainty. These strategies, which Shackley and 
Wynne call “boundary ordering devices”, are similar to “truth will out devices” or TWODs 
(introduced 2.5.2, see also below in 5.4.2) in that they too prevent present day uncertainty 
from challenging present day authority of science73. 
  
Nevertheless, not all my informants evince certainty in the context of the interview. 
Participants’ views of my identity (as a fellow scientist, as a young female, as a member of 
the public, as a conduit towards broader publics, as a journalist) is revealed in the forms of 
argumentation they adopt. For instance, when they use the same discourse in our interview 
as in public fora, this suggests they see me as a member of the public or a conduit towards 
them. This is similar to what Pinch finds:  
                                                     
73 TWODs give more of a sense that, somehow, contingent factors will be eliminated, and objective 
truth can be revealed; their aim is to legitimate empiricist conceptions of the world in the face of 
evidence of contingencies. Whereas boundary ordering devices show more specifically how 
uncertainties will, actively, be reduced; their aim is to “secure the relevance and authority of a 
particular kind of knowledge [...] and of a corresponding kind of policy making” (Shackley and 
Wynne, 1996: 293). 
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Many informants seemed to regard me as a representative of the public and hence 
as a vehicle by which to transmit the public face of the debate” (1981: 154) 
 
[...] when scientists perceive a possible public audience they tend to act 
defensively and stress the certainty of their own areas – while at the same time, 
doubting the certainty of others’ (1981: 155). 
However, in contrast to what Pinch argues, some researchers treat me like a fellow scientist 
taking an interest in promoting science to “lay” people; they confide in me and share their 
uncertainties. Thus, I observe a variety of (un)certainty discourses in these semi-private 
interactions.  
 
Many of my informants draw on discourses of certainty and of uncertainty about a variety of 
topics. This can cause inconsistencies because opposing discourses are used either by 
different people about the same topic, or by the same person in different contexts. These 
inconsistencies can be resolved by using “reconciliation devices” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 
111), which I explore in the next sections. 
 
5.4.2 Mobilising pasts and futures 
Like Brown and Michael (2003), I want to look at how my informants talk about the future 
of SCR within the context of past accounts of other biotechnologies. Brown and Michael 
distinguish two ways in which futures are used: firstly, by retrospecting prospects, or 
“recollection of past futures”, where informants talk about expectations that were once held 
about other technologies; secondly, by prospecting retrospects, where informants use past 
futures in the present to construct futures.  
 
Some researchers describe mistaken previous high hopes in one field and subsequently 
display high hopes for SCR (their own area, or SCR in general): 
Peter: There’s still this big gap in the lack of enough donors [for organ 
transplantation], lack of the right kind of donor, the tissue type matching is not 
right. So for me, we’ve had adult stem cells for 20 years, and they haven’t, there’s 
still a need to find an alternative. So I think embryonic stem cells still have a 
potential to fill that gap. 
In this quote, Peter is confident about the use of ES cells for therapies, although he notes that 
the certainty about the future of organ transplantation did not fulfil its promises. He is 
making an assumption that the problems faced by organ transplants in the past – such as a 
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lack of donors or immune rejection – will not be faced by ES cell therapies in the present. 
Why ES cell therapies and transplantations have a different fate will just be resolved in the 
future 
 
In contrast to Peter, the following researcher uses the common retrospect of the previously 
imagined promising futures of gene therapy74 which went unfulfilled, to argue that the future 
of ESCR may not be as promising as some people make out: 
Bernard: Look it’s like gene therapy. I don’t know if you’ve ever looked at that, 
but you should look at that as a very similar profile, that is gene therapy now goes 
back, but the hype was exactly the same, enormous hype, and then it was 
discovered of course, gene therapy was an oxymoron because you could never 
keep gene expression on, never any evidence it was actually doing anything, so 
it’s back to ground zero.  
And shortly after: 
Bernard: So I think the similarities to genetic engineering are amazing, amazing. 
Same, big, huge promise to cure all, which you know, you should know, a priori 
that’s not going to be right […]. So you know it’s going to be wrong, you have to 
work out what part might be right, […]. It may just die a little death.  
Bernard uses the retrospect of gene therapy and its temporal progression from promise to 
disappointment to prospect that ESCR has an uncertain future. Bernard works in ASCR and 
made a strong case against ESCR during our interview.  
 
Similarly, Heidi uses mistaken previous high hopes to explain her present uncertainty. She 
starts by reflecting on the previous promises associated with cancer: 
Heidi: When I left Uni, I wanted to work curing cancer, […] I mean there was a 
big emphasis then that we could cure cancer […]. And we all know that, what are 
the cures, how is cancer treated? You cut it out, breast cancers, you cut out your 
breast, and you have severe radio-therapy and that's 20 years on from that promise 
of curing cancer. 
She is retrospecting the prospect of curing cancer and dismissing it as hype. She then 
prospects this retrospect and envisages a future for ESCR, with similar problems to those 
encountered by cancer treatments. She contrasts her views with that of colleagues who are 
making the same mistakes and not learning from the past: 
Heidi: [...] but I think here there's an incredible amount of hype, I mean listening 
to scientists get up and say ‘we can cure diseases in 5 years’, maybe, I mean I'm 
                                                     
74 This is also used to talk about the prospects of xeno-transplantation (see Brown and Michael, 2003). 
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not saying they can't, I have no idea what they're doing, maybe they can, and I 
know there are clinical trials going on, but I think one has to be very careful, don't 
you think?  
Although she expresses excitement about the future of ESCR, she raises potential difficulties 
(Heidi was quoted discussing the difficulties of working with beta cells in 5.2.2. above,). She 
uses the past to prevent herself from hyping again in the present about the future of SCR. 
She resolves the contradiction between her support and investment in this work (performing 
certainty) and her discourse of uncertainty, as well as the contradiction between her 
uncertainty and colleagues’ certainty, by appealing to past biotechnologies where the 
promises were over hyped. She can insulate herself from any difficulties, should stem cell 
therapies not see the light. Therefore, uncertainty can become a strategic resource. This can 
happen in particular in policy discussions (see Campbell, 1985; Shackley and Wynne, 1996).  
 
Heidi also uses uncertainty discourses to promote research in the following quote. She 
discusses the promises that could come from SCR and, although she places the resolution of 
uncertainties into the future, she uses these uncertainties to highlight the broad nature of SCR 
and thus the need to explore many different avenues of research:  
Heidi: Whether that's all the disorders that people are throwing out there, or 
whether it's a few, it could very well be that through the understanding of 
regeneration, that there are some disorders you don't need to put a cell back, or 
maybe you can understand how to trigger the adult stem cells, or regenerative 
cells to actually do the job. And it's all part of this work. 
This is what Gilbert and Mulkay call a TWOD (1984: 90-111) where the resolution of 
contradictory interpretations exist in the present is enabled by a projection into the future, 
when the “truth” unadulterated by contingent factors, will inevitably be uncovered. This 
scientist also uses the fluidity between research tool and therapy (also introduced in chapter 
4) to which I return later in this chapter. 
 
The following senior researcher in Australia also appeals to time in order to reconcile 
contradictions: 
Albert: I'd say the embryonic stem cell […] researchers are currently very 
defensive, and very pro-active and aggressive and getting money, but defensive 
about the ethical side of what they’re doing. And adult stem cell researchers are 
less well funded and having to kind of be defensive about what is the power, the 
potency of adult stem cells because the kind of zeitgeist is that they don’t have the 
same […] potency of developing a different cell type. So you know, maybe there, 
I’d say there’s definitely polarisation out there. But I didn’t sense it particularly in 
 
Chapter 5 – (Un)certainty discourses and SCR futures   134 
the Australian scientific community, except people defending what they were 
doing. 
For him, there is an inconsistency between his certainty discourse around the promises of 
ASCR, and others’ discourses of uncertainty for this research. By using the term “zeitgeist” 
(spirit of the time), he implies that the lack of recognition of ASCR is due to the current 
fashion and that, eventually, truth will prevail and ASCR will be recognised. So here, I find 
another use of the TWOD. For this researcher, people who do not realise the potential of 
ASCR are mistaken. Albert constructs the error in these people’s views as due to 
“contingent” factors, such as current fashions or the fact that they are simply defending their 
own work, which may be in competition with ASCR. This is what Gilbert and Mulkay call 
the “asymmetrical accounting of error” (1984: 63-89) where contingent factors explain why 
people have mistaken beliefs, whereas empiricists accounts explain “true” beliefs. 
 
My informants also appeal (implicitly) to the concept of “cultural lag” (Ogburn, 1950, 
especially 200-13) where people opposing an area of research will eventually come to accept 
it in time. This enables them to reduce uncertainty in SCR and suggest trajectories where 
their work will become more and more acceptable, without questioning it, or the reasons for 
the uncertainties they are thus reducing. This assumes a particular trajectory for innovation 
where it is acceptable to hype in order to get over initial public rejection. I now turn to this. 
 
5.4.3 Uncertainty and the dynamics of expectations 
I have suggested that past futures can be used in the present to construct imagined futures, 
drawing on various discourses of (un)certainty. Brown (2003) highlights the importance of 
studying the situatedness of these future oriented discourses. He argues that expectations are 
“embedded spatially” (2005:5); they vary according to the social location of people voicing 
these expectations. I have illustrated this in the above sections. He also argues that 
expectations are embedded in “temporal conditions” and “Innovation concepts in 
biotechnology [...] will vary according to whether they are presented as new or old” (2003: 
10, emphasis added). Brown notes two central characteristics to the “dynamics of 
expectations”: firstly, when a biotechnology is seen/constructed as emerging, particular 
images and visions of the future are described; secondly, as some of the initial promises, 
which are often exaggerated, fail to materialise, this leads to disillusionment and 
disappointment. I want to explore this, in my view problematic, discourse of hype to 
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disillusionment, or what Brown and Michael call the “early promise and subsequent 
disappointment” narrative structure (2003: 10). Building on the sociology of expectations, I 
examine how (un)certainty discourses change temporarily. Temporality includes the 
construction of areas of research as emerging or established. 
 
The rhetoric of Lord Winston displayed a striking change over time. In 2000, before the UK 
legislation allowing the creation of embryos for research was put in place, the discourse he 
used was very certain about the future promises of ESCR for therapies.  
1. Speculation is growing about the official response to the chief medical officer's 
forthcoming report on research using cells from embryos. A wise government will 
understand that although such work might upset a few members of the public, 
many lives might almost certainly be saved. 
 
2. In short, an injured or sick patient could have one of his [sic] own nuclei 
transferred into a spare embryonic cell from which the nucleus had been removed. 
 
3. There are a vast number of possible applications using stem cell treatments. 
Given further research, they could help repair various damaged organs. Heart 
attack victims should benefit from them; stem cell injection into the heart muscle 
is an exciting prospect. Stem cells are likely to be valuable in treating strokes, or 
possibly to repair the spinal cord in paraplegics. Thousands of people suffer from 
diabetes – stem cells could probably be used to regrow their insulin-producing 
pancreatic cells. And horrendous burns or severe arthritis might be treated by 
replacement cells generated in the laboratory.  
 
4. People find it ironic that we led the world in reproductive research because of 
this liberal and humane legislation, but now there are chances to actually save 
lives, other countries are overtaking us. We need to recognise that it would be 
unethical not to use this new information for the alleviation of fatal diseases. 
(Winston, 2000, emphases and numbers added) 
In these extracts, Lord Winston evinces certainty for the use of SCR (especially ESCR). In 
the first quote, he talks of lives being saved; in the second one, he uses very certain terms to 
describe the use of SCNT. In the third quote, he makes a list of many possible applications of 
stem cell “treatments”, again using a language of certainty. He also enrols patients and uses 
very emotive expressions to “construct a demand” as was done during the stem cell 
parliamentary debates in the UK (Parry, 2003a). In the final quote, he talks about saving 
lives and even suggests that it would be “unethical” to not do this research, which some 
people may themselves consider unethical, as he briefly mentions in the first quote (although 
he does suggest that these are few in number). He also brings in the notion of international 
competition, adding another dimension to the need to invest in the future of these therapies. 
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This sort of discourse used to secure the future of a technology is similar to what MacKenzie 
points out when he talks about the heterogeneous engineering role of Charles Stark Draper. 
 
In 2005, Lord Winston says the following in his presidential address to the British 
Association Festival of Science:  
More recently, both in Britain and America, huge publicity has been given to stem 
cells, particularly embryonic stem cells, and the potential they offer. Of course, 
the study of stem cells is one of the most exciting areas in biology but I think it is 
unlikely that embryonic stem cells are likely to be useful in healthcare for a long 
time. There are many basic problems – their low cell cycle time leading to slow 
replication in culture and the fact there may be selective pressure for the faster 
growing, but possibly abnormal cells, to dominate a culture system; the instability 
of embryonic cells in general and their remarkable propensity to produce 
abnormal numbers of chromosomes; the difficulty in weeding out all rogue cells 
that might proliferate; the risk that stem cells after forced differentiation in culture 
may undergo de-differentiation, or abnormalities of gene expression, after transfer 
to the patient with potential for huge harm. All these difficulties, and many others, 
may be overcome in time. But during the political campaign to encourage the UK 
Parliament to accept liberal legislation, some parliamentarians were clearly led to 
believe that a major clinical application was just around the corner. Of course, 
much of the lobbying came from patient interest groups, such as the excellent 
Parkinson’s Disease Society, but it was stimulated by the scientist’s observations. 
(Winston, 2005, emphases added) 
This lengthy quote shows the list of difficulties that Winston argues could prevent stem cells 
from being useful in clinics. This unreflexive change of rhetoric between the two sets of 
quotes is very noteworthy: none of my informants were very critical and very supportive of 
any one area of research (though they may be very critical of one and very supportive of 
another). Both sets of quotes are drawn from talks to similar public audiences. Thus, the best 
explanation for this contrast in discourses relates to a temporal change. I would argue that 
the certainty and “rhetoric of hope” (highlighting the “alleviation of fatal diseases”) in the 
first quotes was seen as necessary by Winston in a time of struggle, when an emerging 
technology, ESCR, needed to be legalised. In the second quote, the uncertain future of ESCR 
and its attending “rhetoric of fear” (highlighting “rogue cells” and “huge harm”) become 
necessary, since some promises of ESCR have failed to materialise. So, once research has 
become established (or at least legalised), and as initial expectations are shown to have been 
over-optimistic, scientists can start acknowledging the original promises as hype (even if 
blaming others for it). In this way, the authority of science as a good source of knowledge 
and predictions about the natural world is safe-guarded. Scientists can then go on to make 
new promises about other areas of research which are emerging, knowing that the future of 
ESCR (here) is not under threat.  
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I only interviewed my informants once, and therefore did not access how their discourses 
change over time. However, my Australian and UK informants were, to an extent, in 
different temporal locations with regards to the dynamic of expectation. Indeed, in the UK, 
SCNT was legalised in 2000; whereas in Australia, my interviews occur in the lead up to the 
legislative reviews (which caused SCNT to be legalised). Thus, SCNT was, at the time of my 
interviews, more established in the UK than Australia. I now explore how temporal 
situations can shape scientists discourses around SCNT.  
 
In the context of my interviews, scientists from the UK tend to accept SCNT as a given, they 
do not usually voice particularly strong feelings about it and just took it as being part and 
parcel of SCR. They do, however, suggest some limitations: 
Tim: So, yeah, it’s an example of balance isn’t it? It seems to me therapeutic 
cloning, what they call therapeutic cloning is one of several approaches that may 
lead to significant advances, whether it’s the best or not, is not something worry 
about, but if as an approach it seems to offer some reasonable chance of advance, 
alongside other approaches, and if the risks associated with it are not very 
significant, then I think it’s very reasonable. (informant emphasis) 
Scientists working in Australia do not automatically accept SCNT as part of SCR and talk 
about it more actively: some think it should remain banned and others are waiting for a 
different political climate in which to promote its legalisation. In the following quote, a 
researcher in Australia explains why he thinks UK scientists were so keen to legalise SCNT: 
Andreas: I think it was superb marketing opportunism, because the UK was well 
behind in stem cells, in human stem cells, none of the line isolations came from 
there and I think it was a wonderful piece of marketing and taking an opportunity 
which the rest of the world have not taken up. 
He is using the contingent repertoire to account for the differences between his view on 
SCNT and that held in UK legislation. For Andreas, SCNT is not an integral part of SCR.  
 
What is particularly interesting, however, is that, although during my interviews Australia 
was at a similar stage to the UK in 2000, when Winston made the first set of claims 
discussed above, I do not come across any assertions that were very certain about the future 
of SCNT for therapies. I do not come across a single statement similar to Winston’s first set 
of quotes above. Although several informants include the use of SCNT in therapies as part of 
SCR, it is often discussed in the context of potential limitations, or by highlighting its use as 
a research tool that may lead to therapies. I can see two main possible reasons for this. One is 
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that my interviews are not parliamentary debates or any other contexts that my informants 
might see as potentially leading to a change in scientific autonomy. Another is that, at the 
time of my interviews, groups around the world had been trying to develop cell lines from 
nuclear transfer embryos, but without success. Thus, the belief in the potential of SCNT for 
therapies might have diminished (in public and scientific communities), making hype around 
SCNT a less useful and less appropriate rhetoric strategy. The latter explanation is supported 
by the fact that many submissions to the committee reviewing the legislation on SCNT in 
Australia, in 2005, made the case for the legalisation of this technique by focussing on its 
potential as a research tool, not a therapy. Thus, even though SCNT was not legal and some 
of my informants wanted it legalised, the potential of SCNT as a therapy was not hyped by 
my informants in the same way Winston did. This indicates that local conditions (here, of 
SCNT as illegal) are inevitably embedded in global contexts (of SCNT) (cf. Giddens, 1990; 
Beck, 1992): even though SCNT is illegal in Australia, research is taking place elsewhere, 
suggesting limitations to its application as a therapy, and shaping the discourses about SCNT 
in Australia. 
 
This section suggests that the stem cell researchers I interviewed in Australia, unlike 
Winston at a similar legislative juncture, did not feel the need to hype the promise of SCNT 
in these private conversations.  
 
5.4.4 Mobilising the dynamics of expectation 
Another possible reason for the lack of hype about SCNT in my Australian informants’ 
discourses could be their awareness of the potential problems of hype for the future of 
science: 
Arthur: I think that there is, at least among some members of the public, there is 
this feeling that scientists tend to over-play and be maybe over-optimistic and say 
they’re going to cure lots of things and then nothing happens. I think it’s not a 
good thing, if they are going to engage with the public, I think it’s good to tell 
them, give them accurate information, rather than making it sound like you’re 
really at the leading edge and that you’re going to ... provide cures. I think a little 
reflection tells us that these things can be very complicated and going to take a lot 
of time. 
Arthur seems to think that hype, even when a technology is emerging, can lead to public 
disillusionment. He seems more aware than Brown (2003) suggests for his informants of the 
cost of hype. He wants to avoid disillusionment even if hyping could facilitate the enactment 
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of particular desired futures. He draws on the promise to disappointment narrative structure 
to explain why he does not hype. 
 
However, this is not to say that most of my informants do not see the need for hype. In some 
instances, they are reflexive about the promise to disappointment narrative structure in order 
to resolve contradictions between certainty and uncertainty discourses: they suggest it is 
acceptable and/or normal to hype when a field is emerging. In the following quote, a 
researcher is using the retrospect of gene therapy and its high hopes followed by 
disappointment, and comparing it to SCR:  
John: I mean I think gene therapy is ongoing you know and the 1st trials, well, 
there were one or 2 disasters, where people jumped the gun before it was safe, but 
nevertheless gene therapy will happen, […]so it’s not like it’s died, it’s like it’s 
got on a rather more sensible curve. Stem cell biology is similar, in that it’s been 
tremendously puffed up, way beyond what it can deliver, and so there aren’t stem 
cell therapies, except in one or 2 rather specific instances like blood, and there 
won’t be stem cell therapies for quite a while that actually mean anything in most 
fields. Because an awful lot of real science has to get done first. 
The “comparatibility” of a newer technology and an older one can lie in “their common 
social dynamic, such as the need to hype innovation in order to curry investment” (Brown 
and Michael, 2003: 12). This type of discourse normalises narratives of hype when there is 
competition for resources, followed by disillusionment, rather than questioning if it is 
appropriate to hype in the first place, particularly if the expectations are that the promises 
will not be fulfilled. 
 
The mechanisms for research funding can also be drawn on my scientists to justify their need 
to express high levels of certainty in times of struggle: 
David: I think it’s a bit of a conflict because to get in the funding, you’ve got to 
sell things […] that can be a double-edged sword because you try to say you 
should put money into this because we can develop these sorts of therapies and 
this will help lots of people […]; there is a bit of a conflict there between selling 
stuff and then creating false expectations. 
This researcher reflects on the role of the grant system in shaping discourses around science. 
He reconciles his private uncertainty discourse with the discourse of certainty that he uses 
when applying for funding by appealing to the nature of the system: one must make grand 
promises in order to get a chance to work at realising those promises. In these circumstances, 
David must perform an identity of certainty in order to enable a future of funding to happen. 
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All these strategic and temporally dynamic discourses complicate the use of the certainty 
trough. In conjunction, the enactment of different identities in different contexts also adds 
complexity to the analysis of (un)certainty discourses, as I now discuss.  
 
5.5 Protecting the whole: identity salience and location C’ 
Chapter 2 (see 2.4.3) shows that people may draw on particular identities in particular 
circumstances: by choosing to enact an identity that is “salient” (Stets and Burke, 2000) to 
the situation, they can enable particular outcomes to occur, such as the enrolment of patients. 
I draw on social identity theory to make sense of the mobilisation of these different 
identities. 
 
As I suggest in chapter 4, scientists can reinforce the authority of a variety of research areas 
beyond their narrow professional interests. This is particularly noticeable when researchers 
committed to a particular technology do not voice their uncertainties concerning competing 
technologies – this would correspond to location C’ on the certainty trough graph. This again 
highlights the importance of context and the performativity of discourse. In the following 
example, Pierce, whose work competes for funding with ESCR and who dismisses ESCR as 
hype explains why he does not voice his uncertainties in public (both quotes are from the 
first ten minutes of the interview):  
Pierce: But what has worried me a little, [...] is that on the other side, the 
proponents of embryonic stem cells have almost made the raison-d’être for doing 
embryonic stem cells, the idea that they had this staunch right wing Christian 
movement against them. 
 
Pierce: I mean it’s almost to the degree of saying well, as a scientist, you had to 
be on the embryonic stem cell side, because it was almost like, well, this is the 
Visigoths at the door, that you know, were going to take away all the scientific 
principles. 
Here, Pierce is arguing that it can be difficult in public to highlight uncertainties about one 
particular area of research because many colleagues may find this threatens science as a 
whole. Thus, in public contexts, Pierce’s identity as a scientist, rather than specifically as a 
researcher working in a field competing with ESCR, is more salient. He reconciles the 
contradiction between his private uncertainty and his public certainty by pointing out the 
differences in audiences and the importance of defending the authority of science as a whole. 
He is reflexive about the boundary-work that he is conducting in order to protect the 
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autonomy of science from publics (here dominated by the right wing Christians), which are 
considered anti-science. 
 
Similarly, Victor has designed his whole research strategy in order to avoid SCNT on the 
grounds that, aside from being illegal in Australia, he can see many limitations with regards 
to its clinical potential. However, when I ask him if he would voice these uncertainties, 
raised in our interview, in public, in the context of the lobbying for the legalisation of SCNT, 
he replies:  
Victor: I will still support [SCNT] in principle, you know, as a research tool if 
nothing else. Because it still has a benefit, if […] you can take a cell and you can 
cure a patient with it, even if it’s in a controlled situation, at least it’s telling you 
something about the science. And then, if you can use that system to work out 
which gene is being switched on or switched off, in your somatic cell, that again 
is going to tell you something. 
This researcher is faced with two sets of contradictions. On the one hand, he is uncertain 
about SCNT and expresses this in a strong way by premising his research on the 
unworkability of this technology, yet he does not voice these uncertainties in public. On the 
other hand, his uncertainty discourse contrasts with the certainty evinced by other fellow 
researchers. He reconciles all these apparent contradictions by strategically appealing to 
research tools and to therapies: he describes himself as a practical man (data not shown), 
explaining why he prefers working in areas that have good therapeutic potential; 
nevertheless he also portrays himself as a scientist who supports research in general, even if 
it has no immediate applications. In this way, he can reconcile his identities as a scientist and 
as a stem cell researcher avoiding SCNT, both of which are salient in the context of this 
interview. In addition, by talking in terms of research tool, this scientist creates a situation 
where SCR – and research in general – cannot fail as it will produce knowledge; itself 
synonym, for him, with “progress”75. 
 
Similarly, the following young researcher, although he is more supportive of applied 
research, feels that there is a pressure to also display support towards basic research: 
Gary: I personally think that all scientists, um I guess not all... I’m a big fan of 
doing scientific research with a direct purpose in mind, I probably shouldn’t say 
[N: You can take it out if you don’t want] It’s just my personal opinion, but I 
don’t really, a lot of the research that you see, we worked in this protein and it 
does this. A lot of the time I’ll sit there and, you know, great, but how’s that 
                                                     
75 Brown and Michael discuss Van Lente’s idea of “Western progress” as something which is 
“culturally cherished as other idiographic formations like justice, freedom and democracy” (2003: 6). 
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relevant to anything that could possibly be of any use? [laugh] [N: huhuh, OK] 
So, it probably is fantastic, in most cases, it is fantastic work, um, I personally um 
would always be doing something that I think would have a direct impact on 
public health.  
This informant is reflexive about the need to enact a particular identity: he feels there is a 
normative force, exercised by the scientific community, towards supporting basic research. 
Thus, he does not talk as if he belongs to the same “in-group” (Hogg et al., 1995) as these 
other scientists and he argues that he must enact a particular identity in order satisfy this 
more powerful group (where power is the ability to recruit other people to attain one’s 
goals).  
 
5.6 Conclusion: identities, certainty and public engagement 
These stem cell researchers raise a variety of promises and uncertainties concerning SCR. 
MacKenzie’s (1990) certainty trough is a very useful heuristic tool to explore these accounts, 
especially in early stages of analysis. Some of the discourses could easily be located within 
the three types of (un)certainty MacKenzie identified. Nevertheless, there are many 
dimensions missing from this model. Firstly, the notion of “distance” needs to be 
problematised, not least because there are multiple sites of knowledge production in SCR. 
Secondly, the performativity of language is much more central than MacKenzie suggests in 
his discussion of the certainty trough76, and this aspect is difficult to account for using his 
model. I would argue that the strategic use of language is not only relevant to “emerging” 
technologies, but for any area that is competing with others for resources (cf. Gieryn, 1995). 
Thirdly, my informants draw on many different discourses and identities in different contexts 
and this is not reflected in the certainty trough.  
 
I identify a variety of factors that shape stem cell researchers’ discourses about the future of 
SCR. These include their experience in the field, their area of research, the status of 
scientific findings, current legislation, superiors’ opinions and the perceived audience for 
their accounts. There are no true or false imagined futures, but analysing these futures 
enables us to think about how discourses are shaped. This analysis confirms the value of 
international comparisons. As the comparison of the UK and Australia shows, the shape of 
                                                     
76 Mackenzie is, however, fully aware of the performativity of language (e.g. MacKenzie, 2003; 
MacKenzie and Millo, 2003) 
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discussions around SCR is clearly different in different countries. For all these reasons, it is 
important to locate these promissory discourses within their broader contexts.  
 
Brown and Michael argue that “there are few limiting constraints on the hyperbolic 
expectations seeded by entrepreneurial innovators” (2003: 13) and they suggest that 
entrepreneurs can relatively easily move towards other innovations, this is perhaps what 
Winston does. However, as Brown (2003) and some of my informants point out , there is a 
cost to hype. In particular, repeated high hope followed by disillusionment leads to mistrust, 
not only from publics, but also from investors. Collins and Pinch show that by pushing an 
image of certainty, science suggests it can provide all the answers. When this proves to be 
impossible, people may become wary, and seem to be constantly changing their mind about 
science:  
Instable equilibrium – flip-flop thinking – is the inevitable consequence of a 
model of science and technology which is supposed to deliver complete certainty 
(Collins and Pinch, 1993: 142). 
Therefore, I suggest that scientists must move away from this standard narrative of 
“optimism to obstruction” (Brown and Michael, 2003: 12). Uncertainties need to be brought 
out into broader public spheres, but not only once the future of a technology seems secure.  
 
To help towards this, social scientists have a role in showing the situatedness of these 
(un)certainty discourses to scientists. By showing the arbitrariness of particular norms (see 
2.4) such as “certainty and hype improve support for science”, we can help scientists, and 
others, challenge the dominant discourses heard in public fora. The next chapter discusses 
where these challenges could come from, by examining some of the concerns my informants 
raise and the ambivalence they display towards SCR. 
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Chapter 6  
            
Cowboys and mavericks:  
Professional trust and ambivalence 
 
 
Cowboy: 1) A hired man, especially in the western United States, 
who tends cattle and performs many of his duties on horseback 
 2) An adventurous hero. 
 3) Slang. A reckless person, such as a driver, pilot, or manager, 
who ignores potential risk  
(www.answers.com/topic/cowboy). 
 
Mavericks: propose innovations the ... World refuses to accept as 
within the limits of what it ordinarily produces [...]. Not 
surprisingly, mavericks get a hostile reception when they represent 
their innovations to other ... World members. Because it violates 
some of the [...] World’s conventions in a blatant way, [...].  




Early in my data analysis, I noted that stem cell researchers are critical of practices and 
contexts of SCR which enable some people to act like, as some informants put it, “cowboys” 
or “mavericks”. Upon examining these accounts in more detail, I find that not all informants 
are critical of the same practices, and that these criticisms are bound up in complex relations 
of trust and dependence between scientists, their colleagues, institutions of science and 
broader national and international legislation. Thus, there seem to be many expressions of 
“ambivalence” which need to be examined in more detail. In this chapter, I critically draw on 
theories of “reflexive” modernity (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992, see discussion in chapter 2) 
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and studies of trust and ambivalence (especially Wynne, 1996b; 1996c; Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley, 2000) to explore the reflexive potential of professionals’ discourses of 
trust and ambivalence.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, trust, mistrust and reflexivity are tightly linked in 
today’s society. Trust is central to Giddens’ work. For him, in late modernity, we are no 
longer able to judge risk but instead need to rely on “expert systems” (see 2.3.2) which he 
defines as:  
systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large 
areas of the material and social environments in which we live today (Giddens, 
1990: 27).  
For these to serve their function and create ontological safety, individuals need to trust in 
them. However, both Beck and Giddens argue that the visibility of public disputes has 
increased public mistrust of the institutions of modernity, such as science. For Beck, this 
leads to an intensified critique of science, illustrated by the actions of “sub-politics”, such as 
environmental movements (e.g. Beck, 1996), which, in turn, encourages science to confront 
its consequences and become “reflexive”. For Giddens, institutions automatically become 
reflexive through their increased awareness of their role in risk creation.  
 
Wynne diverges from Beck and Giddens’ “rational-calculative” version of trust, and 
suggests a more hermeneutic and relational notion where, for example, publics have to act 
“as-if” they trust the institutions on which they depend (1996b, see also 2.3.2). Wynne is 
quite pessimistic with regards to scientists’ reflexivity. He argues that, although they may 
think about some of the limitations and contingencies of their work, this is due to external 
criticisms and “a related sense of insecurity, rather than by any intrinsic qualities of self-
criticism” (Wynne, 1996c: 43). In later work, he also finds no evidence of reflexivity, in the 
sense of questioning one’s assumptions, in the institutions of science (e.g. Wynne, 2005b: 
79).  
 
Beck and Wynne both see a central role for “sub-politics” in questioning the framing of 
science, in contrast to Giddens’ more automatic reflexivity. However, Beck is much more 
optimistic than Wynne regarding the consequences of this questioning. For Beck, the 
resulting reflexivity of institutional science can enable a shift from early modernity and 
“primary scientization” (and its attending faith in progress) to “reflexive scientization”, 
where the dogmatism of science is radically examined and challenged. This can help society 
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avoid “counter-modernity” (Beck, 1992), which he sees as a return to Enlightenment 
commitments. 
 
The work of Kerr et al. examines in detail the ambivalence and reflexive potential of both 
lay and professional discourses in relation to the new human genetics. One key finding is 
that lay people’s accounts are very sophisticated and reveal a number of ambiguities and 
uncertainties regarding research in this area and its application (1998a; 1998b). If these were 
further explored, they could enhance public engagement and critique genetics practices. 
However, Kerr and Cunningham-Burley argue that the power of these accounts to question 
dominant framings has not been used to its full potential: 
Lay ambivalence about the new human genetics is clearly apparent in the clinic 
and beyond; and it is unlikely to diminish as research and services expand. 
However, we suggest that it is currently more sedative than revolutionary, 
remaining largely privatised and inert. (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 2000: 294) 
Another key finding is that professionals’ accounts of their work rarely problematise their 
practices and, instead, shore up their authority (Kerr et al., 1997; 1998c; Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley, 2000). In this sense, it seems that science rarely meets the conditions of 
“reflexive modernisation”: even when professionals do reflect upon problematic issues 
relating to their work (for example the use of genetic information by insurance companies), 
they do so in such a way that it does not question the assumptions entrenched in their 
practices. Rather, it shifts the blame towards others, or reinforces their authority in particular 
areas, such as education. In addition, sub-politics, here coming out of lay ambivalences, 
seem unable to challenge science. This work has been built on by other sociologists who find 
that scientists express complex feelings, including ambivalence, towards their work (e.g. 
Wainwright et al., 2006a; Ehrich et al., 2007). 
 
As argued above (see 2.4), a central aim of this thesis is to explore the potential for greater 
reflexivity by scientists as a way of improving science-public relations. This chapter 
contrasts my findings to Wynne’s pessimism and builds on some of the avenues for 
reflexivity suggested by Kerr and Cunningham-Burley. For me, reflexivity consists in 
scientists acknowledging and taking responsibility for the “unintended consequences” of 
science (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992; see also Beck, 2000), but even more so in an 
“interpretative reflexivity”. The latter involves acknowledging the contingencies, 
situatedness and embedded assumptions of science (e.g. Wynne, 2005a). An exploration of 
scientists’ trust and ambivalence is a vital step towards potential reflexivity. In particular, 
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expressions of mistrust or ambivalence can reveal concerns and, therefore, critiques of 
science. They can also reveal instances where scientists become aware of “pre-analytic 
assumptions that frame knowledge commitments” (Wynne, 1993: 324) which they disagree 
with and may want to challenge.   
 
Because the distinction between lay people and experts is problematised in this research (see 
2.2), stem researchers can be examined as individuals who, like publics, must rely upon, and 
trust in, various systems of expertise and knowledge production. As Giddens states: 
But the lay person – and all of us are lay persons in respect of the vast majority of 
expert systems – must ride the juggernaut [of science]. The lack of control which 
many of us feel about some of the circumstances of our lives is real. It is against 
this backdrop that we should understand patterns of privatism and engagement 
(Giddens, 1990: 146, original emphasis) 
So this chapter examines stem cell scientists’ discourses of trust in, and ambivalence 
towards, expert systems. From this, it reveals whether these professional discourses, unlike 
the professional and lay discourses discussed above, have a potential for scientific 
institutional reflexivity and “revolutionary” change; or whether instead, they remain largely 
private and inert (cf. Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 2000). 
 
The ambivalence in my informants’ accounts echoes the dual meanings of “cowboy” and 
“maverick” suggested in the opening epigraphs. When integrated into a “rhetoric of hope” 
(Mulkay, 1993), “cowboy” and “maverick” can have a positive connotation; that of an 
adventurer or trailblazer who, against the odds, prevails and makes great discoveries: the 
“adventurous hero” from the epigraph. When integrated into a “rhetoric of fear”, they can 
have a negative connotation; that of someone wild, thoughtless and out of control, who can 
be dangerous to the rest of the community: the “reckless person”. Although my informants 
use these two particular labels in ways that only imply the negative connotation, their stories 
also draw upon “narratives” (Shapin, 1995) implying the trailblazing aspect of science. Thus, 
by exploring how different professionals talk about what conditions enable “cowboys” or 
“mavericks” to take over, I investigate expressions and relations of trust, mistrust and 
dependence and draw out opportunities for reflexivity.  
 
I examine four areas related to SCR towards which my informants displayed mixtures of 
trust, ambivalence and/or dependence. These are: going to clinical trial, informed consent, 
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the commercialisation of research, and the internationalisation of research77. Analytically, I 
examine ambivalence by distinguishing between cowboys seen as “adventurous heroes” or 
trailblazers, and cowboys seen as “reckless” and dangerous. I draw on Beck and Giddens’ 
rational calculative bestowals of trust (taking into account Wynne’s critique of it), Wynne’s 
(1996b) concept of “as-if trust” and Szerszynski’s (1999) notion of performative trust. In the 
conclusion, I draw out aspects of my informants’ accounts that reflect elements of “reflexive 
modernization”, but also of “counter modernity”, which might limit the potential for this 
reflexivity. 
 
6.2 Going to clinical trial 
As demonstrated in earlier chapters, therapeutic applications are often portrayed as central 
aims for SCR. A central part of the process of developing these therapeutic applications is 
the conduct of successful clinical trials. This can be considered an “expert system” as clinical 
trials organise different “experts” and areas of knowledge production such as local, national 
or international regulators, clinical staff, patients, healthy volunteers, informed consent 
processes, and ethics review boards or results from animal studies. Stem cell researchers 
need to enter these systems if they want their research to be taken to the clinic, and they need 
to rely on the knowledge and expertise of these others. If clinical trials go well, they can 
promote scientific research. However, if clinical trials go wrong (and particularly if patients 
suffer, as was recently the case in trials in London, see BBC News, 2006), they become 
visible examples of the failure of science to deal with the risks that it creates.  
 
It is unsurprising that clinical trials often feature during my interviews. My informants use 
the terms “cowboys” and “mavericks” to describe potentially dangerous people going to 
clinical trial too early and putting the reputation of the whole field at risk. Alongside this 
discourse is another describing researchers who take risks but bring treatments and therapies 
closer. In my analysis, I categorise the latter as being labelled “trailblazing” types, whilst the 
former are “reckless” types.  
 
                                                     
77 The title of this chapter may have suggested that I will be focussing on scientists interested in 
reproductive cloning. However, there was little discussion about these during interviews. 
Nevertheless, I do examine aspects of reproductive cloning in chapter 7. 
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One of my informants, a group leader in Australia, talks at length about clinical trials. In the 
following four quotes, he criticises some researchers whom he considers to be going to trial 
far too early.  
1. Stanley: You see situations these days which really disturb me in the adult field 
about people trying to stick bone marrow in various tissues and I find that 
absolutely horrific, because [...], there’s not even a scientific basis in an animal 
model really to underpin those studies, [...]; I strongly suspect it’s a lot of very 
ambitious clinicians who have power over their institutional ethics committee, 
bludgeon their way into these studies. I think that’s terrible because all of us I’m 
sure would agree that one of the worst things we could do is to go prematurely 
into clinical studies.  
 
2. Stanley: [...] And the reason that I mention the adult cell work is because that 
really does concern me that whoever it is that’s bludgeoning those therapies 
through these committees is succeeding based on what I think is a bunch of snake 
oil to be quite honest. If the same sorts of individuals are going to be involved in 
ES therapies, we could unwittingly see ourselves in the midst of a real problem. 
Because if a few cowboys get hold of ES cells and we have worse case scenario, 
yes tumours formed in the recipients of those ES derived progeny, my God that 
will set the ES field back, well, it could kill it. So I’m very worried about that.  
 
3. Stanley: There would be a sort of ripple effect that would go all the way back 
to researchers that are trying to do these studies in a rigorous, scientific and solid 
clinical based manner, going through all the right hoops and everything. 
 
4. Stanley: It almost argues for another level of regulation for these kinds of 
therapies. See the problem is, these kinds of cell therapies are not, there’s no 
official mechanism for regulating them. 
The first two quotes happen in quick succession in the second half of the interview, and the 
last two follow several minutes later, after we discussed another topic. Stanley is criticising 
particular individuals involved in ASCR (the area he works in) who want to start clinical 
trials. He is doing an “asymmetric accounting of error” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) where 
these researchers are managing to go to trial too early due to contingent reasons: they hold 
too much power over their ethics committees and they do not have proper “scientific” data to 
support their case and they “bludgeon” their way through based on “snake oil”. They are 
thus acting recklessly. The danger lies in the downstream effects that could impact upon 
good scientists, who are more “rigorous” and “scientific”. Stanley is conducting boundary-
work to “expel” (cf. Gieryn) these individuals from the bona fide community of scientists. 
Here, it seems that “good” science includes good evidence before proceeding to trial, such as 
animal models. Stanley sees the difficulty in predicting and controlling what happens in 
clinical trials. Drawing on his experience of sitting on regulatory committees (data not 
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shown), Stanley suggests introducing further regulations to deal with the potential problems 
of inadequate trials.  
 
By contrast, earlier in the interview, Stanley gives an account of science which highlights the 
trailblazing characteristics of researchers and downplays the importance of having all the 
evidence, and argues for less regulation of science: 
Stanley: Having sort of grown up in the adult stem cell field and done some of my 
training in institutes where bone marrow transplantation for example started, there 
was an awful lot of empiricism in the implementation of those, of what has now 
become a very standard from of therapy.  
 
Nicola: Sorry, what do you mean by empiricism? 
 
Stanley: It’s really, empiricism meaning you’re asking very simplistic questions 
and you’re going into a situation unaware of a lot of seemingly very important 
questions. But that ignorance doesn’t prevent you from going forward. Um, that 
said I mean nowadays, people are regulated up the wazoo, much more difficult 
environment in which to work, and they, regulatory environments in particular are 
much more stringent and… I see that actually as a problem in truth. [...] as I say, I 
do believe in empiricism, as the way forward, you’ve got, if we,... if [particular 
research group] had taken that view, [...] or if that view had been imposed upon 
them shall we say, we wouldn’t be doing bone marrow transplantation today. So I 
think you know, it’s got to be a real balancing act to make sure that, to me, there’s 
appropriate… grounds to allow exploration of potentially interesting fields with 
as much safety data as one can reasonably expect, but not more. Because 
otherwise you’re imposing you know imaginary problems which are really an 
unfair burden to put on any clinical researcher. 
Here empiricism means going forward and developing SCR or science but without knowing 
all the risks and unknowns. This unusual use of the term “empiricism” reminds me of Beck’s 
use of “counter-modern”:  
Here the counter-modernity of faith in progress becomes clear. It is a type of 
secular religion of modernity. All the features of a religious faith apply to it, such 
as trust in the unknown and the intangible or trust against one’s own better 
judgement, without knowing the way or the ‘how’. Faith in progress is the self-
confidence of modernity in its own technology that has become creativity. The 
productive forces, along with those who develop and administer them, science 
and business, have taken the place of God and the Church. (Beck, 1992: 214) 
What is particularly noteworthy is that Stanley does not reflect upon the tension between this 
exchange (which comes in the first half of the interview) and the quotes above: on the one 
hand, he argues that it is appropriate to go to clinical trials before understanding everything 
as this enables breakthroughs (which would be prevented with excessive, “up the wazoo”, 
regulation); on the other hand, he argues that there are risks in going to trial early and doing 
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this should be controlled more tightly. This points to the interpretative flexibility of absence 
of data: the absence of data can be used to encourage or discourage moving towards trials. 
Stanley resolves this tension by separating “us” and  “disreputable others” (Michael and 
Birke, 1994). “Us” corresponds to good scientists who go to trial at appropriate times even 
though they do not know the answer to all the questions, and who have the “unfair burden” 
of excessive regulation; “disreputable others” corresponds to those putting the whole field in 
jeopardy by going to trial without enough evidence and should be regulated more tightly.  
 
The difficulty in finding the appropriate time to go to clinical trials is explored in my focus 
group with young researchers in the UK: 
Xavier: [...] But I guess if you don't even really understand the basics of the 
biology of it, then how can we move on the therapeutics of it? I mean people see 
the end of it, but they don't always see the process, the basic science. 
 
Yuri: I actually disagree with that. I think that you don't actually necessarily have 
a full understanding of the basic research before you can look for therapies,[ 
 
Zoë: ]I think you have to have reasonable understanding. 
 
Yuri: I don't know, I think most of the therapies that have been discovered in the 
history of science have been by people who were woefully uneducated about the 
actual, or even just uninformed about really what was going on, they just 
happened to try to mix a couple of things together and it worked, I think in 
general, biology is so complicated that often the best way to find therapy use is to 
try things, and not necessarily to over-engineer them before you...[ 
 
Zoë: ]I don't know, I find that very difficult. If you're in a hospital, and you are 
dealing with patients and you see the person, I don't know, it probably depends on 
the character, but I wouldn't try, I wouldn't just go and say well let's try and see if 
the person survives or not, it's easy to say, but it's very difficult to do it, you know 
facing the actual patient. 
 
Yuri: I mean, that's definitely true, I think that the development of any therapy is 
very difficult, my point I guess is really that even if you understand things often, 
or even if you think you understand things, often, even when you do try them in 
the clinic, the results are never, almost never as you would expect them to be. 
This exchange highlights a number of recurrent themes. The narrative of science as 
serendipitous advances is present in Yuri’s talk, as well as the risk of “unintended 
consequences” (Giddens, 1990) and the difficulty in predicting and controlling risks from 
new scientific knowledge (Beck). Zoë’s talk highlights the importance of “cultural 
knowledge” in knowledge production. This term has been used by Kerr et al. in the context 
of the new human genetics to describe knowledge: 
 
Chapter 6 – Cowboys and mavericks   152 
 not specifically about genetic science or its institutions, but concerning the wider 
social and cultural context in which these are located (1998b: 49)  
Zoe acknowledges that her interactions with patients, or “facework commitments”, at one of 
the “access points” to the expert systems of clinical trials, would impact on her decision to 
go to clinical trial. These informants, unlike Stanley, explore the tension between 
trailblazing and recklessness; between developing great therapies and harming patients by 
using mis-understood drugs or processes. 
 
Many other researchers also voice trust in the expert systems enabling clinical trials to take 
place. The following PhD student for example professes little knowledge of the process of 
getting ethical approval to go to trial, but says that he trusts the system:  
Brian: Presumably there’s a lot of ethical considerations for clinical trials, and if 
they’re at that stage, they must have pretty good evidence from animal models 
that it works, so, it’s always justified. And the process to get to a human trial is 
unbelievably complex, so they must be, [inaudible] they know what they’re 
doing. 
For Brian, it seems that the difficulty of getting approval for clinical trials is good evidence 
that if researchers do proceed to trials, they are doing so appropriately. He places trust in the 
mechanisms evaluating the ethics proposal as well as the appropriateness of animal models. 
But he then goes on to say: 
Brian: Whenever we write ethics proposal, we always have to justify why we’re 
doing the work. And in most cases we’ll write that this is our foreseeable 
outcome, and our foreseeable outcome is not something we’ll do in the next 2 
years, which is what we write the ethics for, so you know this therapy has a 
potential for human whatever, and we’re working in mice. And there’re so many 
differences between mice and humans ES cells it’s not funny. 
In this quote, Brian points out that animals and humans are very different. However, this is 
the sort of data used to convince ethics review boards that it is time to go to trial. He is 
drawing on “technical knowledge” (Kerr et al., 1998b: 45) about animal and human 
research, as well as on “institutional knowledge” (Kerr et al., 1998b: 48) about the processes 
of obtaining ethical clearance. The difficulty in extrapolating from animals to humans raises 
problems about the process of proceeding towards clinical trial. The difficulty in inferring 
risks to humans from animal data was highlighted many times in my interviews. There are 
not always alternatives and researchers cannot always opt-out of using animal models; they 
just have to act “as-if” they trust them to give data relevant to humans. Thus, I think there is 
a strong element of “as-if” trust (Wynne, 1996b) in animal models.  
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This section highlights that my informants, like other lay people (cf. Irwin and Wynne, 1996; 
Wynne, 1996b; Kerr et al., 1998b; Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 2000) draw upon different 
types of inter-related knowledges to make sense of the expert systems of clinical trials. 
Acknowledging the difficulties of translating animal into human data and the 
unpredictability of the outcomes of clinical trials, as well as demanding, and participating in, 
further regulation, are all elements of what Beck calls “reflexive scientization”. However, 
Stanley’s version of “empiricism” is more akin to “counter modernity”. I explore this in the 
concluding part to this chapter. Informants have different views about what uncertainties can 
and cannot be ignored before going to clinical trials; this leads to variations in the use of 
labels such as cow-boy and maverick.  
 
6.3 Informed consent 
Informed consent is central to SCR. It is an expert system in that it requires special expertise 
(in law, counselling etc.); it is necessary for systems such as clinical trials and egg or embryo 
donation to take place; few stem cell researchers have any direct involvement in the process, 
but they have to trust that it is done correctly in order to continue with their everyday lives 
(even working on cell lines that have already been derived can become problematic if it is 
found out that these were obtained “unethically”). However, it has been argued that although 
informed consent is a laudable aim, it has many limitations (e.g. Pfeffer and Kent, 2006) and 
is not achievable in practice (Corrigan, 2003). It can, in some instances, be a process of 
legitimation. Here, I explore my informants’ accounts of informed consent. For some, the 
limitations of consent enable reckless research to go ahead. 
 
Many of my informants express trust in this expert system. For example, the following is an 
answer from a British researcher to a question about two UK-based researchers wanting to 
ask healthy women to donate oocytes. I ask Ted whether the risks of this procedure are 
sufficiently discussed. He answers: 
Ted: I'm sure they will be. It won't be [the researchers] going out to discuss it with 
those women I would have thought, it will be the IVF clinics themselves, this is 
speculation on my part, I don't know exactly, I would have thought that it would 
be clinicians not involved in the research personally will be asking for consent, 
that would be fairly standard, I would have thought that the consent forms and so 
on will all have gone through an ethics review process and I think people have a 
right to give informed consent, provided they understand the risks, I would 
imagine that the risks have been set out for them in the information, certainly 
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those are the standards I would expect, I don't see reason to believe [these 
researchers] would not be supporting those standards, and if they are, I have no 
problem with that.  
Ted expresses confidence in the consenting procedure, and in systems, such as ethics 
reviews, that control it. He is voicing trust in a system he is not very familiar with. He knows 
one of the researchers I am talking about and this could help him have trust in the 
appropriateness of this particular act of obtaining informed consent; that is this may be an 
example of Giddens’ or Beck’s rational-calculative trust. What is also interesting is that he 
does not question the framing of informed consent: for him the obvious people to define or 
identify risks are clinicians, not women or patients.  
 
In some instances, I specifically highlight some of the limitations of informed consent but 
that does not elicit confrontation with potential problems this could cause. For example, I 
discuss Parry’s (2003b) findings that women or couples going through IVF are often stressed 
during the process. This results in them signing a number of forms and not necessarily 
realising/remembering they have consented to donate their potential embryos to SCR. One 
PhD student responds: 
Paul: Yeah. I mean we don't do any derivations here78, so it's not something I'm 
too involved in, and in the UK, I'm that concerned, my mind is put at rest a bit; I 
was in [UK town], [...] and we were shown round the IVF clinic there by the head 
of it, a very nice guy and he took a small group of us round and told us exactly 
what goes on and showed us these forms and who talks to the patients and 
actually he came across extremely well. He was clearly very caring, very sort of 
sensible man and, even though that was just one IVF clinic, I thought well, if 
they're all as good as this, then I feel pretty reassured that in the UK it's pretty 
good. The private ones in the UK I don't know much about, and you know, it's 
probably the ones in other countries that I would be more concerned about. I 
mean, there was, I don't know...certain ethical issues with the Korean work, which 
were shown to be completely fine in the end79, but, you're always going to get 
things like this and you don't know often what goes on I think in those countries. 
Several things are evident in this extract. First, Paul has no direct experience of getting 
informed consent. However, his experience and knowledge of a particular person involved in 
this process makes him trust the system as a whole. The fact that this person is “very caring”, 
for example, puts Paul’s concerns at rest; thus a positive encounter at an expert system 
                                                     
78 This means that his laboratory does not derive ES cell lines from embryos, and therefore he does 
not feel directly concerned with the issue of informed consent; he works on human ES cell lines that 
have been derived elsewhere. 
79 Several months after this interview, the ethical concerns for the Korean work were in fact shown to 
be well-founded (see 3.4.1). 
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“access point” (Giddens, 1990) seems to result in trust. Nevertheless, this trust is restricted to 
public clinics in the UK. I will return to trust relations with other countries and with 
commercial and private aspects of research later in this chapter, as many scientists express 
unease towards these two aspects of SCR. Second, Paul does not seem to take on board the 
limits of informed consent that I put to him. He does not, for example, ask if the consent 
procedures I refer to took place in the UK and seems unwilling to question this system in the 
UK. Perhaps to question it would put his work into question and destabilise his identity as an 
ethically legitimate stem cell researcher. Indeed, if Paul puts into question the fundamental 
legitimacy of the informed consent system on which his work (on ES cells) relies, this would 
force him to confront his dependence on an untrustworthy system. This parallels a case 
described by Wynne (1996b) where indigenous populations depended on careless companies 
exploiting their land. When they had to confront their dependence on these companies 
(following a serious incident), this heightened their sense of powerlessness and threatened 
their identity and sense of worth. A serious breach of ethics in the UK may force Paul to 
confront his powerlessness. 
 
Another researcher, Theo, particularly raises my concerns that scientists may not be willing 
to question informed consent and confront the consequences of its limits. He seems to have a 
problem with the consent system and knows of specific flaws relating to it; but he refuses, 
upon several occasions, to talk about it with me. I ask Theo if he sees any issues that could 
come from SCR. Rather than answering, he fields the question straight back to me. When I 
suggest that the unpredictable nature of research may render informed consent difficult, he 
either ignores the question, or highlights the “hell which we all go through to get informed 
consent”. The latter suggest the use of a “discourse of suffering” to indicate authenticity 
(Brown and Michael, 2002; Irwin and Michael, 2003). He also diverts the question by 
criticising my own consent form for not fulfilling particular criteria (such as the length of 
time I was planning to keep data for). He black boxes certain aspects of informed consent 
when I ask him if he is involved in creating the consent form:  
Theo: Let’s not get carried away, there are two things involved in consent forms, 
one is it’s best to have a template, I mean otherwise you’ve got to become a 
lawyer to be able to create something properly, or someone who’s got experience, 
you take the template and you modify it, but there’s a logic, you’ve got to be 
logical, use common sense; what’s a consent form for? You say precisely what 
you want, what you mean, which is a) I’d like your embryonic, your cell lines, 
your spare fertilised eggs, for the purpose of medical research; you state it you 
know, plain English; Number 2,  the part that people agree that effectively they no 
longer wish to utilise them for reproductive purposes; [...] 3, they have the 
opportunity for appropriate consultation with relevant people over a period of 
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time [...] 4, that in fact they agree that they will not gain any financial benefit out 
of the passing on of the spare fertilised eggs and 5th thing, there would be the 
question of the commercialisation [...] they agree that they will have no role 
associated with that. They’re the key points I could see in a consent form, you just 
have to put them in plain simple English. [...] but no, I’m not involved in that [...]. 
By focussing the difficulties of consent of the use of “plain English” and the lack of 
remuneration for embryos donors, Theo can paint informed consent as unproblematic. By 
discussing these particular details of the form, he buries issues around the framing of the 
consent form and the process of obtaining consent (the stressful context in which consent is 
sought, unbalanced power relations, the assumption that "medical research" is a synonymous 
with progress etc., cf. Parry, 2006). This sort of discussion around informed consent serves 
to legitimate this kind of research, down-grade any concerns publics may have (of course it 
is appropriate to donate, it is for “medical research”) and closes down conversations that try 
to question the assumptions of science and its institutions.  
 
By contrast, some researchers do reflect upon the limits of consent. For example, a PhD 
student (Brian) draws on his cultural and institutional knowledge to make sense of informed 
consent. He suggests potential discrepancies between what people think is going to happen 
to their material – the use of which they have consented to – and what may actually happen 
to it. However, he ends this quote by again voicing trust in the system. This extract is an 
answer to my asking him if he knows how potential donors feel about donating to SCR: 
Brian: um … I’d like to think that I do; only because I know, I would say that 
most people that donate eggs would be ill-informed about what’s actually going 
to happen to them. Although I’m sure it’s explained to them. Um, obviously those 
who do donate don’t have a problem with it, because they think they’re 
contributing to science and so on. It’s like people who donate their bodies to 
science, don’t know what actually happens. If they went to any anatomy 
department, any university, I’m sure they wouldn’t donate their body. Because 
I’ve been there, so I and um, yeah, so hopefully they are, surely you have to 
consent to it and surely you’re supposed to be informed about anything you do 
that affects something like that. But I, I don’t know. 
Brian acknowledges that he does not really know how people feel about donating and he 
reflects on the gap between informed consent as an ideal, and as a practice. Based on his 
understanding of donating one’s body to science, Brian infers that people may be donating 
eggs without really knowing what for; but that this fits in with a broader ideal of 
“contributing to science”. He then “hopes” that the people donating are informed, as “surely” 
they must be. There are two ways of analysing this expression of trust. Firstly, by seeing it as 
empty trust or “as-if” trust. Brian knows that there are problems with informed consent and 
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that people donate without really understanding what for. However, as a lot of SCR relies on 
donations, and therefore appropriate consent, he does not want to question this system. 
Indeed, if the consent system can be undermined, many aspects of SCR would be 
undermined too. Brian, here, may have to trust in the expert system of informed consent, 
even if he expresses private mis-trust in it. He does not really have the choice of leaving this 
expert system, unless he leaves most of science and medicine. It would also be difficult for 
him to perform an “adaptive reaction” such as “radical engagement” (Giddens, 1990: 134-7) 
by, for example, forming a group to overhaul the current consenting system, as this might 
jeopardise his location in research. Secondly, it could be seen as a performance of trust, 
where Brian, through me (as the interviewer and potential conduit to other groups), is 
exhorting the relevant people to explain the issues as far as possible and obtain the best 
consent possible. It is also noteworthy that Brian compares donating eggs to donating other 
body parts. This can be seen as a legitimating device where a practice such as egg donation, 
which may be considered ethically troublesome, is associated with a potentially less ethically 
troublesome practice in order to make it seem more acceptable (of course, it is also possible 
that Brian sees no difference between donating eggs and other body parts). 
 
Another researcher also was concerned with the limits of informed consent: 
Heidi: But I find it really interesting people who donate embryos for ES cells 
because I used to do consenting80 in the 1990s [in an IVF clinic] ands no-one ever 
donated when I consented, I used to say you do realise these cells will just keep 
going, I mean the theory is that they will be around, and you don't really know 
what's going to happen to them, you know, [...]. 
Heidi, here, relates how she entered in conversation with potential donors about the 
unpredictability of scientific research. This resulted in people not donating their spare IVF 
embryos for research. By highlighting the uncertainty of science and accepting donors’ 
choice not to donate, Heidi is confronting some of the problems thrown up by scientific 
research. She may conclude from her own experience that these people are not being given 
the same information that she would give. However, she now works on human ES cell lines, 
and has to trust that consent has been obtained in the best possible way. In summary, this 
section shows that the limits of informed consent as an expert system are at times confronted 
and at times black-boxed by researchers. 
 
                                                     
80 This is as part of her job working in an IVF clinic, not as a stem cell researcher. 
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6.4 Trust in Commercial Companies? 
A central part of “risk society” is globalisation through the creation of new alliances, in 
particular the intensification of links between governments, academia and industry (Adam 
and Van Loon, 2000: 12). Ravetz (2003: 811) points out that these new associations can 
cause conflicting situations for governments, particularly when technological innovations are 
controversial. He notes that governments in most countries support industries, but have 
duties towards publics (see also Irwin and Michael, 2003: 57). Problems can arise when 
publics do not want discoveries made in public-funded university laboratories to be exploited 
by profit-making companies. SCR is an example of a science of Risk Society and late 
modernity: it has strong academic and industrial ties. For example, the Australian Stem Cell 
Centre was set up by the government with the express aim that the centre should be self 
sufficient and able to attract commercial funding to sustain itself within a few years. The 
possible problems deriving from these hybrid enterprises are particularly salient for SCR 
since potential embryo donors may not want the cells lines derived from their embryos to be 
exploited commercially (Parry, 2003b) and there may be no easy way for governments to 
satisfy donors and companies. There are also strong pressures on the stem cell community to 
obtain commercially relevant findings and therefore patents. This has led to one of the most 
all-encompassing patents being granted. The patent is held by the group that derived the first 
human ES cells and has been heavily criticised for being “‘onerous, restrictive, and 
uncooperative’ barriers to cures” (Gallagher, 2006; see also Kintisch, 2006; Loring and 
Campbell, 2006; McGee, 2006). Some commercial undertakings were labelled “cowboy 
outfits” by one of my informants, and many expressed ambivalence towards pressures of 
increased commercialisation. 
 
Commercialisation, like informed consent and clinical trials, can be considered an expert 
system, which many of my informants have to enter. Some researchers, who want to focus 
on basic science, find they have to also think about commercial applications. In an 
environment with limited funding, this is, as one informant put it, a “survival thing for 
scientists”. My informants have varied levels of interactions with commercial companies: 
from very broad with researchers working for companies, all the way to very limited, with 
researchers who have never thought about applying for a patent. All the group leaders I 
interview in Australia have some experience with commercial outfits and patenting, and only 
a couple of group leaders in the UK have no experience of it. Most of my interviews have 
therefore interacted with expert systems related to commercialisation at some point: by 
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applying for patents, seeking patent lawyers’ advice, selling a discovery to a company, or 
advising companies. Everyone I interview that has had some involvement with commercial 
aspects of science is quite positive about it. However, they also display a certain amount of 
ambivalence, seeing commercialisation as both necessary and dangerous, with some 
companies considered “cowboy outfits”. Many scientists see working alongside industrial 
research and development as inevitable. 
 
During an interview with a group leader, I discuss surveys that find people to be less 
supportive of commercial scientists than academic researchers. I ask him if the increasing 
links between academia and industry could be problematic in the future. His reply is as 
follows:  
Ted: Good question. I think it has to be managed carefully, and transparently 
obviously, [...] It's a source of funding, and that's, funding is funding, it's resource, 
if you want to do anything in the world, you need to have resource. And a 
resource is not going to come from the universities or the NHS, not in the kind of 
level of resources that's going to be required to drive this field forward, and 
particularly if we're going to compete with California and Korea and China and so 
on and so forth, we can't do that with £1000 from the MRC once every 3 years, 
it's just not going to happen, we need the investment in infrastructure in order to 
compete, and that investment has to come through government or private funding. 
On the other hand I think that does hold risk I agree with you in terms of public 
perception, we have to, that concerns me. 
Ted seems to be assuming that sources of funding will not affect what sort of research gets 
undertaken and how it will be applied. Here, the sole concern with commercialisation seems 
to be “public perception” of commercialisation. Ted sees research as dependent on 
commercial funding and maybe he has to believe that commercial partners are trustworthy. 
The only problem that needs to be managed is the public response to commercialisation. This 
is similar to the lip-service that Beck identifies as arising from new alliances in Risk Society: 
Thus business and technoscientific action acquire a new political and moral 
dimension that had previously seemed alien to techno-economic activity. If one 
wished, one might say that the devil of the economy must sprinkle himself with 
the holy water of public morality and put on a halo of concern for society and 
nature. (Beck, 1992: 186, original emphasis) 
Thus, too often, the bases of public mistrust are not questioned and the main attention seems 
to be focussed on dealing with public fear. 
 
However these public fears (for example about the misuse by commercial companies of 
material donated to public organisations) are echoed in my informants discourses. Riana, a 
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group leader from the UK is particularly concerned about the secrecy that pervades 
commercial research: 
Riana: The main problems I have with the commercialisation are that because of 
commercial pressures it tends to lead to publishing bias and particularly firms that 
are doing their own research [...] and where they are on the Stock Market, have a 
great reluctance to honest, to what I would say was honest publishing, in other 
words publishing results that come out of the laboratory that actually would have 
a negative impact on what you’re doing, but are really important in terms of the 
whole field. So, for example I’m working with neural stem cells, we’ve done 
quite a lot of work recently which rather indicates that if you proliferate for a long 
time in culture, they’re very difficult to direct towards particular phenotypes. 
We’re just about to publish that but if we were a company it would do our share 
price no good at all to publish that information, it probably wouldn’t see the light 
of day. It actually, in terms of the bigger picture I think it is very important. So I 
do have real worries. And, also in terms of hyping-up positive results which again 
unbalances the field. The stem cell field is particularly rife with 
commercialisation and I think there’re some real inherent dangers in there. 
Many other researchers have concerns about this “publishing bias”; they do not trust 
companies to publish all their results.  
 
In parallel, certain researchers, like the following PhD student, contrast the goals of 
academic and commercial science: 
Martin: I’d be less inclined to believe science from companies than from research 
groups where their motivation is more for patient care or producing therapies or 
for the greater good or things like that, as opposed to companies that are trying to 
make money. 
So this young Australian researcher argues that commercial research is less trustworthy due 
to its focus on profit. He is in a laboratory with little commercial funding, and has no 
experience with patents. The narrative of scientists as doing work “for the greater good” is 
noticeable.  
 
Martin’s view seems to contrast to that of another young Australian researcher, Brian, who is 
very supportive of commercial scientific research, to the point where he is hoping for patents 
nearly as much as publications. Nevertheless, a form of “as-if trust” becomes apparent when 
I ask Brian if he is concerned that commercial research may not lead to therapies: 
Brian: Yeah, in most cases hopefully they go hand in hand, so people, they want 
to make money because they can sell, hopefully at a decent price, some therapy 
that people are going to be able to use, [...]. Um, so hopefully they go hand in 
hand, sometimes maybe they don’t, because companies try to make more money 
than they should, but as scientists we don’t really have any control over that. [...]  
 
Chapter 6 – Cowboys and mavericks   161 
Whilst behaving in a manner indicating trust, Brian expresses a sense of powerlessness about 
controlling how companies take research towards therapies. The quote highlights the 
dependence of modern science on these companies.  
 
The potentially problematic reliance upon commercial outfits is also visible here: 
Victor: I’d worked, done some voluntary work in a part of India where nutrition 
was a major problem, these kids basically didn’t get enough protein, [...] and I 
realised that you couldn’t get money for research that was just going to go out 
there, you know there were always going to be companies that wanted to control 
the funding, they had a patent position, they wanted to guard that patent, but for 
me it was OK, if it takes 5 years for that protein to get to those kids, better get 
there in 5 years than not to be there at all. So I’ve been very, fairly practical and 
pragmatic about the way the whole system works, the whole [way the] 
commercial world goes and in Australia especially you, there’s a lot more 
commercial money, there’s a much higher commercial focus on research, [...] I 
know that a lot of scientists get very upset about the fact that, well what is all this 
project planning whatever you know, milestones, we should just be allowed to do 
our science, do our creative stuff, sure, I mean I’d live to be able to do that, but I 
don’t think we have the luxury anymore, because there isn’t that much money out 
there. 
Victor sees the importance of commercial funding, even if that leads to longer delays for 
treatments to reach patients, a change to the sort of research that can be undertaken, and an 
increase in micro-management. He seems to acknowledge these pitfalls and accept them as 
the way science now has to be conducted. His view that you can’t simply bemoan the lack of 
blue sky funding and that it is better to just accept commercial funding as part of the system 
is echoed by others. This dependence on commercialisation indicates to me that much of the 
proffered “trust” is in fact “as-if trust”.  
 
The lack of institutional acknowledgment reflection of the widespread concerns that stem 
from commercialisation and the focus on managing public “irrational” fears mean that 
various issues that could arise from the high involvement of commercial outfit in SCR are 
not given enough space for discussion. In particular, the following researcher highlights one 
of the risks of commercialisation –the cost of potential therapies- during a multi-disciplinary 
discussion. I rarely saw this risk discussed elsewhere by stem cell researchers: 
Sylvie: As a stem cell researcher it actually worries me a lot that even if the hype 
turns out to be true and we do develop a successful therapy, who’s going to be 
able to afford that therapy because it’s probably going to be developed partly with 
private money and commercial money. And that’s what worries me more actually 
than the hype is that we’re almost fooling people that even if we do develop 
medicines that are going to be able to cure people’s diseases; well it’s going to be 
very expensive. 
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This researcher suggests that the heavy involvement of private funds in SCR risks making 
therapies unaffordable, and she argues this needs to be addressed. In my view, the cost of  
therapies is an significant issues that needs further exploration in public.  
 
6.5 Internationalisation and global legislation 
In 2005, it was revealed that a team of researchers in Korea had falsified their data and 
potentially coerced female researchers to donate their eggs. This had international 
ramifications and this became the subject of discussions and criticisms around the world, 
contributing to the breakdown of the Koreans’ collaboration with a laboratory in the USA 
and prompting calls for international regulations.  
 
The above is a part of the globalisation of risk and highlights the difficulty in, for example, 
using cell lines derived in other countries where ethical standards may be different. Beck and 
Giddens argue that globalisation is a key factor in this intensification of material risks and 
their perception. Giddens underlines the role of globalisation which he defines as:  
the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles 
away and vice versa. (1990: 64) 
This puts increasing demands on regulation that must take on a more global character (Irwin 
and Michael, 2003: 46). Many of my informants were concerned about “maverick practices” 
being possible in other countries. 
 
The use of boundary-work by the people I interviewed often serves to expel researchers in 
foreign countries. They identify countries which they describe as inappropriately legislated 
and, by highlighting this, they can portray the research in these countries as unethical and 
therefore exclude their researcher from the legitimate scientific community: 
Fiona: Well, that's my concern too I suppose, as a scientist, you know, the 
technology is good, it can potentially cure these diseases, but what else could be 
done with these embryos or these stem cells, you know by people who maybe 
aren't as stringently controlled as we are here, for example.  
Others express concern about “some unregulated guys somewhere” and the impacts that their 
recklessness could have on SCR as a whole.  
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Alongside this concern run expressions of powerlessness: scientists depend on these 
researchers in other countries to be trustworthy and properly regulated, but they cannot be 
sure this is the case. All they can do is hope so. However private mistrust is accompanied 
with public statements of trust, as these researchers many not want to be seen to constantly 
undermine other researchers in the same field. For example: 
Paul: I mean there are guys in the States using embryonic carcinoma cells, which 
are kind of like a malignant counterpart of embryonic stem cells, in patients, 
which, how on earth that got through approval I don't know, but they're using it, 
and fingers crossed you don't wake up one day and the Daily Mail has it on the 
front page, but there's nothing you can do. 
Paul does not seem to trust the American legislation and regulation as it is allowing 
experiments which, to him, seem unethical. Earlier in this interview, he also criticises the 
lack of legislation in the USA, which enables privately funded laboratories to do pretty much 
as they wish. However, he feels he cannot do anything but hope that nothing goes wrong and 
that the public or press do not find out. Paul goes about his daily life hoping that this 
legislative recklessness will not lead to any troubles for SCR. He does not feel he can vocally 
criticise the USA, particularly as he is planning to go there for post-doctoral work; since, 
despite his misgivings, that country offers many opportunities for scientists. Thus, I would 
argue that Paul is displaying “as-if trust” as he feels he cannot eschew the USA. 
 
The USA is often seen as a dominant player in SCR. For example, one PhD student argues:  
Gary: The International Society for Stem cell Research is really driven by USA 
based researchers. So a lot of what they say sort of goes.  
In Australia particularly, many researchers feel they have to prove themselves abroad, 
usually the UK or the USA, before they are accepted back in Australia. For them it is 
difficult to opt-out of research in the USA, even if they want to have a career in Australia. 
The USA is seen as enabling reckless research due to limited regulation; but also as enabling 
trailblazing research due to high levels of funding. Hence, many of my informants articulate 
ambivalent feelings towards this country. In particular, many as Paul above, want to work 
there, but express concerned about the legislative framework: 
Wendy: It concerns me that places as big as America, they don’t have the 
legislation that we do. I think Britain has got the legislation pretty much right, for 
where we are, I think it allows us to do just enough, with keeping a decent safety 
boundary before we go too far. I don’t think, there's countries there that have 
absolutely no regulation whatsoever in stem cell research and there’s countries 
say, some states in America that still allow reproductive cloning and people think 
America has a lot tighter legislation, because they can’t work on certain things, 
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but there’s so many loop-hole in laws... I don’t know what it’s like in Korea or 
India, but I’m assuming that there’s loopholes, it kind of concerns me that the 
legal people can’t keep up with science occasionally. [...]  
 
Nicola: You’re thinking about going to the States for your post-doc, and you 
mentioned that you’re concerned about the lack of legislation over there; I mean 
is that something that makes you think twice about applying there, or...?  
 
Wendy: Yeah, it makes me think, but then again, I know the lab that I’m going to 
so I know that I’d never be asked to do anything that I didn’t think was ethical, 
and I know that the whole building that I’m going to has a very good reputation, 
so there’s no way they would put their reputation on the line to do something, if 
they didn’t believe it. But it does concern me that a country as big as America 
hasn’t got its legislation sorted [...]. 
Wendy, here, is making a “facework commitment” (Giddens, 1990): based on the person she 
has met from the laboratory she is applying to – so, based on the person at an “access point” 
for the “expert system” of SCR in the USA – she “trusts” him, and the laboratory, and has 
decided to go to the USA for her post-doc. This trust could be rational-calculative –that is 
based on Wendy’s evaluation of the trustworthiness this person and by extension of this 
laboratory and its workers. It could also be “as-if trust”, in the context where doing a post-
doc in a well regarded laboratory in the USA is good for one’s career and Wendy may not 
have the option of leaving this particular expert system (refusing to work in the USA could 
be damaging for her career as a research scientist). Wendy also uses a narrative of scientists 
as responsible people that do need boundaries but are happy to abide by them. However, 
there is a sense of powerlessness: if people want to do something that isn’t allowed, there are 
always “loopholes”. This reflects similar concerns identified by Parry (2003b) in patients and 
potential donors.  
 
Wendy also indicates that legislators and policy-makers should be trying harder to “keep-up” 
with research, thus the responsibility for inappropriate use of stem cell technologies can be 
deflected towards these people, who are not scientists. Nevertheless, my informants do not 
always deflect all the responsibility for regulation onto others, and many are very supportive 
of the move by scientists in the USA towards setting up voluntary guidelines for ESCR (see 
Holden and Vogel, 2005). 
 
Many informants are also troubled with what happens or may happen in other countries. 
There are many concerns about China and India; and a few comments on Korea. However 
the difficulties, and for some the impossibility, in regulating such a globalised science are 
often highlighted. 
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6.6 Conclusion: Opportunities for reflexivity? 
The dual meaning of the labels “cowboy” and “maverick” reflects the ambivalence 
expressed by stem cell researchers towards a variety of expert systems related to their work. 
The inherent uncertainties of science enable different people and practices to be painted as 
reckless and/or trailblazing. On the one hand, my informants voiced support for trailblazing 
aspects of science (for example Stanley’s “empiricism”); but on the other hand, they often 
seemed unavoidably tied in with, and dependent upon, expert systems rife with recklessness, 
as displayed by “disreputable others” (Michael and Birke, 1994).  
 
I want to examine whether these ambivalences enable “reflexive scientization”. For Beck: 
the consequences and risks of modernization can only be brought into view by 
passing through the critique (and counter-critique) of the scientific service 
systems from different sciences. The opportunities for reflexive scientization 
consequently seem to grow in direct proportion to the risks and the list of 
shortcomings of modernization, and in inverse proportion to the unbroken faith in 
progress of techno-scientific civilization (1992: 160, original emphasis). 
 
public discussion of modernization risks is the route for transformation of 
mistakes into opportunities for expansion under the conditions of reflexive 
scientization (1992: 161, original emphasis). 
These elements of “reflexive scientization” can be found in my informants’ discourses. For 
instance, they list limitations to science and some of its expert systems: the difficulty in 
evaluating risks and “unforeseen consequences”; the dual importance of trailblazing and risk 
minimising; the non-correspondence between human and animal data; the limits of informed 
consent especially when addressing the unpredictability of science; the importance and risks 
of commercialisation; and the difficulties in adequate global legislation. At times, they 
confront these: by suggesting, or supporting, the implementation of further legislation; 
electing not to participate in certain types of research (commercial for example); denouncing 
reckless behaviour; choosing to go to trial only when they are satisfied with the amount of 
pre-clinical data they have; or by highlighting the uncertainties of science, even in the 
context of informed consent and risking that people will not participate. Their performances 
of trust may also be conceived as attempts by scientists to compel others to act in a 
trustworthy manner. Thus, the elements of reflexive scientization highlighted here give 
reason to be more optimistic than Wynne about the reflexive potential of stem cell 
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researchers’ discourses. In addition, not all the limitations raised by scientists are the result 
of criticisms from outside the scientific community. 
 
Nevertheless, like Kerr and Cunningham-Burley (2000), I find many elements of “counter 
modernity” or “unbroken faith in progress of techno-scientific civilization” in SCR 
professionals’ discourses: Stanley’s “empiricism”; the black-boxing of aspects of informed 
consent or its use as a legitimatory device (they signed the consent form, therefore I cannot 
be blamed for any problems); choices to work in countries deemed to have unsatisfactory 
regulations; the focus on “managing” public mistrust rather than examining its causes; and 
the deflection of  responsibility towards, potentially “disreputable”, others (companies, 
legislators, publics). My informants rarely, if ever, question the assumptions embedded in 
SCR and its practice. These assumptions contribute to conditions of ambivalence. Thus, 
these expert systems seem to enable some professionals to pass the “hot potato” around as 
“one can do something and continue doing it without having to take personnel responsibility 
for it.” (Beck, 1992: 32-33).  
 
In contrast to what Kerr and Cunningham-Burley (2000) suggest for new genetics 
professionals’ discourses, I find that these stem cell professionals’ accounts are varied and 
some informants are prepared to raise fundamental questions about the assumptions 
embedded in SCR. Thus, I suggest that these discourses do open up ways of challenging 
dominant framings in SCR and science in general and they are not always “a powerful brake 
on the radical potential of reflexive modernisation” (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 2000: 
297) 
 
My informants, nonetheless, often have to rely on expert systems, despite knowing that these 
are problematic: for example, by working with commercial companies despite concerns that 
potential therapies may be inaccessible to most people; or by working with human ES cells 
despite misgivings about informed consent. Notwithstanding the cognitive authority of 
science, I think it is arguable that these scientists may find themselves in positions where 
they see no choice but to work within these systems they do not trust. Similar to Wynne’s 
farmers, who were socially dependent on Sellafield through professional, kinship and 
friendship networks (Wynne, 1996c: 40), stem cell researchers are socially dependent on a 
variety of expert systems through professional, kinship and friendship networks. To deal 
with this “social dependency” which threatens their social identity (cf. Wynne, 1996b), both 
farmers and stem cell researchers express “as-if” trust through their discourses and actions; 
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this is less threatening than dwelling upon their feelings of powerlessness. These stem cell 
researchers (like publics) have to participate in expert systems not only because they lack the 
knowledge (as Giddens argues, 1990: 33), but also the power, to do otherwise (or at least this 
is how they portray themselves).  
 
However, I find it unsatisfying to conclude that these professionals are indeed as powerless 
as some of the communities described by Wynne. Rather, I would argue that they need to 
mobilise the authority they do have – as powerful players in a variety of networks and 
“fields” (Bourdieu, 1975) – and use it to create and protect spaces for these private 
ambivalences to become more public and “revolutionary” (cf. Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 
2000). I suggest that one element of this is to explore ambivalence with others (such as stem 
cell researchers from other areas, but also different kinds of publics, including patients, 
lawyers and ethicists) during processes of public engagement in science. I turn to various 
ways in which stem cell researchers’ discourses can frame and construct public engagement 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7  
            
Talking of publics and engagement;  




7.1 Introduction: constructions of publics, science and engagement 
Chapter 6 highlighted elements of reflexive modernity in stem cell researchers’ discourses. It 
suggested my informants’ concerns should be raised and discussed in public contexts; this is 
part of public engagement. However, drawing on the development studies and cPUS 
literatures, chapter 2 discussed how different types of engagement exercises constitute 
participants in particular ways and so impose identities upon them (see 2.2.4). Therefore, the 
reflexive potential of both publics’ and scientists’ discourses can be limited by the framing 
of engagement; this needs to be explored.  
 
Detailed analysis of public discussions reveals that their framing can, on the one hand, cast 
some voices as value-based, and therefore make them easy to dismiss; and on the other hand, 
cast some voices as objective and factual, and therefore grant them cognitive superiority. As 
Irwin suggests, social scientists must go beyond simply advocating public engagement and: 
[...] instead explore the social processes, underlying assumptions and operational 
principles through which scientific citizenship is constructed in particular settings. 
(Irwin, 2001: 15) 
As scientists are often essential participants in these engagement exercises and their framing, 
it is imperative to look at how their accounts and acts of engagement perform and constitute 
publics, scientists and engagement itself in particular ways. This is rarely examined: 
[...] participation or engagement literature tends to ignore how scientific 
knowledge unwittingly performs its imagined publics in normative ways and 
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reflects its imagined publics, its commercial reference groups and meanings in its 
own culture. (Wynne, 2006: 219, original emphasis) 
This chapter aims to address this gap, especially since the lack of acknowledgement of 
scientists’ assumptions, including by social and natural scientists, may lead to further public 
disaffection (see also Wynne, 2005a; 2006). 
 
Here, scientists’ constructions of who has a role in engagement, what kind of role and in 
what kind of engagement are investigated. To do this, I examine three issues relating to SCR 
and how my informants talk about them. The first issue relates to cell lines derived from 
“primordial germ cells”, and how these cells were classified as “embryonic” stem cells 
during a public debate in the Australian Parliament. By focussing on this particular instance 
of public engagement and how my informants made sense of it, I draw out the scientistic 
framing of the discussion, the authority of “technical” over “social” or “ethical” discourses 
and the variety in what my informants think are appropriate topics for public discussions. 
The second issue is the proposed rhetorical shift from “therapeutic cloning” to “somatic cell 
nuclear transfer” or “cell nuclear replacement”. My informants’ accounts of this show that 
some of them want to use labels that black-box this technology, whilst others want to open 
discussions around it and explore people’s feelings towards it. These accounts also draw on 
the research tool/therapy dichotomy introduced earlier (see 4.4.5) and highlight the sort of 
discourses scientists feel are (in)appropriate in public fora such as parliamentary debates. 
The third issue concerns “reproductive cloning” and the use of fictional imagery. When my 
informants talk about reproductive cloning, some impute science-fiction based fears to 
publics thus devaluing their concerns, whilst others draw on science fiction imagery 
themselves to make sense of their views of reproductive cloning. These accounts reveal the 
tension between expressing one’s “ethical” or “values-based” concerns and maintaining 
one’s cognitive authority by drawing on “rational” discourses.  
 
My informants’ accounts of these three aspects of SCR draw upon several dualisms: 
technical versus cultural, social, ethical or political; rational versus irrational, emotional or 
values-based; and reductionist versus holistic. Like many dualisms, these are hierarchical 
(cf. Faulkner, 2000), with technical, rational and reductionist often portrayed as cognitively 
superior to their counterparts. These discursive dualisms co-exist, often in contradictory 
ways, in my data; my informants consequently have multiple repertoires on which to draw. 
Some acknowledge this and explore it reflexively. These different repertoires are used as 
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analytical categories to explore how my informants normatively construct public 
engagement.  
 
These dualisms are often a reflection of the contradictory roles of experts in public 
discussions about science: they need to be kept close to but not within politics (as shown in 
the literature review by my discussion on expertise, see 2.2, and on the “protection of 
autonomy”, 2.5.1). Similarly, Haraway shows the importance of casting oneself as rational 
rather than irrational or emotional, especially in public disputes: 
The struggle is over who gets to count as a rational actor, as well as an author of 
knowledge, in the dramas and courts of technoscience. In the United States, it is 
very hard to ask directly if new technologies and ways of doing science are 
instruments for increasing social equality and democratically distributed well-
being. Those questions are readily made to seem merely ideological, while the 
issues of safety and labelling can be cast as themselves technical, and so open to 
rational (objective, negotiated, adjudicated, liberal) resolution. The power to 
define what counts as technical or as political is very much at the heart of 
technoscience. (Haraway, 1997: 89) 
However, as I explore in this chapter, it is no longer possible (if it ever was) to keep politics 
and ethics out of science. I conclude by arguing that scientists do not systematically seek to 
distance themselves from these aspects of their work. They draw upon a variety of 
repertoires and worldviews, and seem to have taken up criticisms of the deficit model to 
varying degrees. 
 
Scientists’ accounts examined in this chapter all reveal a variety of constructions of publics 
(uninformed, in need of education, knowledgeable, emotive, concerned, and irrational), 
scientists (rational, emotional, neutral providers of information, (un)trustworthy) and 
engagement (education, conversation, opportunity to manage one’s image, opportunity to 
explore public concerns). I make sense of this variety in chapter 8 where I draw parallels 
between such constructions of publics, engagement and conceptions of democracy. 
 
7.2 A rat in parliament; engagement and scientism 
In 2002, during the lead-up to the new legislation on SCR and cloning in Australia, an 
eminent SCR professional, Oscar, gave evidence to Parliament. He discussed an experiment 
undertaken in the USA as an example of the therapeutic potential of human ESCR. In this 
experiment, a virus was injected into rats, partly destroying their motor-neurons and so 
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reducing their ability to walk. Their mobility was partially restored after they were injected 
with particular cells. Oscar, in a brief he circulated to Parliamentarians, described this 
research as: 
Human ES cells directed into neural stem cells and motor neurone cells – when 
injected into the spinal column of rats with a motor neurone lesion (viral induced) 
– no muscle control at all below C6 (lower body) – were completely reversed 
(animals walked again and had control of bowel and bladder function) – potential 
application for human Motor Neurone Disease” (Oscar quoted in Parliament of 
Australia, 2002a: section 2.20).  
Oscar also showed a video of the rats before and after their injections with the “Human ES 
cell” derivatives, showing how their walking improved with the treatment81.  
 
This episode was discussed in the media (ABC News Online, 2002b) and in Parliament 
(Parliament of Australia, 2002a: especially sections 2.21-2). Opponents of ESCR made 
several criticisms about this experiment and the way it was described. One particularly 
significant one was related to the nomenclature: it was said that the cells used in the 
experiment should not have been described as “embryonic” stem cells, as they were derived 
from “differentiated germ cells from the early sex gland of a two month old aborted human 
fetus” (Do No Harm, 2002, emphasis added). In contrast, ES cells are usually derived from a 
“blastocyst” which is only a few days old (see Thomson et al., 1998). The researchers who 
undertook this work say they used  “human pluripotent embryonic germ (EG) culture” which 
was “generated from primordial germ cells as described” (Douglas Kerr et al., 2003: 5132); 
that is from: 
Gonadal ridges and mesenteries of 5- to 9-week postfertilization human embryos 
(obtained as a result of therapeutic termination of pregnancy by using a protocol 
approved by the Joint Committee on Clinical Investigation of the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine) (Shamblott et al., 1998) 
Deciding whether to use the term embryo or foetus is particularly problematic as the label 
“embryo” is often used for the first 8 weeks of development post-fertilisation, before the 
organism “becomes” a foetus82. Therefore, five to nine week old beings can be assigned 
either label. 
 
                                                     
81 See a press release from John Hopkins University where this research took place: 
https://hopkinsnet.jhu.edu/servlet/page?_pageid=584&_dad=portal30p&_schema=PORTAL30P.  
82 The HFEA, for example, defines foetus as: “The term used for an embryo after the eighth week of 
development until birth” (http://www.hfea.gov.uk.) 
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Other criticisms included that the rats were not “cured”, that Oscar owned shares in a stem 
cell related company (therefore creating a conflict of interest) and that the research was 
presented as published when this was not the case. Oscar was given the opportunity to 
respond in the Senate. He explained that he had already rid himself of his shares and that his 
assumption about the research’s publication’s status was a mistake. He also argued, using a 
variety of examples, that the “terms ‘embryonic stem cells’ and ‘embryonic germ cells’ are 
often used interchangeably” (Official Committee Hansard, 2002, September 24th: CA 191). 
He highlighted that: “Both represent human pluripotential stem cells derived from embryos 
and are quite distinct from adult tissue stem cells”.  
 
Taking this case as one example of public engagement, I examine what versions of publics, 
scientists and engagement my informants contrast when talking about it. I draw out two 
themes: scientism and boundary-work conducted for “expulsion”. 
 
7.2.1 The prominence of scientism 
“Scientism” suggests that science alone can provide all the answers. It is an  
“institutionalized idolatry of science” (Wynne, 2006: 214), and: 
It reinforces, without question or comment, the widespread sentiment that science 
should be the only authority for belief and the only criterion for action. (Ziman, 
1991: 33) 
As I demonstrated earlier (see 2.2.4), public consultations that focus on technical aspects of a 
particular scientific development can marginalise other aspects embedded within it. Parry 
(under review) looks at stem cell researchers’ accounts of embryonic stem cells (ES cells). 
She argues that by rhetorically and visually focussing on technical aspects of these cells – 
emphasising their small size, their physical resemblance with other cells in the body, their 
“absence of identifiable human features or structures, such as limbs”, and by naming them 
“blastocysts” – scientists remove other more contentious issues from the discussion. These 
issues include the circumstances under which embryos are procured and the potential related 
health risks to donors.  
 
Focussing solely on technical issues also pre-empts discussions about choosing between 
adult and embryonic stem cells on “ethical grounds” (where cells from the skin are seen as 
less ethically problematic than cells from embryos). Scientists can then focus on cells’ 
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“pluripotentiality” – that is their ability to differentiate into various cell types – and paint ES 
cells as more promising. This “dehumanisation” and “scientisation” isolates science from 
other values and focuses discussions on aspects in which scientists are themselves experts. 
These sorts of understandings of embryos, focussing on their size and cell-like appearance, 
were also very prominent in the media (e.g. Williams et al., 2003). 
 
In this context, where proponents of ESCR are keen to highlight the cell-like (non-foetus-
like) visual properties of ES cells, the merging of ES cells with germ cells is particularly 
noteworthy. The primordial gonadal ridge from which primordial germ cells and then 
“embryonic germ cells” are derived is a primordial organ. Organogenesis has thus begun in 
the entity from which these cells are derived, and in this sense, this entity is becoming more 
human-like, moving towards having discernable physical human features. As feminist 
writers have previously shown (e.g. Petchesky, 1987), foetal images are powerful in 
highlighting the kinship between these entities and fully-developed humans. It is therefore 
interesting to see how my informants view this episode and how they define ES cells and 
germ cells. 
 
When I interview Oscar, I ask him whether his experience of public speaking has helped him 
for the stem cell parliamentary debates: 
Oscar: I was always of the view that you should be direct and as simple as 
possible, the problem is you actually get very small grabs or very small bites for 
transmitting your information, you know 5 minutes, 1 minute, 10 minutes is about 
what it is often, so you can’t be too complicated or too complex, because you 
spend all your time addressing the complexity of the issue. So in getting that 
information across, you need to be careful that you’re portraying it in an accurate 
way and so, there were certainly claims, because I’d taken a much shorter bite at 
some of these things that the information that was transmitted wasn’t accurate 
enough for some people.  
Oscar is referring to the rat episode. He argues that in order to get a message across, in a 
limited time, one has to be succinct, but also accurate. He is indicating, as he did in 
Parliament, that it is appropriate to use “ES cells” as a short-hand for germ cells, in order to 
make his message clear. For him, not distinguishing between so-called embryonic germ cells 
and ES cells is not a problem as he judges these on their pluripotentiality. For him the valid 
characteristics on which to differentiate stem cells area particular set of technical ones. He 
constructs his audience (parliamentarians and other public groups) as wanting technical 
information stripped of its contingency and complexity. Public discussions are occasions for 
simplifying the facts, not raising new questions. 
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By drawing on “scientistic” arguments, Oscar is not leaving a space for discussions about the 
origin of the stem cells. It could be argued that deriving cells from an “embryo” that is a few 
days old raises different issues to deriving cells from an aborted “foetus” that already has 
started developing primordial organs. Not everyone with an interest in SCR would be happy 
with the rhetorical separation of cells from their source, as is evidenced by some anti-
abortion submissions to Parliament. There is no evidence here to suggest that Oscar is using 
this terminology because he does “not feel properly qualified to take an explicit position on 
the moral status of the object of concern” (Hauskeller, 2005). Indeed, he stated in parliament 
that he felt “uncomfortable” working on aborted foetuses (Official Committee Hansard, 
2002, September 24th: CA 207). Rather I would argue that this choice is more strategic. If 
one vital aspect of the pro-ESCR case was to distance ES cells from human, likening these 
cells to cells from an aborted foetus (and its associated powerful imagery) risks closing the 
distance between ES cells and humans and therefore the destruction of life. Therefore it is a 
strategic necessity in this instance not to highlight that these cells come from an entity that 
could be labelled “foetus”. 
 
In addition, by using experiments done with germ cells derivatives and labelling them ES 
cells, Oscar extends the definition of ES cells to accommodate the successes of these germ 
cells. This in turn “expands” the authority of ESCR. Although Oscar did not reflect upon this 
rhetorical strategy, another researcher did:  
Georges: [Oscar] was relying on data to prove you know that embryonic stem 
cells could regenerate I forget what it was, spinal cords I guess, of these rats, and 
the only data he could find, was not from embryonic stem cells. It wasn’t that he 
was trying to sort of, you know sort of… tell a white lie, he was telling a real lie. 
Because I mean, the point is that he didn’t have data, that’s what I think he, you 
might say well, what are those cells called, embryonal stem cells[ 
 
Nicola : ]Foetal weren’t they? 
 
Georges: Foetal… foetal germinal stem cells, something like that, I’m not an 
embryologist, but they were several steps downstream from embryonic stem cells, 
so he was using those because they were, that experiment obviously worked. 
Georges works in a field related to SCR (immunology) and is opposed to ESCR. He is 
criticising Oscar’s tactics of labelling ES cells and germ cells as the same. Georges, like 
Oscar, justifies his position on technical grounds: he argues that germ cells are “several steps 
downstream from embryonic stem cells”. This implies that they are more differentiated and 
therefore are likely to have different properties.  
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What is remarkable is that Georges does not agree with ESCR for several reasons, one of 
which is that he opposes the destruction of embryos. His views are informed by his Catholic 
religion. I would, therefore, have expected him to highlight the problems with using tissue 
from aborted foetuses. However, both here and in Parliament where he also gave expert 
evidence, he chooses to make his case on what I classify as technical grounds. He mentions 
during our interview that he used to highlight his religious view, but found that this 
“weakens your argument”. Georges’ reflection highlights the prominence of scientism in 
public debates. Both Georges and Oscar have broad experience of public talking and have 
probably learnt through experience that technical claims hold more sway than arguments 
based on personal beliefs. Both these researchers are drawing on a “modernistic worldview” 
(Goven, 2006) where technical facts are the gold standard by which to judge cells and 
science. In this way, people who cannot articulate their views scientistically are excluded as 
a result of the frameworks in which debates take place. 
 
This scientism was embedded in the parliamentary context. Although many parliamentarians 
strongly opposed to research on embryos succeeded in focussing the Senate hearings on 
Oscar’s character and the ethical and religious aspects of using ES cells, the report following 
the hearings focussed on technical aspects of ESCR and separated them from other aspects 
of the research. As I highlighted in chapter 4, the report also focussed on pluripotentiality:  
For the purposes of this inquiry, the properties of cells that are of interest are 
those related to their capacity to ‘differentiate’ or ‘specialise’ into particular kinds 
of tissue (Parliament of Australia, 2002a: section 2.27).  
Thus, the public debate was effectively ring-fenced to only address the technical properties 
of stem cells. This makes it difficult for people who take a holistic (rather than reductionist) 
approach to these issues world – who see the nature and value of ES cells and germ cells as 
inseparable from the contexts of their derivation and application – to express their views 
about ESCR.  
 
7.2.2 Boundary-work for protection or expulsion; defending science 
This rat episode also illustrates another type of boundary-work, “expulsion”, which is 
conducted to banish “pseudo-scientists” from the realm of science and thus protect its good 
name. Gieryn (1995: 432-4) discusses the case of Sir Cyril Burt, a psychologist publicly 
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accused of fraud. Burt was a high profile researcher whose work confirmed “hereditarian” 
theories (who see psychological factors as determined by genetics) but was criticised by 
“environmentalists” (who see them as determined by the environment) for being spurious. 
Initially, the hereditarians defended Burt, describing his work as merely “sloppy”, and 
accused those who attacked his character of being politically motivated (accordingly 
“unscientific” and unreasonable). The environmentalists continued to argue that Burt was the 
one being unduly influenced by political factors and giving science a bad name. However, 
when it became clear that Burt’s conduct was indeed fraudulent, hereditarians aligned their 
position with that of the environmentalists. They expelled Burt from their ranks, blaming 
“personal and idiosyncratic troubles”, and highlighting the role of psychologists in policing 
their own field. They could secure the authority of psychology and its credibility as an 
appropriate scientific endeavour (whether focussing on environmental or genetic factors). 
Similar attempts at expulsion’ can be seen in my informants’ views on Oscar and the role of 
public debates, raising questions about what my informants see as relevant in public 
judgements about SCR and stem cell researchers. 
 
Although I never specifically raise this rat incident, it comes up in several interviews. Many 
researchers feel that this episode had had a deleterious effect on relations between the stem 
cell community and public groups. The two quotes below are example of this: 
Connor: He kind of clouded the issue because he was a bit free and easy with his 
definition of stem cells. And I don’t think that did the cause too well because it 
says that, you know, it comes down to what you were talking about, public 
perception of scientists, the public expects scientists to be precise in their use of 
terms and definitions and so on. So I think the reaction to him just referring to 
those as stem cells, the people then, particularly the opponents would say, look 
you lied on that when he was probably, I’m not necessarily trying to defend him, I 
can imagine that he was just trying to make it easy as it were, generalising, yeah. 
Because the debate was extremely heated, it wasn’t the right time to generalise. 
 
Nathan: To tell you, a lot of Australians in the scientific community particularly 
in the adult stem cell community were pretty pissed off at [Oscar], because he’s 
got a lot of money, he made a lot of money and made a lot of money sneakily. 
And also that way that he went about, yeah, I guess trying to deceive the public 
through the media with that rat walking again. That’s not science, that’s wrong, 
and it’s nearly embarrassing in a way to be associated with that area of science 
when you see things like that going on. I’ve had to defend myself over that, say 
I’m not involved in embryonic, what he did is not what other embryonic people 
do either, it’s what he did and it was wrong and, yeah. 
Both these researchers work in ASCR and disagree with the way Oscar presented this 
experiment. They feel that this rat episode had a direct effect on public trust, not only for 
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researchers in ESCR, but also in ASCR. Here, public discussions are seen as important 
moments for scientists to manage their image of trustworthiness amongst wider publics.  
 
Nathan attempts to “expel” Oscar from science because he sees him as unduly influenced by 
social factors such as money. ASCR competes with ESCR for funding; hence Nathan’s 
attitude parallels that of the Gieryn’s environmentalists. For Nathan, the character of a 
researcher is fundamental to the credibility of his/her work and untrustworthy scientists need 
to be expelled to protect SCR as a whole. Connor is more generous and argues that the 
context of public debates may have made it difficult for Oscar to explain what he saw as the 
differences between ES cells and germ cells. However, Connor does accept that these two 
cell types are different; thus he is not simply judging them on their pluripotentiality. Connor 
seems to be acting like Gieryn’s hereditarians early in the debate: he would characterise 
Oscar’s talk as “sloppy” rather than deliberately misleading. Both these researchers 
understand the importance of factors, such as trustworthiness, in public assessments of 
science and they construct publics as having means of judging science and scientists. They 
impose a less scientistic framing on public discussions than the informants discussed above, 
in 7.2.1: they argue that the choice between different types of stem cells will be made by 
taking into account factors beyond the cells’ pluripotentiality, and including the personal 
commercial links and ethics of advocates of particular cell types. Both Connor and Nathan 
are happy to be working in ASCR which they portray as raising fewer ethical problems than 
ESCR, therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that they are not desperate to defend Oscar. 
 
Steven, on the contrary, criticised the parliamentary debates and following media stories for 
enabling these sorts of personal, rather than technical, issues to be raised: 
Steven: [...] I’ve heard [Oscar] for example you know, and seen debates there and 
in a really, he’s generally been on the back foot, he’s been faced with a fairly 
staunch set of opposition [inaudible], I have to say I sort of take pity on him 
because a lot of the, a lot of the questions I thought were really left field and 
really not, they were for shock value only, not really to, to really ask probing 
questions, they were simply there to rattle his cage. 
Steven works in adult stem cell research (ASCR), but has collaborations with ESCR. He is 
contrasting ES cell researchers, whom he described, earlier in the interview, as presenting 
their “data” in a balanced fashion, with their opponents (anti-ESCR parliamentarians here) 
who ask inappropriate questions. Although Steven does not mention specifically what 
questions he is alluding to, the only ones that were asked were those about Oscar’s alleged 
misrepresentations of the data and its publication status, and those about his share ownership. 
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Thus, it is clear that Steven feels that public debates should not focus on the trustworthiness 
of particular scientists, or issues such as conflicts of interests, but should focus on “the data”. 
Therefore, public debates are seen as an arena for presenting scientific “facts” and other 
questions are not seen as appropriate. He is defending Oscar, as Gieryn’s hereditarians did in 
another context, by accusing opponents of having ulterior motives (political ones) rather than 
simply being interested in the “facts”. Steven dismisses as irrelevant the contexts in which 
research takes place, such as the increased commercialisation of science (cf. Goven, 2006). 
 
Bernard is a supporter of SCR in general, but was quite critical during our interview of the 
way the rat experiment was discussed in Parliament and in the press: 
Bernard: I said look, the real problem with the media is not whether, this [Oscar] 
controversy, I don’t know if you know about this, where he shoved this film of 
this rat. The story of [these] rats was that they had a viral motor-neuron disease, 
they didn’t have spinal cord injury, nothing to do with that. And all his studies, 
[...] showed that there was no neuronal replacement in those animals83, there was 
some glial replacement. Anyway, unfortunately [Oscar] showed this in the 
context of the Senate, in which there were people with kids in wheelchairs, and 
everything else, and purported to say that it was a spinal cord recovery and they 
were embryonic stem cells. What the press jumped up about, was that they 
weren’t embryonic stem cells, but they were these gonadal stem cells which, you 
know... 
 
Bernard: But the point was that they missed the major discrepancy that this had 
nothing to do with spinal cord injury and that the data was unpublished and it 
wasn’t verified and you know, and it really upset me greatly, […]. But they kept 
wanting to ask me “but these weren’t really embryonic stem cells; well they were 
gonadal, virtually the same properties, it doesn’t concern me, it’s silly for him to 
say they were embryonic, he probably thought they were at the time, I have no 
idea. But the argument got lost in this embryonic or not embryonic, rather than in 
whether they actually did anything, which seems to me to be the bottom line 
about this whole debate. I mean if they don’t do anything, there is no debate.  
Bernard, like Oscar, does not distinguish between ES and germ cells; he paints them as 
having similar “properties”. However, he does see a difference between reducing the rats’ 
mobility by using a virus that prevents their neurons from working properly, and by creating 
a spinal cord injury by, for example, severing their spinal chord. He indicates that the 
symptoms of the latter would not have been reverted by this experiment. Bernard’s focus on 
this is likely to be due to his clinical experience of spinal cord injuries. Here, we see a 
scientist criticising the public discussion processes for not allowing certain questions to be 
raised. Although the focus remains scientistic, this example also shows that, for Bernard, the 
                                                     
83 These are the sort of problems certain commentators highlighted to the Australian senators in the 
wake of Oscar presenting this data. They argued that the rats were thus not “cured” (see 7.2). 
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value of particular cell types is embedded in their potential application. This last quote also 
shows Bernard’s view of public discussions as special fora where, due to the presence of 
publics, like the “people with kids in wheelchairs”, scientists have a special duty to watch 
what they say, be accurate and not raise false hopes. These particular publics are seen as 
highly emotive and desperate for cures. So for this scientist, SCR cannot be disembedded 
from its application and its political and social contexts.  
 
7.2.3 Multiple constructions 
This rat episode has enabled me to look at a variety of sociologically interesting aspects of 
my informants’ discourses. In particular, it highlights how informants are scientistic in their 
accounts and do not address other questions that may be raised by their research. It shows 
their wish to provide “accurate” “technical” information to guide policy (also discussed for 
new genetics professionals in Kerr et al., 1997) and educate publics into appropriately 
distinguishing various types of stem cells (that is by looking at their pluripotentiality). By 
focussing on technical aspects, scientists can avoid a loss of authority which often 
accompanies the entry of scientists into political and policy arenas (Jasanoff, 1990; Gieryn, 
1995; Parry, under review).  
 
Even when focussing on the technical, however, there are many possible positions as to what 
SCR really is, or should be, about. These different positions have different outcomes in terms 
of which cell types are portrayed as most promising. Again, there is no unique story about 
SCR (see also chapter 4).  
 
Some researchers, who are critical of Oscar’s manoeuvrings, think that questioning 
scientists’ personal trustworthiness is an important part of engagement. They draw on a more 
holistic worldview and highlight that ES cells are judged on a variety of factors. It is relevant 
here that these researchers (quoted above) all work in ASCR, and therefore may have less to 
lose professionally by criticising ESCR84. Nevertheless, they share the view that publics need 
simple educational messages. 
 
Publics are seen at times as emotive patients and relatives, politicians, or the general public. 
They are constructed as receptacles for factual information, as easily misled and unable to 
                                                     
84 Although see 5.5, on the importance of professional solidarity. 
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judge science on their own without scientists pointing out the relevant aspects. Yet, the 
public are also portrayed as able to judge science and scientists using indicators such as 
trustworthiness and involvement in commercialisation. Public discussions were seen as 
important arenas for scientists to explain their work, and convince others of its usefulness, 
but also manage their image of trustworthiness. 
 
7.3 “Therapeutic cloning”; labels to black-box technologies? 
At the time of my interviews, “therapeutic cloning” was legal in the UK, and illegal in 
Australia. The permissive legislation in the UK was partly attributed to the successful 
severing of “therapeutic” from (more problematic) “reproductive” cloning (Parry, 2003a; 
2003b). Part of this success was due to scientists highlighting the “therapeutic” potential of 
ESCR (see 4.2). Another key strategy was to rhetorically separate the two by avoiding the 
term “cloning” and replacing “therapeutic cloning” with “somatic cell nuclear transfer” 
(SCNT) or “cell nuclear replacement” (CNR).  
 
In the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Human 
Genetics Advisory Commission released a joint report in 1998 in response to growing public 
concerns about embryo research and cloning. In it, they encouraged a change of 
nomenclature from “therapeutic cloning” to “therapeutic uses of cell nuclear replacement” to 
“avoid the stigma of the word ‘cloning’” (discussed in Parry, 2003a: 179, original emphasis). 
Kitzinger and Williams have noted that, when scientists talk in public, they tend to use 
“therapeutic cloning” as, unlike CNR, the label directly implies therapies (2005: 735). 
Opponents of this work, however, tended to use the label “human cloning” thus “implicitly 
conjuring up visions of full reproductive cloning” (Kitzinger and Williams, 2005: 734-5). In 
2004, the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) decided at its annual 
conference that “nuclear transfer” should be used in preference to “cloning”. The term 
“therapeutic cloning” was seen as a “commercial” term with “negative connotations, 
“cloning” as not “accurate” and “therapeutic” as “misleading” (see ISSCR, 2004). Other 
scientific bodies have since made similar calls (see Vogelstein et al., 2002; Hauskeller, 
2005) 
 
The choice of labels such as “therapeutic cloning” in public engagement can therefore 
promote and/or hinder particular SCR futures. For this reason, the label is a fruitful site for 
sociological analysis, both in the UK, where the case for therapeutic cloning has been won, 
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and in Australia, where my interviews took place in the build-up to the discussions for the 
2005 legislative reviews when SCNT became legal. My informants’ accounts of this label, as 
well as on the techniques associated with it, provide insights into their construction of 
publics and engagement, as well as SCR.  
 
7.3.1  “Cloning”: opening-up discussions or black-boxing 
Mulkay’s (1994) analysis of the 1980s embryo debates in the UK offer a useful precursor to 
today’s SCR debates. In particular, he has shown how labels serve as powerful political 
devices. He argues that two opposing images of the embryo came into play, resting on 
different labels. The people opposed to research on embryos, by using the label “embryo”, 
drew on readily available cultural resources to render experiments on defenceless “un-born 
children” (1994: 621) repugnant. People supportive of embryo research, however, had no 
available cultural trope to establish the appropriateness of this work. They therefore had to 
invent a new image and label that were more acceptable. They did this by creating the term 
“pre-embryo”, which designates the first 14 days of development after fertilisation, before 
the appearance of the “primitive streak”. Mulkay argues that the label “pre-embryo” was an 
intrinsic part of the eventual success of the pro-embryonic research groups in Parliament. 
 
Similarly, proponents of therapeutic cloning can have difficulties in promoting their work 
and separating it from reproductive cloning. Opponents, by playing on the association 
between reproductive and therapeutic cloning, can undermine this type of research. 
Proponents have to create a new image of this technology as separate from cloning full 
humans, but that promises applications in research and therapies. The label “SCNT” offers 
one such image. 
 
During my interviews in Australia, the label “therapeutic cloning” is repeatedly commented 
upon. This is probably related to the upcoming legislative reviews for which some of my 
informants were preparing submissions. Some think SCNT is more appropriate and accurate, 
others disagree. One researcher feels that it is necessary to change the label and no longer 
use the word “cloning” due to its connotations: 
Balthazar: I’m sure you’ll get to it, when you talk about somatic cell nuclear 
transfer. The issue basically is people call it cloning, and it is therapeutic cloning, 
but my God, all you’ve got to do is look at it from the science point of view and 
see what you’re doing is taking a nucleus and putting it from one cell into 
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another. It’s much better to utilise the term nuclear transfer, because it is, it 
describes exactly what you’re talking about and it’s devoid of all the hype, and 
devoid of the association with the concept of cloning another human being, which 
is what basically what a lot of people get upset about the possibilities of. It’s not, 
yes technically it can be done, or theoretically it can be done by a similar process, 
but you know, checks and balances can be put into place to prevent such a thing, 
so let’s call it what it is, which is nuclear transfer. That’s all it is. The issue is 
…the word cloning means lots of things to different people, and I think it’s 
[better] to utilise words that describe what you’re talking about.  
Here Balthazar is implying that “nuclear transfer”, a more technical description, is more 
accurate. He specifically highlights that the label nuclear transfer can be distanced from 
reproductive cloning. Thus, he can see the power of labels in carrying particular 
connotations; but for him, in this case, the more accurate description is one that is devoid of 
these connotations. He does not reflect upon the power of labels such as SCNT in deflecting 
criticism or in black-boxing issues related to the technology: they can foreclose any public 
discussion about the potential “slippery slope” towards human reproductive cloning or about 
issues of kinship and identity. These labels also help to mask the origin of the cells: the word 
“cloning” reminds us that the cells in question come from a particular donor, whose genome 
is to be reproduced, whereas the word “nuclear transfer” more easily isolates the technique to 
the laboratory, with no connections to the outside world, to the nucleus donor and his/her 
cells, or to the oocyte donor, her body and her potential hyper-stimulation syndrome. The 
implication, here, is that public debates should focus on technical aspects and avoid raising 
all the concerns mentioned above. 
 
Another informant from Australia, Gerald, raises the ISSCR’s wish to change the label. He 
agrees with Balthazar that we should avoid the word cloning – which, for him, has the 
“wrong implications”; that is, human reproductive cloning. However, he does not find 
“somatic cell nuclear transfer” a much more helpful label, as: “the general public, they have 
no idea what somatic cell nuclear transfer meant”. He also argues that this label does not 
directly imply the promise of therapies, as I shall discuss in the next section. Therefore this 
new label makes it difficult to get a simple message across.  
 
One Australian informant takes a different approach. Although she agrees that “cloning” is 
not a very accurate label for the process of nuclear transfer, she criticises the move to simply 
change its name:  
Heidi: [The ISSCR] brought out an edict to all members that they shouldn't use 
the word cloning, they should use nuclear transfer, well, in actual fact, nuclear 
transfer is a technology that doesn't always result in cloning, [...], so it's actually a 
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misnomer from what they're doing, but also I mean, to me, I don't understand why 
they think if you call it something else, people are not going to, people are going 
to think it's OK. I don't, I don't really understand why they think people are that 
stupid. I don't know. Maybe they do think people are that stupid, but I don't think 
they are! Most people who are stupid probably don't care. 
 
Heidi: [People] are not against the word, they're against the technique to make 
children, so just because you call it nuclear transfer, they still should be against it, 
you're just saying they don't understand what you're talking about because nuclear 
transfer is meaningless. To me, that seems really stupid, why not just discuss the 
issue, like say "OK, well why are you against cloning?", and you know, be very 
clear about what cloning is, and what is the problem with it, and if people are 
against it, you regulate it, but… 
This informant argues that dissociating reproductive and therapeutic cloning by name will 
not help resolve any difficulties (“I don't understand why they think if you call it something 
else, people are not going to, people are going to think it's OK”), and portrays these 
discursive changes as tactics to avoid difficult conversations. She agrees with Gerald above 
that people may not know the meaning of “nuclear transfer” but suggests, therefore, that it is 
appropriate to talk about “therapeutic cloning” and discuss the issues that this label raises. 
For her, public engagement is not just about getting a simple message across to members of 
the public, but also involves discussing any concerns that people may have. Like many of the 
informants who want to black-box SCR and ignore questions that cannot be answered by 
science, Heidi had broad experience of engaging with publics. However, this has taught her 
to listen to (and respect) other people’s knowledges. So experience of engagement can for 
some scientists lead to an increased ring-fencing of issues and strategies to avoid raising 
difficult questions, but for others to a willingness to listen to and learn from other people. Of 
particular interest here, is that Heidi works on human ESCR. Therefore, further public 
discussions of SCR could lead to her work being directly under threat.  
 
The above informants all work in Australia. The situation in the UK is slightly different and 
the change of labelling suggested by the ISSCR is not raised during my interviews. 
Informants do not correct my use of the term “therapeutic cloning” and are comfortable with 
the terms SCNT, nuclear transfer and cloning. One informant does comment on the difficulty 
of banning reproductive cloning and allowing therapeutic cloning, when they are both “from 
the same technique”. Although fears of reproductive cloning are often projected onto “the 
public” (see later in this chapter), the need to disassociate reproductive and therapeutic 
cloning in public discussions was not raised. This could be an indication that the boundary 
between reproductive and therapeutic cloning is seen as successfully constructed and stable 
enough for the moment. 
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7.3.2 “Therapeutic” cloning? What can and can’t be said in public 
During the UK debates leading to the 2001 HFEA amendments, proponents of therapeutic 
cloning were keen to emphasise its potential “therapeutic” applications. However, as I noted 
in 5.4.3, many of my informants, in both countries, suggest (in the semi-private context of 
the interview) that the technology for therapeutic cloning may better be applied for research 
than directly for therapies. The only scientist to specifically promote the potential of SCNT 
in tailor-made therapies does so in the semi-public context of giving a presentation in a 
multi-disciplinary discussion: 
Vincent: I thought I should touch on [...] cloning because this is the other 
component of the controversy. So from the point of view of a scientist, this is 
really just something beautiful because it's the perfect solution to rejection. So 
rejection is the problem you would have in transplanting any of these cells. And 
it's a major major problem, one that actually really limits the value transplants. 
Hmm, you know, there are various potential solutions, but cloning, would offer 
what might be an ideal solution. [...] So this has been demonstrated now several 
times, in the mouse, [...] and now recently also mentioned in human. So we, we 
know that in principle it could work. Of course, we don't know [...] that there may 
not be some risk to this procedure, we don't know that these cells are fully 
programmed accurately, and we don't know, [inaudible] be able to say anything 
about the efficiency of it, whether it would be economically viable. But we're only 
going to be able to answer those questions by doing research. 
This is typical of the public talks I heard promoting the use of SCNT in therapies, but 
contrasts heavily with the sort of accounts I heard during interviews. In this section then, I 
examine the therapeutic aspect of “therapeutic cloning” and SCR more generally and address 
questions about what scientists feel they can and cannot say in public.  
 
Philip, working in Australia, raises problems with both words in the label “therapeutic 
cloning”. When answering my question on whether avoiding the label “therapeutic cloning” 
is useful in public debates, he says: 
Philip: I think, these things, there’s kind of an interesting history in this whole 
area that you may know about. In the old days of the IVF debate in the UK there 
was an attempt to substitute the term pre-embryo, to substitute for embryo, in 
what’s currently done in IVF. I think the trouble with therapeutic cloning is that 
it’s a terminology that’s not accurate. It’s not in and of itself therapeutic, the only 
goal isn’t therapy, it’s also research. And it’s not cloning in the sense that cloning 
means to make a new individual, it’s really, if you look at it in a scientific light, as 
cellular reprogramming. So it’s an experiment with cultured cells. I think if we 
can get that idea across, we’ll have done a good job, but all we can do is put the 
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concepts out there as clearly as possible for the public, and then it’s not down to 
us to make the decision.  
This quote is worthy of note on three accounts. First, although Philip draws a parallel 
between the rhetorical manoeuvrings during the current stem cell debates and those during 
the 1980s, he does not seem to acknowledge these as rhetorical manoeuvrings per se, and 
does not give these changes in labels any political weight. Rather, and this is the second 
point of note, he places himself and other stem cell researchers as neutral and objective 
advice providers (as do genetics professionals, cf. Kerr et al., 1997). Having said this, Philip 
is one of the very few scientists I interviewed who had no problem supporting the idea of 
scientists “lobbying” governments. Third, Philip, like Oscar and Balthazar above, constructs 
public discussions as fora to get simple, clear, accurate and objective messages across to the 
public. Again there is no reflection on the social factors that shape the choice of the message 
to be delivered (and, as I discuss later in this section, Philip is clearly aware that there are 
several ways of talking about therapeutic cloning). 
 
Many other researchers in the UK and Australia share Philip’s view that therapeutic cloning 
is unlikely to directly provide therapies: 
Ted: [...] the current paradigm using cloning, cell cloning, from a therapeutic 
perspective is a no goer. 
Interestingly, when Ted talks about the “paradigm”, he is referring to what public discourses 
centre around, not discourses within the scientific community. Indeed, after this quote, Ted 
gives examples of eminent stem cell researchers who, in his view, no longer believe that 
SCNT will be used directly in therapy. The dominant discourse in the scientific community, 
according to Ted, is that SCNT is a promising research tool. This highlights the divergence 
between what stem cell researchers may think and what has filtered out – or what scientists 
have tried to transmit – to broader communities.  
 
One explanation as to why this divergence exists can be found in the following account by 
Philip. He makes a most revealing statement about his view of publics and engagement, 
which shows that he is aware of different ways of presenting scientific “facts”: 
Philip: I think in that role, our job is to explain as clearly as possible the science 
behind everything to clear up any misconceptions [...]. 
 
Nicola: Is that difficult? 
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Philip: It is difficult. To give you an example, I think that actually in some ways 
one of the most important contributions of embryonic stem cells in particular will 
perhaps not come from their direct use in the clinic, but rather from their use as 
research tools: for understanding human gene function, for understanding disease, 
for developing new medicines. Because for the first time with this system we 
have a source of virtually any type of normal human cell to study in the 
laboratory, to manipulate. And if you think about it, that’s a very very powerful 
tool; but it’s quite difficult to explain to the public. It’s much easier to explain to 
the public well this might one day make this person walk, and so I think in trying 
to put across the benefits, potential benefits, of this research, which the scientific 
community overwhelmingly felt they were there, one tended to focus on those 
sorts of outcomes rather than these equally important things that are perhaps more 
difficult for the public to understand.  
Philip is commenting on the public debates in the lead up to the 2002 legislation on SCR in 
Australia. From this quote, I propose that, for Phillip, public discussions are seen as an 
occasion to promote a particular area of science (here SCR, particularly using embryos), by 
highlighting its potential role in therapy, rather than highlighting that it may not work in that 
fashion, and therapies may be arrived at by other routes. Again Philip casts himself as a 
purveyor of neutral information. However, by painting this picture of SCR (that is by 
focussing on the easy-to-explain therapeutic advantages), he is not simply purveying neutral 
information: he is selling it. This quote highlights his conception of the public as ignorant, 
and unlikely to possess sophisticated understandings of how science operates, and in need of 
receiving simple images such as “SCR equals therapy”. Philip does acknowledge this to an 
extent85 but it is, in my view, still troubling that he constructs engagement in this way.  
 
There are other examples in the UK and Australia of the above conception of engagement. 
Often, as soon as I asked my informants how they would present SCNT in public, they 
highlighted the need of many patients for a cure and suggested SCNT as a way towards that, 
even if they had just told me they could not see any therapies coming directly out of SCNT86. 
For example, Ted opened several public talks I attended by highlighting the therapeutic 
potential of SCNT and contrasting it with the immune rejection problems faced by 
conventional organ transplantation. 
 
                                                     
85 For example later in the interview, he does highlight that the case for SCNT should be made by 
focussing on its potential as a tool, rather than a therapy. 
86 Nevertheless, I do want to point out that in a submission, made by one of the laboratories for which 
some of my informants work and sent several months after these interviews to the committee 
reviewing the SCR legislation, the case for SCNT was made in terms of research tools, and did not 
overemphasise the tailor-made therapy approach. 
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I found that researchers, particularly those with experience of interacting with patients, are 
keen not to offer false promises, either to avoid backlashes or simply patients’ 
disappointment. Some researchers do not fear public backlashes, and portray publics as 
capable of seeing the provisional nature of science, and therefore of forgiving scientists for 
making promises that do not bear fruit (data not shown). In addition, a variety of public talks, 
both in the UK and Australia, tend to focus on the direct therapeutic promise of SCR. This 
indicates a disparity between talks to broad publics, and talks to me or to patients. It may 
indicate that some scientists see patients as different kinds of publics, and may acknowledge 
they can play particular roles in science governance (see chapter 8) 
 
7.3.3 Multiple constructions 
Some of my informants do not want to leave space in public discussions for understandings 
of cloning and nuclear transfer that associate reproductive and therapeutic cloning. 
According to them, the only proper or “true” understanding of these two technologies is one 
that emphasises their differences, not one that highlights the fact that they derive from the 
same technology (which others were keen to highlight). They want to avoid the label 
“therapeutic cloning” and dissociate therapeutic from reproductive cloning techniques. These 
stem cell researchers seek to achieve the same with “SCNT” as was achieved with “pre-
embryo”: create a cultural trope which does not have ethically troublesome implications. 
They focus on other questions about cloning and how it might help patients, for example. 
Here, publics are constructed as lacking a stock of knowledge and experience with which to 
judge scientists and their pronouncements, implicitly promoting the need for education rather 
than participation.  
 
Most of the researchers in this section construct publics as potential patients, wanting quick 
fixes and cures, and uninterested in research. They also portray them as unable to see any 
link between advances in research tool and in therapies. Thus, here, public engagement is 
aimed at “educating” publics into being supportive of therapeutic cloning by “informing” 
them about the therapeutic promise rather than the uncertainty surrounding this technology. 
 
For one researcher (Heidi) however, hiding behind new labels is not an answer, and will not 
allay people’s fears of cloning. For her, it is essential to engage with people’s fears rather 
than dismiss them as unfounded, regardless of the labels used. Publics are constructed as 
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holding relevant knowledge and holding legitimate fears (not based on mis-understandings 
for example) that need to be examined. Engagement is an opportunity to enter into 
conversations with diverse publics, rather than foreclose debates by black-boxing 
technology. Because Heidi works on human ESCR, and because respecting people’s 
concerns about cloning human embryos may directly impact on other forms of ES cell 
derivations, it seems that she is prepared to put her job at risk in order to have these 
fascinating, but challenging conversations. 
 
I have also highlighted that there is a disjunction between what many of my informants say 
about SCNT (that it would be a useful research tool) and what public talks often focus on 
(the direct use of cells derived from SCNT in patient-specific therapies). Thus, some 
informants view engagement as a means of promoting science like SCNT, by focussing on 
what they think publics will find more acceptable; whereas other informants are more 
prepared to question what they are doing and use engagement to air concerns and issues 
about their work.  
 
7.4 Reproductive cloning, science fiction and rationality 
Mulkay (1996) has examined the use of science fiction images in the 1980s embryo debates 
in the UK. IVF, at the time, was in its very early infancy and to make sense of it, many 
people looked to science fiction. As Mulkay argues: 
What could be more natural than to fill the missing parts of the test-tube story 
along Frankenstein lines? (Mulkay, 1996: 158) 
He then explains how members of the press and Parliament drew on science fiction to 
discredit those objecting to embryo research and IVF. By steeping their opponents’ views in 
fictional imagery, proponents of IVF were “removing [their] opponents’ objections from the 
sphere of fact to the cognitively inferior domain of fiction” (1996: 162). As a result: 
When Frankenstein appeared within the context of pro-research discourse, he was 
made to speak, not of the dangers of science, but of the credulity, ignorance, and 
dogmatism of those who were unwilling to endorse the advance of science 
knowledge. (Mulkay, 1996: 169)  
Consequently, science fiction can be used to discredit critics of science.  
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Gamson and Modigliani introduce the concept of “interpretive packages” which are clusters 
of elements such as “metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals and other 
symbolic devices” that characterise a temporarily dynamic discourse which provides people 
with “interpretation and meaning for relevant events” (1989: 2). There are a variety of 
competing packages available for people to draw upon in order to make sense of the world, 
but these packages are also themselves shaped by shared cultural meanings. These packages 
are signalled by “condensing symbols” (1989: 3) which often correspond to strong images 
from particular works of fiction. These can include “one hundred dictators” from Levine’s 
Boys from Brazil or “alpha males” from Huxley’s Brave New World. As these symbols draw 
on well known images, they are short-cut ways of expressing particular thoughts or feelings. 
However, there are often manifold interpretations to these works of fiction. Thus, in the 
above IVF story, the condensing symbol was “Frankenstein” for example which has 
“cultural resonance” (1989: 5) with shared popular culture and can convey a dystopian image 
about science. However, by being projected onto opponents of embryo research, it can serve 
as an interpretative package indicating these people are irrational to believe in science 
fiction. 
 
Mulkay highlights that proponents of IVF and embryo research also drew on fictional 
narratives. Indeed they needed to project themselves into the future and imagine IVF (see 
also Mulkay, 1993). However, the projections they made were always utopian, and as there 
were no well-known and readily available utopian fictions with which to associate these 
imaginings, these were never labelled as fantasies. Therefore, the people articulating them 
could maintain their cognitive authority by not being associated with science fiction.  
 
Reproductive cloning, like IVF in the 1980s, is currently in its early stages of development. 
It has been successful in certain animals and has never been achieved (to my knowledge), in 
humans. Not surprisingly then, science fiction is a common interpretative device to make 
sense of it. A variety of science fiction stories and characters have been drawn upon by 
publics, scientists and the media during discussions about cloning. These include Boys from 
Brazil, Frankenstein and Brave New World (see Nerlich et al., 2001).  
 
Most scientists have come out in opposition to reproductive cloning (as did some scientists 
with regards to IVF). They were keen to distance it from the more acceptable therapeutic 
cloning and there were no widespread mainstream utopian discourses in defence of 
reproductive cloning (for an exception see Nerlich and Clarke, 2003). Kitzinger and 
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Williams show how supporters of SCR and therapeutic cloning, similar to supporters of IVF, 
used science fiction “as a rhetorical weapon to discredit the opposition” (2005: 737). Parry 
found during her interviews that stem cell researchers “expelled” reproductive cloners as 
“pseudo-scientists”, and openly aligned their views with what they perceived public views to 
be (Parry, under review).This also occurs in more public settings such as in the media or 
parliamentary debates (Nerlich and Clarke, 2003; Parry, 2003a). Of particular interest here, 
is that, by agreeing with public views, scientists move from the discursive domain of fact and 
rational thought, towards that of values and fears, which they usually construct as 
epistemologically inferior. Ethical reasoning is embraced here, and the issues are no longer 
scientised: publics are “enrolled” when it comes to criticising reproductive cloning (Parry, 
under review). 
 
My interviews with stem cell researchers reveal two important differences from the above 
findings. Firstly, my informants do not mention any of the people who claimed to want to 
achieve human reproductive cloning. I believe this is due to the timing of my research: when 
Parry did her interviews and when the above media samples were analysed, reproductive 
cloners had the attention of the media and were promoting people’s fears about cloning and 
embryo research in general. However, by the time I was interviewing, all these people’s 
claims had been dismissed and SCR had retained its aura of “good science”. Secondly – and 
this could be due to the larger sample size compared to that of Parry and to the private 
setting compared to that of the media and parliament – I find more variety in my informants’ 
approaches to reproductive cloning. Thus, although several researchers criticise publics for 
drawing on science fiction to judge SCR and cloning, many others also themselves draw on 
explicit dystopian science fiction references to make sense of their own fears. However, 
rather than accepting that their views could also be shaped by science fiction and “cultural 
knowledge”(that is knowledge of the social and cultural contexts of knowledge production, 
Kerr et al., 1998b, see 2.2.2 ), some of these researchers try to rationalise their science 
fiction-based critique of reproductive cloning. Looking at the use of science fiction imagery 
and rationalisation techniques has implications for the role of values, and cultural knowledge 
in decision-making abound SCR and science. 
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7.4.1 Science fiction in scientists’ discourses 
Some of my informants criticise members of the public for drawing on popular science 
fiction to make sense of cloning. In the following quote, for example, a researcher condemns 
both the media and the press for associating scientists with Dr Frankenstein: 
Clara: There’s lot of … bad press you know, Dr Frankensteins, so that’s the other 
thing, I find that really annoying, this whole, like with the cloning debate, and the 
public issue was because you know a scientist is going to go away and clone 
something just because they can, and… We all have better things to do! 
Here, Clara is implying that scientists are responsible people who would not waste their time 
on something as unsavoury as human reproductive cloning. She does not seem to think that 
these images of Dr. Frankenstein could be ways of expressing concerns over the potential of 
science to run away and lead to perhaps unintended consequences. She is steeping criticisms 
of SCR in science fiction, and can thus dismiss them as irrational. 
 
Another of my informants also criticises members of the public for basing their views on 
science fiction, after I mention the frequently voiced concern that clones would not have 
their own identity: 
Ted: I think [clones] would have their own identity, because, I come back to 
identical twins, in practice, I think we're being kind of skewed by [...] The Boys 
from Brazil kind of scenario, of creating mini-Hitlers, you're probably too young 
to remember a film by Woody Alan, called ‘Sleeper’, have you seen that? It's 
probably worth watching that, because [the] grandmaster's nose [is] to be cloned 
to form a new one... It's ridiculous obviously but in practice, when we have 
identical twins, we might say, ouh, they look very similar, but we don't somehow 
think they are the same person, or they have the same identity, we treat them as 
separate people, so we are completely capable of distinguishing between genetic 
identity and psycho-social identity. 
Ted is highlighting the idea that a person’s genetic makeup does not determine their 
“psycho-social” identity. In other words, he condemns genetic determinism and highlights 
the role of nurture as well as nature in identity formation. Ted is partly blaming science 
fiction such as The Boys from Brazil for this focus on genetic determinism. Scientists project 
science fiction imagery onto publics, whose fears then no longer have to be taken seriously 
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In contrast to the above informants and to Mulkay’s findings, some of my informants 
expressed their concerns using science fiction imagery. In the following quote, I ask a UK 
adult stem cell researcher what he thought about his country being one of the only ones to 
have legalised SCNT. He answers by criticising other countries’ decisions for being based on 
emotions rather than facts. He then describes his own concerns about reproductive cloning, 
and draws on imagined futures derived from science fiction: 
John: Yes, I think, well you have to ask why the other countries have made it 
illegal, you know, and it’s mostly these sorts of semi-religious or emotional things 
about, about them being human embryos or human cells. I don’t really see, I 
mean, I think you can now make the case that any cell of your body is potentially 
a stem cell, and so giving blood is no different actually from giving stem cells, so 
I don’t really see that you know we should take a different view about these cells 
to any other cells, unless people are proposing to grow them up into, into live 
human beings, where there’s a whole set of different issues that come up, but, so 
no, I think our legislation is sensible. 
  
Nicola: So what issues concern you about reproductive cloning then? Is it the 
safety issues…? 
 
John: Well at the moment it’s unsafe for a start so you shouldn’t do it. [...] I mean 
I think the first thing is safety, and unless it’s absolutely safe, you shouldn’t do it, 
there are issues of more sort of widespread issues of public health like [...], sexual 
reproduction actually has a function of mixing up the gene pool and if 
reproductive cloning became common place you could end up with a really rather 
restricted gene pool [...], …um, I don’t terribly like the idea of having one 
hundred copies of some of the world’s dictators, [laugh][  
 
N: ]Is this Boys from Brazil?[  
 
John: ]Which could easily happen[  
 
Nicola: ]Do you think that? That that could happen? I mean in terms of 
environmental factors being important, for example, I mean I don’t necessarily, I 
mean Dolly was different to her mum for example, and I don’t know…[ 
 
John: ]Well we don’t know actually. Um, but I think it’s quite possible that a dear 
leader would make one hundred copies of himself [laugh].  
By highlighting his approval of UK legislation, John indicates that for him scientific facts 
and not “semi-religious or emotional things” are what should drive decisions around science. 
He is satisfied that reproductive cloning is banned and gives three reasons. The first is 
related to safety and is often used as grounds not to reproductively clone human beings. The 
second was given to me by several informants and highlights the importance of having a 
varied gene pool for adaptation in case of environmental changes. The third is the most 
remarkable here. John suggests that allowing reproductive cloning could lead to the creation 
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of hundreds of identical dictators. This scenario is, in my view, a cultural trope clearly 
inspired by “Boys from Brazil”. John does not see this as a fantasy scenario, in fact he seems 
to think that it is quite possible and “could easily happen”. When I quiz him about the role of 
nurture in shaping identity, he indicates that there is no clear evidence that environment 
would play a large role: “Well we don’t know actually”. Although John may acknowledge 
the cultural reference to science fiction, he does not portray his concerns about reproductive 
cloning as based on irrational fears; rather the idea that a leader would want to use cloning 
to make one hundred copies of himself seems to him quite reasonable. Thus, John contrasts 
unsatisfactory legislation or decision making around science, based on emotions and 
religion, with sound decisions, based on evidence and risk assessments – even if these risks 
are re-interpretations of science fiction scenarios. He avoids sounding contradictory by 
suggesting that the (potentially non-fictional) scientific storyline is realistic, based on the 
evaluation of available data (such as the status of current scientific knowledge or the 
character of current leaders) and by implication, then, is not emotional. So being able to 
explain one’s views rationally is important. I will come back to this in the next section.  
 
John’s is a very genetically deterministic view, which contrasts with Ted’s (on page 191 
above). Other informants such as Barry, from Australia, also draw on deterministic 
discourses: 
Barry: In terms of reproduction I see no real merit in having a cloned individual 
because it’s really only a facsimile of, genetically, of someone who’s already 
there.  
By using the label “facsimile”, Barry is using “metaphors” of clones as “photocopies” 
(Nerlich and Clarke, 2003) to dismiss reproductive cloning. Thus, similarly to publics and 
media (Nerlich et al., 2001; Nerlich and Clarke, 2003), he is drawing on cultural imagery.  
 
The above quotes by John and Barry illustrate Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) concept of 
“interpretive packages”. One of these packages could be “reproductive cloning is 
unacceptable”. In John’s case, “one hundred dictators” is a “condensing symbol” which has a 
particular cultural resonance, through its association with the storyline of Boys from Brazil 
and is thus likely to suggest similar meanings to various people who might hear it. Such 
condensing symbols may also play the role of “boundary objects” (Star and Griesemer, 
1989). For instance, using the imagery of Boys from Brazil can be a short-cut to saying 
reproductive cloning is bad. However, people may have different interpretations of the 
movie itself. For example some might take from it the message that all the boys cloned from 
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Hitler’s cells will become like Hitler, and therefore that clones lack their own identity and 
are not full members of the human race. Others may assume that the book is not about 
cloning per se but is a critique of genetic determinism, a social and philosophical 
commentary on the responsibilities, of scientists, of society and of politicians, or a multi-
faceted oeuvre highlighting the complexities of issues such as cloning. It is particularly 
noteworthy here that Ira Levine’s novel is perhaps unusual in that it highlights the role of 
nurture in identity formation. Van Dijck (1999) discusses how the complex meanings of 
science fiction like Boys from Brazil and their critique of society are often lost in media and 
scientists’ recasting of the stories. This certainly seems to be the case above, when Ted 
blames this book for genetic deterministic ideas.  
 
Whatever the interpretations of “one hundred dictators” or Boys from Brazil are, having 
these common symbols helps these informants mobilise a strong voice against reproductive 
cloning. This contrasts to those like Clara, at the beginning of the section, who dismiss 
concerns about reproductive cloning. 
 
7.4.2 Rationalising emotions 
I have shown how some of my informants draw on culturally available images and symbols 
to express their concerns about reproductive cloning. In this section, I explore how they 
make sense of their fears, concerns and emotions, particularly with regard to decision 
making and legislation around SCR. Some researchers are happy to paint their views as 
grounded in values, fears and other cultural knowledges. Others work hard to rationalize 
their views and render them objective and factual. This follows on from Irwin and Michael’s 
(2003: chapter 4) discussion showing that commitments to rationalization are visible in 
modern society but take place in increasingly complex global relations. 
 
In the following quotes, Peter and I are discussing how to regulate SCR. He starts by saying 
that it is unethical to ban a particular area of SCR (ESCR here) because of a “strong feeling” 
felt by certain people who are opposed to it. Then we turn to reproductive cloning, a practice 
against which Peter expresses strong feelings. I ask him if it should therefore be banned. He 
eventually says yes, but seems to have a problem with suggesting that feelings are sufficient 
to ban something and tries to explain his view in terms of safety. We start by talking about 
ESCR: 
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Peter: [...]But to ban it, because a certain sub-population of the community has a 
strong feeling that no-one should have access to this because they don’t believe in 




Nicola: If say embryonic stem cell research went forward and somatic cell nuclear 
transfer was, became more safe and reproductive cloning became safe, what 
would you say to that? What, in the legislative point of view, in the ethical point 
of view, how should that be handled? [clarifications] 
 
Peter: I don’t think that’s acceptable. 
 
Nicola: OK. Why do you not think that’s acceptable?  
 
Peter: Because you’re making, well because, even though we think it’s safe, if 
something, there’s a couple of reasons. First of all, I can’t see any point in making 
a new human for the sake of you know making a new person that’s going to grow 
up as a person, you know, I don’t see any medical, necessarily any medical 
benefit that couldn’t be achieved in an other way. There’s something, maybe I 
have some religion in there somewhere deep down, there’s something wrong 
about that, it just doesn’t feel right to me, I don’t see the need for it and it doesn’t 
feel right. 
 
Nicola: So do you then think it should be banned? 
 
Peter: But I don’t... so it comes back to where, where do you think human life 
begins. I don’t have a problem with, dealing with cells in the dish all the time, I 
don’t think a few cells in the dish are, have a soul basically. I guess if they’re used 
for a therapeutic reason, that’s fine, but to make a whole new living organism that 
can also then pass it’s genetic material on, even, mistake or no mistake, to the 
next generation, and then throughout the rest of mankind, and there’s a potential 
for a tiny mistake to be passed on forever. And you know, possibilities are 
horrendous ethically, you know, I can think of disaster scenarios where you have 
a cloned person that has some, that you think is fine but has some terrible disease, 
some new disease, some early aging disease like Dolly or something that gets to 
twenty and wants, like everyone else, to have their family, all of a sudden, I know 
I’m talking about, maybe talking eugenics here but, you don’t really want, there’s 
no need to have that situation happen, [...] we shouldn’t allow you know 
reproductive cloning.  
For Peter, concerns based on religious or emotive grounds are not good reasons to put breaks 
on science. After finishing the interview, he told me that I had made him think about things 
he had not really considered before. I believe Peter is, here, struggling to find reasons to ban 
reproductive cloning. His initial “gut-reaction” (in his words) against reproductive cloning, 
which presumably he had not explored before, is not seen as a strong enough justification for 
approving of the ban on this technology. Peter finally says that reproductive cloning should 
not be allowed, but only after he has found and voiced concerns which are more technical –
such as the creation of people with unknowable and undetected mutations. Here, we see two 
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opposing voices: one arguing that decisions should be based on rational facts, the other 
explaining concerns around reproductive cloning in more emotional or value-laden language. 
This extract highlights how difficult it is for some scientists to accept what they see as 
emotional or irrational reasons for shaping technological trajectories. However, it is also 
visible that these emotions shape their concerns, even if they go unrecognised or 
unacknowledged. It seems that Peter does not have an ethics-based repertoire at his disposal.  
 
Other researchers are more comfortable recognising their views as shaped by emotions and 
cultural tropes. For example, Zach says the following: 
Zach: [...] I can’t see any productive reason for [reproductive cloning]… and I, I 
suppose I’m sort of contradicting myself in saying that if there’s no obvious 
benefit, why should you do it when I’ve said there’s other things that have been 
banned that shouldn’t have been banned because of the possibility of stuff87… for 
that one, I just can’t, I can’t understand why you would need that sort of an 
aspect, it seems, and in that case, it’s not actually for research, it’s for people to 
have children along other pathways so, I don’t know if it needs to be banned I 
suppose. I’m not really big on banning stuff, so [laugh] I just can’t see the 
necessity for it. If that’s like the final option and you’ve gone through absolutely 
every other possible way to have a child, you’ve really been unlucky but…it 
seems a very extreme way, you know, I’m just not really comfortable with the 
idea of people basically raising themselves, and I know it’s not the same and 
nurture comes into it but I probably just see too much science-fi to [laugh] to 
separate from my way of thinking. 
Zach is commenting on the contradiction between his criticism of stopping research due to 
ethical reasons and his fear, based in science fiction, of reproductive cloning. He is willing to 
admit that his views are shaped by his cultural environment. As a PhD student with little 
experience of speaking with publics, Zach appears to be more prepared than other informants 
to acknowledge his views as being contradictory and influenced by science fiction. He seems 
to be acknowledging and accepting a role for value-based decisions making in certain 
instances and does not need to explain his view rationally. Hence, Zach flexibly draws on 
two repertoires here: a technico-rational one, and a more socio-cultural one; he is taking a 
more holistic approach to making sense of his views than many other informants.  
 
                                                     
87 He is here referring to his opinion that SCNT and ESCR should not be banned because people have 
ethnical or religious views against them. 
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7.4.3 Multiple Constructions 
Stem cell researchers’ discussions of reproductive cloning construct engagement, publics, 
and scientists in particular ways. Engagement is seen by most of these informants as an 
opportunity for rational decisions. Some scientists criticise particular instances of decision-
making around science for being skewed by science-fiction scenarios, or religious and 
emotional thinking. They feel the need to rectify this by highlighting the “facts” of SCR and 
cloning. The voice of scientism remains dominant, even if there is general support for public 
participation; the latter is often only seen as appropriate once emotions and values have been 
stripped away. 
 
Fears are projected onto publics but are often delegitimised; this is done by arguing that 
these concerns are based on improbable science-fiction scenarios, religion, emotions or 
values. However, this section also highlights that scientists’ views are shaped by a number of 
factors, including science fiction imagery. This is rarely acknowledged. If any momentary 
departures from rationality are identified during our conversations, they are usually 
subsequently rationalised by drawing on technical reasoning. This desire for rationality in 
discussions around science seems to stem not only from scientists’ (typical) commitment to 
an image of science as an objective provider of truth, but also from their experiences of 
public engagement: the one stem cell researcher in this section who is willing to 
acknowledge a role, if limited, for more holistic approaches to science has little experience 
of public engagement.  
 
7.5 Conclusion: multiple performances  
The examination of these three issues has revealed that stem cell researchers have a variety 
of socially located ways of constructing science, publics and engagement. For some, public 
engagement requires the use of labels and “condensing symbols” to black-box particular 
aspects of SCR and focus on its more technical aspects. This scientization supposedly 
enables simple messages to be put across; it aims at educating publics and, so, fostering their 
support. It also dismisses scientists’ personal attributes or interests as irrelevant. For others, 
engagement is an opportunity to unpack labels and look into black boxes; to delve into the 
various concerns people have; to examine scientists and the factors that shape their work 
(and maybe “expel” said scientists); and to think about the contexts in which, for example, 
stem cells are derived and might be applied. As a result, for some scientists there is, and for 
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others there is not, an acknowledged place for explicit interests and values in discussions 
around science. Different scientists have different concerns about the role of 
promoting/hyping SCR. 
 
Publics are at times painted as misunderstanding science, lacking in judgement and relevant 
knowledge or experience, easily duped, irrational and in need of education. At other times, 
and by other informants, they are described as sources of relevant knowledge, who can voice 
legitimate concerns and bring alternative points of view. They can be broad homogeneous 
groups or include a variety of people with different expertises, knowledges or perspectives, 
such as patients, politicians or journalists. As for scientists, they can be seen as neutral, 
rational, independent and objective information providers, holders of the only relevant 
expertise, or they can be one of many voices with their own social, cultural, ethical and 
political locations and related interests.  
 
Accordingly, there are also multiple worldviews discernible, more or less reinforced by the 
setting in which different engagement activities take place. There is a strong modernistic 
worldview, with its attendant universal and predictive science which inevitably leads to 
progress and can be easily disconnected from the contexts of its creation and application. 
There are also more holistic worldviews which see science as uncertain, socially and 
culturally embedded, and with inseparable ethical, technical, cultural, environmental, 
economic (and so on) issues.  
 
These various conceptions are tightly linked to the contexts of the discussion: the timing in 
which interviews took place, the locations of my informants in the field of SCR, their 
country of work and origin, their experience of talking in public or working with particular 
patients, the level of temporary stabilisation of various boundaries around SCR and the 
importance of the issues (such as future funding) at stake. 
 
The existence of these worldviews has implications for engagement. It seems that the deficit 
model is still present, if not dominant, as is the desire to make decisions by separating values 
and emotions from the “facts”. However, many of my informants also acknowledged the 
existence of theirs and others’ values and assumptions, thus using more participatory or 
dialogic voices, and suggesting opportunities for engagement. Experience of talking with 
publics has had different effects on stem cell researchers. For some, it highlights the power 
of scientism and has taught them to focus on technical aspects of SCR, at the expense of 
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taking a more holistic approach. For others, it has reinforced a desire to reveal and discuss 
problematic issues with publics. 
 
These different constructions perform engagement in different fashions. Describing publics 
as uninformed and scientists as neutral information providers can create a reality where 
engagement becomes education; describing both publics and scientists as located in 
particular social contexts and having relevant concerns can create a reality where 
engagement becomes respectful conversations between a diversity of people who can 
challenge the usual scientistic framing of engagement. These constructions open up 
engagement to different sorts of participants. In the next chapter, I look more closely at these 
constructions and link them with broader notions of “scientific citizenship” and democracy. 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Ideal types of engagement 200 
 
Chapter 8  
            
Ideal types of engagement and models of democracy 
 
 
While many commentators portray a lack of public understanding of 
science as an obstacle to democratic vitality, it may be that the 
reverse is also true; that impoverished democracy and intensifying 
hegemony around science is a major obstacle to the enhanced 
public understanding of science. 
(Wynne, 1991: 121)  
 
 
8.1 Introduction: moving away from “utopian rationalism”? 
Ezrahi argues that modern Western democracies have used science and its authority to 
legitimise their power. He finds that this ideological and political role of science decreased at 
the end of the 20th century due to a decrease in science’s authority in legitimating public 
action and “a decline of beliefs in the existence of objective external reality, in the possibility 
of universally valid knowledge” (1990: 14). Similar to Beck and Giddens, Ezrahi puts 
forward science-related disasters such as Chernobyl as contributors to mistrust in science and 
its ability to inform political choice. He argues that many in policy, politics and social 
science now consider the idea of policy decisions being taken by an informed public making 
rational decisions, as utopian:  
the formerly normative conception of policy-making as a process of rational or 
informed problem solving became widely discredited on the grounds that it 
represented a version of utopian rationalism that ignored both the complex 
symbolic and normative aspects of collective choices, and the fundamentally 
political logic of public policy-making involving negotiations, compromises, and 
control (Ezrahi, 1990: 244, emphasis added) 
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In this context, science for Ezrahi is now used as a “privatized resource for the advancement 
of diverse particular views” (1990: 248). That is, science is drawn upon to make personal 
choices (about whether or not to smoke, for example). Ezrahi suggests that the dissociation 
between politics and supposedly “objective” knowledge is good and “perhaps the ultimate 
move towards the autonomy of politics in our culture” (1990: 282). 
 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, rationality and scientistic understandings are 
prominent in many stem cell researchers’ accounts. Chapter 5 also indicated that discourses 
around science are often made by projecting images of certainty. This chapter examines how 
my informants envisage scientific knowledge and its role in policy and decision-making and 
how their views on engagement construct different types of “scientific citizenship” (see 
chapters 2 and 7). It asks if, as Ezrahi suggests for policy makers and others, some scientists 
are moving away from “utopian rationalism”. 
 
The previous chapters drew out the richness and diversity of scientists’ views and 
understandings of science, SCR, knowledge, publics and engagement. This chapter 
specifically addresses my second research question, about the implications of scientists’ 
discourses on public engagement. It starts by an over-view of some literature linking 
expertise, theories of democracy and performances of scientific citizenship. Then, drawing 
directly from interview data, it develops six “ideal types” of engagement, before concluding 
with a discussion on power. 
 
8.2 Investigating democratic citizenship and expertise 
The literature review (particularly section 2.2.4) argues that particular forms of public 
engagement construct particular types of publics. Going one step further, Michael and 
Brown (2000) show how accounts of engagement constitute citizens and fit into various 
versions of democracy. They show that some scientists portray themselves as separate from 
publics and recommend dialogue with some “publics-in-particular” (such as moderate 
animal activists). These scientists are deploying an “external” model of dialogue; that is, they 
engage in conversation with people outside the scientific community. Other scientists, or the 
same scientists at other times, deploy an “internal” model of dialogue where discussions 
around science are conducted within the scientific community; here, scientists see 
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themselves as part of “publics-in-general” and, therefore, as holding the same fears, concerns 
and “commonsensical stories” as publics.  
 
Similarly, Elam and Bertilsson (2003) explore scientific citizenship by examining the shift 
from science conducted in ivory towers, to calls for public understanding of science (as in 
the Bodmer Report) and then for public engagement with science. They draw out the models 
of scientific citizenship and democracy constructed by each: respectively, the Enlightenment 
model, where scientists, who discover “truth”, are the only scientific citizens; advanced 
consumer democracies, where citizens need to be educated about science in order to 
appropriately consume the products of scientific innovation; and deliberative democracy, 
where a variety of citizens can deliberate and reach a rational consensus about science. They 
then critique the conditions of deliberative democracy for being too idealistic and argue that: 
By valuing rationality, reserve, selflessness and powers of argumentation, 
deliberative democracy as a democratic politics played out on scientists’ home 
turf (Elam and Bertilsson, 2003: 242). 
Instead, they argue for a more radical democracy, dismissing the idea that “power can be 
bracketed out of politics” (2003: 244). 
 
Studies of democracy must therefore explore the problematic concept of expertise and the 
authority particular kinds of experts may exert (as suggested by Irwin, 2006: 304). The 
notion of expertise has been problematic in the context of modern democracies. For example, 
Turner argues that for some: 
We are left with a picture of modern liberal democracies as shams, with a public 
whose culture and life-world are controlled or ‘steered’ by experts whose doings 
are beyond public comprehension [...], but whose ‘expert’ knowledge is nothing 
but ideology, ideology made more powerful by virtue of the fact that its character 
is concealed. (Turner, 2001: 127)  
However, for Turner, this is only a problem for liberal democracies if we assume that there is 
a higher “reason” or God that should direct our assessment of experts. Instead, he believes 
that publics can judge experts, and decide or not to give their claims the temporary status of 
“neutral fact”. These decisions are “political”; that is “a matter of decision, not truth” (2001: 
143). This granting of cognitive authority is not the same as an acceptance of extensive 
power over one’s life, but enables non-experts to delegate, for a limited time, certain 
decisions to experts (for a further discussion of expertise, see 2.2).  
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Nevertheless, given the framing of science-public interactions (as discussed, for example, in 
2.2.4), it may be difficult for publics to have the agency not to grant cognitive authority to 
experts, since existing structures often reinforce the latter’s power. Wynne, drawing on SSK 
and development studies, argues that:  
Dominant hegemonic discourses of risk embody tacit power and cultural 
relations, and transmit these through their global ‘scientific’ status and [...] 
through consequent international networks of training, recruitment and 
accreditation. This throws into sharp relief the ways in which discourses of risk 
embody and project assumptions about social and cultural context, which in turn 
embody particular models of the salient ‘public’ or ‘citizen’. (Wynne, 2005b: 75-
6) 
Wynne’s argument is in sharp contrast to Turner’s claim that certain forms of expertise can 
unproblematically be given authority, either because they have successfully been accredited 
within their own discipline, or because publics give them authority. As an empirical example 
of how problematic the granting of authority can be, Lahsen’s (2005b) study of climate 
debates in the USA shows how certain groups have disproportionate financial and political 
power, and therefore influence on policy. Thus, the various calls for the “democratisation of 
expertise” (see the special issue of Science and Public Policy, 2003) will be difficult to 
realise unless this process comes in parallel with wider changes in social order and power 
relations (as suggested by Epstein, 1996: 352).  
 
In addition, Jasanoff (2003a) highlights the problems not only with elitist/technocratic 
conceptions of expertise, but also with relativist ones. In some instances politicians, 
assuming that all expertise is contingent, find it appropriate to simply appoint experts who 
have matching political convictions to their own. Instead, Jasanoff argues that standards of 
transparency and accountability should be sought and this is where publics should play a role 
in democratic societies (see also Jasanoff, 2003b). Therefore it is fundamental to see how 
potential participants in democratic decision-making conceive, perform and drawn upon 
notions of expertise. Scientists’ views are particularly important since, despite Ezrahi’s 
claims, scientific knowledge is a crucial currency in modern democracies (as discussed in 
Lahsen, 2005b). 
 
Drawing in particular on Michael and Brown (2000), and Elam and Bertilsson (2003), this 
chapter looks at how my informants’ accounts of engagement perform specific types of 
citizenship, expertise and democracy. Rather than trying to make an exhaustive list of all the 
different ways in which engagement can be conceptualised and trying to trace this back to 
 
Chapter 8 – Ideal types of engagement 204 
the complex cultural factors that come into play, it is more useful here to set out models that 
can be used as heuristic tools. This is done by drawing on Max Weber’s concept of “ideal 
type” which can be: 
a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterisation of individual 
concrete patterns which are significant in their uniqueness, such as Christianity, 
Capitalism etc. (Weber, 1949: 100) 
As Weber highlights, an ideal type does not have to correspond to what the researcher sees 
as an “ideal” situation. Using this tool, my analysis reveals emerging patterns from the rich 
and diverse data collected on stem cell researchers. Even if one particular scientist may not 
exactly belong to one of my ideal types, using this tool as a heuristic device can identify 
ways in which citizenship, publics and democracy are co-constructed. Once some ideal types 
of engagement and citizenship have been identified, empirical data can be compared to them, 
and differences and similarities drawn out. The selection of ideal types discussed is of course 
not exhaustive, but serves as a starting point for further studies. Six ideal types of 
engagement are developed here (see Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7: Six ideal types of engagement  
Table legend: 
  Technical capital 
+  Technical capital that leads to support and appreciation of a research 
endeavour 
-  Technical capital that leads to the questioning of a research endeavour 
+/-   Technical capital that can lead to support and/or questioning of a research 
endeavour 
 
  Political (or consumer) capital 
+  Political capital that leads to support and appreciation of a research 
endeavour 
-  Political capital that leads to the questioning of a research endeavour 
+/-  Political capital that can lead to support and/or questioning of a research 
endeavour 
 
  Various types of capital: cultural, political, technical etc., without strict 
boundaries between each  
+&-  Both + and - capital: knowledges, expertises, views etc. that support and 
question various research endeavours and understandings of the world 
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These ideal types are not direct reflections of reality, but correspond to how my informants 
construct and perform different versions of engagement. Each one considers the sorts of 
“capital” (Bourdieu, 1975) described as relevant by my informants. Several types of capital 
are distinguished. Technical capital includes technical knowledges; that is those painted as 
rational and objective, usually universal, where contingencies lead to error. It also includes 
forms of authority typically recognised by scientists, such as publications or the ability to 
impose (what I would call) scientistic definitions onto discussions. This is contrasted to 
political and consumer capital which include the power to shape the direction of science by 
voting, consuming, funding, criticising etc. Engagement ideal type VI fits into a slightly 
different framework, where the “technical” and the “political” are no longer separated. 
Rather, in a manner more consistent with SSK and my other theoretical commitments, 
capital here encompasses a range of cultural, situated or socially constructed knowledges, as 
well as the ability to shape decisions in a variety of ways. 
 
For each ideal type, I point out potential participants for engagement, the roles envisaged for 
scientists and publics, the understandings of “knowledge” and “expertise”, the conceptions 
of scientific citizenship, the models of democracy and the recurrence of the model. In 
particular, I examine whether my informants draw on liberal democratic traditions, where 
publics and scientists are portrayed as individuals with rights and where citizenship is just 
“one identity amongst others” (Mouffe, 1992b: 237); on republican traditions where identity 
is subsumed under the membership to a community and where citizenship is “the dominant 
identity that overrides all others” (Mouffe, 1992b: 237); or on other traditions. My 
informants draw on different conceptions of scientific citizenship throughout one particular 
interview (as shown in Table 8). The recurrence of each ideal type and the social factors that 
shape it are discussed. There are no differences due to the country of the informants. I now 
turn to a detailed discussion of these ideal types. 
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8.3 Type I – Engagement as internal dialogue with scientists as publics  
Scientists Publics  Engagement as 
Attributes 
Engt. 









 Rational or try 
 Capital: all 
technical + all 
political 
      +/- 
 
      +/- 
 




 Capital: none 
 
 
In this ideal type of engagement, scientists self-regulate because they have the necessary 
technical and political capital to do so. They locate themselves as part of the public and 
therefore any decisions about science can be made internally, by scientists, whose fears 
reflect those of the public. This model of engagement is expressed by five PhD students and 
three group leaders (from both the UK and Australia). 
 
During an interview, I ask an informant whether he thinks that embryo donors and patients 
can “bring anything to the way science is done”, whether scientists can learn anything from 
them. His answer is as follows: 
Ian: In terms of fertility clinics, I think the thing they can bring is obviously the 
embryo, and if they're more aware and more well educated, maybe we would 
sway more people to donate, or maybe it might have the opposite effect. I don't 
know. And people suffering from Alzheimer's, what can they bring?  
When I ask this question, I am hoping for examples of experience-based expertise, such as 
different meanings for “embryo”. But when I ask Ian about what people with infertility can 
“bring”, he only suggests the physical embryo. This portrays scientists as the only ones 
holding relevant expertise. I then use this quote as a prompt in a subsequent interview:  
Paul: I mean, it's quite a harsh statement that they make but I think it's reasonably 
true. I mean, honestly what can someone with Alzheimer's or a family of someone 
with Alzheimer's really bring. As scientists we know there's a chronic need for 
better therapy, and we're all extremely motivated, so I don't see what they could 
particularly tell us that would make us do anything differently. 
Scientists, such as the two PhD students above, who deploy this model consider they have all 
the necessary capital to make decisions around science. They have the technical capital to 
judge the promises and risks of research and its application and to know what concerns 
publics may raise. This is because these scientists portray themselves as part of the “public-
in-general” (Michael and Brown, 2000). They also have all the necessary political capital to 
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vote or make decisions in their field. They discuss no role for publics as “scientific citizens”: 
the provision of biological material is not seen as a choice related to practices of citizenship, 
but as a gesture made automatically, if and when the material is needed. These scientists 
locate themselves apart from outside influences (from publics, commercial groups, 
politicians etc.) and, if they have any concerns about their work, they turn to their peers. 
They portray the majority of scientists as more “virtuous” than others (Shapin, 1995: 404). 
Here, technical capital is automatically converted into political capital. 
 
Publics are depicted as emotional. However, some are seen to share “commonsensical 
stories” (Michael and Brown, 2000) with scientists such as: if you accept abortion, you 
cannot reject ESCR. These stories can shape research through scientists’ recasting of them in 
rational terms. Other publics are too irrational to share these stories (for example extreme 
anti-abortion groups) and their views must not shape research. Public stories that are not 
shared by scientists can be rejected (made irrelevant to science) by being cast as not based on 
sound science: 
Danielle: I think that the public should be engaged, if they’re interested, in the 
ethical debate. I think that the public, if they have strong feelings, should be 
allowed to express those feelings. And I think that scientists should respect that 
some people may, may be very well informed and may not like what they’re 
doing. You can’t just say ‘Well they don’t understand the science so of course 
they’re not going to agree with it; if they only understood, then they’d think it’s 
wonderful’, because they may understand quite well, and they may still not agree 
with it. I think that, though, that you also need to realise that the general public 
probably does not have 8 years of, you know, focussed study in that arena of 
science [...]. I do think that the public’s opinion is important, but I think it should 
also, that the public should respect scientific community’s opinion is also very 
important, because they are the experts in this area. And so I think it’s a mix 
between public approval and the scientific approval. There’re a lot of people in 
the scientific community that don’t agree with embryonic research, I think the 
majority of scientists do. So I guess my opinion is that I’m, as a scientist, I’m very 
open to the public’s opinions and thoughts, if they’re well based in, you know, 
well founded, well understood [...]. If they want to have an opinion, should at 
least become well informed of the technology. 
A central limitation of the deficit model is described here: knowledge does not necessarily 
lead to acceptance. However, these criticisms of science can be relegated as inferior to 
“scientific” views, as they are not based on “eight years of study”. Thus, some elements of 
the critique of deficit model – particularly the need to respect other forms of knowledge – are 
recognised, but only partially embraced. In particular, the last sentence indicates that the 
need to be well informed before being able to legitimately criticise science.  
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The knowledge used to make decisions around science must be rational and objective. Some 
appropriate views can also be included, like the commonsensical stories above, but they 
have to be rationalised by scientists. For Michael and Brown (2000), the rationalisation of 
concerns about animal welfare can be brought about through the experience of working with 
animals for a long time. In SCR, the rationalisation of fears about cloning can be through 
logical analysis of biological risks (see 7.4.2), or the rationalisation of the need for therapies 
can be through experience with patient groups. People are allowed to hold opinions, but not 
shape science. 
 
Engagement takes the form of rational discussions between scientists, with public 
engagement being the incorporation of commonsensical stories. It also includes a small 
measure of talking to the public and “letting them know what we’re doing”. Although some 
aspects of the critique of the deficit model are raised, the importance of having an 
“informed” view remains. This normative position is operationalised by excluding anyone 
who does not have recognised scientific training, or who can be portrayed as “emotional” or 
“irrational”. Informants draw on this model either to describe how science works in most 
instances, or how it should work. Informants with little or no experience of engagement 
seem to think that science easily can be isolated from the rest of society in this way. 
Informants that have experience of public engagement at the parliamentary level see a distant 
and exceptional role for politicians in setting legal frameworks (such as banning 
reproductive cloning or research on embryos) but do not accept a role for the public shaping 
of research any more directly. 
 
Here, scientific citizenship is only held by scientists and, as Michael and Brown (2000: 9-10) 
find, democracy is only vested in particular people. I would describe this form of democracy 
as similar to Polanyi’s (1962) concept of Republicanism, where the “Republic of Science” is 
a “Society of Explorers” who “strive towards a hidden reality”  (1962: 67) and are 
independent of external pressures88. This Republic of Science is also identified by Rothman 
et al. (1996) as one of the models of science that British scientists draw upon89. It could also 
be described as a very limited type of “civic republicanism” which, according to Leach and 
Scoones (2005), sees individuals as part of groups that can become politically involved. One 
central aspect of republicanism is that it involves a community with shared values, whose 
                                                     
88 Fuller (2000) has criticised this view, especially for the idea that these “explorers” can be 
independent. 
89 This model is arguably institutionalised within British and Australian contexts. 
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members handle common concerns and interests through discussions within the community 
(e.g. Cunningham, 2002: 55-6). Here, the community is that of scientists.  
 
8.4 Type II – Engagement as educating scientific consumers/citizens 
Scientists Publics  Engagement as 
Attributes 
Engt. 










 Capital: all 
technical 
 















In this ideal type, engagement is aimed at providing a variety of publics with neutral 
information and offering them a number of options. Individuals can then choose between 
these, either by exercising their rights as consumers (by choosing or not to buy a product) or 
as citizens (by voting). This ideal type is used by informants from the UK and Australia: five 
PhD students, one post-doc and six group leaders. 
 
Scientists describe themselves as objective providers of neutral information, as discussed by 
Kerr et al. (1997, see also chapter 7 above). They hold all the relevant technical capital, 
which is understood as “certified” expertise (Collins and Evans, 2002). Scientists do not 
have the right to make all the decisions about science however; they lack political capital. 
Their role is to give impartial advice about technical issues: 
Victor: So scientists, I don’t know if we are the best people to talk through all 
those issues. We’re only there for one aspect and that is can you do something, 
you know, what is the chance of this working. What is the chance of this going 
wrong, producing something that's dangerous. [...] What working in stem cells 
does for me, it tells me what is probably possible, what probably is going to be 
very hard, or it’s going to be impossible, and that’s all.  
The purpose of engagement is to inform publics about options made possible by scientists, 
such as donating or not, participating in a trial or not. That is, scientists share their technical 
capital with publics, through education. Publics are seen as temporarily ignorant but some 
can be empowered to make appropriate, rational and informed decisions, once they have 
been educated: 
Philip: I think one of the things about this debate, is that for many of the people 
who are opposed to this work, these are matters of religious belief, and religious 
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belief is by its definition not something that’s up for lot of discussion, you know 
either you believe [laugh] or you don’t believe. And that’s kind of the end of the 
story. I’m not really competent to get into religious/philosophical discussion with 
these individuals about their beliefs, not my job, not my role. So I think we just 
have to accept that this, abortion is another example in which there will be a 
significant minority of the community that is never in consensus. And that’s why 
we have to make a democratic decision and either move forward or not. 
This ideal type is similar to the conception of engagement-as-education developed by the 
Association of Scientific Workers where citizens need to be taught about science in order to 
become democratically competent (Irwin, 1995: 10-13). Legitimate political capital comes 
with scientific education. However, some publics, even with the best education, may come 
out against science, due to their irrational religious beliefs, for example. Importantly, this 
does not deny them citizenship (see below).  
 
Publics in this ideal type are not only potential voters, they are also potential consumers: 
Nicola: OK. So would you for example um, if you went to speak to patients for 
example, um, would you, if they had particular ideas about how treatment would 
be more effective, or how stem cells could be used, would you listen to that? [ 
 
Gary: ]Oh, I’d absolutely take that on board, because they’re the, they’ll be the 
number one consumers. [laugh] [N: OK] and they probably have a lot more idea 
about kidney disease than I ever would because they have to live with it every 
day. [N: OK] So I absolutely would respect their opinions. (1, 82) 
Citizens are “consumers”. This relates back to Ezrahi’s argument that science is used for 
“private” decision-making. Citizens voting via their wallets can, of course, also influence 
state policy; nevertheless, science is not always assumed to speak directly to governments 
and justify their actions. Michael and Brown note a “blurring of the boundaries between 
‘citizen’ and consumer’” (2000: 16). This is also discussed by Michael who notes that with 
the rise of the “New Right”:  
It seems to be becoming increasingly problematic to separate out – to keep 
distinct – the practices of citizenship from those of consumption (Michael, 1998: 
320).  
People are seen to consume science not only because it fulfils a function and is practical, but 
also because knowing about science performs certain types of identities and this 
consumption of science has aesthetic reasons (Michael, 1998). In the above quote, the 
“opinions” of patients only become legitimate because they are potential consumers, making 
decisions about what product to consume. They have citizen rights through their 
consumption.  
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Science, here, is not an independent republic as above. Rather, scientific citizens are all sorts 
of educated publics and scientists who vote and consume. I see them as belonging to what 
Elam (using the Bodmer report as an example) calls an “advanced consumer society”: 
Scientific citizens are imagined as participating in a different type of consumer 
democracy. Unlike conventional consumers of established products with clearly 
defined characteristics, consumer-citizens confronting the novelties of science-
based innovation are unavoidably individuals with incomplete information, who 
are being asked to pass judgement on things that literally no one can claim to fully 
know or understand. The challenge of scientific citizenship is, therefore, one of 
political decision-making under conditions of exceptional uncertainty. (Elam and 
Bertilsson, 2003: 239-40) 
Unlike Elam and Bertilsson’s conception of this advanced consumer society, I find no 
acknowledgement these uncertainties in my informant’s accounts. Rather, the education 
process is seen as a simple process of giving objective, clear, universal knowledge. This is a 
crucial point in the context of public engagement to which I return in the concluding chapter.  
 
In this ideal type, there is a recognition that scientists cannot make all decisions about 
science alone. This is in sharp contrast to model I, where scientists have all the necessary 
capital for decision-making. There is also an idea that citizens have rights in decisions 
around science because they pay taxes, and therefore partly fund science. Neutral 
information is, nevertheless, necessary here before any decisions can be made. The State is 
seen as benevolent and citizens are able to act rationally – by supporting science once they 
are educated about it. People “hold faith in the modern States expertise” and science is the 
main vehicle of authority and expertise (Leach and Scoones, 2005: 22). Further, society is a 
“market structured network of interactions among private persons” who are trying to 
advance their “private interests against a government apparatus specializing in the 
administrative employment of political power for collective goals” (Habermas, 1996: 21). 
This engagement ideal type accordingly reflects a notion of “advanced consumer society”, 
which is, in my view, based on liberal democratic notions that highlight the importance of 
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8.5 Type III – Engagement as recruiting supporters 
Scientists Publics  Engagement as 
Attributes 
Engt. 










 Capital: all 
technical 
 
          + 
 
  




 Politicians   
 Emotional, but 
can try to be 
rational, excludes 
extremists 
 Capital: political 
(lobby) 
 
In this ideal type, engagement involves educating publics about science in order to recruit 
them into supporting it and perhaps lobbying politicians and other decision makers on behalf 
of scientists. The notion that education leads to support was drawn upon by many of my 
informants in both countries (explicitly by twelve) and the strategic use of patients or public 
groups to convince politicians or other decision makers was explicitly made by four of these 
informants. 
 
Scientists who draw on this model portray themselves as objective and with the necessary 
technical capital to predict the best future for science and society. However, they view 
themselves as lacking the necessary political capital to make decisions around science; these 
are made by funders and politicians. In addition, scientists cannot easily convert their 
technical capital into political capital:  
John: [...] it’s quite hard for scientist to lobby on their own behalf, because it’s 
seen as self-serving and it’s much better and much more effective in many ways 
to the patients to lobby for themselves, so you’re generally lobbying you know for 
a group of patients that you’re trying to cure, um and you think that you’re doing 
a procedure that would help them, it’s actually better to put the patients up there 
than to put yourself up there generally.  
Here, John argues that for scientists to be seen as promoting their interests can challenge 
their neutrality; in turn, this may diminish their technical capital as well as their political 
capital. Indeed, to maintain their status as experts and their position in the scientific field – 
that is their technical capital – but also their status in the political field as objective fact 
producers, these scientists have to be seen as neutral (see also Jasanoff, 2002).  
 
As in the first two ideal types, publics are seen as ignorant and emotional, but some have the 
political capital to convince politicians and others about the promises of science. For 
example, some scientists feel that having community support can be politically very useful: 
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Terence: So politicians, you know people who make the law, listen to these 
people so there is a very strong persuasive sort of argument or case, therefore a 
strong level of support that can be provided in the right direction by these 
individual groups. So in a way it would be too narrow minded to go forward 
thinking that you don't necessarily have to involve these people because they are 
not informed; [that] they will just rock up to the clinic and accept what therapy is 
developed at that moment in time. That is not going to be the case... You know 
because, no matter how much they are going to be long term dissatisfied with 
their current treatment, if they don't really understand what is happening, they 
won't take their clinicians’ word for granted. And they won't you know accept or 
sign up to have any kind of experimental therapy which would involve stem cells. 
Often, publics-as-patients are seen to carry more weight, have more political capital, than 
other publics. Once they have been appropriately educated with technical information, they 
will inevitably, if they are rational, support science.  
 
One informant argues that “the more education that people receive, the more liberal90 they’re 
prepared to be, because they understand the issues better”. I then raise some cPUS studies 
going against this assumption. He replies by drawing a parallel with debates around 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs):  
Barry: I mean the GMO debates are a classic, because I think generally the claims 
that GMOs are so dangerous is nonsense, yet it is one of the most contentious 
issues, and the one that the community is probably least supportive of, and so 
here’s a reality grab that it [education] doesn’t work, and the more you educate 
some of these people, the more critical they become. It doesn’t mean to say that 
the process ought to be thrown out but, I think it’s helpful to know that the 
scientists and other people are willing to engage in discussions and debates.  
This informant does not go on to suggest that engagement should be abandoned or modified 
(as others do, see model IV below). However, Barry draws a clear distinction between, on 
the one hand, scientists and other rational and acceptable citizens and, on the other hand, 
“some of these people”, who even when educated remain critical, and are by inference, 
irrational. This paints scientists and some publics as having educated intelligent discussions 
and trying to progress science, whilst, unfortunately, some irrational people try to prevent 
this. The limits of deficit model-style education only seems to apply to extremists here. This 
implies that for most people, scientific education leads to support of science in general.  
 
Knowledge is depicted as objective, and it is assumed that more of it will increase support 
for science, echoing the traditional deficit model of public understanding. However, two 
                                                     
90 This informant uses liberal in the sense of giving people (scientists) freedom to do as they wish. 
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types of publics are pictured. On the one hand, there is a majority public which can be 
educated and shown the promise of science, and who holds a worldview compatible with 
science as a vehicle of progress. On the other hand, there is a minority public, such as 
religious groups, that will not be convinced by education and whose worldviews contrast 
with those of scientists91. The latter do not have the minimum requirements to count as 
appropriate publics as they cannot enter rational debate and are not amenable to being 
enlightened.  
 
There are two main distinctions between engagement ideal types II and III. Firstly, in type II, 
especially in Philip’s quote, even if people have irrational views, they can legitimately 
participate in democratic decision-making around science. By contrast, in type III, legitimate 
citizenship is more restricted and anyone who is irrational, and for whom education does not 
lead to support, is excluded. Secondly, and consequently, type III draws on the assumption 
that more public knowledge implies more public support. Thus, these legitimate citizens will 
use their political capital to support science. In a circular manner, if they do not support 
science, they are not legitimate citizens.  
 
One particularly relevant sub-group of publics is patients. The notion that they have more 
political capital than scientists was specifically expressed by group leaders with engagement 
experience. Thus, experience of engagement can lead to scientists becoming more aware of 
strategies to improve their position – here, by using patients who support their cause. 
 
Similar to ideal type II though, ideal type III draws on liberal perspectives of citizenship. The 
State is seen as benevolent but can only make the correct decisions after having been 
educated by science, via messengers such as patients.  
 
8.6 Type IV – Engagement as a public relations exercise 
Scientists Publics  Engagement as 
Attributes 
Engt. 




P.R. to keep public 
at bay; scientists 
decide alone –  
New republic of 
Science 
 Rational 
 Capital: all 
technical +  
partial political 
      +/- 
 










                                                     
91 These are similar to Michael and Brown’s (2000) extreme animal activists. 
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In this ideal type, scientists should ideally be left alone to self-regulate as they have all the 
necessary technical capital to do so. However, irrational public fears can go against scientific 
progress and need to be managed through engagement, which involves projecting a good 
image of research. This model was not central to most interviews, but it was suggested by 
eight researchers, who worked in both countries, at various levels of seniority. 
 
Scientists who draw on this ideal type portray themselves and their colleagues as objective 
and endowed with all the necessary technical capital to set agendas around science. This 
includes knowing what is right for society. Similar to engagement type I, scientists consider 
themselves responsible enough to self-regulate, with the internal workings of science 
ensuring that fraudsters and pseudo-scientists are not given free rein. This view of scientists 
is exemplified in the quotes in section 7.4.1, where scientists are assumed to have better 
things to do than clone human beings.  
 
Publics are portrayed as irrelevant to science but nevertheless able to counter progress if not 
effectively managed. Different informants focus on a variety of specific publics, depending 
on who they have had interactions with. Particular publics that my informants want specific 
attention paid to include: funders, who hold the purse strings and therefore need to be shown 
promising results if they are to continue investing their money in a particular project; 
members of ethics boards, who need to be won over to permit research (see for example the 
discussion on clinical trials in chapter 6); or the media, who have a strong influence on 
public opinion and, therefore, need to be given the “right” stories to prevent widespread 
unpopularity. Thus, all these publics have political capital that can go against science: they 
can mobilise existing modes of communication and power structures to slow science down. 
 
Engagement involves projecting a particular image and should therefore not be done by 
inexperienced researchers: 
Nicola: I just want to talk about public engagement. In terms of your students, do 
you encourage them to talk to lay groups and things like that, or do you think that 
it’s something that you should do later in your career? 
 
Rachel: No, when you know what you’re talking and you’re good at 
communicating. I think the students are still developing their communications 
skills, it’s like you take them to conferences and things like that, but actually 
speaking to, because they do represent your group as well, you have to remember 
that [laugh] and I think you do have to portray a certain message to the general 
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public that isn’t too complicated, so I would do that instead of my students, they 
should be in the lab writing their thesis [laugh]! 
I ask the same question to various other group leaders. They all either say that they 
encourage their students to talk to publics, or that they didn’t encourage them because 
spending time away from the laboratory could be detrimental to their career (in terms of 
writing publications). Rachel is the only researcher who states that engagement is about 
“portraying a certain message” and “representing the group”. During the course of our 
interview, she is also very critical of the effect that animal rights activists have had on 
research, claiming that the additional paperwork now required inhibits research. This 
indicates that experience of public influence on research can lead certain people to be more 
strategic about engagement and reduce their willingness for dialogue.  
 
Another researcher, a post-doc with no experience of engagement, is initially very supportive 
of engagement, in the sense of educating publics. However, after I suggest that education 
does not necessarily lead to support, he seems to change his mind: 
David: I think it’s still important to go and talk to people. It does sort of surprise 
me, I thought the more, if you didn’t have any religious objections, then the more 
you knew about an area, the more supportive you would tend to be about it. So 
from that point of view it is surprising. But I don’t think that would be a reason to 
not talk to people about science. Probably you have to be a bit sensitive about 
what sort of things you talk about, and the way you talk about them, so maybe 
that’s a reason to think about the way the story is delivered, rather than trying to 
keep things quiet. 
Here, the critique of the deficit model is re-appropriated to turn engagement into public 
relations. The quote by Philip about the necessity of selling SCR based on its (potentially 
unrealistic) promise as a therapy rather than a tool (see 7.3.2) is another good example of 
how strategic engagement can become. 
 
Not all scientists who draw on this model are necessarily comfortable with it. They tend to 
blame the need for hype on the contexts of research and engagement which might dictate the 
need to strategically select the sorts of information made available to particular publics. As I 
discussed in chapter 5, the exclusion of uncertainty from public representations of science is 
often seen as necessary.  
 
This ideal type is similar to ideal type I, but it draws on lessons learnt from experience of 
public talks and from cPUS work. I call it the “New Republic of Science”. Scientists who 
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draw on this model seem to long for the independence of science from politics and publics, 
but have learnt that they need money and to be strategic about their engagement. In this 
model, there is no pretence that scientific knowledge is neutral and should be provided to 
people who can then make democratic decisions (as in model II). Instead, people need to be 
given the “right” kind of information so they can make the “right” kind of choices and not 
impeded science.  
 
Increased public knowledge, here, is seen as potentially dangerous for science. Both positive 
and negative technical aspects of research – promises and risks – can be discussed within the 
Republic of science (including the risks of cancer and teratomas, the numbers of eggs and 
embryos potentially needed, and various other uncertainties). However, only positive 
knowledge should leave the Republic. That is, public engagement involves telling people 
about the promises of science, not raising potential problems or uncertainties. Specific 
knowledge is selected for dissemination in order to create public support, as opposed to 
model III, where any increase in legitimate citizens’ knowledge is assumed to command 
support for science. Thus, rather than excluding irrational people from bona fide citizenship 
as in model III, in model IV, citizens from outside the Republic are managed through lip-
service and public relations exercises. This renders any citizenship outwith the Republic of 
Science rather meaningless.  
 
8.7 Type V – Engagement as mixing elite expertises 
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Scientists and other experts or “publics-in-particular” (Michael and Brown, 2000) decide 
together on the course of action in a rational way. They can be aware of, and interested in, 
broader public views. Thirteen scientists – from both countries, of all areas of seniority and 
working in all areas of SCR – appealed to this ideal type. 
 
Scientists who draw on this model describe themselves as holding partial objective 
knowledge, but as needing help from others to make decisions about science. They belong to 
a particular community with a set of expertises and power resources, but see others as 
relevant to science. Technical capital, albeit encompassing various types of knowledge and 
symbolic power, is shared amongst different groups. 
 
This other technical capital is held by “publics-in-particular” (Michael and Brown, 2000): 
intellectual property (IP) lawyers, investors, clinicians and the like, who have their own 
specialist knowledge. My informants suggested a variety of relevant “publics-in-particular” 
or stakeholders when my questions prompted them to do so. For example, in Australia, I 
used as a probe a quote from the NHMRC (National Health and Medical Research Council) 
about their review of the SCR legislation: 
The reviews will involve consultation with the Australian, State and Territory 
governments, relevant agencies and a broad range of persons with expertise in or 
experience of relevant disciplines and will also involve an extensive public 
consultation phase. (NHMRC, 2003, emphasis added) 
I ask my informants which experts and relevant knowledges they would call upon. In the UK 
I use several probes. In all cases, I ask if there is a role for people other than scientists in 
discussions around science. Answers differ depending on my informants’ social location. For 
instance, informants who have experience of setting up companies acknowledge the 
expertise of business people and patent lawyers, or scientists involved in clinical trials 
acknowledge the expertise of clinicians and biotech companies. The following 
clinician/research scientist talks about the mutual learning that can occur between clinicians, 
researchers and people from the commercial world, through, what he calls, a “constructive 
dialogue”: 
Ted: For scientists, driving forwards the field is what counts, for a medic it's 
treating patients which counts, for somebody who's trying to run a private sector 
organisation, it's the profits which count at the end of the day. [...] But of course 
none of those is mutually exclusive: if you’re a doctor, you still have to think 
about money from time to time; if you're running a private organisation, you do 
have to think about the science and its application, you can't just make money if 
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you see what I mean. They're overlapping worlds; the emphasis tends to be 
slightly different [...]. So it's important to understand that if you're going to have a 
constructive dialogue.  
Another informant, when talking about clinical trials, suggests it might be relevant to have 
the input from experts in community views: 
Riana: Take for example, say the use of foetal tissue, whether that was 
appropriate or not. From my perspective I see the patients, the disease, so I have a 
close understanding of the nature of that disease, its incurable nature and the lack 
of any other therapy, so that’s one perspective. I also have a perspective from the 
scientific point of view, in that I know the literature and I've seen, I've been 
involved in studies which show that that particular approach in a laboratory 
context can be very useful, and I have a detailed understanding of that. I have a 
detailed understanding of the problem but what I don’t have, probably the right 
perspective, I still have a perspective but it, I haven’t done any work which 
samples what’s acceptable in the community and how it impacts socially. 
Obviously I understand from my local interactions but I don’t have a special 
knowledge, I have a layman’s knowledge from that point of view. 
This informant is locating herself as an expert in certain aspects relevant to clinical trials and 
research, but lay in others (cf. Kerr et al., 2007). This suggests she sees a role for social 
scientists’ “expertise” in discussions around science. 
 
Not all publics, however, become licensed for deliberations about science. Emotional 
publics, such as “individual patients” must not be included in rational decision-making:  
Nicola: Talking about your discussions with the [pharmaceutical licensing body] 
and finding a solution that’s acceptable to everyone, do you think there is room 
for talking to other people than politicians and scientists? Patients, ethicists, 
different other groups...? Do you think they have a role in those discussions? 
 
Stanley: Ummm... good question. I think ethicists for sure. I think that's very 
important. We don’t, certainly on the body I sit on, there's no real consultation 
with ethicists as part of that, [...] but I think ethicists have a major role to play. 
Patient groups, individual patients, no; but I think patient groups where, and the 
reason I say that is obviously because it’s very difficult when you get impassioned 
pleas from you know an ill patient, or a relative, you know it’s very difficult. But 
when you get coordinated approaches from a knowledgeable body, and I think 
like the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation in the States is a classic case in 
point, very effective lobbying, very influential, that’s excellent. So I think more of 
that would be very good.  
In consequence, there are two groups of publics: those with relevant expertise and those 
without. To qualify as a potential “public-in-particular”, people must convert their capital 
into, or have, capital recognised by scientists (this can be through a process of 
“expertification”, see 2.2.3). One of the essential criteria to qualify as a public-in-particular 
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in this model is rationality: one’s contribution needs to be presented as rational in order to be 
acceptable.  
 
The tacit model of dialogue drawn on here is “external” (Michael and Brown, 2000), where 
decisions are not made internally, by scientists within their own community but acting as 
publics; rather they are made externally to the scientific community, in discussion with other 
experts. Thus, engagement involves discussions with elite groups. For Michael and Brown, 
the purpose of these “external” discussions is to educate these publics-in-particular (see 
especially 2000: 5-6). By contrast, in my version of “external” discussions, the purpose is to 
share expert knowledges. Accounts such as these echo what Collins and Evans (2002) 
advocate when arguing that people with relevant technical expertise can shape research. This 
means that each expert group contributes its particular technical capital – such as how to 
derive a cell line, what sorts of inventions are patentable, or how to get funding – and have 
the political capital to push that decision through. Scientists alone do not consider that they 
have the capital to decide what research is appropriate for society. 
 
However, following an enumeration of various “experts” relevant to science, a PhD student 
added: 
Gary: Getting everyone’s feedback I think is always useful, um, whether or not 
you want to take that on board is another [laugh], another issue.  
Thus, although the notion of engagement as talking with other elites was drawn upon by a 
variety of informants, it is unclear how much these other expertises are accepted in practice, 
particularly if they deeply affect the way science is done.  
 
This ideal type of engagement corresponds to an example of deliberative democracy, but is 
much more elitist than many advocates of this democracy would like to see it. In particular, 
the processes of this engagement model are similar to processes found in deliberative 
democracy, but criteria for participation are quite restricted. Deliberative democracy is an 
extension of civic republicanism (Cunningham, 2002: 54). It can be used to describe a 
relatively broad range of citizen interactions, but the type of deliberative democracy that my 
informants perform most closely resembles Habermas’ conception of it, also called 
“discourse theory of democracy” (Habermas, 1996). In this type of democracy, decisions are 
reached through processes of education from experts, and through deliberation with peers 
(Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003). However, for my informants, not everyone can be educated; 
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here, deliberation and education occurs between peers who are all “experts” of a kind 
acceptable in scientistic societies.  
 
Although never implicitly invoked in my data, this model of citizenship draws on Habermas’ 
“ideal speech situations”. This notion has been criticised for its “naivety about the politics 
and power relations of such encounters” (Leach and Scoones, 2005: 25). Benhabib, a strong 
supporter of deliberative democracy suggests that  
within discourse theory each individual has the same symmetrical rights to 
various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the 
presuppositions of the conversations, and so on. (Benhabib, 1996: 78)  
She argues that, although this can be seen as utopian, it does explain some democratic 
practices which are already taking place (1996: 84). Relating these theories back to my data, 
stem cell researchers describe interactions (such as encounters between researchers and 
institutional ethics boards) where ideal speech situations may indeed be attainable. However, 
to be an individual who qualifies for these interactions, one already has to be in a particular 
location in the political and power relations and have recognised expertise. This is where the 
negotiation of the legitimacy of expertise becomes very relevant. It is done through 
examining people’s credentials and by excluding certain views by portraying them as 
“emotional” (see 7.4.2).  
 
Like engagement ideal type III, citizenship in type V is limited to people who fulfil 
particular criteria and hold a worldview consistent with scientific “progress”. Unlike models 
I and IV, where no-one outside the Republic of Science can bring anything good to scientific 
research, and unlike models II and III where publics only hold political capital, in model V, 
there are those outside the scientific community who hold relevant technical capital. 
Scientists are willing, at least to an extent, to build on these alternative expertises. In this 
way, they can depict themselves as reflexive and willing to include others’ in decision-
making around science, whilst at the same time, excluding views they judge inappropriate by 
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8.8 Type VI – Engagement as upstream mixing of situated knowledges 
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Scientists and a variety of publics hold diverse socially contingent knowledges that can be 
used to shape the future direction of research. This model was only used by seven 
informants, including PhD students, post-docs and group leaders, from the UK and Australia. 
 
One of the most striking differences between this ideal type of engagement and the five 
others discussed, is that scientists, here, do not portray themselves as totally objective and 
rational, with any departure from this used to account for errors (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). 
Rather they describe themselves as having interests: 
Simon: We like to think of the Holy Grail of Science today being evidence based 
medicine, but, [laughs] it’s the evidence that you’re prepared to accept that 
influences your medicine.  
These scientists argue that they cannot dissociate their science from their other views and 
ethics. For them, “science is inherently political” and it is done by people with their own 
interests, biases and commitments. Some argue that these interests need to be acknowledged 
in order not to interfere in decisions where they are not appropriate. These scientists draw on, 
and recognize, a diversity of fragmented identities; such as researcher, mother, relative of a 
sick person and so on. 
 
Publics are seen as multiple and include scientists. Examples are: highly informed patients, 
patients who want no say in their treatments, people who have no problem donating tissue or 
embryos, people who only want to donate certain tissues, scientists who have never entered a 
fertility clinic, people in wheelchairs who worry about their carer not coming on time or 
people in wheelchairs who have heard too many unrealised promises. Knowledge is depicted 
as non-universal and based on life experience. For me, this implies that these informants 
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accept it as “situated”, “contingent” or “socially constructed” (although these exact 
expressions were not used). 
 
These scientists do not believe they can, or should, self-regulate. Engagement involves the 
upstream shaping of science (including future directions of research and the set-up of clinical 
trials) by diverse people sharing their situated knowledges during constructive conversations. 
For example: 
Nicola: So do you learn anything from meeting the patients?  
 
Albert: Yeah I think you, I suppose yes, apart from a sense of urgency, which you 
kind of have, and you might say “yeah I think it’s a good idea” but when you 
meet people, it gives you a greater sense of urgency. But spinal cord injury for 
example is a good example, most neuro-scientists say [...] the goal in spinal cord 
injury research would be to have somebody to get out of their chair and walk. [...] 
On the other hand, people in wheelchairs will say, let’s say paraplegic first, if 
people with paraplegia say what they want, first is bowel and bladder control, 
then they want sexual function, then they’d be looking for sensation of 
movement. [...] But that’s not on the horizon of neuro-scientists normally. And if 
you look at all the research in the literature, very little of it is looking at those 
aspects, and I think that's something that I’ve learned as a  neuro-scientist coming 
in and we’re doing some more work in that area, in autonomic nervous system. So 
you can learn stuff.  
This clinical researcher is giving a specific example of how he changed his research 
priorities after meeting particular patients. 
 
Stemming from scientists’ acknowledgement that their knowledge is situated, the criteria for 
citizenship and participation in decision-making around science are different here from all 
the ones discussed above: one does not have to present one’s contribution as based on 
rational and objective facts, and on expertise certified through degrees in science for 
example (this is a main difference between engagement ideal types V and VI): 
Nicola: In terms of expertise, I mean obviously you, people who were involved in 
stem cell research are experts in that, but do you think you know, for example, 
patient groups and infertility groups, so they have a form of knowledge or 
something you could label as expertise, a special relation or something, important 
opinion that could be important in the debates? 
 
Heidi: O, absolutely, infertility groups clearly because they understand what it is 
to make that decision of donating embryos, people, patient groups, people with 
the disorders that everyone's talking about trying to cure, because they understand 
what it is to maybe be promised therapies and to go through those sorts of 
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Nicola: Some scientists I've spoken to have this idea that we have the facts and 
the truth, and [ 
 
Heidi: ]Nobody else knows anything? It's incredibly patronising isn't it? Don't you 
think? [...] I mean I hear that a lot and. There's a Wellcome Trust study that came 
out, and I must look it up because whenever I'm at these public sociologist debate, 
partly I don't go because they make me really annoyed, but I want to get up and 
say this, there's a Wellcome Trust study, and OK, this is the UK, but they went 
around asking people what they felt about different sciences and they questioned 
them to what they knew, and it turned out that the people who knew the most, and 
understood the science, were the more against it. So whenever I hear scientists say 
if they could understand the science, we need to teach them science, or it's 
because they're ignorant and don't understand what a stem cell is, and that's why 
they're against it... It's an incredibly patronising viewpoint. It's like, and even if 
they don't understand the science and they still have an opinion, it's still, it's 
everyone's, that's everyone's right to, I mean I probably don't understand the 
nuances of the Iraqi war, but I have a hugely strong opinion about that, and I 
would campaign against it. I just don't understand why people have that view that 
they're any different. Don't you think? I don't know.  
Here, it is clear that Heidi is aware of a study contradicting the deficit model. Rather than 
using this to justify more cautious engagement (as some informants do in section 8.6), she 
uses it to criticise arrogant and “patronising” people who draw on this model. She advocates 
action, such as campaigning, based on strong opinions rather than specific technical 
knowledge. Another informant also highlights that certain decision making bodies, such as 
ethics committees, can be too elitist.  
 
The conception of citizenship drawn upon here is similar to Turner’s conception of expertise: 
it is not given by a higher order – such as Reason – but negotiated politically. One does not 
need to appeal to rational thought in order to become a legitimate participant in discussions 
around science. I would argue that this engagement ideal type draws upon a notion of 
citizenship as “practiced engagement”: 
A perspective on citizenship as practised engagement of social solidarities [...] 
allows for the possibility of global citizen action but in ways that are often 
contingent, fragmented and diffuse, emerging through the expression of aspects of 
people’s global and local identities. Rather than recourse to the establishment of 
global institutions to guarantee global citizenship rights, these are claimed and 
might be institutionally supported through more diverse actions linked across 
different sites. (Leach and Scoones, 2005: 34) 
This is a useful way of thinking about scientific citizenship, particularly in the context of 
globalisation, which “renders theories of citizenship situated solely within the context of 
nation-states (whether liberal or civic republican persuasion) as highly limited” (Leach and 
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Scoones, 2005: 34). Engagement model VI is the only one where multiple people can 
legitimately challenge the framing of science and public engagement in science.  
 
This ideal type draws on features reminiscent of “radical and plural democracy”, which 
involves going beyond the individualism of liberal theories of democracy and beyond the 
homogenising concepts of civic republicanism (Mouffe, 1992a: 5). Radical/plural democrats 
recognise the “precariousness of identities” (Mouffe, 1992a: 10) and argue for the need to 
think about identities in a non-essentialist way, with the “social agent” as: 
the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions, constructed within specific 
discourses and always precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of 
these subject positions (Mouffe, 1992b: 237). 
They also support “a collective identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the 
principles of the liberal-democratic regime: liberty and equality.” (Mouffe, 1992b: 236). 
There are multiple ways of interpreting these principles: 
To the idea that the exercise of citizenship consists in adopting a universal point 
of view, made equivalent to Reason and reserved to men, I am opposing the idea 
that it consists in identifying with the ethico-political principles of modern 
democracy and that there can be as many forms of citizenship as there are 
interpretations of those principles. (Mouffe, 1992b: 237) 
This also chimes well with Turner’s conception of “expertise”. 
 
Few of my informants, I am sure, would recognise themselves as radical/plural democrats. 
However, I did find that their portrayals of scientific knowledge as contingent and their 
description of scientists’ and publics’ multiple and fragmented identities was consistent with 
the radical/plural vision of democracy. Here, scientific citizenship is performed through 
participation in the creation of agendas for science. However, many of the scientists who 
drew on this ideal type also highlighted the current need to, at least rhetorically, appeal to 
reason and rationality92. Thus, many of my informants were of the opinion that situated 
knowledges, if acknowledged as such, are not a powerful currency in decision-making. 
Consequently there is a need to reflect upon the power relations at play here. This is a central 
feature of “radical and plural democracy”, to which I return in the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
                                                     
92 Witness, for example, the “weakening” of ones argument once religious opinion is imputed, as 
discussed in 7.2.1. 
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8.9 Conclusion: power and emancipation; inroads towards broader 
“engagement”? 
This chapter has explored the types of engagement performed by some stem cell researchers. 
It focuses on notions of expertise, capital and theories of democracy, and develops six ideal 
types of engagement implied by my interview data. 
 
Michael and Brown’s (2000) two models of dialogue are supported by some of these data. 
Ideal type I corresponds to their idea of an internal dialogue, and ideal type V (mixing elite 
expertises) corresponds to an external dialogue. But there are various other ways of 
portraying the relation between science and publics, as developed in my other models of 
engagement. 
 
Ezrahi (1990) notes that objective knowledge is no longer directly used to guide policy. 
Scientists who portray engagement as an internal dialogue between scientists as publics 
(ideal type I) would disagree. Rather, they argue that decision- and policy-making roles 
should belong to scientists themselves. In addition, if in ideal type II (educating 
consumer/citizens), “public” is taken to refer to politicians, we also see the direct influence 
of science on policy. However, if the “public” for this second model of engagement refers to 
other consumers/citizens, then the influence of science on policy is no longer direct; rather, it 
is made through the private choices of these citizens. This is more akin to the role Ezrahi 
sees for science today.  
 
In all but model I, scientists acknowledge that the “best” science is not always enough to 
justify decisions. In engagement models III (recruiting publics) and IV (PR), the political 
capital of people such as patients and animal activists become crucial in influencing 
decisions around what sorts of research can go forward. In models V and VI, other expertises 
and knowledges are seen as equally legitimate and relevant as scientists’ in decision about 
the future and framing of science. In these four models, science alone is not seen as enough 
to shore up policy and political decisions, confirming this aspect of Ezrahi’s argument. 
 
My informants draw on various conceptions of expertise. In ideal type I and IV (PR), 
scientists argue that decisions about science should be made internally, by scientists who 
have all the necessary knowledge. Expertise is not problematic for this vision of democracy 
as limited Republicanism because those who are experts are those who belong to the 
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Republic of Science and should be making decisions. Here, technical capital should 
automatically convert into political capital. Expertise is “certified” (Collins and Evans, 2002) 
through years of study and the acquisition of diplomas or the publication of papers. It is 
reified and technical knowledge of science implies the ability to make decisions about 
science and society.  
 
In ideal types II (educating consumer/citizens) and III (recruiting publics), expertise is not 
considered a problem either. Although it is held by an elite minority who do not have the 
power to make decisions alone, it is possible to “educate” decision-makers with the 
appropriate knowledge. As a result, certain publics can be taught to make the “right” – 
rational – decisions by learning the relevant knowledge from neutral experts. Relevant 
knowledge in these two models is reduced to scientific/technical expertise. For ideal type V 
(mixing elite expertises), however, the pool of relevant knowledge is widened and expertise 
would be considered limited if it only included scientific/technical knowledge. Here, other 
sorts of technical/rational expertises are included such as in patent law, commercialisation or 
professional social sciences. All these expertises have to be “certified” by belonging to a 
recognised (usually professional) body. 
 
In ideal type VI (engagement as mixing situated knowledges), expertise is only problematic 
to democracy if it is reduced to technical expertise. Rather, it can be incorporated into 
democracy if it is seen as political, that is negotiated, situated and temporary (Turner, 2001). 
This is the only ideal type of engagement that indicates a move away from “utopian 
rationalism” (Ezrahi, 1990). However, scientists that draw on this model do not portray it as 
widespread in practice. 
 
Thus, this ideal type brings us back to the problem of power, since this version of expertise 
does not hold much sway in most decision-making fora. If even scientists, generally 
recognised as having more epistemic authority than most (Gieryn, 1995; Shapin, 1995), find 
it difficult to win arguments by appealing to versions of expertise and citizenship as 
politically negotiable, what chance does that leave to other publics? Maybe inroads to more 
inclusive engagement could come through working with the radical/plural notion of 
democracy, which recognises power differences as central to political interactions: 
In coming to terms with pluralism, what is really at stake, is power and 
antagonism and their ineradicable character. (Mouffe, 1996: 247) 
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The main question of democratic politics, then, becomes not how to eliminate 
power but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic 
values. (Mouffe, 1996: 248)  
As part of this recognition, there is a need to acknowledge that anyone’s claims are situated, 
and not objective and universal (1996: 247-8), as some of my informants, drawing on ideal 
type of engagement VI, do.  
 
The project of “radical and plural democracy” also calls for the abandonment of appeals to 
higher orders such as Reason or rationality: 
Such a project recognizes that the specificity of modern pluralist democracy – 
even a well ordered one – resides not in the absence of domination and of 
violence but in the establishment of a set of institutions through which they can be 
limited and contested. To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim 
at a universal rational consensus – this is the real threat to democracy. Indeed this 
can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to 
“rationality”, as is often the case in liberal thinking, which disguises the necessary 
frontiers and forms of exclusion behind pretences of “neutrality”. (Mouffe, 1996: 
248) 
Thus, for truly inclusive engagement, there is a need to bring to light power differences. The 
other ideal types of engagement developed here hopefully furnish us with tools to start doing 
just this. We must problematise people’s calls for more “engagement” and examine what 
they mean by this. In particular, it is necessary to problematise calls for deliberative 
democracy, which reinforces scientists’ cognitive authority (Elam and Bertilsson, 2003) and 
permits the exclusion of any voices painted as “irrational”. This may be one of the reasons 
for the limited successes of some engagement exercises which seem to reproduce existing 
power differences (Kerr et al., 2007). This chapter suggests a role for social scientists in 
harnessing and creating spaces in public engagement for accounts, such as those found in 
engagement type VI. There are also other ways of finding and promoting scientists’ 
reflexivity, as I discuss in the concluding chapter 
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Chapter 9  
            
Conclusions:  





Stimulated by what the House of Lords termed a “crisis of trust” between science and society 
and by calls for better or more public engagement in science, this thesis has focussed on one 
particular area of science – stem cell research – and its practitioners, institutions and 
interactions with publics. It develops a micro-level empirical exploration and an in-depth 
analysis of stem cell researchers, and their discourses about their work and public 
engagement. Drawing mainly on interviews with over fifty researchers, it expands the 
limited body of work which combines a cPUS framework with an SSK-informed study of 
scientific institutions, scientists, and their embedded assumptions about public engagement. 
It achieves not only academic aims, by contributing to a number of inter-disciplinary 
literatures, but also political aims, by offering suggestions for improved science-public 
relations. 
 
Reflexivity is an important analytical thread that runs throughout this work. This concept has 
been the focus of a number of debates in academia, with the quest for greater reflexivity at 
times resembling a game of “epistemological chicken” (Collins and Yearley, 1992). 
Following Lynch (2000), the present work does not position reflexivity as either the   
“academic virtue” par excellence, or a “source of privileged knowledge”. It does 
nevertheless argue for reflexivity as an important means of improving science-public 
relations through rigorous social scientific analysis. 
 
There are two main and inter-related forms of reflexivity which are important to this thesis. 
Firstly, “interpretative” reflexivity (Lynch, 2000), which involves revealing to institutions 
(here, scientific institutions) some of their embedded assumptions and helping them to 
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consider alternative ways of imagining themselves, their knowledge claims and their 
interactions with others. Secondly, a more “internal” reflexivity (Wynne, 1996d) that can be 
termed “methodological” reflexivity (Lynch, 2000) and that focuses on the social science 
researcher’s own embedded assumptions which shape her knowledge claims. By paying 
attention to these two forms of reflexivity, this work can put forward alternative framings for 
public engagement in science whilst remaining open to the fact that these alternatives also 
rest on assumptions, have limits and should be open to re-examination and change.  
 
This last chapter highlights the main conclusions from my thesis. Firstly, it reminds us why 
interpretative forms of reflexivity are important and how the present work contributes to the 
literature on this. Secondly, it turns its eye towards the construction of the knowledge claims 
made here and how they are socially situated. The chapter then pulls together some central 
findings concerning stem cell researchers and their discourses about engagement. It 
highlights not only how these contribute to diverse areas of scholarly pursuit, but also how 
they can be used to create opportunities for institutional interpretative reflexivity. So thirdly, 
this chapter focuses on the interpretative flexibility of stem cell researchers’ discourses about 
their work and public engagement. Fourthly, it examines findings suggesting scientists are 
publics too and the implications of this. Fifthly, it looks more specifically at evidence 
suggesting there are already opportunities for scientists to reflect on their institutional and 
social embeddedness. Sixthly, it draws attention to the potential roles of social science and 
social scientists in a move towards scientific institutional reflexivity. Finally, the chapter 
ends by discussing a vision of improved science-public relations facilitated by public 
engagement forms that leave space for reflexivity.  
 
 
9.1 Interpretative reflexivity 
Critical public understanding of science and development studies have alerted us to the 
existence of diverse and sophisticated “lay” knowledges. However, the dismissal of these in 
many engagement or participation fora can lead to people’s identities being threatened and to 
ever more troubled science-public relations. This dismissal is, more often than not, due to the 
framings of these interactions which, in an unacknowledged way, privilege particular forms 
of knowledge and particular identities over others – usually favouring understandings which 
are scientistic and couched in certainty, and which focus on a knowable, predictable and 
controllable nature (see chapter 2). Given these findings, some social scientists have argued 
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that it is important to explore the minutiae of science-public interactions and their framing 
(e.g. Irwin, 2001; 2006) and to help change scientific institutional contexts by encouraging 
members of these institutions to reflect on their own cultural and social embeddedness (e.g. 
Wynne, 2005a; 2006). This is precisely where the present thesis locates itself: by exploring 
scientists and their discourses, it reveals some of the framings that shape science-public 
interactions and, by highlighting them to scientists, it can encourage scientific institutional 
reflexivity, which in turn may foster better science-public relations. 
 
The present thesis has been a study of scientists in a promising but controversial area: stem 
cell research. These scientists are frequently in the public eye, and are interested and 
concerned about public support for their work. Their voices are often dominant in public 
engagement – for example, when they are called in front of parliament to give evidence to 
inform decisions about the legalisation of certain practices. Therefore, their discourses can 
be very important in shaping science-public interactions. By studying these discourses and 
how they frame engagement, this thesis sought to uncover the often invisible socio-cultural 
assumptions that shape scientists’ epistemological commitments and discursive practices, 
and therefore that shape the possible forms science-public relations can take. By holding up a 
mirror to stem cell researchers and showing them these assumptions, social scientists may be 
able to encourage reflexivity in these researchers and encourage a “change of institutional 
cultures” (Wynne, 2005a: 19) away from those that seem to foster mistrust in science 
(Wynne, 1996b; 2006).  
 
This thesis contributes to debates about modernity, trust and reflexivity by putting forward, 
and searching for opportunities for, a type of reflexivity that enables profoundly different 
ways of thinking about the world. In this, it builds on, but goes further than, Giddens’ and 
Beck’s “substantive” forms of reflexivity (Lynch, 2000) to advocate an “interpretative” form 
of reflexivity (Lynch, 2000). From Giddens (1990), it takes the importance of modifying 
current practices in the light of new knowledge. Unlike Giddens, it does not see these 
changes as automatic given the conditions of modernity and, instead, the version of 
reflexivity advocated here highlights a role for social scientists and scientists to actively 
participate in the transformations of current practices (of engagement for example). From 
Beck (1992), it takes the useful analytical categories of “counter modernity” and “reflexive 
modernization”, where the conditions of the latter (which is seen as preferable to the former) 
should be identified and promoted. It also builds on the role seen for a variety of “sub-
politics” to critique the institutions of science. However, the focus of interpretative 
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reflexivity goes beyond that of Beck on the “confrontation with unintended consequences”. 
Thus, in contrast to both these scholars, the aim of reflexivity here is to examine 
epistemological commitments framing knowledge claims, rather than to provide further 
scientistic “facts” which will – supposedly – improve prediction and control, and therefore 
trust in science. This type of reflexivity relies on a conception of trust that goes beyond Beck 
and Giddens’ rational-calculative model (see below).  
 
The present work also contributes to and further develops cPUS. Most empirical research in 
this multidisciplinary field has focussed on the existence of sophisticated lay understandings 
and how identities and epistemologies are imposed on lay people (e.g. Irwin and Wynne, 
1996; Kerr et al., 1998b; Parry, 2003b). Here, I pay heed to the work of Development 
Studies scholars with their focus on power and the framing of participation exercises (e.g. 
Cooke and Kothari, 2001a), and to recent calls and emerging findings by cPUS researchers, 
(some working with people from Development Studies, e.g. Leach et al., 2005), to explore 
the intricacies of public engagement and its framing (e.g. Rogers-Hayden, 2003; Irwin, 
2006). This enables me to offer a study of scientists, rather than publics, as a contribution to 
cPUS, and to focus on how power relations are played out (how scientists maintain their 
authority for example), and how they can be transformed. An understanding of these 
dynamics is essential in order to open the door to different framings of public engagement.  
 
In particular, by focussing on how stem cell researchers talk about not only their work, but 
how they should interact with publics, I am able to develop a typology of the types of 
“scientific citizenship” (used in Irwin's sense, e.g. 2001) which they perform. I see a role for 
social scientists in helping stem cell researchers reflect on this in order to create alternative 
forms of science-public interactions (as I discuss towards the end of this conclusion). I also 
examine, similarly to the way lay people have been studied, whether identities and 




9.2 Elements of methodological reflexivity 
Wynne has argued that “SSK is badly prepared for dealing with the public arena by a lack of 
reflexivity over its own founding preoccupations” (Wynne, 1996d: 362). Given my aims to 
use sociological findings to contribute to improving public engagement in science, it is 
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important to lay out some of the factors that shape this research. Thus, before holding up a 
mirror to scientists and highlighting some of their embedded assumptions, I need to reflect 
on my own epistemological commitments and on the constructedness of my knowledge 
claims; this requires a commitment to methodological reflexivity. It must also be noted here 
that my “founding preoccupations” are not rigid and have evolved as a result of conducting 
this research. 
 
I have a dual membership as a natural and social scientist. Both of these identities have 
influenced this research in a number of ways. Firstly, I am committed to science being a 
valuable part of society; I have never considered options for improving science-public 
relations that would require dramatically cutting down scientific research and development. 
Having said this, my training in social science has revealed to me that the central role of 
science in setting and shaping our ways of understanding the world, its problems and their 
solutions should be challenged. I seek solutions where science is still a respected creator of 
knowledge claims about the world, but where it takes on a more modest role as only one 
source of authority and truths amongst others. This overall political aim did change 
throughout this research and my normative view of the balance between science and other 
forms of expertise and knowledge in society did shift. In particular, the initial focus on 
finding better ways of communicating science became a focus on encouraging scientists to 
become more reflexive. I currently am very interested in highlighting to scientists the 
constructedness of their knowledge, without implying that this falsifies it or suggesting that 
it becomes mere social construction. However I am not afraid to acknowledge that this does 
entail questioning the scientific knowledge involved (Wynne, 1996d: 379) 
 
Secondly, on a more practical level, this dual membership has shaped most of the particular 
instances of data collection that my work is based on. Many of my interviews were set up 
through contacts I had as a scientist. Also, the CV I sent informants highlighted my funding 
by a research council that would usually fund natural science research, and my training as a 
geneticist, but also as a sociologist. Thus, the conversations I had with these scientists was 
influenced by their projection of one or several identities onto me, and there were probably 
many instances when informants opened up to me in a way they would have felt less 
comfortable doing with another social scientist or a journalist.  
 
Thirdly, as well as being informed by my natural scientific knowledge, my data analysis is 
embedded within frameworks and epistemological commitments derived from my training as 
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a sociologist in Edinburgh. The teachings of SSK’s Strong Programme have heavily 
influenced me, as have other constructivist perspectives, including discourse analysis. I 
started out my research keen to use discourse as a “topic” and a “resource”, in the same way 
Kerr et al. (1997) do for example. However, as my data collection and analysis proceeded, it 
became clear to me that we can never access what people really think, and therefore we 
cannot use informants’ accounts as a resource to create definitive accounts of events. 
Therefore I became more interested in discourse as a resource and in its performativity (e.g. 
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996; Szerszynski, 1999). This enables me to contribute to 
cPUS and STS (SSK in particular): building on studies of lay people and their knowledge, 
and on studies of scientists and the interests shaping their knowledge claims, I explore how 
scientists’ discourses can privilege or marginalise various voices and forms of knowledge 
and expertise in public fora. I develop a typology of discourses about engagement and the 
sorts of citizenship these perform (further discussed below). Thus, although my study 
focuses on discourse as a “topic”, it is not reductive (as argued by Gieryn, 1982): because 
discourse is not separate from but constitutive of institutional cultures, power relations and 
so on, the form of discourse analysis advocated here offers a way of studying all these 
sociologically interesting things. 
 
Finally, my social constructivist background brings out the importance of thinking about the 
constructed nature of my own knowledge claims. Although I am committed to helping 
scientists be more reflexive by giving them a sociologically informed understanding of their 
knowledge, I do not argue that my knowledge claims are more truthful than theirs. They are 
instead offered as ways to open-up for examination and change the already-existing, often 
crystallised, and sometimes problematic forms of public engagement. Thus, the interpretative 
reflexivity I am advocating is different to Bourdieu’s reflexivity thesis, and social scientific 
understandings are not seen as truer than natural scientific or commonsensical ones. 
 
The rest of this conclusion will draw out the themes which cut across my work and will link 
my empirical findings with the literature. It will highlight contributions to knowledge and 
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9.3 Flexible interpretations and performativity in stem cell research 
My work confirms a number of findings from STS, particularly in relation to the 
interpretative flexibility of scientists’ discourses, and the socially negotiated nature of 
scientific claims and authority. It also develops previous work on the performativity of 
scientists’ discourses.  
 
The body of empirical data in this thesis, collected in a number of different locations from a 
number of different informants, shows that scientists describe and define stem cells and stem 
cell research in diverse and sociologically interesting ways. Knowledge claims about stem 
cell research are “under-determined by reality” and “theory-laden” (Bloor, 1976), since one 
cannot point to a stem cell in nature or directly measure concepts such as “pluripotency”, and 
since definitions and classifications of what counts as a good (or real) stem cell will depend 
on the social location (including goals and interests) of the people articulating these 
definitions. Thus the conceptual fluidity surrounding SCR provides anyone talking about this 
field with many opportunities for interpretative flexibility. This interpretative flexibility 
enables stem cell researchers’ discourse to do a number of things, which I make sense of in 
sociological terms 
 
Firstly, stem cell researchers’ discourses often take the rhetorical form of “boundary-work” 
(Gieryn, 1983; 1995). By analysing the boundaries they erect and the diverse criteria they 
use, I show that stem cell researchers attempt to give greater authority to certain areas of 
SCR, or to SCR or science as a whole. As an illustration, boundary-work work is conducted 
around the promise of adult stem cells versus embryonic stem cells, pluripotent versus 
lineage restricted stem cells, or “natural” versus “unnatural” reproductive technologies.  
 
Often, boundaries around science and around particular aspects of SCR mutually shape each 
other. If science is constructed as aiming for therapies, a boundary between pluripotent – yet 
potentially cancerous – stem cells and lineage-restricted – yet safer – stem cells may be 
erected. If science is constructed as focussing on basic biological processes, a boundary 
between exciting, pluripotent stem cells as research tools, and relatively unexciting, well-
understood stem cells may be erected. However, boundary-work in this study does not 
always reflect my informants’ narrow institutional interests, and in some instances, the 
defence of SCR can become a microcosm for the defence of science as a whole. These 
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multiple boundaries highlight that SCR can be analysed as a boundary object, with a 
conceptual fluidity enabling multiple competing agendas to be satisfied.  
 
As Wainwright et al. (2006a) also find, the boundaries erected in relation to SCR in this 
research draw on the ambiguities and uncertainties that my informants experience in this 
field. These boundaries are more than just rhetoric: for example, SCR can really be 
experienced as a brand new field or as an established one. However, unlike Wainwright et 
al., I try not to impose an analyst’s definition of SCR or science onto this study (for example, 
where realist assumptions about what counts as “scientific” in opposition to what counts as 
“ethical” are imposed onto informants’ discourses). Instead, I focus on the implications of 
the boundaries erected. Thus, when a researcher draws a boundary between “ethical” adult 
stem cells and “less ethical” embryonic stem cells, I do not see this as a reduction in the 
authority of science through an inclusion of “ethical” (as opposed to “scientific”) criteria 
Rather, I see this as a temporary normative construction, made by my informant, of science 
as an “ethical” pursuit; in opposition to “non-science”, constructed as less ethical. This can 
shore up the authority of science against claims that scientists are not ethical and need further 
regulation to be kept in check. 
 
Secondly, stem cell researchers’ discourses can perform certainty. MacKenzie’s (1990) 
certainty trough was a useful heuristic to make some sense of stem cell researchers’ 
(un)certainty discourses about the future of SCR and how these relate to the “distance” from 
knowledge production. However, this concept needs to be developed as it cannot take into 
account the situatedness of discourses. Building on Lahsen’s (2005a) critique of the certainty 
trough, I analysed discourses of (un)certainty as “topics” and focussed on their performative 
dimension: stem cell researchers may try to create belief in the promises of SCR by evincing 
certainty.  
 
By analysing these sorts of future-oriented discourses, the present thesis thus contributes to 
the “sociology of expectations” (cf. Brown and Michael, 2003; Brown and Kraft, 2006; 
Wainwright et al., 2006b; Horst, 2007). I found that stem cell researchers often highlight the 
need to hype promises in early stages of research in order to secure political, legislative, 
financial and/or public support (for example, by over-selling the potential for cures or by not 
mentioning particular limitations such as teratoma formation). This is what Brown and 
Michael (2003) call the narrative of “optimism to obstruction”. Therefore, discourses of 
certainty may, under certain circumstances, lead to a belief in the future promise of SCR and 
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change the funding environment. Like Wynne, I do not want to suggest that any contrast 
between private expressions of uncertainty and public expressions of certainty are some form 
of “conspiracy”; these contrasts can be a way of reconciling a number of different external 
pressures (1996d: 378). However, as I discuss below, it is important for social scientists to 
reveal and analyse these, and to open-up ways for public discourses about science to 
confront these contrasts. 
 
Thirdly, particular ways of classifying stem cells, or the focus on certain definitions rather 
than others, can shape the avenues open for discussions about SCR. Since stem cells are not 
given in nature, there are a number of ways to define and classify them. Wainwright et al. 
(2006a) describe variations in the ways in which SCR professionals describe embryos. 
Similarly, I find variety in how they classify, for example, embryonic stem cells. I then go on 
to analyse what these definitions do. I locate these definitions, for example, in the context of 
parliamentary debates and show that, by classifying stem cells according to scientistic 
criteria such as pluripotency, discussions about the origin of stem cells (aborted foetuses or 
embryos “left-over” from IVF) are fore-closed. This also reinforces the dominance of 
technical (rather than lived or embodied) forms of expertise in public fora. 
 
Thus, scientists’ discourses about their work, but also about what forms public engagement 
should take, enables certain types of citizens to have a valid place in discussions around 
science: these discourses perform certain types of “scientific citizenship” (see Irwin, 2001). 
By linking theses discourses with theories of democracy, I show that stem cell researchers 
can perform six different types of citizenship, including: engagement modelled on versions 
of liberal democracy, where citizenship involves consuming science, or being enrolled by 
scientists and lobbying for them; engagement modelled on deliberative democracy, where 
citizenship involves sharing and discussing “expert” knowledges; and engagement modelled 
on radical/plural democracy, where citizenship involves sharing multiple contextual 
knowledges and challenging “normalising” (Foucault, 1976) power structures. This typology 
could potentially be used to encourage interpretative reflexivity (see below). 
 
In summary, scientists’ discourses can do a number of things: they establish, promote or 
demote the epistemic authority of certain areas of SCR or science; they set up particular 
definitions as beyond negotiation (Van Dyck, 1995), thereby framing discussions about 
science (sometimes encouraging scientistic understandings, and also fore-closing or opening 
up discussions);  and they can change the material world (for example, by affecting funding 
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or the forms that engagement take). It is also important to note that an emphasis on what 
should count as a stem cell diverts attention from discussions about whether stem cells are 
what we want to be using in the first place. In other words, a focus on internal, small-scale 
debates puts out of view larger scale uncertainties about the role of science in society (see 
Star, 1985). Thus, boundary-work and other rhetorical strategies discussed here have 
implications beyond the narrow confines of technical claims and their authority; they shape 
engagement and the meaning and role of science itself. 
 
 
9.4 Scientists as publics 
This work has elaborated more fully than others the extent to which and ways in which 
scientists are publics. Taking seriously the deconstruction of the lay-expert dichotomy, it has 
used analytical tools from STS usually used to study scientists, in combination with tools 
from social theory and cPUS usually used to study lay people.  
 
Like Ehrich and her colleagues (2006; 2007), I look at the diversity in professionals’ views 
and understandings of their work (see also 9.3). In particular, similarly to publics, 
professionals express a number of concerns about SCR. Interestingly, many of these are 
articulated by drawing on similar motifs to the ones used by lay publics (such as the 
Frankenstein script or images from Boys from Brazil). This suggests that available cultural 
tropes are an essential way of making sense of complex science and the issues which are 
embedded within it. They are useful not only for lay publics (e.g. Mulkay, 1996) but also for 
professionals. Scientists, like publics, simplify existing science-fiction storylines to order the 
world and express themselves. The fact that they rarely use these cultural tropes to refer to 
their understandings in public fora (the examples drawn on here all come from interview 
data) should be explored (see below). 
  
Using the analytical lens of “expert systems” (Giddens, 1990), I make sense of the 
ambivalence expressed by professionals towards their work and their own role. In this way, I 
am specifically examining how professionals are also “lay”, as suggested by Giddens. Even 
though I have critiqued theories of modernisation for reifying expertise, I find this tool 
particularly useful in exploring the discourses of stem cell researchers. I undertake an in-
depth analysis of some of the many expert systems that stem cell researchers have to rely 
upon in order to go about their daily life and work. I develop the literature on trust and 
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modernity by combining this analysis of expert systems with a hermeneutic, rather than 
rational-calculative, conceptualisation of expressions of trust (unlike Giddens, 1990; Beck, 
1992; see a critique in Wynne, 1996b) and of mistrust (Wynne, 1996b; see a critique in 
Szerszynski, 1999). Thus, I analyse scientists’ discourses in the same way I would lay 
discourses, and I explore which concerns about expert systems are articulated under which 
circumstance. For instance, I find that in private settings, some stem cell researchers may 
reflect on past disappointments due to over-hyped promises, and may also raise a number of 
specific concerns they have about SCR and the way it is conducted and applied (in particular 
in relation to clinical trials, commercialisation and the globalisation of research).  
 
Concerns that are raised in private settings by stem cell researchers about particular aspects 
of their work and its location in society need to be explored; they can have an impact on 
future ways of doing public engagement (see below). Showing that these concerns can be 
discussed under certain circumstances suggests a role for social scientists to create spaces in 
other fora for such concerns to be raised. These concerns are also evidence of, and 
opportunities for further reflexivity, including interpretative reflexivity. This is an important 
aspect of the present research to which I now turn to. 
 
 
9.5 Spaces for reflexivity? 
This research provides a micro-level empirical investigation of broad claims about trust and 
reflexivity in modern society (e.g. Beck, 1992). It highlights the presence of professional 
ambivalence and examines the conditions which enable this ambivalence to be expressed. It 
also demonstrates that scientists can be reflexive about their practices, knowledge and 
cultural location. In many instances, stem cell researchers’ discourses do serve to shore up 
their professional authority (as Kerr and Cunningham-Burley find for new genetics 
professionals, 2000). Nevertheless, I find more evidence of, and opportunities for,  “reflexive 
modernization” and even interpretative reflexivity than other scholars, thus building on the 
limited empirical data in this area (e.g. Ehrich et al., 2006). Although this reflexivity is not a 
dominant feature of scientists’ discourses, its presence has important implications for 
science-public relations. 
  
This thesis’s analysis of trust in expert systems reveals opportunities for and examples of 
scientists’ self confrontation with the potential consequences of their work; that is, 
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“substantive reflexivity”. For example, some express concerns that research on humans 
might be approved based on results from animal experiments, when there can be a lack of 
correspondence between the two. This in turn can cause clinical trials to be dangerous for 
participants.  
 
Some expressions of mistrust or ambivalence are also accompanied by explicit reflections on 
the context of knowledge production and on the embedded (and potentially problematic) 
cultural-institutional body language. For instance, clinical trials can be led by people with 
high levels of capital (such as influence on ethics committees); this may lead to unsafe 
protocols being tested on humans; or informed consent may not sufficiently highlight the 
uncertainty of knowledge claims. Raising these sorts of concerns creates opportunities for 
change. 
 
Some scientists are also aware of the culturally and socially situated nature of their 
knowledge. For instance, stem cell researchers sometimes specifically highlight how social 
factors shape scientific claims (not only false claims), which contrasts with the more 
common discursive construct that “asymmetrically” accounts for “error” by only using the 
“contingent repertoire” for false claims, and the “empiricist repertoire” for true ones (see 
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). 
 
These expressions of concern are examples of reflexivity, as well as opportunities for further 
reflexivity. This reflexivity takes on a number of forms in these stem cell researchers’ 
discourses. It can be methodological reflexivity, where scientists reflect on the contexts of 
production of their own knowledge claims. It can also be substantive reflexivity, where 
further knowledge leads scientists to confront the unintended consequences of their work. 
Finally, it can be substantive reflexivity. In this case, an awareness of the arbitrariness of 
particular science-public interactions – such as a focus on certainty in informed consent 
settings – can be revealed and opened up to change. Following this, new ways of imagining 
and framing these interactions are put forward: for example, a scientist may choose to 
highlight the unpredictability of science to potential donors, even at the risk that they will 
then not consent to donate their material. The latter form of reflexivity is invoked, even at 
the risk of stopping some areas of science from going forward and of letting “non-technical” 
criteria be used to shape the future of research. 
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This reflexivity occurs not only in response to external critiques (cf. Wynne, 1996c) or to 
“sub-politics” (cf. Beck, 1992) – even though some examples of reflexivity come from 
talking to patients or becoming acquainted with social science critiques of the deficit model 
of public understanding of science. Some stem cell professionals attribute their reflexivity to 
their work putting them in contact with forms of knowledge that challenge their own 
understandings (for example, when people who work on embryonic stem cells visit fertility 
clinics and talk to colleagues who care for infertile people, and therefore have different ideas 
about the “value” of an embryo). This resembles Giddens’ version of “reflexivity”, which 
becomes intrinsic to the processes of science. However, this reflexivity is, in no way, 
automatic or inevitable. Indeed, my data also suggest that contact with other forms of 
knowledge can lead scientists to become less reflexive, less open to criticisms, and more 
protective of their authority (for example, when refusing to discuss the limitations of 
informed consent).  
 
Thus, there is evidence in stem cell researchers’ discourses of a reflexivity that breaks with a 
scientistic understanding of the world. However, this reflexivity can be very uncommon 
during interviews with some researchers, and is very rare in public fora.  The challenge for 
social scientists and others is to extend the opportunities for this reflexivity. 
 
Many of my informants say they cannot use certain forms of argument in certain fora. For 
example, they discuss the difficulty of using religious, ethical or emotionally-framed reasons 
for and against particular practices. They also rarely want to highlight the social contingency 
of their knowledge claims, even in private. Although these could be considered to be a 
discourses of “suffering” and performances of “authenticity” (see Brown and Michael, 
2002), it is interesting that they exist, and to explore in which circumstances they are 
deployed.  If reflections on the usually unacknowledged framings of scientific knowledge are 
made by scientists in the private context of the research interview, it might be useful for 
social scientists to highlight this discrepancy and make scientists reflect upon it. It would 
also be useful to think about what sorts of spaces could be created to enable scientists to be 
this reflexive (as discussed below). 
 
9.6 Reflexivity and the role of social scientists 
I see a practical and explicitly political role for social scientists in improving science-public 
relations: by facilitating interpretative reflexivity. This does not, however, entail setting 
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social scientists up as experts with authority over (natural) scientists. Rather, this entails 
transforming the framing of engagement and encouraging scientists to explore their 
assumptions. This, in turn, may lead to scientists taking on a different, perhaps more modest, 
role in public engagement. 
 
A number of roles for social scientists have been advocated by different people. Even within 
the field of SSK, various positions have been put forward (see the special issue in Social 
Studies of Science, 1996). For me, given the multiplicity and contingency of views, identities 
and knowledge claims, it is impossible to choose “sides”, let alone side with the underdog. It 
is also impossible to remain “neutral”, since any contribution to debates about science will 
influence and shape these (even if this is only at the micro-level, for example, influencing 
one person). In this, I follow Wynne (1996d) and believe that social scientists, in particular 
informed by SSK, can play an interesting role by problematising scientific knowledge and its 
role in society, and by encouraging scientists to reflect on this.  
 
I want to make the claim (which has political implications) that public engagement does not 
have to be the way that it is. To use Bourdieu’s language, but eschewing his realist 
commitments, I want to reveal the arbitrariness of the “structure of the field” of public 
engagement and create opportunities for changing the “rules of the game” in science-public 
relations. This can be done at two levels: at the level of individual scientists, by helping them 
acknowledge their embedded cultural assumptions (thus opening these up to change); and at 
the level of wider society, by building on scientists’ interpretative reflexivity and making it 
more widespread and visible. The main (socially located, open to criticism and change) 
assumption underlying this goal is that public engagement, if it is very scientistic and framed 
by problematic but un-acknowledged cultural assumptions, can be improved. This can be 
done by reflecting upon the uncertainty and contingency of knowledge claims and by 
changing the normalising forces (Foucault, 1976) that shape current engagement practices, in 
order to enable different voices to gain epistemic authority. 
 
More specifically, social scientists can show scientists that they too are publics, for example, 
that they too use science fiction imagery to make sense of SCR. This may encourage them to 
share their fears and concerns in terms that make sense to other members of the public. It 
may also encourage them to stop dismissing concerns expressed by publics using science 
fiction or other available cultural references. Social scientists can also highlight to scientists 
that, at times, they openly accept “contingent” rather than “empiricist” reasons for making 
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decisions or constructing knowledge claims. This highlights that contingent or socially 
constructed does not equate with falsehood, and may encourage scientists to be more modest 
about their knowledge claims and accept that (equally contingent) claims made by publics 
should not be dismissed out of hand. By showing them that even technical claims are social, 
and by suggesting alternative frameworks for engagement (ones that welcome the language 
of feelings and values, for example), social scientists may create situations where scientists 
find they can draw on other discourses and identities than the ones they have previously felt 
restricted to.  
 
Social scientists should also highlight the performativity of scientists’ discourses to them. In 
particular, we could show them, for example using the typology developed in chapter 8, that 
these discourses enable and disable different kinds of scientific citizenship. This can open up 
opportunities for yet other forms of engagement, or favour existing ones (which already tend 
towards respecting lay views, for example). For instance, if we demonstrate to scientists that 
during one interview, they switch between a model of engagement as an “internal dialogue 
with scientists as publics” and another as “constructive conversations”, we might encourage 
them to reflect upon why they sometimes dismiss and sometimes include forms of expertise 
other than their own. This has the potential to lead to more inclusion in public engagement.  
 
We should also challenge the idea that scientistic classifications are the “natural” way of 
thinking about the world, and we should challenge the idea that science is the “natural” 
frame for public engagement in science. As Mouffe (1992b; 1996) suggests, we need to 
fundamentally question the existing power relations that play out in public engagement, and 
for example, by bringing definitions back to the stage of negotiations (see Van Dyck, 1995), 
we can change the power hierarchies of who has a say in what. In addition, if we highlight 
that scientists are not the voices of rationality (without implying that they are merely 
emotional and political and therefore wrong), we can seek ways of accommodating 
avowedly socially and culturally embedded views in public engagement. If, on the contrary, 
we maintain the fantasy that scientific knowledge is free of influences and founding 
assumptions, we will end up ignoring particular forms of bias which may lead to worsened 
science-public relations, as was the case in New Zealand after the inquiry on Genetic 
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9.7 Improving science-public relations? 
There are a number of specific ways in which I think science-public relations could be 
improved through changes in the “body language of science” (Wynne, 2005a) and changes 
in public engagement with science and scientists’ engagement with publics.  
 
In particular, I think it would be useful to more frequently highlight the uncertainty of 
science in public fora and discourage the common narrative of “optimism to obstruction” 
(Brown and Michael, 2003). I also believe that discussions around science need to 
specifically address concerns that scientists raise in private, such as: the potential for women 
to be coerced into donating their eggs, the ownership of biological material, the difficulties 
(and perhaps impossibility) of obtaining true informed consent, the domination certain 
clinicians can exert over local ethics committees, the risks of tumour formation from stem 
cells and the likely prohibitive cost of any therapies derived from cloning technologies. This 
can be done by inviting scientists, talking at public events, to raise these issues themselves, 
or by presenting findings such as those from this thesis in public fora. 
 
I have argued above that the scientistic framing of public engagement needs to be 
challenged. One way social scientists can do this is by organising engagement events which 
cover topics that publics request (this can be determined during earlier focus groups 
discussions, for example). Also, it might be useful to organise events to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of stem cells, but rather than classifying these cells according 
to criteria such as pluripotency, they could be classified according to their origin: this would 
highlight rather than down-play the ethical and social issues raised by the use of stem cells 
from different sources (foetuses, embryos, cord blood etc.).  These events could also be fora 
to re-examine and question labels such as “therapeutic cloning” versus “somatic cell nuclear 
transfer”, and to explore the issues raised by choosing one definition over another. 
 
This research has also shown that some of the so-called “irrational” fears projected onto 
publics (by scientists and others) are also to be found in scientists’ accounts (for example, 
concerns about country leaders creating clones of themselves). These fears should not be 
dismissed as irrelevant, or responded to with supposedly unproblematic “facts”. Rather, they 
should be explored, since they can often be the expression of deep-seated and very relevant 
anxieties. We must acknowledge that concerns, decisions or arguments do not have to be 
 
Chapter 9 – Conclusions  247 
cast as “rational” in order to be legitimate, and publics and scientists have a shared status as 
rightful citizens.  
 
Similarly, many of the public “misunderstandings” are present in scientists’ accounts (such 
as ambiguities about how old the field of SCR “really” is). Rather than dismissing all these 
as wrong, and looking for the definitive account of SCR, we should acknowledge that these 
different stories can co-exist. It is also interesting to reflect upon why people draw on 
particular definitions, what concerns or promises they want to highlight by using these 
definitions, or what boundaries they want to erect. 
 
Importantly, in order to encourage scientists to express their private concerns in public, or to 
move away from their language of rationality and certainty, there need to be changes to 
public engagement environments. In particular, it might be advantageous to set up 
discussions in less adversarial and polarised ways. This can be achieved by encouraging 
participants to explore their commonalities, rather than focussing on their disagreements (for 
example, by imagining futures they would all agree with). It is also important, in any 
science-public interaction, to highlight to participants that all views should be respected. 
This can be facilitated by holding discussions in small settings (as was done here in the 
multi-disciplinary discussions), but is also possible in larger events (which might begin with 
small round-table discussions, and then might increase in scale). Another way of 
encouraging scientists to change their public discourses is to build relationships with them: 
participate in their meetings and offer social scientific knowledge there, and invite them to 
other events where they are welcomed.  
 
In response to the Royal Society’s concern about a “crisis of trust”, I would suggest, in 
keeping with Wynne (2006), that there is no way to instrumentally make people trust 
science. Nevertheless, an interpretative form of reflexivity on the part of scientists and their 
institutions is an important means by which they can seek to be more trustworthy. If 
scientists accept the limits of their knowledge and stop making illegitimate claims that 
alienate publics who disagree with the founding assumptions of these claims, science can be 
given a more legitimate and modest role in society. This may in turn reduce further public 
alienation. However, I do not want to suggest yet another easy fix to yet another deficit (cf. 
Wynne, 2006): this is not a case of solving the deficit of public trust caused by a deficit in 
scientists’ reflexivity simply by telling scientists their knowledge is socially constructed. 
Rather, working to improve science-public relations will take a long-term commitment by 
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social scientists, scientists and others to come together and explore, question, reflect upon 
and share their embedded assumptions about knowledge, the place of science in society and 
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Appendix 1: Stem cell definitions 
 
Here are a few definitions to help navigate my thesis. In keeping with my theoretical 
commitments, these are to be taken as a guide only, all the terms used tend to be constructed 
differently by different researchers in different circumstances. 
 
  
Adult stem cells: Stem cells that can be found in adults, for example haematopoietic (blood) 
stem cells. This label can also describe cells found in cord blood and in foetuses. These cells 
usually differentiate into a restricted range of cell types (such as the different skin cells), but 
some adult cells seem to give rise to many different cell types (such as neural stem cells 
giving rise to haematopoietic cell types, or apparently multipotent haematopoietic cells). 
Autologous therapy: Therapy that helps a particular patient by using their own tissue or 
cells. 
Blastocyst: Early stage embryo. 
Cloning: (in biology) To create a genetically identical copy. There are different types of 
cloning: cloning plants from cuttings, cloning individual genes or particular DNA segments, 
cloning cells or cloning whole organisms. 
Differentiation: Process by which cells divide and specialise in to evermore specialised cell 
types. 
Embryo: Fertilised egg that has started dividing but has not yet given rise to fully developed 
organs. The earliest stages can also be called pre-embryonic. In humans, the label can be 
used to describe the first 8 weeks, 10 weeks or 3 months of development. Some sources also 
use it to describe all the stages until implantation in the uterus or birth. 
Embryonic germ cells: Cells that have been derived from primordial germ cells (for more 
details, see chapter 7). 
Embryonic stem cells (ES cells): Cells derived from an embryo that is a few days old. The 
embryos can be derived from in vitro fertilization or somatic cell nuclear transfer. 
Foetus: Usually describes the stages of development following embryonic stages.  
Germ cells: Gametes; sperm in human males, oocytes in human females. Contain one set of 
chromosomes. 
Germ layers: Tissues found in the three germ layers (endoderm, mesoderm and ectoderm) 
are the precursors of all the tissues of the adult organism. 
Gonadal ridge: Precursor to gonads (testes and ovaries in humans). 
Haematopoietic stem cells: Stem cells of the blood system. 
Inner cell mass: Group of cells inside the embryo (at blastocyst stage) from which ES cells 
are derived. 
Multipotent stem cells: Stem cells that can give rise to many cell types. 
Nucleus (of a cell): Contains most of the genetic material necessary to build a whole 
organism. It is packaged up into chromosomes (the rest of the genetic material is present in 
small organelles: mitochondria). 
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Oocyte: Female gamete; unfertilised egg cell. Contains one set of chromosomes. 
Plasticity (developmental -): characteristic of a specialised cell that can give rise to a 
specialised cell of a different tissue.  
Pluripotent stem cells: Stem cells that can give rise to all (or most) cell types in the body. 
Primordial germ cells: Cells that can mature into germ cells. Contain two sets of 
chromosomes.  
Reproductive cloning: somatic cell nuclear transfer followed by the implantation of the 
resulting embryo into a female. Can result in the birth of offspring with the same nuclear 
DNA as the donor.  
Somatic cell: Cell that is not a gamete. Contains two sets of chromosomes 
Somatic cell nuclear transfer, SCNT (or cell nuclear transfer, CNR): to take a nucleus 
from a somatic cell and place it in an enucleated oocyte. In some cases, the resulting cell can 
be made to start dividing and give rise to an embryo with the same nuclear DNA as that of 
the somatic cell donor. 
Stem cells: cells that can self-renew and give rise, by differentiation, to various cell-types. 
Teratoma: Tumour that usually contains a variety of cell types (adj. teratogenic: ability to 
give rise to teratomas) 
Therapeutic cloning: often used interchangeably with SCNT. Involves taking the nucleus of 
a somatic cell from a patient, placing it in an enucleated oocyte, prompting cell division to 
start and continue till blastocyst stage, removing the inner cell mass and culturing it. The aim 
in humans would be to be able to obtain cell lines (ES cells) that could be used to treat the 
patient that initially gave the somatic cell. One blastocyst has been obtained in this way by a 
group in Newcastle, but no human ES cell lines have yet been obtained in this way (although 
this is what a Korean group claimed to have done). 
Trans-differentiation: Ability of cells which are already committed to becoming cells from 
a particular tissue to, instead, become cells from a different tissue (e.g. haematopoietic cells 
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Stem cells, Scientists and Publics: Generating a Dialogue 
A multidisciplinary discussion 
  
Strands for the discussion: 
Substantive discussion: 
- How and when the aims and details of current and future work should/could be 
discussed publicly 
- How and to what extent legislators should enter into dialogue 
- How and at what stage of scientific development legislation should be 
considered  
- Whether there are any topics where some or all groups should not be involved 
- Under what circumstances areas of laboratory-based scientific enquiry might be 
vetoed by society and what happens in this case 
- The impact legislation has on scientific practices  
- How, if at all, the translation from lab to clinic should take place 
 
Establishing Dialogue 
- The reasons for open discussion of aims, plans and progress in science and 
medicine  
- How scientists can better learn from/listen to publics  
- Which engagement practices could best be used in the stem cell debate 
- What avenues of communication are most effective or problematic 
- How lay-expertise can impact on research practices 
- How, when and where a broad spectrum of publics can be engaged 
- Whether the outcome of discussions should end in consensus or whether more 
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Appendix 3: Background information provided to participants 
 
 
Scientists’ Understandings of Publics and Engagement 
Practices; Stem Cell Research in the UK and Australia 
 




I came to this PhD through training as a geneticist to post-graduate level, work experience in 
Australia, as well as an interest in stem cell research and the interactions between scientists 
and members of the public. 
 
2003-  MRC Human Genetics Unit and INNOGEN, the ESRC Centre for Social and 
Economic Research on Innovation in Genomics, University of Edinburgh, UK 
 PhD 
 Supervisors: Prof. Veronica van Heyningen (MRC HGU) and Dr. Sarah Parry 
(Sociology/RCSS/INNOGEN) 
   
2002-2003: MRC Human Genetics Unit, University of Edinburgh, UK  
Masters by Research in Life Sciences             Awarded with Distinction 
 
2001-2002: Royal Children’s Foundation, Royal Brisbane Hospital and Queensland Health 
Pathology and Scientific Services, Brisbane, Australia 
 Research assistant and scientist 
 
1998-2001: St Catharine’s College, University of Cambridge, UK 




The research project and its background: 
 
Brief literature review: 
 
Social scientists have shown that changes in modern society -such as globalisation, 
commercialisation or the visibility of scientific disputes- can have strong impacts on trust 
between members of the public and the scientific community. Various institutions have tried 
to address this ‘crisis of trust’ by providing more information about science. 
 
However, studies of the ‘public understanding of science’ have shown that ‘understanding’ 
science is much more multifaceted than the assimilation of facts and that it depends widely 
on other social and cultural factors. Thus simply ‘educating’ lay-people is not the way to 
improving science-public relations.  
 
In addition, the notion that only knowledge derived from controlled laboratory experiments 
can be used for science policy has been put into question. Indeed, various studies show that 
alternative forms of knowledge, such as that derived from living with an illness, are 
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important too. It has thus been suggested that more inclusive dialogues between scientists, 
policy-makers, stake-holders and others members of the public could lead to better decision-
making around science. 
 
Although the ways in which publics interact with science and scientists has been widely 
investigated, the ways in which scientists view and interact with various members of the 




Aims and objectives: 
 
Overall objective:  
Provide insights into engagement practices and science-public relations in order to help 
improve dialogues between science and publics, particularly in the case of stem cell research 
(SCR). 
 
Main research question:  
What are scientists’ views, understandings and experiences of publics, engagement, as well 
as SCR and the issues surrounding it? 
 
Some points of interest: 
What are the issues in SCR? 
How could these better be discussed in public? 
How could different forms of knowledge play a role in shaping the future directions of SCR? 





My overall strategy is to investigate SCR scientists’ accounts in different settings.  
 
Comparing the UK and Australia: 
 
I am talking to various researchers in the UK and Australia. The idea is not to perform a 
systematic comparison between the two countries. In this sense, I am not speaking to 
‘equivalent’ people (same gender, level of seniority, media experience and research topic) in 
the two countries, in order to uncover the precise factor that creates a difference in opinion. I 
am instead looking at a variety of researchers, in a variety of settings to see what differences 
and similarities arise.  
 
I am doing an international comparison as I think it is interesting to look at the role different 
legislations play as well as the impact of different histories in science-public relations. I 
chose Australia because it has a strong research agenda in SCR and, although it is similar to 
the UK culturally, the regulations concerning the use of embryos in research are different. I 
thought this would provide interesting contrasts. In addition, I have access and contacts in 
Australia which should facilitate the research process. 
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Interviews: 
I am interviewing junior and senior SCR scientists, working on adult and embryonic stem 
cells, in Brisbane and Melbourne. I am also interested in speaking to scientists from other 
fields who have been active in the promotion or criticism of SCR. I am aiming to speak to 
15-25 scientists. Some of the topics I would like to discuss are the issues they see in SCR, 
their experience of interacting with members of the public and their views on some social 
science findings. 
 
Focussed group discussions: 
I plan to conduct 2 group discussions in Australia. The groups will be composed of peers (I 
hope to do one focus group with researchers at the beginning of their career and one with 
more senior researchers). These interviews aim either to investigate particular experiences of 
engagement or generate thoughts around SCR controversial issues or social science findings. 
Follow-up: 
Subsequent to the focus groups, I hope to briefly speak with the participants in order to 
obtain their reflections on the process. 
 
Observational research: 
If the opportunity arises, I would like to observe SCR scientists in the process of interacting 
with public groups. This could include presenting evidence to policy-makers, talking to 
venture capitalists or funding agencies, speaking in schools, giving press conferences or 





I have already organised a group discussion between senior natural and social scientists to 
talk about particular issues pertaining to SCR and also about how people with different types 
of expertise can interact. 
 
On my return, I plan to conduct another similar group discussion, this time involving more 
people. 
 
I also plan to do interviews (I have already conducted a few), focus groups and observational 





Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
With the permission of the participants, I audio-record the interviews and group discussions. 
If this is acceptable, I transcribe them in full and code the names to indicate information such 
as country of residence, level of seniority, type of research and gender. I will be the only 
person to have access to the full transcript which will be stored on a computer, accessible 
only by password, but other researchers involved in the project will be shown extracts.  
 
If the participants do not wish to be audio-recorded, I ask their permission to take notes, 
which I write up after the interview, and code in the same way I would a transcript.  
 
Upon request from the participants, I can send a copy of the transcript from which they may 
remove anything they do not wish to appear. 
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I may use quotes from individual interviews and group discussions in my thesis. The name 
of the research participants will nowhere appear in my thesis and the quotes will only be 
attributed by code (see above).  
 
I must however highlight the fact that the stem cell community is not very large, and there is 
a small risk that someone may recognise a quote as originating from a particular person. The 
precautions I am taking will reduce this risk, but I cannot guarantee full anonymity.  
 
If the participants decide at any time during the interview or in the 6 months subsequent to it 
that they no longer wish to take part in the research, they are free to end their participation 
without stating a reason. The transcripts and recordings would then be erased and not 
included in the study. 
 
If the participants indicate an interest, I would be happy to send them a summary of my 
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Mobile (temporary until 13/03/05): +61 4 0512 9701 
 
Prof Veronica van Heyningen: 
E-mail: v.vanheyningen@hgu.mrc.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 131 467 8405   direct 
  +44 131 332 2471 x2217 via switchboard 
Fax: +44 131 467 8456 
Mobile: +44 7740 965 986 
 
Dr Sarah Parry: 
E-mail: Sarah.Parry@ed.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 131 650 6395  
Fax: +44 131 650 6399 
 
 
  275 
Appendix 4: Research consent form 
 
 
Scientists’ Understandings of Publics and Engagement Practices; Stem Cell 
Research in the UK and Australia 
 
 
Investigator:  Nicola Marks  
Contact:  nicola.marks@hgu.mrc.ac.uk 
 
 
MRC Human Genetics Unit 
Western General Hospital 
Edinburgh EH4 2XU, UK 
 
INNOGEN, ESRC Centre for Social and Economic 
Research on Innovation in Genomics  
The University of Edinburgh, High School Yards 




I have been given information about the project and I agree to participate in it. I understand that: 
 
• I will be asked to take part in an interview 
• My permission will be sought to audio-record the interview and that the recording will be 
transcribed in full and my identity will be coded in a manner that renders the transcripts 
anonymous 
• I can refuse to be audio-recorded and that in this case the interviewer will take notes that will 
be anonymised in the same manner as the transcripts 
• The information I provide for the interview will be treated confidentially 
• The interviewer will be the only person to have access to the full transcripts and that 
information may only be shared with research staff directly involved in the project, such as 
the interviewer’s supervisors 
• The data will be stored securely 
• My participation is voluntary and I can stop the recording and/or the interview at any time 
without penalty and without giving a reason 
• I can ask for my data to be removed from the project at any time within 6 months of the 
interview taking place 
• I can request a copy of the transcript and I can ask for it to be amended 
• I can ask for a summary of the findings 
 
Please tick as appropriate: 
 
 I give my permission for the information I give to be used for research purposes (including 
research publications and reports) with preservation of anonymity through coding of my 
name 
 I give my permission for the interview to be audio-recorded   
 I request a copy of the transcript     
 I request a summary of the findings     
 
 
PLEASE PRINT YOUR NAME:         
SIGNED:       DATE:      
RESEARCHER’S NAME:         
SIGNED:       DATE:      
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